STUDIES IN IQBAL'S THOUGHT AND ART

Edited by

M. SAEED SHEIKH

BAZM-I IQBAL

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(Select Articles from the Quarterly "Iqbal")

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BAZM-I IQBAL
CLUB ROAD, LAHORE—3

April 1972, 1100 Copies

Printed by
Muhammad Zarreen Khan
at the
ZARREEN ART PRESS
61 Railway Road, Lahore

Published by
Dr M. Jahangir Khan
Secretary: Bazm - i Iqbāl
Club Road, Lahore

To the Memory of
The Late Professor M. M. Sharif
Editor of the Quarterly "Iqbāl"
(1952—1965)

FOREWORD

Iqbāl, the bilingual journal of the Bazm-i Iqbāl, Lahore, is unique in being the first of its kind, It has, for the last twenty years, induced scholars all over the world to contribute research studies on Iqbāl and on all those branches of learning in which he was deeply interested : Islamics, Philosophy, History, Sociology, Comparative Religion, Literature, Art, etc. Members of the Bazm-i Iqbāl felt that it would be a useful project if selections of the more important of these studies in Urdu and English were printed in separate volumes and made available to those who, for one reason or the other, could not find easy access to all the back numbers of the journal. Selected studies on Iqbāl in Urdu have already been published by the Bazm-i Iqbāl under the title : *Muṭāl'ah-i Iqbāl.*

Happily it became possible to entrust the compilation of the present volume as well as the one to follow entitled *Studies in Islamic Thought* to Mr M. Saeed Sheikh, Senior Professor and Head of the Department of Philosophy, Government College, Lahore. He was just the right person to have undertaken this kind of work. Professor Saeed Sheikh, among his other teaching assignments, has been lecturing on Iqbāl's Philosophy for the last twenty years or so. He has contributed a large number of articles to the quarterly *Iqbāl*, and has acted as its Editor for some years. As a writer and a specialist in Muslim Philosophy he assisted the late Professor M. M. Sharif also in editing the monumental two-volume *History of Muslim Philosophy*.

I am glad to state that Professor Saeed Sheikh has applied

himself to the present work with meticulous editorial care. He has carefully read and retouched the articles selected for this volume, has checked all the quoted prose passages and verses, and has supplied the footnotes. He has also transliterated all the Urdu, Persian and Arabic words, for the benefit particularly of the Western scholars.

I am confident that *Studies in Iqbāl's Thought and Art* will be received as a welcome addition to literature on Iqbāl. The twenty-five articles included in this volume present a scholarly exposition of Iqbāl's views on a wide range of subjects. It is hoped that this collection will be of interest not only to the specialist but to the general reader as well. It should have a special appeal to teachers and students of colleges and universities where the study of Iqbāl's thought and art forms part of the prescribed curricula. I wish that these studies may bring Iqbāl's message home to our younger generation of scholars.

M. Jahangir Khan
(Secretary, Bazm-i Iqbāl)

Lahore :
21 April 1972

PREFACE

The quarterly *Iqbāl*, official organ of the Bazm-i Iqbāl, Lahore, published alternately in English and Urdu since July 1952, has done all these years a singular service in promoting research studies on Iqbāl, undoubtedly the greatest poet-philosopher of the modern Muslim world.

The present volume is a collection of twenty-five articles selected from the English issues of *Iqbāl* from July 1952 to July 1971—some of the earlier of these issues are now hard to find. These articles have been so arranged as to keep those having greater affinity of subject matter as close to each other as possible. Together they examine and expound the various aspects of Iqbāl's thought and art.

All the quoted prose passages and verses, the latter alone numbering one thousand or so, have been carefully checked and referred to in the footnotes, mostly worked out for this volume—a task which took more time than I thought it would. Three asterisks placed in between the Urdu or Persian verses, as well as in their English translation where so given, denote a break in the continuity of the verses, while four such asterisks indicate a reference to some new poem or work as given in the related footnote. A standardised system of transliteration has been employed for titles, names and technical terms in Urdu, Persian and Arabic. Disparity in capitalisation and punctuation, as well as in the form of supplying quotations and footnotes, has been kept as much within bounds as possible. Though I had the privilege of closely reading the articles selected for this volume

and giving them editorial touches here and there, it has not been possible to achieve any uniformity of language and style, or coherence in the learned contributors' different viewpoints and somewhat varying interpretations of Iqbāl. The variety of viewpoints and interpretations has perhaps brought an added richness to this volume.

It is hoped that *Studies in Iqbāl's Thought and Art* will be well received by all lovers and scholars of Iqbāl and that it will further stimulate the study of Iqbāl's works. It is further expected to make a special appeal, and be useful, to young scholars, more particularly to University students engaged in the study of Philosophy, Islamics, Political Science, Literature, etc.—it is for them that this work has been primarily designed.

I must acknowledge my indebtedness to Mr B. A. Dar, ex-Director, Iqbāl Academy, Karachi, for his critical comments on some parts of Mr J. B. Prior's article : "Iqbāl's View of 'Islamic Nationalism' in *Jāvīd Nāmah*", thus calling my attention to certain editorial excisions and revisions in that article. I am equally grateful to Professor Muhammad Munawwar of Government College, Lahore, for his help in working out certain editorial problems connected with some of Iqbāl's verses quoted by the learned contributors. I also wish to express my thanks to Mr M. Ashraf Darr, Administrative Officer and Secretary, Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore, for his expert advice to the printers in the matter of observing certain niceties of their art. To Dr M. Jahangir Khan, Secretary, Bazm-i Iqbāl, Lahore, I am specially indebted for his personal encouragement, keen and sustained interest in the present work, and for his willingness to write a Foreword to it.

M. S. S.

Lahore :
22 November 1971

CONTENTS

Dr L. S. May

IQBAL AND HIS PHILOSOPHY

What can I do? My nature is averse to rest,
My heart is impatient like breeze in the poppy field.
From the spark to the star, from the star to the sun
    is my quest.
I have no desire for a goal ; for me, rest spells death!
With an impatient eye and a hopeful heart,
I seek for the end of that which is endless.[1]

I

Muḥammad Iqbāl (1873—1938) was born at Sialkot (West Pakistan) on February 22, 1873, over a year after Sayyid Aḥmad Khān had

1. *Payām-i Mashriq*, pp. 148-9 :

چہ کنم کہ فطرتِ من بہ مقام در نسازد
دل نا صبور دارم چو صبا بہ لالہ زارے

* * *

ز شرر ستارہ جویم ز ستارہ آفتابے
سر منزلے ندارم کہ بمیرم از قرارے

* * *

طلبم نہائتِ آں کہ نہائتے ندارد
بہ نگاہِ نا شکیبے بہ دلِ امید وارے

founded the Anglo-Oriental College (later known as the Aligarh Muslim University) in the attempt to revitalise the Islamic community in India. This community, after a brilliant era of government (culminating in the Mughul Empire) on the Subcontinent, fell into decadence during British rule. The most important reasons for this situation were: (1) British accusation of the Indian Muslims of having been the instigators of the War of Independence known as Mutiny (1857); (2) Muslims' abstinence from all that was foreign and un-Islamic.

In truth, the British seemed to be more sympathetic towards the Hindus who attended the British educational institutions on the Subcontinent, which enabled them to apply for and fill the lower Government posts.[2] Increasingly, under British rule, education meant the opportunity to enter into British Government service; that is to say, it became a means to an economic end. The Indian Muslims, on the other hand, did not relish the thought of sending their children to secular educational institutions where the curriculum, taught no longer in Persian but in English,[3] did not include instruction in Islamic principles. As a result, the subsequent Muslim generations in India could not qualify for British Government service. The consequences were disastrous for the Indo-Muslim community whose members[4] (*a*) lost all on the economic plane; and (*b*) suffered social degradation. This was partly the fault of the British, partly the result of their own aloofness.[5] Its vitality and wealth gone, the impoverished Indo-Islamic community sank deeper and deeper into apathy.[6]

As the years passed by, the degraded Indian Muslim masses commenced to arouse the pity of the few Indian Muslims who could under-

2. The higher positions were reserved for the British.

3. Macaulay's Minutes of 1834.

4. The princes both Hindu and Muslim, who signed treaties with the British, which meant, in fact, their co-operation with the latter, retained their wealth.

5. It may be noted that the centres of administration and education, Madras, Bombay and Calcutta, lay far from Lucknow and Delhi, the Muslim centres of learning.

6. For a description of the plight of the Indo-Muslim community, see W.W. Hunter, *Our Indian Mussalmans*, Trubner & Co., London, 1871. Hunter points out that even those who qualified were ignored or discouraged.

stand their plight. One of the men most responsible for the reawakening of the Indian Muslims was Sayyid Aḥmad Khān (1817-1898). It was he who not only realised that the Muslims of India should once again take part in all spheres of life, but who also started a concrete programme which would have the desired results. For this purpose, he founded (in 1875) the Muḥammadan Anglo-Oriental College (subsequently known as Aligarh University) where teaching in the English language of a Western type of curriculum became allied with the instruction in Islamics. It was he, furthermore, who as a firm pro-Britisher urged the Indian Muslims to abandon their anti-British attitude, and played his role in urging upon the British a reversal of their hostile attitude towards the Muslims of India. He was successful to the extent that the Indian Muslims now had a chance to obtain a "modern" education which would enable them, eventually, to enter once again fully into the economic and political life of their country.

As a nationalist, Sayyid Aḥmad firmly believed in Hindu-Muslim unity. However, in his later years, he had to concede that this unity had been shattered. It is an historical fact that the British took advantage of the existing situation known as communalism—the co-existence of a huge majority (Hindus) and a large minority group (Muslims), each with its distinct approach to life dictated by its faith, in one geographical area. While dissatisfaction among these two groups did arise, on the whole it can be said that, especially during the Mughul period, harmony prevailed. British policy of "divide and rule", of playing out one group against the other, of drying up the sources of income which the Muslims of India had enjoyed for centuries while allowing the Hindus to advance themselves, could not but produce ugly consequences. There were Hindu-Muslim rivalry and bloody Hindu-Muslim riots which were quelled with a strong hand. When the British finally did turn their attention to the so far neglected Indian-Muslim community, the gap between it and the Hindu society had been cut too deeply ever again to be healed. For these reasons, it grew progressively clearer, especially to the educated Indian Muslims including Sayyid Aḥmad, that India did no longer constitue "one

nation".[7] The political aspirations of the two communities, the one Hindu (in the majority), the other Muslim (in the minority), had become irreconcilable.

It was in this atmosphere of British hostility and an attempt at a *rapprochement* between the British and the Indian Muslims, Indo-Islamic passivity and the call back to action, that Iqbāl was born.

He was put on the stage of life at a crucial point and was assigned to play a termendous and meaningful role in exhorting his Muslim brethren in India to dynamic activity—meaningful because it was the message of the Qur'ān which, furthermore, lays down the precepts to be followed—and pointing out to them the path that would and ultimately did lead them to freedom.

II

Iqbāl was educated at the Government College, Lahore, where he received his Master of Arts Degree in Philosophy (in 1899). At this early stage of his life, he manifested the tendencies of a fine, lyrical poet endowed with fervid imagination. In 1905 he went to study at Cambridge (England) where he chose to specialise in Philosophy and Persian. At Munich (Germany) he obtained the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy (in 1908) upon his presentation of a thesis on *The Development of Metaphysics in Persia*. He returned to London where he became a Barrister-at-Law; towards the end of 1908 he came back to Lahore where, after teaching in his old College for two years, he "set up a Barrister's practice".[8]

7. Cf. Sayyid Aḥmad Khān's speeches before the Indian National Cogress (founded in 1885) during its sessions at Lucknow and Meerut (1887 to 1888). They reveal his fear of Hindu majority rule which would endanger the (survival of the) Indo-Muslim community as a distinct cultural group. He deplored the situation but saw no way out. In 1889 he founded the Upper India Mohammedan Defence Association. He finally stated clearly that he favoured communal rather than joint electorates. This was the "visible point of no return", the concrete political starting point of a course of events leading ultimately to the creation of Pakistan.

The British also referred to India as "two nations". They did not, however, fully understood the depth of the cultural differences between the Muslims and the Hindus.

8. Wilfred Cantwell Smith, *Modern Islam in India*, London, Victor Gollancz, 1946, p. 102.

In India, he witnessed the growing friction between the Hindus and the Muslims. Like other spiritual and political leaders of the Indo-Muslim community, he also felt the urgent need for some programme that would ensure the political safety, and promote the economic and social welfare as well as religious and cultural freedom of that community. He took an active part in political activities, though he was not a politician *per se*. His political approach was anti-imperialistic and pan-Islamic. During the First World War, he passionately defended Islam and Turkey, while he ardently denounced Great Britain.

He was chosen as President of the Muslim League[9] in 1926. In his address delivered at its annual meeting at Allahabad (1930),[10] he said in part:

I would like to see the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state. Self-government within the British Empire or without the British Empire; the formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim State appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims, at least of North-West India.[11]

This statement, made ten years prior to the adoption of a concrete political programme by the Muslim League,[12] clearly implies the poet's vision of a Muslim State on the Subcontinent. No one, including perhaps Iqbāl himself, took it seriously; it was regarded more as the dream of a poet. Yet, future events were to give shape and reality to the dream.

9. Founded in 1906 as a counterpart to the Indian National Congress with the purpose of representing in a forceful manner the political aspirations of the Muslim community in India.

10. Each year the Muslim League met in a different city.

11. Symonds, Richard, *The Making of Pakistan*, Faber and Faber, London, 1950. Whether this idea was first advanced by Raḥmat ʻAlī or Iqbāl is of much less importance than the fact that it was conceived and given expression and soon gained popularity.

12. League policy remained somewhat vague until 1938, when its reorganisation was undertaken. With the adoption of the Pakistan Resolution in 1940, the Muslim League began a vigorous campaign for the creation of a separate Muslim State to be carved out of the Indian Subcontinent and to consist of Muslim majority areas.

Iqbāl accepted the invitation to attend the Round Table Conferences which were held in London in 1930-1932 [13] for the purpose of examining political reforms in the governing of India.[14] After the close of the last of these Conferences, Iqbāl returned to India and advised his Indo-Muslim countrymen to trust solely their own people. Henceforth he lived a quite life in Lahore.

A few years later, on April 21, 1938, after having contributed a priceless share to the betterment of not solely the Indian Muslims, not solely the Muslims, but of all men, Iqbāl died. If, contrary to Sayyid Aḥmad, Iqbāl (who had also been knighted[15] by the British) did not agree with British policy and went so far as to show hostility towards the foreign rulers of India, he did continue the work commenced by Sayyid Aḥmad in the sense of raising the Indo-Muslim community out of despair by infusing it with strength, and teaching it that it can and must play its role in the secular domain, for which it is not necessary to give up the Islamic heritage. Iqbāl (like Sayyid Aḥmad Khān) also favoured communal electorates and was opposed to Muslims' participation in the Congress.

Through his poetry, Iqbāl reached the masses; through his sophisticated prose writings, he communed with the learned; and in both forms he gave expression to his philosophy of God and man. If he was an Indian, he was also a Muslim in that he looked beyond the frontiers of India;[16] if he presented conservative ideas, he was also a progressive and, from an extreme orthodox Muslim viewpoint, a revolutionary.[17] Above all, he was a humanitarian and an idealist. He was an inspirer of

13. The first Conference was held on November 12, 1930 the second on September 7, 1931; the third and final one lasted from November 17 to December 24, 1932.

14. Symonds, op. cit., pp. 52 ff.; T. W. Wallbank, *India in the New Era*, Scott, Foresman & Co., U.S.A., 1951 (Consult the "Index" for the discussion of each of the three Conferences).

15. In 1922.

16. The charge is often made that the Indian Muslims were more interested in the happenings in other Muslim lands than in India. This is however, in line with the spirit of Islam, which teaches that all its believers constitute one brotherhood.

17. See below, Iqbāl's conception of *Millat*.

politics rather than a politician, which makes him supremely important in the movement for political independence of the Indo-Muslim community. The appeal which Iqbāl made through his poetry to the Indian Muslims had far-reaching political effects. It was the poet's vision that stirred up the ferment which was to be "exploited" by practical political-minded persons.

Among these, by far the most important was the late Muḥammad 'Alī Jinnāḥ (1876-1948) who, like Iqbāl, had been President of the League (in 1916) and had attended the Round Table Conferences in London. Iqbāl and Jinnāḥ were in constant correspondence with each other and the latter's gradual change of attitude towards a "communalist" opproach was, at least in part, due to Iqbāl's influence. The poet's vision and its nebulous expression was ultimately translated—after much pondering—into a bold political programme by the political craftsman. In 1940, two years after Iqbāl's death, Jinnāḥ said: "No power on earth can prevent Pakistan." History can attest to the truth of that statement. The Muslim League adopted it as its platform in February 1940, during its session at Lahore. The Indian press designated it as the "Pakistan Resolution". Seven years later, on August 14, 1947, Pakistan was proclaimed officially as an independent sovereign State. Its first Governor-General was Muḥammad 'Alī Jinnāḥ, the Qā'id-i 'Āẓam, the "Father of the Nation".

It is the mysterious force of history that brought the poet and the politician together at a time that circumstances ripened for this boldest of human efforts and achievements. The poet pointed the way. In the long chain of causes and effects in history—in this context, Indian histroy—the path was to lead to freedom, to self-expression. In Indian Islam, at least, this self-expression implied an independent free State where the Muslim way of life would be adhered to, would, so to speak, be the life of the nation, and where Islamic culture would bloom and flourish. Iqbāl who not only aroused the Indo-Muslim community into active restlessness, but gave its members a sense of direction based essentially on their own heritage, and Jinnāḥ, the practical politician who rallied them to the cause of freedom, are the Lincoln and Washington of the free and sovereign Islamic Republic of Pakistan,

whose citizens annually commemorate them in solemn ceremonies.

III

The most coherent statement of Iqbāl's philosophy is found in his *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam.*[18]

Iqbāl commences this work with an analysis of religious experience. The philosophical content of such experience is pure duration. The author refutes the concept of a fixed universe, replacing it with an ever expanding "free creative movement". He then proceeds to a discussion of the concept of God, developing in this connection his interpretation of the Fall of man as narrated in the Qur'ān,[19] and of the immortality and freedom of man. The legend of man's Fall purports "to indicate man's rise from a primitive state of instinctive appetite to the conscious possession of a free self, capable of doubt and disobedience."[20] Iqbāl then continues to explore man's freedom of action and his immortality. "Man's first act of disobedience was also his first act of free choice."[21] Somewhat further he writes that man's individuality is not destroyed after death. However, "personal immorality . . . is not ours as of right ; it is to be achieved by personal effort."[22]

In the chapter on "The Spirit of Muslim Culture" (chapter V), Iqbāl emphasises that Muslim culture "fixes its gaze" on the finite, the concrete, which is characteristic of the Qur'ān and with which knowledge begins; that there are two main ideas which "both form the foundation of the Qur'ānic teaching" : (1) "The unity of human origin",[23] and (2) "A keen sense of the reality of time, and the concept of life as a continuous movement in time."[24]

18. Delivered by Iqbāl in English in 1928-1929 under the title *Six Lectures on the Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam.* They were edited a second time in 1934 under the title: *The Reconstruction of Religious Thoughts in Islam* with an additional chapter : "Is Religion Possible ?" (The references in the present article are to the edition published in 1954).

19. Chapter IV : "The Conception of God and the Meaning of Prayer", pp. 82 ff.

20. Ibid., p. 85.

21. Ibid., p. 86.

22. Ibid., p. 119.

23. Ibid., p. 140.

24. Ibid., p. 141.

In the following chapter, he explains the "Principle of Movement" in the "Structure of Islam" in terms of *Ijtihād*, *Ijmā'*, etc.

In the last chapter of the *Reconstruction*, raising the question whether religion is possible, Iqbāl denounces passivity, affirms that there are religious processes whose ultimate aim is identical with the final object of scientific processes, though both employ different methods. The ultimate purpose is to experience the universe in a completely objective manner. "This final experience is the revelation of a new life-process—original, essential, spontaneous."[25] Towards the end of this last chapter, Iqbāl writes : "The final act is not an intellectual act, but a vital act which deepens the whole being of the ego, and sharpens his will with the creative assurance that the world is not something to be merely seen or known through concepts, but something to be made and re-made by continuous action."

This very brief exposition of Iqbāl's celebrated *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* serves solely to reveal the essence of his thought : passionate love for action (by action, Iqbāl means "spiritual activity" in the sense that activity must be guided by the principles of religion—in this context, Islam) and absolute negation of passivity; creation is not a single act once for all, but a continuous process ; man has a unique status as a free, immortal individual (immortality in the sense of being saved through exertion of positive "personal effort") and as God's vicegerent on earth.

A more detailed analysis of the contents of Iqbāl's thought as well as an account of his attempt to relate it to the daily life of the Muslim individual and the Muslim community is given in the pages that follow.

Iqbāl's Rejection of Passivity. Averse to pantheistic and mystical thought, Iqbāl felt that the purity of the Qur'ānic teaching had been spoiled by Greek and Persian influences. He calls Plato, who had no taste for action, a "philosopher of the sheep" because he is an exponent of contemplative philosophy.

Hinduism, Buddhism, Sufism hold the concept of reabsorption of the individual entity (soul or "self") into the eternal "Self" and

25. Iqbāl, op. cit., p. 196.

preach a negative approach to life on this earth, which is regarded as transitory.[26] These religio-philosophical doctrines influenced and undermined Islam through the principle of negation which is rejected emphatically by Iqbāl on the grounds that the Qur'ān is empirical and hence teaches reverence for the actual and that the doctrine of negativism has had a paralysing effect upon the Islamic community in India. Furthermore, he seems to have been of the opinion that it is chiefly the "complete authority in legislation" which has caused the stifling of personal development and "has reduced the Law of Islam practically to a state of immobility".[27] It is necessary, therefore, to restate the fundamentals of Islam, "to tear off from Islam the hard crust which has immobilised an essentially dynamic outlook on life, and to rediscover the original verities of freedom, equality, and solidarity with a view to rebuilding our moral, social, and political ideas out of their original simplicity and universality."[28] These fundamentals, briefly stated are : the unity of God (doctrine of *tauḥīd*) ; God is the Creator : He is Omnipotent, Omniscient, Self-Subsistent, the sole Arbiter of men, Compassionate and Merciful ; Muḥammad is His Prophet (the last in a succession of prophets) ; the Qur'ān which is the Word[29] of God, is eternal and has been revealed to the Prophet and it is the final authoritative revelation of God. Apart from the Islamic doctrine of creation, which has been discussed, there remain to be mentioned the doctrines of sin and redemption, of the freedom of the will, of human destiny and immortality. Islam, like Judaism, but unlike Christianity, does not believe that sin is inherited ; sin does

26. Of these three faiths, Buddhism has retained to some extent at least, the concept of activity. It teaches its adherents to participate actively in life, but not to get attached for the purpose of lessening the pain caused by too deep an attachment. This doctrine of renunication is generally regarded by non-Buddhists as a complete negation of life. The teachings of Buddha—as they have come down to us—and modern Buddhist programmes (such as the Buddhist Young Men's Association, similar to the Y.M.C.A. in Christain lands) do not seem to fully bear out this interpretation.

27. Iqbāl, op. cit., p. 149.

28. Ibid., p. 156.

29. The "Word" is not to be taken in the Christian sense of Logos.

not cling to man, but it is conceived in terms of good and evil acts and of forgiveness if there is genuine repentance. Adam signifies mankind (not just one man) and the creation of mankind represents the "ought" where, prior thereto, there existed only the "yes" and the "no". The fall does not mean an irreparable sin, but the beginning of regeneration along a path that ultimately leads to man's holding full command over all powers; the true vicegerent of God, to Whose Will man is harmoniously bent. Instead of the Day of the Lord filled with complete destruction,[30] there will be the day of joy. Paradise is not only in Heaven; it will, in the process of time, be the ultimate state of affairs on this earth.

It is this core of Islamic thought, in which Iqbāl passionately believed. He not only reinterpreted afresh the teachings of Islam as found in the Qur'ān, but his genius gave them poetic form of great beauty which swept the emotions.

In one of his poems, for instance, Iqbāl develops the theme of man in the following manner. Man, says Iqbāl, has two elements: the Gabrielic or angelic, and the Satanic or rebellious. Were the Satanic element to conquer the Gabrielic, man would forge his own destruction; were the Gabielic element to dominate the Satanic, man would become passive. But here, too, Iqbāl denounces passivity, for it is the destroyer of man. Therefore, the rebellious element is necessary to incite man against passive or angelic goodness and produce a stream of energy. The tragedy of Satan lies not in that he must die, but in that he must offer his life-blood to generate vitality in Adam. "Selfhood" cannot be built up with the Gabrielic element alone as its foundation. It is the attainment of goals on earth through good works and praiseworthy behaviour—which are the fruits of activity—that man must strive for. In other words, man is a this-worldly creature (in contrast to the mystic), but his "this-worldliness" is contingent upon the spiritual. The question whether activity will not be supplanted by passivity once all goals are attained, does not seem to arise; for, as

30. Christian eschatology is another unique explanation for the mystic longing of final consummation in God.

stated, the victory of the Gabrielic element would result in passivity and, hence, in destruction ; and, furthermore, in the process of time, new situations constantly confront man, urging him to activity. Consequently, activity must forever remain, bolstered by religion, the secular creed of mankind.

In expounding his view of man or of what man "ought" to be, Iqbāl did not abandon Islamic principles. And if he was influenced by foreign cultures and thinkers (French liberalist thought ; Bergson's concept of time as a process ; Kant's view of the moral man ; and many others), he amalgamated them all into a unity which, to him, was part and parcel of Islamic thought. The Qur'ān remained his principal source, but, as stated before, he reinterpreted its teachings. He emphasised the dynamism of Islam and went to the Qur'ān to prove it. He emphasised the concept of creative evolution and proved that it was taught by the Qur'ān. He pounded upon the dignity of man, who was born because God willed it, and whose "self" or "soul" was therefore divine in nature ; who was made the Lord's vicegerent on earth ("He hath appointed you His vicegerents in the earth"—xxxv. 39) and could voluntarily say "yes" or "no" to the Lord (although he "ought" to say "yes").

In a period when Islam was confronted by a "new World Order" and the Islamic community, not only in India, but throughout the world, had become shackled to the dreams of the past and, consequently, mostly inert, Iqbāl's message carried hope. He negated, so to say, negative thinking and reconstructed Islamic thought along the cardinal principles of Islam. He emphasised creative evolution, which makes activity possible and gives it meaning, and the development of individual uniqueness or "selfhood" (*Khudī*), which constitutes the essence of his philosophy.

The Process of Creation. Iqbāl conceives neither of life as a prefabricated pattern nor of the universe as a finished product. According to him, life truly interpreted is a constant process of becoming (Aristotelian philosophy) and not a state of being (Platonic philosophy) ; every moment we become by ceasing to be what we are. Man has un-

realised potentialities and it is through becoming that these can be realised (Aristotelian philosophy). But becoming implies change, for a movement is involved. One moves or develops from one "state" to or into another "state" (the word "state" is not to be taken in the Platonic sense). This movement or development takes place in time which can be defined historically as a series of events, psychologically as a series of human developments (mental, physical, behavioural).[31] The crucial point, however, is that "time does not stand still" (proverb); that is to say, it implies movement (past-present-furture) and movement, in turn, implies change. Change can be creative and, hence, there is hope for a better future ; because it is through change that man can develop from a potential to an actual being (Aristotelian terms) or, in popular phraseology, can become his better self.

This process is regarded by Iqbāl as "genuinely creative", bringing forth a range of possibilities which permit man to better himself and to exercise to the fullest extent his free choice. By exercising this free choice wisely, man can develop his potential into actual immortality. It implies the development of mankind along a path that begins with the "I" or "self" and ends with the "Thou" (God).[32]

1. Selfhood

(*a*) *The Ego and Its Development*. The term Khudī,[33] i.e. "self", or "I", or "ego" is defined by Iqbāl as the "unique inter-relation of our mutual states".[34] With this phrase, Iqbāl places before his readers a

31. Development or arrest of physical growth has tremendous importance for mental and behavioural progress or otherwise and is, therefore, included under Psychology.

32. Though Iqbāl rejects Sufism, he was greatly influenced by the celebrated mystic, Jalāl-ud-Dīn Rūmī. However, the path elaborated by the Sufis is not a part of life, while the path advocated by Iqbāl is in actual life ; he does not reject spirituality, as has been shown, but it must be a spirituality which is in constant touch with life.

33. Two of Iqbāl's writings containing the word *khudī* are entitled as : *Asrār-i Khudī* (The Secrets of the Self), translated into English by R. A. Nicholson —revised edition 1944 (Lahore)—made Iqbāl famous in the English-speaking world ; and *Rumūz-i Bekhudī* (The Mysteries of Selflessness) translated into English by A.J. Arberry and published by J. Murray, London, 1953.

34. Iqbāl, op. cit., p. 100.

most urgent problem that confronts the theologians as well as the psychologists, namely, "What is the nature of this I?"[35]

Viewed negatively, the "self" is not a passive entity to be thrown hither and thither like a steerless ship upon the waves of a heaving sea. Positively conceived, the "ego" is an entity constantly in process of development through creative activity resulting from interaction with a dynamic environment. "The ego is not something rigid."[36] The "system of experiences we call soul or ego is also a system of acts."[37] The development of the ego is impossible if it does not remain continuously in contact with the dynamic forces of life. The "life of the ego is a kind of tension caused by the ego invading the environment and environment invading the ego. The ego does not stand outside this arena of mutual invasion. It is present in it as a directive energy and is formed and disciplined by its own experience."[38] It is neither fully complete at its birth, nor is its development mapped out prior thereto.

(*b*) *Freedom of the Human Personality.* According to Iqbāl, the doctrine of the human personality as expounded in the Qur'ān is perfect and any faults attributed to it are due to its not having been put into practice or to its having been misinterpreted.

"Man is the trustee of a free personality which he accepted at his peril." The "peril" is that man must constantly make choices in a life full of changes that challenge him. He has the freedom to choose between the good and the bad, and it is up to him to justify his choice. He alone carries full responsibility for each choice made. Proper choice which generates good actions, is the mark of fully developed selfhood. It raises the individual to the divine level, making him capable of vicegerency on earth. Needless to say that wrong choices, which result in bad or evil actions, are evidence of human fallibility. This, joined with the doctrine of free will, presents a problem, not only for Iqbāl, but for all thinkers. The logical question is: If man has freedom of the will, why would he freely choose that which is wrong and which, as

35. Ibid., p. 100.
36. Ibid., p. 106.
37. Ibid., p. 105.
38. Ibid., p. 102.

a result, would injure him? If Satan offers up his life-blood for the regeneration of man, why do man's actions exhibit the evil symbolised by Satan? The question could also be phrased in different terms: Why is there evil in a world created by God? According to Iqbāl, who as a Muslim gives the Islamic or Qur'ānic interpretation, there is evil in order that man may be constantly exerting himself to do good. The implication of this view is that evil has no ontological status, because ultimately Satan is subdued by man under God.[39] Yet, the man of the Qur'ān, who is an inspiration and an example for all humans (in the Islamic view, the term "man" includes woman), is an ideal man. For, as stated previously, the Satanic element must remain, if man is to be constantly exhorted to activity. Yet, Iqbāl questions whether God did well to place such a heavy weight on mortal shoulders by allowing man to incur heavy risks involved in (the freedom of) making choices.

(*c*) *Destiny of the Free Individual.* "As the Qur'ān says: 'God created all things and assigned to each its destiny.' "[40] In the Qur'ān, destiny (*taqdīr*) is described as pure time which "is regarded as an organic whole. Destiny is time regarded as prior to the disclosure of its possibilities." The "destiny of a thing" is "its realizable possibilities which lie within the depths of its nature . . . ."[41] Destiny, conceived of in this manner, presents a future which exists as an open possibility. Every act of the free ego, which is born in time, creates a new situation and gives scope for progressive and positive development. A succession of acts unfolds new opportunities, lending to life a vigorous character and an exciting flavour. The truly free individual is he who always makes the proper choices, acts rightly, that is to say, who lives a life under God. What is the destiny of such a man? Personal immor-

39. If evil had ontological status, there would be the duality found in Manichaeism. (Cf., for example, in contrast, the view propounded by one of the foremost Western thinkers and writers, Goethe, in *Faust* where Satan gets the better of man). If, theologically speaking, the duality is non-existent (except where stated), philosophically speaking, the duality seems to be very real indeed. Satan has almost corporeal reality in such countries as Portugal, Spain and Italy.

40. Iqbāl, op. cit., p. 50.

41. Ibid.

tality is his destiny.

(*d*) *Personal Immortality*. Iqbāl writes that the nature of "true infinity" consists not in extensity, but in intensity; in other words, from an extensive viewpoint, the ego is absorbed in the spatio-temporal order, but from an intensive viewpoint, the ego regards this same spatio-temporal order "as a confronting 'other' wholly alien to me". Hence, the finite ego and the Infinite Ego do not, nay, cannot, exclude each other. The finite ego bears a relation to, but is not absorbed by, the Infinite Ego. "I am distinct from and yet intimately related to that on which I depend for my life and sustenance."[42] It is the I-Thou relationship; the Thou gives meaning to the life of the I. The relationship becomes a true and full one only when the I, endowed with a divine nature (soul, ego, self), voluntarily and completely identifies its will with that of the Thou. Such harmony between the Divine and the human will implies fully developed selfhood. The man who has attained it, has done so by personal effort. He is saved; that is to say, he has gained personal immortality. "Personal immortality, then, is not ours as of right; it is to be achieved by personal effort. Man is only a candidate for it."[43]

Summary. Iqbāl views the "life of the ego" as a constant strife between the "self" and its environment, which is necessary in order to combat passivity, improve the quality of the ego, i.e. to better the life of individual and, inasmuch as the individual is the member of a group, also of the community. Iqbāl curses fatalism, which, in his time, had become synonymous with the East.

In an environment (India) where world was regarded as an illusion (*māyā*)—a corroding influence of Hinduism—and where colonialism had bred fatalism (in the Islamic world as a whole), Iqbāl had to emphasise time and again that this world is thoroughly real. Its reality is derived from God; hence, this world has genuine reality. He propounded constantly that Islam is a concrete religion; that is to say, it is vitally concerned with the affairs of this world. Human activity, not indolence, is taught by the Qur'ān. Activity, which challenges life

42. Ibid., p. 118.
43. Ibid., p. 119.

itself and which is meaningful because it has its roots in the Qurā'n, is demanded of every Muslim.

In Iqbāl's philosophy the element of mysticism can be said to be a blend of the two strains of idealism and realism. The Ideal (God, Being) must needs invade the realm of the real (the world) in order to give it sustenance. According to Iqbāl, the development of the individual "self" does not lie solely, however, in the spiritual union into which the "self" enters with the divine; if there is such a union, and Iqbāl does not deny that there is, then the "self" will be the richer for it, if it applies the religious experience to creative life on earth.

There is not the slightest doubt that the two currents of realism and idealism run through all Iqbāl's works. If, on the one hand, he emphasises dynamic energy, which is the life-force of Islam, on the other hand, he does believe in a final consummation. This is precisely the desire of every mystic and the ultimate objective of all systems of mysticism. Upon closer analysis, however, the two apparently conflicting tendencies in Iqbāl's thought do not seem as inconsistent as they would appear to be upon a cursory survey. For he did not believe in consummation beyond time (the goal of the mystic; at the moment of consummation he enters into eternity), but in time. He does not negate life and its values, which the mystics generally do; he affirms them and gives them positive meaning. For this reason, Iqbāl must not be called a mystic in the sense the word usually implies. Idealism, by its very nature, contains a mystical essence ; but in Iqbāl's system, it is interwoven with a most realistic approach to life.

2. Love versus Intellect or Spirituality versus Materialism

To be creative, man must display originality, which he cannot exhibit if he is cut off from the culture in which he grew up. Man in order to develop his individuality, must feed on the cultural heritage of the community to which he belongs. This condition of contact with Muslim (and Hindu) culture was absent during the later period of English rule when the British tried to cover Indian education with a European veneer. Iqbāl attacks the Western form of

education as it had been imported into India, because it was an imitation not of what was the best, but of what was the least good in European civilisation. It aimed at making intellectual resources dependent on foreign cultural ideas. This dependence on others (*su'āl*, also translated as "asking") in the intellectual sphere, and as a result of it, in the political and economic domains as well, debases the individual and impoverishes the community to which he belongs. The deterioration of the Islamic community in India proves well Iqbāl's argument.

Creative genius cannot be unfolded except in an atmosphere of freedom, which is a second condition for the development of individuality. By exercising initiative in a world where change is the motto, the individual learns to become independent and to develop a capacity for dealing with new situations. Furthermore, to be creative, the individual must not be educated so as to adhere passively to a rigid ethical code, which he would outwardly accept, and inwardly reject. Such superficial acceptance can only harm, not develop, moral character of a high calibre. "Goodness is not a matter of compulsion; it is the self's surrender to the moral ideas and arises out of a willing cooperation of free egos. A being whose movements are wholly determined cannot produce goodness. Freedom is, therefore, seen to be a condition of goodness."[44]

It is clear that the central fact in Islamic ideology is "the growth of individuality"[45] which is the right of all men and women. This growth can occur only if the individual belongs to his community, if he plays an active role in life, and if he can develop himself in an atmosphere of freedom.

Individuality is the product of the spiritual and the physical, of the real, and the ideal. It repudiates "the dualism between '*ālam-i āfāq* (the world of matter) and '*ālam-i anfus* (the world of spirit)".[46] While Islam is in constant touch with the world of matter,

44. K.G. Saiyidain, *Education for International Understanding*, Hind Kitabs, Bombay, 1948, p. 155.
45. Ibid., p. 67. 46. Ibip., p. 68.

it does not favour a purely materialistic outlook which would push the spiritual wholly into the background. Iqbāl has much to say on this subject :

> The greatest service that modern thought has rendered to Islam, and as a matter of fact to all religions, consists in its criticism of what we call material or natural—a criticism which discloses that the merely material has no substance until we discover it rooted in the spiritual. There is no such thing as a profane world. All this immensity of matter constitutes a scope for the self-realization of the spirit. All is holy ground. As the Prophet so beautifully puts it: 'The whole of this earth is a mosque.'[47]

Iqbāl writes :

> Nor is there such a thing, as a purely physical level in the sense of possessing a materiality, elementally incapable of evolving the creative synthesis we call life and mind, and needing a transcendental Deity to impregnate it with the sentient and the mental. The Ultimate Ego that makes the emergent emerge is immanent in nature, and is described by the Quran as 'the First and the Last, the visible and the invisible.'[48]

Thus religion is not an afterthought that lingers on in the domain of material life ; it is, itself, an invaluable element in the creative process which does not consist solely of man's "reshaping of mater"[49] but also of his "capacity to build a much vaster world in the depths of his own being, wherein he discovers sources of infinite joy and inspiration."[50]

If man is not taught that the spirit predominates and that his material exploits must serve spiritual purposes, then his education is worthless. Iqbāl was led to this view because, as pointed out earlier, education in India under English rule had become more a matter of economics than of spiritual development. Furthermore, during his journey on the Continent of Europe, he had come into direct contact with a purely materialistic outlook. Though he admired the scientific attitude of the West and the spirit of endeavor it displayed, he noted

47. Iqbāl, op. cit., p. 155.
48. Ibid., pp. 106-7.
49. Saiyidain, op. cit., p. 69.
50. Ibid.

grave limitations in European life: corroding influences of economic competition and a purely materialistic outlook which bred not only greed but "soul-destroying frustration". The West revealed to him a vision of the possibilities and potentialities of human life as reflected by the exuberance and the confident restlessness of the European people. Yet he ultimately turned away from Europe, severely criticising its crude materialism, crude because it was no longer sustained by a sincere spirituality. Contrast, for example, man's victories over the physical world, with his poor knowledge of his own self, with his ignorance of how to control himself and to employ the unleashed forces of his scientific discoveries for worthy purposes. A sordid picture indeed!

Love has vanished and Intellect bites him like a snake,
Man has failed to bring Reason under the sway of Love;
He has succeeded in tracing the stars in their courses
But failed to pick his way in the labyrinth of his Ideas!
He has got so entangled in the maze of his knowledge
That he is unable to distinguish Profit from Loss!
He has ensnared the rays of the Sun
But failed to illumine the dark night of his Life![51]

In which manner can this tragic situation of man "which threatens to turn the fruits of his intellectual activity into veritable grapes of wrath"[52] be mended? The answer to this question has partly been given in the preceding pages, but Iqbāl has still more to say about it.

Apprehension of Reality through the "Intellect" (*Naẓar*, also translated as "head") is a slow and cold way of proceeding through hypotheses and strict evidence. Knowing Reality through mystical "Intuition" (*Khabar*) based on Love (*'Ishq*) meaning "sight", used here in the sense of insight and equated in Iqbāl's poetry with Love, is a heart-warming manifestation of the divine in one flash. This Love is not love between the sexes, but a much more comprehensive love grasping the symbols of Reality. It is then through Intuition,

51. This poem is quoted by Saiyidain, op. cit., p. 70.
52. Ibid.

Insight or the Heart (the terms *Khabar* and *'Ishq* taken together) that man is able to grasp metaphysical truths. "The heart", says Iqbāl, "is a kind of inner intuition or insight which, in the beautiful words of Rumi, feeds on the rays of the sun and brings us into contact with aspects of Reality other than those open to sense perception."[53] The experience revealed by Intuition is as real as experience revealed in any other manner. Such a view tends to efface the opposition between the scientific and the intuitional modes of apprehending Reality and to bring them close to each other. Knowledge (which term Iqbāl interprets as a capacity "based on the senses") yields Power while Intuition or Love generates Vision. Those possessing Power lack Love or Vision. "Vision without Power", he observes, "brings moral elevation but cannot give permanent culture. Power without Vision tends to become destructive and inhuman. Both must combine for the spiritual expansion of humanity."[54]

Iqbāl's philosophy reveals a strain of revolt against the "over-intellectualism"[55] predominant in a society where the issue is between Intellect and Intuition, between Reason and Love, the two ways of grasping Reality. In his opinion, knowledge must remain subordinate to the spiritual aspirations, if it is to serve man in his stride toward self-fulfilment ; if knowledge becomes the predominant factor, that is to say, if it is not made to serve spiritual purposes apart from the material, it becomes a satanic force, carrying man down to annihilation. Today, in the atomic age, we may well ponder over the truth of Iqbāl's conviction.

3. Principles of Human Behaviour

Prophets, educators, civic leaders and responsible men of every station in life agree that there must be some principles by which human behaviour is to be regulated and with which the minds of youth must be imbued. While the principles advanced by various religions such as

53. K. G. Sayidain, *Iqbāl's Educational Philosophy*, Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf, Lahore, 1945, pp. 125-6.
54. Ibid., pp. 131-2. See also *Education for International Understanding*, p. 71.
55. *Education for International Understanding*. p. 70.

love, respect, honesty, fair play, courage, and so forth, approximate to each other, they are in each case approached from a different point of view. Iqbāl, who not only is born a Muslim, but who finds in Islam the realistic, universal and moral outlook, gives new meanings to the principles of human behaviour taught by the Qur'ān. He, furthermore, shows the manner in which they may develop either into positive or negative guiding forces of human conduct.

Courage is necessary in education to eradicate fear which Iqbāl regards as one of the most inhibitory and weakening emotions. Apart from the fear of the Lord, which engenders wisdom, any other kind of fear is destructive and, as psychology has confirmed it, is frequently the hidden cause for aggressiveness. Examination of fear is possible by applying the principle of *Tauḥīd*, which is the most dynamic concept of Islamic thought and the guiding rule in the conduct of Muslims. *Tauḥīd* as a principle in the life of the individual and the community occupies an important place in Iqbāl's thought. It implies unity. It relates the entire domain of human life to the I-Thou relationship. Above all it implies that all men are one. Unity between man and God and between men creates solidarity which, in turn, gives birth to a fearless courage, giving man the strength to conquer all.[56] This aggressiveness, born from a spiritual bond, must necessarily assume a positive form. If it takes on a negative attitude, it results in militarism, which defeats the original meaning and purpose of *Tauḥīd*. It is, therefore, of supreme importance that a positive attitude be assumed which will enable men to remain united with and under God. This positive attitude does not refer solely to the Islamic society, but to all societies as parts of a bigger community—the community of mankind. Geographical and colour barriers must be pulled down, and all men must march together to a better future.

Tolerance results from the strength injected by *Tauḥīd*. It implies

56. The strength to conquer does not, of course, mean that the conquest is necessarily achieved. In another respect, however, the conquest of an immense part of the world by Islam as a result of the Muslims' zeal and fearless courage, was an absolute success.

a positive attitude, and is displayed by the true believer, who does not adhere to Islam in a mechanical fashion, but orders his life on the principle of *Tauḥīd* in all sincerity. Tolerance reveals breadth of understanding, which is possible only if one is a firm believer in the principles taught by one's religion and society.[57] Intolerance, on the other hand, manifested mostly among those not firmly rooted in a society believing in positive principles, is suicidal, as it arrests the development of the individual and the community. Iqbāl was firmly convinced that men are equal between themselves (as it is taught in the Qur'ān). Such equality erases all barriers, all frictions, looks upon the varying approaches to life, man and God as an enrichment of human existence and thus gives birth to tolerance and to a sense of unity of mankind.

Faqr has come in for great stress in the later thought developments of Iqbāl. What does it mean? There are two kinds of *Faqr*: that of renunciation, which is a debilitating force, and that of non-attachment, which becomes a source of incorruptibility. It is the second type of *Faqr* which Iqbāl advocates.

By indulging in worldly pursuits, man must not be engulfed by worldliness. He must retain an inner attitude or, in other terms, he must practise a kind of intellectual and emotional asceticism for the pursuit of good and worthy goals. The Islamic ideal of "this worldliness", then, must be somewhat modified so that power and riches will not enslave human beings. For this purpose, the capacity of *Faqr* should be developed as a protective device against an excessive materialism.

The living of an active and full life in this world develops man in all directions and leads to the creation of the "whole" man rather than to a human being divided into two watertight compartments which exclude each other : the spiritual, emphasised on times set apart for mosque services, and the material, predominant in everyday

57. The implication is that religion advocates tolerance. Iqbāl is right, of course. The tragic fact is that tolerance was rarely preached from the Pulpit.

affairs. This "whole" man is at the same time the "good" man for Iqbāl. As stated, the good man is he who believes sincerely in the values of his religion, whose life is regulated by *Tauḥīd.* He is not a crass materialist. He is a man whose creative activity enriches and beautifies life, whose tolerance enables him to transcend geographical, racial, economic and social barriers, and whose courage and ethical conduct earn him the respect of all who come into contact with him. This then is the sketch of the *Mu'min*, the "good" man, who does his duty by the Lord.

4. Iqbal's Conception of the *Millat*

If the individual is so much emphasised, what is to be said about his relationship to the community—of which something has been said in the previous pages—and what should be the socio-political order in the world of Islam?

In *Rumūz-i Bekhudī*, Iqbāl presents an analysis of the relationship between the individual and the community. Denouncing the life without a centre, which he believed was rapidly becoming a characteristic of the Western world, Iqbāl stated that it is necessary to have a spiritual and an ethical basis for human thinking. The individual exists in relation to a community, which widens his scope. The community as such constitutes a unit, composed as it is of a group of individuals who have merged together and who (ideally speaking) struggle for the same objectives, namely, those that would improve their particular community. This does not mean, of course, that a community represents or reflects the demands and desires of each of its individual members. It does not; and, consequently, there is a tension between the individual and the community to which he belongs. This tension provides, however, for the community's growth. Nevertheless, the community, for the reasons stated, presents a unity of outlook, of joint endeavours and objectives. This view of the community leads to the concept of the *Millat* ("Community"), that is to say, the idea of homogeneity of thinking of a group or a people, based on ethics rooted in religion. Inasmuch as Islam constitues a *Millat,* it cannot

and should not be identified with one particular country.[58]

Iqbāl is able to rise above nationalism and racial and religious fanaticism, because the community he imagines—and which is mirrored in the Qur'ān—is averse to any sort of boundary. Says Iqbāl :

> It seems to me that God is slowly bringing home to us the truth that Islam is neither Nationalism nor Imperialism but a League of Nations which recognizes artificial boundaries and racial distinctions for facility of reference only, and not for restricting the social horizon of its members.[59]

Clearly, the *Millat* envisaged by Iqbāl, does not find its true expression in the political realm, with its "artificial boundaries and racial distinctions" ; it is a spiritual homogeneity, which transcends all "artificial boundaries".

If the *Millat* cannot be identified with one particular country, can the emergence of "States" in Islam be justified? The answer has been given. In one sense, the modern political conception of the State is quite contrary and, in fact, contradictory to Islam, for Islam is the State and the State is Islam. Hence, Islam does not recognise States, but only a State, the implication being that the political and the spiritual in Islam constitute an absolute unity. Says Iqbāl:

> In Islam it is the same reality which appears as Church looked at from one point of view and State from another. It is not true to say that Church and State are two sides or facets of the same thing. Islam is a single unanalysable reality which is one or the other as your point of view varies.[60]

The "reality" is unity and the emergence of "States" shatters this unity, since different "States" will make different claims

58. See also above, p. 6, footnote 16. Inasmuch as Iqbāl was of the opinion that a devout Christian was a better Muslim than the irreligious Muslim, he also conceived of an ideal Community in which all communities (Islamic, Christian, etc.) were immersed. Such an ideal Community would, however, efface all distinctions between the various communities. This is the approach of Idealism, found not only in Plato, but also in St Augustine's *City of God.*

59. Iqbāl, op. cit., p. 159.

60. Ibid., p. 154.

which frequently arouse disagreement, indifference towards each other, and rivalry and hostility. One Islamic State attacking another is inconceivable under the dictates of Islam. Hence, States do not, from the Muslim point of view, present diversity, but disunity. However, for "facility of reference", as Iqbāl terms it, or for political expediency and in the name of sovereign independence, as the practical politician sees it, or in the rhythm of history, as the historian and the philosopher interpret it, States are essential. There is no other political form in the contemporary world apart from the State which allows for political independence and self-expression in every domain of life. Yet, if the Islamic world is divided into States, according to the Qur'ānic teachings it remains essentially a unity. States are to be regarded as instruments for carrying out the teachings of the Qur'ān ; they have made possible Islamic self-expression because they have sovereign independence.

The State according to Islam is only an effort to realize the spiritual in a human organization. But in this sense all State, not based on mere domination and aiming at the realization of ideal principles, is theocratic.[61]

In other words, the political division of Islam has been redeemed by placing upon each State the responsibility of living in accordance with the Qur'ān. By assuming and carrying out this responsibility, the various States do not really cause a schism in Islam. The schism is only in the political realm and is artificial. Essentially, the world of Islam remains united. The *Millat,* its spiritual fortress, stands unharmed, and unshaken.

For a final reappraisal of Iqbāl's philosophy, the following questions arise :

61. Ibid., p. 155. "Theocracy" in Islam means not a Church-dominated State, but a State which acknowledges as its sovereign not man, but God. Islam has no organised priesthood and no Church in the Western sense of the words. It is a congregation of men who assemble in the mosque for prayer, led by an *imām*; but they can pray anywhere they wish and need no intermediary. The *imām* has no status comparable to that of the priest in Catholicism or Protestantism; he is a member of the community without any preferential status.

(*a*) Is Iqbāl, in his desire to reconstruct Islam, a reactionary?

Iqbāl was aware of the fact that life in not change, pure and simple. It has within it elements of conservation. Life moves with the weight of the past on its back. "What is history? A tale, a story, or a fable? No, it makes thee conscious of thyself." History implies continuity of a particular culture, of a community, and imbues a particular community with historical consciousness. The longer the continuity of a culture, the stronger its adherents emphasise the values inherent in it. The eternal values in Islam made possible the great achievements of the Islamic community in the past. If Islam could produce such a dazzling culture in the past, why could it not give birth to a creative Muslim community in the contemporary world? Iqbāl did not live in the past; however, he looked to the past solely to rediscover the essence of Islamic culture, to examine the dynamic forces that created it.

As a man who spent his life in the effort to regenerate the Muslim community, Iqbāl came to look upon himself as a shaker-up of society, as a superman giving it stimulus, lending to it a new shape in harmony with, and in answer to, the demands of a new era. It was his belief, which was based upon historical evidence, that from time to time a *Ṣāḥib-i dil* ("possessor of a sensitive heart") appears on the world stage, whose aim it is to awaken the community. On this conception of *Ṣāḥib-i dil*, Iqbāl built up the notion of a Superman, which is different from Nietzsche's. Though Iqbāl admired great military men, he did so not because of the motives that spurred them on, but because of the energetic and purposeful activity with which they carried out their goals. Neither the cult of the Superman as developed by Nietzsche nor the collectivism advocated by Marx is the ideal. For Iqbāl, the ideal remains forever Islam.

This shaker-up of society dared to challenge the secular world with the sacred Qur'ān. Yet, he was not regarded as a reactionary by the orthodox Muslims, who accepted his views to a large extent inasmuch as he based his philosophy on the fundamental principles of Islam. For the same reason, they did not regard him as a heretic; he believed

in the strictly monotheistic Islamic creed, professing "no god but God", and believing in the mission of Muḥammad. He has, however, been accused of "heterodoxy" in the sense that he called his personal world-view—a synthesis of Muslim and non-Muslim theories—Islamic, which, by the very fact that it is such a synthesis, it no longer is. Yet, this accusation does not seem to be valid, for Iqbāl brought in these non-Islamic theories to test and reveal the true nature of Islam. Whatever good these theories had, Islam also had ; only the real nature of Islam was buried under a crusted heap which went by the name of—but no longer was—Islam. The word "reconstruction," as used by Iqbāl, means essentially a reinterpretation of Islam in terms of its basic teachings, not solely for the purpose of giving this faith new depth, or greater dynamism, but of revitalising the community professing Islam. It was precisely in the social area rather than in the domain of thought that his veiws differed from those of the orthodox.[62] For Iqbāl Islam is progress and, in order to make progress possible for the inert Indo-Muslims, he hammered on activity. The orthodox, however, including the religious leaders, are not a progressive group ; they withhold rather than promote activity in society. But he had fired their, as well as anybody else's imagination and, inasmuch as they did, on the whole, accept his philosophy, Iqbāl can be credited with having injected them with progressiveness.

To summarise, Iqbāl's contribution lay in capturing the essence of Islam and attuning it to the modes of a new society. The ideals of this new society were not really new ; they are embodied in the Qur'ān and, hence, they are eternal. But what was new, was Iqbāl's reappraisal in the light of new conditions. He had no other choice. It was the role assigned to him. No matter what or how strong the criticism—arising from an analytical study of his thought-system—against him may be, he met the challenge of his task for which he was equipped better than anyone else. He gave the Indian Muslims, at a critical moment in their history, a sense of direction which they

62. Iqbāl accepted, however, the Muslim view concerning the role of womanhood in society.

sorely needed.

(*b*) Does Islam give guidance in the reconstruction of a community?

This question, which has in the main been explored in the preceding pages, can be answered in the affirmative. As Iqbāl saw it, Islam could be a vital force in the reconstruction of a community. For Islam is not solely a religion; it transcends the religious (and theological) terms and expresses itself in intellectual, artistic and social forms. Inherent in Islam is the concern with itself as an organised society, and a code of laws is provided by it for the guidance of the Muslim community.[63]

(*c*) What is the nature of social order in Islam?

To summarise the discussion, the social order in Islam rejects geographical, political and racial or social barriers. It is based on the unity of the Muslim community (*Millat*). Of course, this is an ideal approach, since State and nationalism have arisen in the Muslim world. Iqbāl rejects nationalism as much as he does imperialism. Nationalism is a dividing factor which splinters the Islamic world into exclusive fragments, which could not again be united. Yet, there seems to be a contradiction here because, at the same time that Iqbāl rejects nationalism, he favours (or at least appears to have advanced) the idea that Muslim majority areas be consolidated "into a single state" and given self-government. This means not only political freedom, but also the emergence of nationalism. The contradiction, however, arises from the fact that while Iqbāl the philosopher rejects nationalism as being opposed to the concept of the *Millat*, as a human being, he is identified with the Indian Muslims among whom he was born and raised. The contradiction, then, is apparent rather than real, having arisen from the fact that the nation as an expression of social life, is the result of settlement of a particular human group in a specific area, and a consolidating process takes place whereby the

63. By community is, of course, meant (except where stated otherwise) Islamic Community, although Islam could give guidance to other communities as well.

group and its permanent habitat become a compact unit. This process bears two consequences: the growth of political consciousness and the emotional feeling called nationalism; that is to say, the preference for and adherence to a country or a people among whom one is born and for which or whom one feels genuine attachment. Consequently, if the philosophical approach of Iqbāl the thinker is that of an anti-nationalist, the social outlook of Iqbāl the man cannot but be that of a nationalist. His anti-nationalism, however, must be regarded in the same vein as his nationalism: they are both the expression of an idealistic spirit and emotional fervour. Actually, Iqbāl acknowledged the political fact of the existence of States but, as indicated, he interpreted it in the light of the spiritual. He, like any other Muslim today, found himself to be both a member of a particular community and the Community. He was, so to say, a product of contradictory circumstances which, on the one hand, produced the Community of Islam and, on the other hand, forged smaller Islamic communities in the form of States. As a result, the contradiction could not but appear in his thought. He made an attempt to solve it by emphasising the artifical nature of States and true nature of Islam as a "State" in the sense of a universal Community.

The country of his birth (Pakistan) hearkened to his message in this double sense. It became an independent sovereign State expressing the freedom of that Indo-Muslim group which felt deep genuine attachment to it. The freedom of the people of Pakistan could not be postponed until the Islamic State also became a political reality, for in the history of Pakistan, freedom preceded any formalised preferential pattern. It was not until eight years after Pakistan had obtained its freedom that it proclaimed itself to be an Islamic Republic.[64] Its proclamation constitutes essentially a pledge to the Qur'ān, redeeming its sin of Statehood in Islam by the promise of allegiance to the Islamic faith and the Islamic way of life.

January 1958

64. The constitutional Bill was signed on March 2, 1956. Pakistan became a Republic officially on March 23, 1956, to be called "The Islamic Republic of Pakistan".

M. Saeed Sheikh

IQBAL'S MAIN RELIGIO-PHILOSOPHICAL DOCTRINES

Iqbāl is undoubtedly the greatest Muslim philosopher of the present century, and his philosophy has an inspiration and a message unique in the history of human thought. He had the good fortune to combine within him a thorough grounding and a deep existential involvement in the teachings of the Holy Qur'ān, a rigorous formal discipline in philosophy, and numinous poetic visions bordering on the metaphysical disclosures of reality. All this made him more than a philosopher: he was, indeed, a seer, a sage, a revivalist, almost a messenger from another world who opened our inner eyes to new possibilities of human experience and new horizons and dimensions of human existence. His is a philosophy not of dry as dust ideas, abstract speculation or academic theorisation; it is a philosophy vibrating with elevating experiences, stemming from the very depths of our being and replete with almost revelatory visions born out of direct encounter with the really Real. He himself openly declares that "positive views of ultimate things are the work rather of Inspiration than Metaphysics".[1] Thus, his philosophy, even as expounded in his major philosophical work in prose: *The Reconstruction*

1. *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, Oxford University Press, London, 1934, p. 108.

of Religious Thought in Islam, makes an ample use of the "grammar" of suggestion and appeal, evocation and illumination, but woefully lacks in the logic of definition and explanation, analytical reduction and theoretical construction, verification and proof—all so highly prized in the contemporary philosophical thought. No wonder that a Western or Westernised mind proudly drilled in the agelong Platonic dichotomies and static Aristotelian logic fails to appreciate the spiritual organon and unique logical grammar of Iqbāl's synthetic philosophy of global experiences. The Westerners like Sir H.A.R. Gibb and Dr Cantwell Smith have found in Iqbāl's philosophy only a mere juxtaposition of incongruent elements, an eclecticism in which anything can mean anything—"certainly so contradictory and unsystematic that it is difficult to assess him". The so-called incongruences and contradictions are in fact quite markedly visible in Iqbāl's philosophy. They are the incongruences and contradictions of transcendentism and immanentism ; rationalism and intuitionism ; creativity and teleology; freedom and necessity; dynamism and perfectionism; monism and pluralism; being and becoming ; temporality and eternality; self and not-self; and so on and so forth. But they are no more than the incongruence and contradiction involved in inhaling and exhaling in our breathing process, on which contradiction our very existence is literally perched as if on a razor's edge. As a matter of fact all existence is perched on this razor's edge of the ever-trembling, ever-fleeting "now", sandwiched between the two contradictory blocks of the eternal past and the everlasting future. Iqbāl's incongruences and contradictions are the incongruences and contradictions inherent in life and love, self and time—the pivotal notions of his philosophy. In particular they reverberate the inherent dialectical rhythm of the tensions of religious experience which has the intrinsic bipolarity of a dialogue between the human and the divine, the finite and the infinite—between "I and Thou". It must be clearly understood that religious experience, like life and love, cannot be treated mathematically and logically. In general there is an enormous difference between the logic of ideas and that of experiences. Our experiences do

not follow one another like premisses in a chain of syllogisms. We can deduce one "idea" from another but we can hardly have a logical deduction of one experience from another.

Iqbāl's philosophical thought in *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* is interwoven with an undercurrent of deep existential experiences and thus loses its logical rigour and gets scattered and unconnected. Even in the purely philosophical chapters it is hard to find a closely well-knit and logically reasoned-out argument—although all along one is greatly overwhelmed by its genuine philosophical flavour and fervour. The synthetic and creative character of his philosophy makes him rise above the professional modes of philosophical exposition. He does not have to formulate his problem, define or explicate his terms, systematically, marshal his arguments for or against a specific thesis, and arrive at the end to one particular conclusion or many possible conclusions. His mode of exposition, much like that of the existentialists, is a little messy murky affair and like them leaves him open to the charge of imprecision, vagueness, and even obscurity. All in all, to the general reader, *The Reconstruction* seems to make a difficult reading. Hence we propose to list below the main thrusts of Iqbāl's religio-philosophical thought, without any claim to comprehensiveness and with all misgivings that this card-index cataloguing of doctrines may lead to a faulty representation of his global philosophy; for it can be really appreciated only in its synthetic unity and through an existential involvement in it, and not by breaking it into fragments or rattling it out in set formulae.

1. The nature of ultimate reality, according to Iqbāl, is neither mental nor material; it is essentially vitalistic, i.e. characterised with the quality of life which is ever-active and perpetually creative. Matter and mind are among the various modes or manifestations of the principle of life. In this view of reality Iqbāl seems to be in close agreement with the French philosopher Bergson. It is, however, altogether baseless to assert that Iqbāl's philosophy is an Islamicisation of Bergson, for he also differs with him on many essential points.

2. God is an Absolute Ego, ever active and creative from eternity.

Every moment He is in a new state of glory.[2] The movement of His action is not from less perfect to more perfect, His is the perfection of creative and dynamic activity itself. Iqbāl's God is not an absentee Lord in the sense that He created the universe once for all and now is on a long holiday. "He adds to His creation what He wills"[3] and He is perpetually creating the universe anew, every moment of His being.

3. Material universe or the physical nature is not an illusion (*māyā*) but the veritable manifestation of reality. The phenomena of nature are the signs of God (*āyāt Allāh*). Natural processes indicate the behaviour and character of God so much so that the laws of nature represent the habits[4] or ways of God (*sunnat Allāh*).

4. Space and time, so far as the knowledge of the universe is concerned, are the categories of thought devised by the human ego in order to understand and control the external world. There are, however, different levels of space and time according to the various grades of being or reality. Iqbāl lends whole-hearted support to 'Irāqī's conception of the stratification or plurality of time and space. Time of dream experience, for instance, is different from that of waking consciousness.

5. God is an Absolute Ego having both will and purpose in a supra-personal sense such as is beyond the comprehension of finite intellect. God being an Ego creates egos only and so the universe is nothing but a graded hierarchy of egos or monads. Human ego is at the highest reach of God's creativity: nothing manifests the reality of God more than the self of man for God "breathed of His own spirit into him".[5] Iqbāl's philosophy may thus be said to be a happy synthesis of Leibnizean monadism and Bergsonian fluxionism, the closest parallel of which we meet in the system of Whitehead, undoutedly the greatest philosopher of the present age.

6. Man is the carrier within him of the infinite possibilities of the

2. The Qur'ān, lv. 29.
3. Ibid., xxxv. 1.
4. *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 54.
5. The Qur'ān, xv. 29.

eternal life principle. These possibilities pertain both to the inner spiritual growth and enrichment of the human ego, and to the reshaping or remoulding of the external world. The burden of fulfilling these possibilities lies on man and informs him of the *summum bonum* of his life. Both God and man are essentially the creators of new worlds. By making the fullest use of his creative faculties man becomes verily the co-worker of God, His vicegerent or deputy on earth (*khalīfat Allāh*).

7. Intellect with its method of trial and error is a mode of comprehension devised by the ego itself to enable it to attain to its own full growth and maturity. Finite or partial intellect comprehends the perpetual flux of reality by dividing it into specific individualities, i.e. by circumscribing it in finite forms. This is inevitable for the partial intellect as it operates primarily within the realm of serial time. Intellect in its higher reaches, however, has the capacity to transcend itself and capture the Infinite or the Absolute.

8. Besides intellect man has the intuitive faculty through which it becomes possible for him to get into a living contact with reality. Both intellect and intuition, however, need each other for reciprocal supplementation and mutual rejuvenation. It is verily through the operation of intellectual faculties that man not only gets mastery over nature but also develops a vision through which he gets a peep into the nature of ultimate reality. The final participation in the Being of reality, however, becomes possible only through an intuitive comprehension of it, i.e. through a religious communion with it.

9. Body and mind are the two facets of the same reality which in essence is nothing but life itself. Neither parallelism nor interactionism are fully countenanced by Iqbāl, for neither of these theories according to him succeeds in giving a satisfactory account of the body-mind relationship.

10. Iqbāl is bitterly against the belief in a predetermind or preordained cosmic plan in the mind of God which is alleged to have been inscribed on a "Preserved Tablet" from all eternity. This, according to him, makes creativity and freedom impossible not only for nature and

man but also for God Himself. The Orientalists' standpoint that Islam favours the idea of fatalism, according to Iqbāl, is a very serious and widespread misrepresentation of the original Islamic position with regard to the freedom of man. All in all, the Qur'ān is very clear about man's freedom, which indeed is God's gift and trust to him and him alone.

11. Ego creates its own difficulties such as "matter" and evil for the sake only of self-maturity and self-expression. It cannot come to have a full joy of controlling and mastering the environment without encountering various difficulties therein. Iqbāl further maintains, like Fichte, that evil is a necessary prerequisite of moral life.

12. Heaven and hell, according to Iqbāl, are not localities but different states of the human soul.[6] Life hereafter is the continuity of this very life, and it opens up new possibilities for the further growth and development of the human soul. Man's soul passes from one stage of its development to another ***ad infinitum***.

13. Islam does not at all preach hermeticism or asceticism. It, on the other hand, more than any other religion of the world, recognises and emphasises the need for a social and collective life for the real and full development and expansion of the human ego.

14. The religion of Islam through the intrinsic worth of its teachings is capable of creating an ideal society constituted of a set of people endowed with the very best in life. They indeed would stand as a model for the rest of mankind.

15. The whole of humanity is one organic whole; racial, national, and geographical distinctions are only for the practical convenience of distinguishing the various social groups from one another.[7]

16. No society can flourish or progress through imitation or blind following of others. East should not copy West slavishly but carve out and evolve its own destiny from within.

17. The religious law of Islamic ***Shar'īah*** contains all the essential and ultimate guidance for mankind, yet it is dynamic and progressive

6. *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 116.
7. The Qur'ān, xlix. 13.

in spirit and freely admits of change with the changing conditions of time.

18. There is thus a need for a perpetual reinterpretation and reconstruction of religious thought in Islam at various times in the light of the developments then taking place in sciences, philosophy and other domains of human knowledge.

July 1967

Dr Fazl-ur-Rehman

IQBAL AND MODERN MUSLIM THOUGHT

It is somewhat embarrassing to be asked to write on modern Islamic philosophy, not because of the difficulty of describing and analysing it, but for the simple reason that very little of such a philosophy exists as yet. As is well known, philosophical quest at a high level in the Muslim East stopped suddenly after al-Ghazālī (d. 1111), although there has been a considerable commentatorial activity since, which so far has not been studied by any modern student. We shall not here try to discuss the causes of the downfall of the philosophical movement in classical Islam—it was not indeed even a very powerful movement, although an important one--but shall, appropriately to the occasion, make some brief general observations on the relative absence of Islamic philosophical thinking in modern times and then attempt a descriptive and critical analysis of what does exist.

The modern age of Islam can be taken to have begun in the latter half of the nineteenth century. But the forces which inaugurated this era were not intellectual but political. The early impact on Isam of the West consisted in the eastward expansion of European political powers which threatened to consume the already decaying political strength of the Muslim world. The Muslim nations, in face of this danger, were awakened to a sense of their political weakness and disintegration. The problem, therefore, which has stood foremost since then in

the minds of the Muslims has been: How to reorganise themselves in order successfully to resist Western political domination and how to strengthen themselves? Such a situation was hardly conducive to an intellectual and spiritual growth? There was, no doubt, a spiritual factor which went alongside of the political domination, viz., the Christian missionaries. The missionary activity, however, was generally regarded by the Muslims as another more indirect expression of the Western imperial designs on the Muslim lands. This is very clearly expressed in an article of Jamāl-al-Dīn al-Afghānī,[1] in which he attacks Sir Sayyid Aḥmad Khān as an agent of British imperialism. He says there that in order to ensure their political domination over the Indian Muslims, the first "trick" of the British was to implant missionaries in India, but that when this "plan" failed, they "employed" Sir Sayyid and his group to "weaken the faith of Islam from within Islam". This attitude to the missionaries is, with varying degrees, still true of the mass of the Muslim world. Nevertheless, the missionaries and the Orientalists did contribute to a great extent to a religious re-awakening of the Muslims.

This inability to direct attention to merely religious-intellectual problems and investigate them as such constitutes generally speaking a striking feature of Muslim modernism. But here one naturally asks: What about those Muslims who directly (as in the case of many Pakistanis, Indians and Arabs) or indirectly (i.e., remaining in their own country as in the case of many Turks) came into contact with Western intellectual currents and took them seriously? Now, it is

1. See his article *"Hindūstānī Naichrī"* in *Irshādāt-i Jamāl al-Dīn* (Lahore, 1945), a collection of his articles in *al-'Urwat al-Wuthqā* translated into Urdu. Professor H.A.R. Gibb's statement (*Modern Trends in Islam*, Chicago second Impression, 1950, p. 29) that the *Refutation of the Materialists* is the sole published work of Jamāl al-Dīn is perhaps an oversight. For, besides several articles on diverse topics, he wrote a history of Afghanistan called *Tatimmat al-Bayān fī Tārīkh al-Afghān*, an Urdu translation of which appeared in 1342 A.H. at Lahore. With Professor Gibb's judgment about Afghānī's intellectual calibre, however, I could not agree more. The Institute of Islamic Studies at McGill is trying to assemble a complete Afghānī Corpus, has launched a programme of translations of his works, and will welcome any bibliographical assistance in this project.

precisely in this group that the subject of our present treatment is to be found. But when one looks at their scanty numbers and at their still more scanty results, one is truly amazed. For among these people too, there were many whose deliberations and cogitations were primarily directed towards an immediate practical end. Such, e.g., is the striking case of the Turkish intellectuals whose problem was: How to reconstruct Ottomanism (Nāmik Kamāl) or how to reconstruct Turkey (Ziā Gokalp)?[2] Yet in the thought of both these men Islam played an important integral part, but unfortunately this aspect of thought has not yet been worked out.[3] Other Westernists are secular. But the largest part of this group is constituted of those who are simply "silent" on these issues, i.e. they are not troubled by them at all. And this brings us face to face with the most pathetic situation in the field. The crux of the matter is that so long as modern Western thought and science remain "Western", i.e. super-imposed from without, and are not assimilated, they cannot be but a pure facade without any real import.

The bulk of Muslim modernist intellectual attempts is concentrated on practical matters of legal and social content. This is due to the fact that (*a*) the main internal troubles of recent Islam arise out of dissatisfaction with the medieval legal schools which were hopelessly becoming inadequate for the rapidly changing conditions and (*b*) the brunt of Western criticism of Islam was levelled against its legal and social institutions and the morality implied by them. Thus the Egyptian orthodox Shaikh Muḥammad 'Abdūh was primarily occupied by overthrowing the authority of the four legal schools and re-asserting (under Wahhābistic influences) a puritanical, fundamentalist attitude. Yet, with all the concern about practical questions, there is surprisingly little or no interest at all in modern Islam in Moral Philosophy. Although Sir Sayyid Aḥmad Khān and Shiblī based morality, under

2. Although these two men are justly renowned, as far as I know, a complete collection of their writings is not yet available in published form.

3. Professor Niyazi Berkes, my colleague at the McGill Institute of Islamic Studies, is now completing a translation into English of Gokalp's basic writings which should throw considerable light on this subject.

the influence of Western moral intuitionism, on "Conscience", they took it rather as a datum than as an assumption and had nothing more to say about it. A deeper, rational inquiry into the principle of morality and an analysis of "good" and "bad", which is perhaps the greatest desideratum of Islam, would have had most far-reaching effects on modern Muslim society.

Western thought has had its influence most patently on Muslims of this Subcontinent. Here a movement arose which may be calld, and has been called by most of its own advocates, the neo-*Kalām*, harking back to the *Kalām* School of classical Islam, which arose under the impact of Greek philosophy. It arose with the declaration of Sir Sayyid Aḥmad K͟hān, the first modernist of Indian Islam: "In this age we need a new *Kalām* by which we should either refute modern scientific knowledge (which is not possible), or prove the conformity of Islam with it."[4] This movement was both apologetic and reformist. Sir Sayyid himself was not, however, in any appreciable sense a philosopher. He applied what he called the "principle of conformity with nature" to the entire range of Islamic belief and practice, declared "Conscience" and its deliverances to be the criterion for judging the truth of a moral and religious system. The Qur'ān and Islam, when understood rightly, he affirmed, do stand this test and are therefore in harmony with science and progress. There was, of course, fierce opposition to his views, and for subsequent developments he was important in his modernising impulse rather than in the content of his thought. Apart from disseminating Western education from Aligarh which was his greatest service to Muslims of this Subcontinent, the main part of his reformist activity was concerned with Muslim manners and customs, which he carried on in his journal called *Tahd͟hīb al-Ak͟hlāq*.

Belonging to the same group is the theologian and historian S͟hiblī Nu'mānī whom Professor Gibb (op. cit., n. I, p. 519) has justly, with reservations, compared to S͟haik͟h Muḥammad 'Abdūh. S͟hiblī was educated on traditional conservative lines but later came into contact

4. See S͟haik͟h Muḥammad Ikrām, *Mauj-i-Kaut͟har*, Lahore (undated), pp. 166-7.

with Sir Sayyid Aḥmad Khān who influenced him in a modernist direction. From T. W. Arnold he learned some French which being a rather out-of-the-way thing for an Indian to do is to be explained by the influence of certain Egyptian writers, especially Farīd Wājdī. Shiblī in his spirit is more radical than 'Abdūh. 'Abdūh was convinced that religion cannot be in conflict with science, encouraged the study of science but did not allow an examination of the faith.

> Thus it [Islam] delivered reason from all its chains, liberated it from the blind imitation that had enslaved it, and restored to it its domain in which it makes its own decisions in accordance with its own judgment and wisdom. . . . Nevertheless, it must humble itself before God alone and stop at the limits set by the Faith ; but within these bounds there is no barrier to its activity and there is no limit to the speculations which may be carried on under its aegis.[5]

Shiblī, in his *Al-Kalām* (Lahore, 1952), on the other hand, starts by doubting the existence of God ; he admits that although science and religion cannot conflict, philosophy and religion may and often do. He rejects the cosmological argument and accepts the existence of God (*a*) on conscience and (*b*) as a power which integrates the various isolated bits of matter which initially possess self-motion and essential properties, into a systematic cosmos. The first satisfies the demands of religion, the second of science. No attempt, however, is made to relate the two ideas together.

Of course, the "doubt" with which he starts must not be exaggerated because it soon becomes clear that it is purely methodical and is used only for the purpose of the argument. Besides, the purpose of the whole treatise is a defence of Islam, not an independent inquiry. Shiblī uses the classical Muslim thought quite copiously, and carefully selects the radical passages from his sources, supporting his views equally copiously from Western authors. He envisaged the task of modern *Kalām* as two-fold : one as a defence of the beliefs of Islam which is essentially a restatement of the old *Kalām* in the light of

5. Gibb, op. cit., pp. 43-4.

modern philosophical thought, and the other, an entirely new *Kalām* in defence of Muslim ethics and law, etc. Says Shiblī :

This is because the objections levelled against Islam in old times were related only to belief—but today a religious system is judged by its history, ethics, civilisation, etc. According to modern Europe, the beliefs of a religion are not so much objectionable as its law and ethics.[6]

But whereas Muḥammad 'Abdūh's teachings were influential, and continue to be so, Shiblī's influence is almost non-existent and the school he left behind him at Azamgarh assumed an ultra-conservative character.

Strictly speaking, the only philosopher of modern Islam is Sir Muḥammad Iqbāl (d. 1938) who, in his *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* (recently reprinted by Muḥammad Ashraf, Lahore, from the Oxford edition of 1934 ; references here are to the Oxford edition) seriously attempted to formulate a new Muslim metaphysics "with due regard to the philosophical traditions of Islam and the more recent developments in the various domains of human knowledge." In the generation younger than Shiblī, a new and vigorous reaction to the rationalistic tendencies of the earlier generation set in. It was perhaps natural that the none-too-sober character of the initial modernism should provoke a comparably none-too-thoughtful radical reaction. The most prominent leader of this movement was Abū'l-Kalām Āzād (in his early youth). He denounced rationalism as the "so called knowledge whose result is nothing but a darkness of uncertainty and doubt"; he stigmatised old scholastics as "Greece-ridden" and modernists as "West-ridden".[7] In the words : "darkness of uncertainty and doubt", we have the key to the understanding of Indian Muslims' attitude to rationalism since, say, 1912. Doubt and knowledge are taken as absolute terms, mutually exclusive. It is quite clear that no value is attached to the modern attitude of *pursuit* and *inquiry* as such. which constitutes the essence of philoso-

6. *al-Kalām*, p. 10.
7. Shaikh Muḥammad Ikrām, op. cit., p. 32.

phy. Moreover, the Indian Muslims in their political struggle needed something definite and defined, something ready-made to rely on. This could be achieved much more easily by faith and tradition.

Partly against this background grew Iqbāl's thought. Furthermore, Iqbāl saw the basic direction of his thinking being realised also in the West where Bergson's intuitionism and vitalism were challenging the nineteenth-century materialistic determinism. Above all, the dynamic theories of Bergson and of modern physics were obviously suited for a need at home. Iqbāl has profoundly influenced the younger generation of educated Muslims in India and Pakistan. This can be seen from the establishment of two Iqbāl Academies, one in Lahore and another very recently opened by the Pakistan Government in Karachi, and from a plethora of books written by his followers about his teaching and thought. But it is surprising that in this whole literature one cannot find a single work which undertakes a serious examination of the great poet-philosopher's central philosophical doctrines. And here we come to another basic weakness in our modernism. For one thing, the modernist too, like the conservative, has his authorities which he venerates in an unhealthy spirit. Moreover, in view of the paucity of intellectual activity, with which our critics only too justly stigmatise us, the venerating Muslim thinks that at least whatever there is by way of intellcctual product should be left "unmolested". (Criticism is generally equated with wanton destruction which, no doubt, it too often is in the hands of many of our "critics"). Yet, by doing so he obviously perpetuates intellectual stagnation. I imagine this is not the attitude dearest to Iqbāl's own heart, who wrote in the preface to his Lectures, "It must, however, be remembered that there is no such thing as finality in philosophical thinking."

The purpose of the following remarks is merely to state briefly and critically the main points of Iqbāl's philosophical thesis in order especially to point out his failure to reconcile reason and dynamism.

This failure, as will become obvious, is due not to the fact that dynamism is necessarily opposed to rational purposiveness, but to the plain fact that Iqbāl was not prepared to admit, in the final analysis, any veritable purpose in the process of reality, for it seemed to him to threaten what he called the "freedom" of activity. When, however, the student attempts to understand and examine Iqbāl's philosophical theories, he finds his task beset with difficulties. The main trouble arises out of the fact that Iqbāl is also a poet and as such lacks precision, definition and formulation. He frequently uses phrases in which it is hard to discover any definable core of conceptual content. Secondly, in the whole book and especially in its first four chapters which are purely philosophical, there is no well-knit and reasoned-out argument. It is rather an ingenious statement indicative of a certain philosophical attitude and for that purpose coherent enough, but, when subjected to an analytical examination, full of irreconcilable contradictions and logical anomalies.

Iqbāl starts in the first lecture by describing religious experience which is intuitive and immediate. He is, however, not prepared to admit that knowledge of the Ultimate Reality is obtainable only by intuition but declares that reason or thought is also capable of giving us knowledge (although in his poetry he ceaselessly deprecates reason and exalts intuitive experience which he terms, after the Persian Sufis, *'ishq* or love). "The idea that thought is essentially finite, and for this reason unable to capture the Infinite, is based on a mistaken notion of the movement of thought in knowledge. . . . In its deeper movement . . . thought is capable of reaching an immanent Infinite in whose self-unfolding movement the various finite concepts are merely moments."[8] Again, "It is a mistake to regard thought as inconclusive, for it, too, in its own way, is a greeting of the finite with the infinite."[9] These statements apparently mean that one can reach the Ultimate Reality both by mystic experience and by ratiocination. Yet, in the

8. M. Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, Oxford University Press, London, 1934, pp. 5-6.

9. Ibid., p. 6.

same breath, he says, " He [i.e. Ghazālī] failed to see [i.e. in his denial of the claims of philosophy] that thought and intuition are *organically* (italics my own) related."[10] But if they are organically related, then, obviously, neither of them can operate on its own, both must work together. And yet, what is this "thought", what is precisely its nature and its method? When one turns to the second chapter entitled. "The Philosophical Test of the Revelations of Religious Experience", one expects to find there, in view of the disjunction of thought (i.e., reason as distinguished from "logical understanding") and intuition, a *rational* test of the truth of intuitive communications. But, on the contrary, what one sees there is a Bergsonian type of intuitionism in which Reality is a free, creative vital impulse as revealed in pure duration. Here again Iqbāl reiterates that it is not only in intuition but also in thought that the true nature of Reality is known and accuses Bergson of having created an insurmountable gulf between will and thought: "This is really due to the partial view of intelligence that he [Bergson] takes. . . . But as I pointed out in my first lecture, thought has a deeper movement also. While it appears to break up Reality into static fragments, its real function is to synthesize the elements of experience by employing categories suitable to the various levels which experience presents. It is as much organic as life."[11] But although Iqbāl is throughout anxious to keep thought, in opposition to Bergson, it turns out in reality to be a mere lip-service, for whenever he describes it he condemns it like Bergson, as a mere intellectual mechanism devised only to control the world of space and matter. The results of this we shall see presently.

In the second lecture Iqbāl is concerned with finding a philosophical proof for affirming the spiritual character of Reality, and thus establishing God's existence. He rejects the cosmological and the ontological arguments. He also rejects the teleological argument which seeks to prove the existence of a God Who works on His materials from the outside. An immanant teleological ground he,

10. Ibid., p. 5.

11. Ibid., p. 46.

however, accepts. In support of this he rejects the static view of matter aud accepts Whiteheads's formulation of it as a "structure of events" in ceaseless dynamic flow. Then, turning to inner experience, he finds, with Bergson, its real character in "pure duration" untouched by serial time. In "pure duration" there is change but no seriality or succession. Its unity "is like the unity of the germ in which the experiences of its individual ancestors exist, not as a plurality, but as a unity in which every experience permeates the whole."[12] From the individual self this pure duration is then transferred to the universe and predicated of the Ultimate Ego. Thus an immanent God is established for Nature.

The motive, both with Bergson and Iqbāl, for affirming such a curious inner experience as that of pure duration, is, of course, to avoid determinism and to ensure for the ego a free dynamic activity. Bergson's anti-rationalism denied all teleological character to this activity. But at this point Iqbāl's anxiety about keeping something of rationality reasserts itself and he describes this vital surge as "purposive" and "rationally directed". But that these epithets are devoid of meaning is shown by the fact that he is not prepared to ascribe to it any long-range purpose or plan. Its purposes are being created afresh almost at every moment. He says :

> Mental life is teleological in the sense that, while there is no far-off distant goal towards which we are moving, there is a progressive formation of fresh ends, purposes, and ideal scales of value as the process of life grows and expands. . . . The world process or the movement of the universe in time, is certainly devoid of purpose, if we mean a foieseen end, a far-off fixed destination to which the whole creation moves. To endow the world process with purpose in this sense is to rob it of its originality and its creative character.[13]

Iqbāl goes on to say on the same page, "To my mind nothing is more alien to the Quranic outlook than the idea that the universe is the temporal working out of a preconceived plan." How long, it may be asked, does a single Divine purpose last? And what does it

12. Ibid., p. 45. 13. Ibid., p. 52.

even mean to talk of a single purpose terminating perhaps with a single move? For, purpose, in its strict sense, means nothing but the ultimate end with reference to which alone all individual movements are said to be purposive. As for Iqbāl's appeals to the Qur'ān, they are usually unconvincing.

Professor Gibb points out that "nowhere in these lectures does he specify the moral imperatives of his system of thought."[14] I think a system of thought whose gospel is just pure dynamism wherein purpose can have no real place can, *ex-hypothesi*, specify no moral imperatives.

Besides, I fail to see how a theory of pure duration proposes to fulfil its programme of establishing freedom and dispensing with the notion of causality. If all the past with its series of causes and effects were to shrink to the unit of a single moment, then even according to the theory, if the extension of time is gone, the order is still patently there. The theory, in fact, has overlaboured its insistence that it is the temporal priority of the cause over the effect, and, therefore, the notion of serial time that is responsible for producing determinism. For one thing, it can be and has been, contended that causation is a unique unanalysable relation and that temporal precedence may not even be a part of the notion of cause. And secondly, one can imagine, as indeed the primary laws of physics assume, a rigid scheme of causality in which what we call the past and what we call the future are equally necessarily connected with each other and the entire order is absolutely determined, thus making the past and the future, i.e. the whole extension of time, entirely irrelevant, since the whole process can be supposed to be given at once, in a single moment. And what about the future? The unity of pure duration, we are told, is like the organic unity of a germ in which the past and the present are co-present with "open possibilities" for the future. But the notion of an objective possibility is precisely the notion of potentiality. And what is a potentiality but a positive tendency to "become". Thus we believe that the future tree is potentially present in the seed (Iqbāl

14. Gibb., op. cit., p. 82.

himself says this)[15], just as an effect is potentially present in its cause. Thus we see that even in the process of pure duration, the future must be somehow given in the present.

The doctrine outlined above represents the fundamental position of Iqbāl. It leads him to reject the transcendent view of God, Whom he therefore regards, in the true tradition of Sufism, as being immanent in the World. But he vigorously rejects pantheism and regards God as a supreme individual. Of this God he affirms the attributes of creativity, knowledge and omnipotence. Dealing with the question of creativity, he takes up the atomistic theory of the classical *Mutakallimūn*, and develops it in the light of the atomism of modern physics. He wrongly attributes the modern idea of an expanding universe to the *Mutakallimūn*, who, since they were atomists both with regard to space and time, could not believe in the continued identity of the world and therefore postulated an ever recurring creation and annihilation of the world by God. But they were far removed from having any idea of an expanding universe in the sense in which modern science understands it. As to the relation of God with Nature, Iqbāl describes the latter as being something not apart from God but as being God's behaviour. Just as behaviour and the owner of behaviour are not *two* entities co-ordinate with each other, so is the case with God and the world. This behaviour, i.e. the movement of the world, Iqbāl describes as being, according to the Qur'ān, the *sunnah* or the habit of God. From this he deduces the regularity and permanence of the world. Here, nevertheless, a conflict appears between Iqbāl's immanentism and the Qur'ānic transcendentism. If the world is the behaviour and character of God, then obviously God cannot dispense with it, for no one can dispense with one's character. Hence his affirmation that the world is regular, permanent, etc. But in the same breath he says, "The ultimate Self, in the words of the Quran, 'can afford to dispense with all the worlds. . . .' What we call Nature or the not-self is only a fleeting moment in the life of God."[16]

15. Iqbal, op. cit., p. 6. 16. Ibid., p. 53.

It would carry me beyond the scope of this article to pursue further the analysis of Iqbāl's philosophy. Whereas a student of *The Reconstruction* cannot fail to be impressed by its true fervour and its great ingenuity, he cannot at the same time but feel vexed at its claims to appeal to the Qur'ān and classical Islam. Apart from the Qur'ān, Iqbāl seldom, if at all, gives any sources to which the student may refer and check his statements. Yet it constitutes so far the only really serious attempt on the part of any modern Muslim to restate the philosophical position of Islam. There is surely a heavy responsibility on thinking Muslims to re-cogitate and re-express their faith in terms of newer knowledge and thereby in turn revitalise and deepen it. The human mind never stands still and knowledge is perpetually advancing, and every major change in man's world-view demands a fresh interpretation and revaluation of the basic truths of faith. But these interpretations must not be imposed from without but must grow from within the system of belief itself. Only then can they convince other Muslims and command respect outside. At the present there exists a most serious gap between the conservatives and the opposite wing—a spiritual and intellectual gulf which may one day disintegrate our society as the expression of a fabric of belief which has shaped our cultural values for centuries. This gulf can be bridged only by a rational understanding and clarification of faith, for whereas faith can be rejected, reason cannot: it can only be refuted. And that which refutes it is *ipso facto* reason. It was a grave mistake of later generations of Muslims to suppose that Ghazālī had refuted philosophy by faith, for philosophy cannot be refuted except by another philosophy.

I must say that I hope this critical statement will be taken in the genuine spirit of truth-seeking investigation in which it has been written. Far from minimising the truly deep debt which the Muslims owe to Iqbāl, I sincerely think that, in saying what I have said, I have only acted according to his own fervent love for truth.

I also want to point out that, according to me, the sixth chapter of *The Reconstruction* is the best, although it can be criticised here and

there. In advocating a cautious and sober attitude towards social change, Iqbāl can be charged with being out of tune with the out-and-out dynamism avowed in his earlier chapters and, on this score, Professor W. C. Smith has criticised him in his *Modern Islam in India.* But I think this charge can be met by saying that although a social organism must continuously experience microscopic changes, it, by its very nature, exhibits microscopic changes in accordance with the laws of its constitution as an organism : otherwise it will disintegrate. The case would be analogous, although not exactly parallel, to changes in an aggregate of atoms we call a thing.

January 1955

M. Saeed Sheikh

IQBAL AS A MODERN INTERPRETER OF ISLAM

It is evident from the very title[1] of his major work in English that Iqbāl's was an attempt essentially to reconstruct the religious thought in Islam in the light of the latest developments in modern science and philosophy. And in the twentieth century so far, he indeed is the greatest Muslim thinker to have made an attempt at a really modern philosophical interpretation of Islam. Many Muslim modernists, Iqbāl's contemporaries or those belonging to the preceding generation, Nāmik Kamāl and Ziā Goklap in Turkey ; 'Abdūh, Rashīd Riḍā, and 'Abd al-Rāziq in Egypt ; Kāẓim 'Aṣṣar, 'Allāmah Ṭabāṭabāī, and Alī Ḥusain Rashīd in Iran ; Muḥammad Kurd 'Alī in Syria ; Ḥājī Āgus Salīm ln Indonesia ; and his own compatriots Sir Sayyid Aḥmad Khān, Shiblī Nu'mānī, Ameer 'Alī and Abū'l-Kalām Āzād, to mention just a few names, were great in other ways but not in the modern philosophical interpretation of Islam. None of these has had Iqbāl's rigorous formal discipline in Western philosophy and other domains of modern knowledge, nor was anyone of them fortunate enough to be possessed with his almost numinous poetic vision bodering on the metaphysical disclosure of reality. There is no gainsaying the fact that it is

1. *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam.* Oxford University Press, London, 1934.

verily a biological necessity for the Muslims of the modern world to have a reinterpretation of the teachings of Islam in the idiom and grammar of modern science and philosophy, for thus alone can they be communicative to others and have a meaningful international existence as well as an international message.

One may, however, very legitimately ask : How far is it possible to reinterpret and reformulate religious thought in Islam in terms of modern science and philosophy? Is this attempt at the modernisation of Islam justified from the point of view of the Qur'ān and the Ḥadīth ? Are these through and through pro-philosophical or pro-scientific ? What is the philosophical justification of bringing about a kind of *rapprochement* between the humanly discovered truths of modern science and philosophy on the one hand, and the divinely revealed teachings of Islam on the other ? What really is at the back of Iqbāl's mind in effecting such a *rapprochement* ? What practical purpose does it serve ? The present essay is an attempt to answer these and other subsidiary questions as briefly as possible.

In the Holy Qur'ān there is no dichotomy between faith and knowledge as there is none between the spiritual and the secular aspects of man's individual and social life. The very word *Qur'ān* signifies "the book which is (or should be) read" and it speaks of itself, among other titles, as *al-Kitāb*,[2] i.e. "the Writing" which is complete. Indeed "reading" and "writing" have been given such a paramount place in the Holy Qur'ān that the very first revelation received by the Prophet was an injunction to read and there is also the mention in it of "the pen" (*al-qalam*)[3] of which the Qur'ān elsewhere takes an oath.[4] The Prophet, according to the Qur'ān, is both a messenger and a teacher[5] who himself, like a great teacher, is represented as praying : "My Lord, increase me in knowledge".[6] Knowledge raises man in dignity and it is through the exercise of his noetic faculties and the acquisition of knowledge that he comes to rule over the forces of nature. Man is

2. The Qur'ān, ii. 2.
3. Ibid., xcvi. 1-4.
4. Ibid., lxviii. 1.
5. Ibid., ii. 151.
6. Ibid., xx. 114.

superior to angels verily because of his capacity to name things[7], which is at the same time the capacity to form concepts through a process of inductive generalisation. This is just a passing mention of the importance given by the Holy Qur'ān to knowledge in general. The sayings of the Prophet (*aḥādīth*) bearing on the subject are too many and too famous to be listed here. Suffice it to say that, according to the Prophet, "seeking of knowledge is religiously obligatory on every Muslim man and Muslim woman" and no difficulty, howsoever great it may be even so much as to march on foot from Arabia to China, exonerates a Muslim from the performance of this duty.

It is of utmost importance to note that Islam is a dynamic religion in the sense that it makes full allowance for the reinterpretation or reconstruction of its teachings in the changed circumstances and novel conditions of life through the institution of *Ijtihād* which is considered, besides the Qur'ān and the Ḥadīth, the third source of Islamic law. *Ijtihād* is a jurist's exerting the faculties of mind to the utmost for arriving at a legal opinion concerning a doubtful and difficult point. The importance and value of the exercise of one's judgment or, in other words, the use of one's reasoning faculty is expressly recognised by the Holy Qur'ān. It is full of repeated exhortations like the following : "Do you not reflect ?" "Do you not understand ?" "Why do you not reason ?" "Have you no sense ?" In case of a controversy with people of other religions it urges the believers to make use of an argument in the best possible manner.[8] Those who do not make use of their reasoning faculty have been called by the Qur'ān the deaf and the dumb. They have been spoken of as cattle and even worse than them.[9] "The vilest of the animals in Allah's sight are the deaf and the dumb, who do not understand."[10] On the other hand, the learned doctors of Islam who, by the use of their deductive faculties, bring out (*istinbāṭ*) the hidden meanings of the text of the Qur'ān, have been given a position and status next only to the Prophet.[11] According to

7. Ibid., ii. 31.
8. Ibid., xvi. 125.
9. Ibid., vii. 179.
10. Ibid., viii. 22.
11. Ibid., iv. 83.

the Qur'ān, though revelation as a source of knowledge is higher than reason and though it is through revelation alone that the fundamental principles of Islam are made known to the believers, there is also an ample provision, particularly through the institution of *Ijtihād,* for the exercise of one's rational faculties. It is thus alone that those learned in religious sciences of Islam are to explicate the inner meanings of its fundamental teachings and work out their practical ramifications in individual and social life. Islam thus admits of the principles both of "permanence" and "change" with regard to its teachings and makes full allowance for their perpetual readjustments with the changing conditions of time, as novel situations crop up and new socio-economic problems arise. The institution of *Ijtihād* is also expressly recognised and equally emphasised in the Ḥadīth. What is important to note here is that the Companions of the Prophet were freely allowed to resort to the exercise of their judgment even during the Prophet's own lifetime. On being appointed the Governor of the province of the Yemen, Mu'ādh was asked by the Prophet as to the law by which he would manage the affairs of the people. "By the law of the Qur'ān," Mu'ādh replied. "But in case you do not find any [explicit] direction in the Qur'ān?" asked the Prophet. "Then I will act according to the Sunnah (practice) of the Prophet," was the reply. "But if you do not find any direction even in the Sunnah ?" the Prophet asked further. "Then I shall exercise my own judgment and act according to it," was Mu'ādh's reply. He did not say that he would send an emissary to the Prophet to seek his advice in a difficult matter, nor did the Prophet make any such suggestion. He instead, on hearing Mu'ādh's reply, raised his hands and said : "Praise be to Allāh who guides the messenger of His Messenger as He pleases."[12]

The above is a short account of the importance accorded by the Qur'ān and the Ḥadīth to the seeking of knowledge and the use of reasoning faculty in general. Iqbāl, however, avowedly makes an attempt to reconstruct the religious thought in Islam in terms of modern science and philosophy. What then is the attitude respectively

12. Abū Dāwūd, 23 : 11.

of the Qur'ān and the Ḥadīth to the study specifically of philosophy and science ?

The term "philosophy" being derived from the Greek words *philein* and *sophia* originally means "love of wisdom". The Arabic word for wisdom and so also for philosophy is *ḥikmah* and it has been used at least nine times in the Holy Qur'ān and many more times in the sayings of the Holy Prophet. The term *ḥikmah* as used in the Qur'ān and the Ḥadīth has a unique and peculiar connotation of its own rarely to be found in the modern use of the term "philosophy". Philosophy, for example, has been defined by William James as an "attempt to think clearly and methodically about certain notions (concepts) which are always turning up in our thinking and which seem necessary to our thinking but which the special sciences do not tell us about." "Philosophy", according to another modern philosopher, G.T.W. Patrick, "is an attempt to combine the common experiences of life on the one hand and the results of the special sciences on the other into a consistent and harmonious world-theory."[13] Whereas the former may be said to be an analytical and the latter a synthetical or synoptic definition of philosophy, in both cases it has been primarily understood to be a theoretical affair, an abstract or speculative study. With the advent of the movements of Logical Positivism and Philosophical Analysis, philosophy in our days in fact has been reduced to a clever but empty game—mere logic-chopping and trifling with semantic husks, the salad of truth-tables and the dust of sense-data. *Ḥikmah* is far from being any such thing. It may partly consist in the theoretical understanding of the universe and man's place in it but it essentially is a practical wisdom—a vision and light—gained through the inner purification and cultivation of one's soul and the rigorous discipline of one's individual and social life. Philosophy, according to *ḥikmah*, is not mere noetic ownership or equipment which leads one to a certain "world-theory" or point of view but entitative assimilation of new visions of reality through a living encounter with it, which assimila-

13. See article "Philosophy" in *An Encyclopedia of Religion* edited by V. Ferm, The Philosophical Library, New York, 1943.

tion leads to a complete transformation of one's inner self and lifts it up to ever new horizons and dimensions of being. It is in this sense that the Qur'ān speaks of *ḥikmah* or philosophy and says : "Whoever is granted *ḥikmah*, he indeed is given a great good."[14] It is also in this sense that it very rightly speaks of itself as the "Book of Wisdom"[15] or "the Book the verses in which are characterised with wisdom."[16] In the Ḥadīth *ḥikmah* is said to be "the lost thing of a believer", that is, a thing of which he is in a perpetual search or quest. The Prophet is also reported to have said *kād-al-ḥakīmu an yakūna nabīyyā*, meaning that "a philosopher is well-nigh a prophet", which saying is to be construed in the light of the Qur'ānic meaning of the term *ḥikmah*. According to another tradition, the Prophet is said to have prayed, "O Lord ! show me the inner reality of things as they are", which indeed is a truly philosophical prayer and it readily reminds us of the Kantian notion of the noumenon or the thing-in-itself. One is tempted to conclude that it is because of the above-mentioned pro-philosophical attitude of the Qur'ān and the Ḥadīth that Iqbāl as against Kant strongly maintains the thesis of the "possibility of metaphysics".

The teachings of the Qur'ān certainly evince a through and through favourable attitude towards the study of various sciences so much so that Iqbāl makes the rather challenging pronouncement that "The birth of Islam . . . is the birth of inductive intellect."[17] It is significant to note that the Qur'ān uses the same word *āyāt* (singular *āyah*) for the Qur'ānic verses as well as for the observable phenomena of nature as if the open book of nature is another Qur'ān which every Muslim is obliged to study with as much devotion and diligence as the Holy Scripture. In fact the Qur'ān repeatedly enjoins upon the believers to make a close observation of the rich variety of the facts of nature and thus have the vivid sense of the presence of God to all things. Of the very many verses of the Qur'ān bearing on this theme only a few can be quoted here.

14. The Qur'ān, ii. 269.
15. Ibid., x. 1.
16. Ibid., xi. 1.
17. Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, Oxford University Press, London, p. 120.

In the creation of the heavens and the earth and the alternation of the night and the day, there are surely signs (*āyāt*) for men of understanding.[18]

And He it is Who sends down water from the clouds; and We bring forth with it buds of all [plants], then We bring forth from it green [foliage], from which We produce clustered grain; and of the date-palm, of the sheaths of it, come forth clusters [of dates] within reach; and gardens of grapes and the olive and the pomegranate, alike and unlike. Look at the fruit of it when it bears fruit and the ripening of it. Surely there are signs (*āyāt*) in this for a people who believe.[19]

He it is who made the sun a shining brightness, and the moon a light, and ordained for it stages that you might know the computation of years and the reckoning. Allāh created not this but with truth. He makes the signs (*āyāt*) manifest for a people who know. Surely in the variation of the night and th e day, and that which Allāh has created in the heavens and the earth, there are signs (*āyāt*) for a people who keep their duty.[20]

And He it is Who spread the earth and made in it firm mountains and rivers. And of all fruits H: has made pairs, two [of every kind]. He makes the night cover the day. Surely there are signs (*āyāt*) in this for a people who reflect. And in the earth are tracts side by side, and gardens of vines, and corn, and palm-trees growing from one root and distinct roots—they are watered with one water; and We make some of them to excel others in fruit. Surely there are signs (*āyāt*) in this for a people who understand.[21]

He it is Who sends down water from the clouds for you; it gives drink, and by it [grow] the trees on which you feed. He causes to grow for you thereby herbage, and the olives, and the date-palms, and the grapes, and all the fruits. Surely there is a sign (*āyah*) in this for a people who reflect. And He has made subservient for you the night and the day and the sun and the moon. And the stars are made subservient by His command. Surely there are signs (*āyāt*) in this for a people who understand. And what He has created for you in the earth is of varied hues. Surely there is a sign (*āyah*) in this for a people who are mindful.[22]

18. The Qur'ān, iii. 190.
19. Ibid., vi. 99.
20. Ibid., x. 5, 6.
21. Ibid., xiii. 3, 4.
22. Ibid., xvi. 10-13.

See they not the birds, subjected in the heaven's vault. None withholds them but Allāh. Surely in this are signs (*āyāt*) for a people who believe.[23]

See they not the camel, how it is created ? And the heaven, how it is raised high ? And the mountains, how they are fixed ? And the earth, how it is spread out ?[24]

It is evident from the above verses that the Qur'ānic epistemology is as much pro-empirical as pro-rational. Knowledge through the sense-organs is not illusory or mere appearance but a veritable blessing of God. Says the Qur'ān : "He gave you hearing and sight and hearts that you may give thanks."[25] Sense-experience indeed is in a way our source of revelation to us of the signs (*āyāt*) of God as manifested through the observable phenomena of nature—as much in the ripening of fruits and the flight of birds as in the alternation of the night and the day and the swing of the sun and the moon in the vault of heaven. There is in fact a God-like mystery about all the phenomena of nature and the more we know about them the greater our sense of wonder about them. With all the great strides that we have made in our scientific knowledge of things, we have yet not been able to unravel all the myriad secrets that lie embedded in their heart. The simple act of opening our eyes and perceiving a thing that lies before us is as much mysterious as the jump of the electrons from one orbit to another in their frenzied dance around the protons in an atom. The philosophers of all times have puzzled over the former and the modern physicists have posited the embarrassing "principle of indeterminancy" to account for the latter. Nature seems to have the divine touch of the miraculous in all its varied phenomena and the deeper we go into their study the greater our feeling that we are enwrapped all around by impenetrable mysteries. Yet we also become very acutely aware of an ineluctable power and glory, a wonderful intelligence and a creative design pervading the entire

23. Ibid., xvi. 79.
24. Ibid., lxxxviii. 17-20.
25. Ibid., xvi. 78 ; xxxii. 9.

scheme of things. Such are the revelatory signs (*āyāt*) of God in all the phenomena of nature. It is in this sense that nature is an open book of God, a veritable another Qur'ān ; the study of the phenomena of nature under various sciences may be said to be an attempt to divide this divine book into various chapters (*sūrahs*). According to Iqbāl, the so-called laws of nature are in fact the habits of God (*sunnat Allāh*). He tells us in so many words that "knowledge of Nature is the knowledge of God's behaviour", and adds that this is only "another form of worship".[26] There is no dichotomy in Islam between being a great Muslim and a great scientist. There indeed has never been a conflict between science and religion in the history of Islam as is to be found in the history of Christianity in Europe. Because of the clearly pro-scientific teachings of the Qur'ān, the Muslims in the early era of Islam pursued the study of various sciences almost with a sense of religious devotion and soon became famous for their remarkable achievements in astronomy and mathematics, physics and chemistry, botany and zoology, geography and historiography, etc. But their greatest singular achievement was the discovery anew of the scientific method, hence the statement of Iqbal: "The birth of Islam . . . is the birth of inductive intellect." There is no gainsaying the historical fact that the Muslim scientists keenly elaborated and promoted the various methods employed in scientific investigation. It is rightly claimed by Iqbāl that it was through the study of Arabic and not Greek works that the European scholars for the first time came to be initiated into the inductive methods of scientific inquiry. He corroborates this claim of his by quoting at length from R. Briffault's famous work *The Making of Humanity* and of this we reproduce below the last passage :

The debt of our science to that of the Arabs does not consist in startling discoveries of revolutionary theories; science owes a great deal more to Arab culture, it owes its existence. The ancient world was, as we saw, pre-scientific. The Astronomy and Mathematics of the Greeks were a foreign importation never thoroughly acclimatized in

26. Iqbal, op. cit., p. 54.

Greek culture. The Greeks systematized, generalized, and theorized, but the patient ways of investigation, the accumulation of positive knowledge, the minute methods of science, detailed and prolonged observations and experimental inquiry were altogether alien to the Greek temperament. . . . What we call science arose in Europe as a result of a new spirit of inquiry, of new methods of investigation, of the method of experiment, observation, measurement, of the development of Mathematics in a form unknown to the Greeks. That spirit and those methods were introduced into the European world by the Arabs.[27]

We have tried to establish so far that Iqbāl's attempt to reconstruct religious thought in Islam in terms of modern science and philosophy is fully justified on the basis of the teachings of the Qur'ān and the Ḥadīth. But is this attempt also justified philosophically and if so in what sense ? The essential basis of Iqbāl's entire philosophical thinking is the fundamental Islamic doctrine of Divine Unity (*tauḥīd*) and so ontologically he is primarily a monist. He believes that reality is essentially one, even though it has various levels or grades of its manifestation. It manifests itself variously at the levels of matter, life, and mind, and it best manifests itself in the selves of human beings. But in every case it is the manifestatiou of the same one reality—more at this level and less at that—and not of many realities. As to the epistemological position of Iqbāl, it is necessary to draw the important distinction between an epistemological theory which is independent of ontological presuppositions and the one which is not so. Iqbāl's epistemology is of the latter kind : it is through and through based on his ontological doctrines and particularly on the monistic doctrine of the unity of God. Hence his epistemology like that of the Qur'ān is a global espistemology making full allowance for all kinds of noetic experiences : sense-perception, reason, intuition, prophetic revelation, etc. All these according to him are the various media for our apprehension of the same reality at the different levels of its manifestation. Scientific, philosophical, and religious approaches to the understanding of reality are man's endeavours directed to the same

27. Ibid., p. 124.

objective. True that science, philosophy, and religion lay varied emphasis on man's noetic sources, apparently speak different languages—each having its own peculiar terminological vocabulary and grammar—and they certainly have palpable procedural and methodological differences, but all these are differences of degree or level only and not of kind or quality. In the final analysis there is nothing in them which should make them inherently antithetical to each other. In fact, Iqbāl insists, they need each other for mutual supplementation and rejuvenation.[28] It is not logically impossible to be a great Muslim as well as a great scientist and philosopher; a Muslim on the contrary comes to have much deeper and richer vision of the teachings of his religion because of his greater scientific and philosophical understanding of things. It is indeed biolgically necessary for the very inner unity and integrity of our personality that we should bring about some kind of coherence in our scientific, philosophical, and religious world-views. We as Muslims cannot possibly afford to keep them in watertight compartments.

In the Preface to the *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, Iqbāl tells us that in his attempt at a kind of *rapprochement* between Islamic religion and modern science and philosophy he has only followed the past philosophical tradition of Islam. Though it is true that the Muslim philosophers from Kindī (d. *c*. 260/873) onward in general have made sincere effort to reconcile their faith with the scientific and philosophical knowledge of their day, there have also been, one may point out, some serious exceptions to this general practice. Imām Ghazālī, Ibn Khaldūn and Ibn Taymīyah, for example, were not at all happy over the philosophers' syncretic attempts at grandiose system-building, and they even declared an open warfare against them.[29] But what is important to note here is that Iqbāl's gaze is fixed more on a present need and urgency than on the past tradition or practice. He is convinced that the Muslims in the twentieth century can ill-afford to keep their religious beliefs altogether insulated

28. Ibid., p. 2.

29. See M. Saeed Sheikh, "Reorientation of Muslim Philosophy", *The Pakistan Philosophical Journal*, Vol. IX, No. 3, pp. 7 ff.

from the great strides made by the West in the various domains of human knowledge. Further, Iqbāl's interest in the reinterpretation of Islam in terms of modern science and philosophy is essentially and primarily of a practical nature and not merely theoretical or academic. Thus alone, he thought, he could bring about the revival of the Muslim community and pull it out of the woeful state of backwardness into which it had fallen.

The Muslims all over the world, Iqbāl felt keenly and painfully particularly after his return from Europe, lagged much behind in the march of nations not only politically and economically but almost in all spheres of life. Technologically they were pitiably underdeveloped, intellectually unproductive, and morally no better. Lethargy, sloth, inefficiency and mismanagement seemed to prevail in their individual and social life in general. Religion, which they often considered the best compensation for the loss of their material well-being, was reduced by them more or less to ritualism, obscurantism, and fanaticism. Above all, they lost their cultural roots: they were so overwhelmed and demoralised by the dazzling progress of the West that they no longer had any faith in their own cultural values and norms and even awareness of them. They stopped thinking out things for themselves and began to cherish more and more foreign imported ideas and ideals, fashions and fads. It is at this juncture that Iqbāl made his clarion call to awaken the Muslims of the world from their state of self-oblivion and, infused a new life into them.

January 1967

Abdur Rahman

IQBAL'S PHILOSOPHY OF THE SELF

Iqbāl's philosophy of the self has more or less been ignored by the West. You will not find mention of Iqbāl's name or philosophy in any Western work on the subject. On the other hand, after the initial period of indifference, the East started taking notice of Iqbāl, and has ended by worshipping him, more or less blindly. Both these attitudes are unfair to the great poet-philosopher. Iqbāl appears to have had no time or inclination to present his doctrine of the self in plain philosophical language. One should have expected his Muslim followers, however, to have completed this task. Although many commentaries have been written on the various aspects of his philosophy, much remains to be accomplished in this important field. In this article, an attempt is made to present certain salient features of Iqbāl's doctrine of the self.

Iqbāl asserts that self is the only Reality in this world. Before tackling the problem of the self, it appears necessary to define Reality. What do we mean by Reality? There is, for instance, a table lying in front of me at the moment. Is the table real ? Philosophy says, "No", and science agrees with philosophy. Philosophy points out that the framework of space, time and form, in which the various objects of the universe seem to be moulded, are but the figments of my own mind. And likewise, the colours, the qualities of hardness, softness, heat and cold, the sounds, smells, tastes, etc. are also the result of

mind's "own subjective" construction and interpretation. The knowledge of the intrinsic nature of the universe, apart from that gleaned through the channels of the mind, is beyond the reach of humanity. Many philosophers, in fact, deny the existence of the universe, and concede Reality solely to mind or consciousness.

And what is the attitude of science? The table lying in front of me feels "solid" to the touch. This feeling, however, is merely the interpretation given by my mind to the mutual repulsion of the electrical charges in the molecules of my hand and the table. And, moreover, since no two molecules can "touch" each other, my hand can never really touch the table. And what of the table itself? Rays of light of different wave-lengths strike my retina, and reach my brain cells via the optic nerve, which I interpret as the table. I only see the light. The table is my own invention. Moreover, we do not know what light is. It is a most mysterious thing. We see objects through it, but never the light itself. And the "matter" of the table consists of electrons and protons, the ultimate constituents of electricity. Their nature is as inscrutable as that of light. It turns out that "things are not what they seem" to be.

Now consider the mind. Here apparently we have at least something real. Whatever the nature of the universe, I am indubitably convinced of the reality of my own self. "I think, therefore I exist." There is a great measure of truth in this formula. While writing this article I am thoroughly convinced that "I" am writing it. But, unfortunately, when I recall this memory in retrospect, the ideas which are passing in my mind at this moment will be recalled, but the "I" behind them will refuse to be isolated. This means that mind, as such, refuses to be isolated for scrutiny. This has led many philosophers to deny the reality of the mind. The mind, they say, is an illusion, there are only ideas.

There are other philosophers with views diametrically opposed to the above. They assert that all consciousness, say, "my seeing a tree", however absent-mindedly, without intruding my "I" in the process, is essentially of the nature of self-consciousness. That is to say, the self

or the "I" is always involved in an act of perception. That means that I only see my "I" or self projected as the "tree" and nothing else. Thus, according to these philosophers, the universe is the result of the self externalising itself, and coming back to itself, as objects of the universe. The difficulty of the above position is obvious, as the following illustrations will show. I see a car turning round a corner, and notice that its wheels are round and about three feet in diameter. Does it mean that my consciousness or "I" is round, and is about three feet in diameter? Again, is the softness and warmth of the body of a loved one part of my "I" or consciousness?

Other eminent philosophers have been led to believe in the unreality of human thought and experience (sense-perception), owing to the existence of irreconcilable contradictions in them, for instance, the existence of both free will and determinism in human thought. Both these exist side by side in the human mind, but each is incompatible with the other. They, therefore, concede only partial reality to human thought and experience, the total Reality being consciousness or experience in general, of which the individual thought is but a partial manifestation. The General Consciousness or the Absolute, however, being outside human experience, it is impossible to conceive it ; and herein lies the difficulty of this view.

In the field of biology, as in physics, the law of causation is supreme. Every effect is preceded by a cause. Our actions are automatic and causal responses to the stimuli of the outside environment. This leaves no room for free will to both human thought and action. Psychology, in asserting the parallelism of mind and matter, denies initiative or reality to the mind. The sensory nerves of the body receive the outside stimulus, the brain cells decide on the response, the motor nerves take the appropriate action. The result is a thought or an action. Some philosophers who consider that all mental acts are the result of physiological processes in the human body as above, have drifted into Scientific Materialism. There are others who take the opposite view, and give priority to the mental over the physical and physiological aspects of the chain, arguing thus : Rays of light (a physical pheno-

menon) are interpreted by my mind as the rainblow (a mental occurrence). The chain between the physical and the mental being continuous, the chances are that the so-called physical link in the chain is also mental in character. Psychology also throws doubt on the intrinsic value of Truth and Goodness. Truth is that which works in practice, e.g., a Law of Physics, and Good is that what the mind desires to be good.

Lastly, there is the insoluble problem of mind and matter. The famous philosopher who postulated, "I think, therefore I exist", also laid down the rule that only those things can be called real, of the reality of which we are convinced with the same certainty as about the reality of our own "I" or mind. Now it is obvious that we cannot be convinced of the reality of matter with the same certainty as we are of the mind. So matter and mind were rent asunder, and no means have yet been found to bring them together. It is a mystery why and how we see, hear and feel outside objects, the intrinsic nature of which is forever hidden from us.

To sum up, both philosophy and science join in denying reality to human mind, thought, or experience, and to matter, truth and goodness. This, in fact, is the fragile foundation on which the edifice of Western civilisation has been raised. Iqbāl attacks this position, and points out Reality for all to see.

Iqbāl points out that the centre of experience, i.e. the mind or self is the only reality in this world. And this is not the mere "thought" of Hegel, or the "experience" (sense-perception) of Bradley, but the whole of personality, and that, too, "in a state of tension". This means : (i) Personality is a self, carrying not only the impressions of its past responses to outside stimuli during its present life, but in addition all its inherited responses since creation. It is an "attitude" poised like a knife-edge to receive stimuli, to judge the same, and to take action. (ii) It is "in a state of tension to receive and interpret fresh stimuli, and (iii) to take appropriate action "on its own initiative".

Now both orthodox philosophy and science would have no quarrel with the above views, except with the latter part of the last, viz., "on its

own initiative". How can a self chained to the Law of Causation, possibly find room for initative in thought and action?

Iqbāl answers : through a faculty which is termed intuition. This faculty, according to Iqbāl, provides consciousness with a short cut to Reality. In religious language, the above term is identified with "the grace of God" and popular religion says that it is a gift from God. Iqbāl disagrees with this view, and says that the self must earn the grace of God by effort. It is not a gift, but a prize to be won. And he further adds that a self developed and in a state of tension acts as a magnet for the grace of God. It absorbs the latter. But the initiative for development must spring from the self, which is a measure of its individuality.

Kant suggested that when we are doing a moral act from a pure sense of duty, we are part of the world of Reality and are outside the world of phenomena. Iqbāl agrees with this view, but adds that the faculty to do good deeds must be cultivated by developing the self. Iqbāl further adds that the faculty of intuition is vastly improved by prayer, which provides a direct channel between God and man. But he makes it clear that prayer is not an end-in-itself. It is a powerful aid to the development of the self.

Now what does Iqbāl mean by the development of the self? The self in developing itself must make itself more and more unique or individual. By what means? By impinging itself against the environment, by self-expression, by creative activity. He is endeavouring to say that the self must not act as a passive recipient of outside stimuli, but (through the faculty of intuition) should snatch the initiative, and stamp its own personality on the hostile environment. It should create. How does the faculty of intuition help the self? It does so by creating moral and spiritual significance and values. The struggle against the environment, to be real, must be carried on the spiritual plane.

But there must be a motive force behind the self to carry it through the terrific struggle. That force, says Iqbāl, is Love. Love, in fact, is of the very nature and being of the self and the universe. Observe how a child hankers for being loved, patted and cuddled. Notice how an adult

craves for the world's regard, approval and appreciation, not to mention the proverbial relations between the lovers of the opposite sex. The nature of man is, therefore, a craving for being loved. And his self-expression is an expression of this side of his nature.

But man also loves his fellow-beings and the universe. Have you ever had the misfortune to undergo a serious operation, or find yourself in a situation facing death, and were lucky to have come out of the situation with a new lease of life? Do you remember those enchanting moments following the fresh assurance of life, how sweet the universe appears, with its sky, sun and stars, the earth with its multitude of interesting objects, and lastly your fellow-beings. How beautiful everything is, including your worst enemy! You love them all. Thus the nature of man, nay the nature of existence, is to love and be loved.

But can this be said also about the universe in general? Is there an element of love in nature? In reply I would only ask: What is beauty in nature if not an expression of Love? Consider your physical body attentively. When young you are beautiful and during that magic period your mind is also at its best, full of love of yourself and the world. In fact, during youth you are brimming with Love. It is not a mere coincidence that during that period you are also beautiful.

The above are my own conclusions, not expressly stated by Iqbāl, but he does say that the universe is based on Love as in the following verses:

بباغاں بادِ فرور دیں دہد عشق
براغاں غنچہ چوں پرویں دہد عشق
شعاع مہر او قلزم شگاف است
بماہی دیدۂ رہ بیں دہد عشق[1]

Love brings spring breezes to the garden.
And raises flower buds like the pleiades in the meadows.
The rays of the sun of love pierce the ocean.
And provide the fish with seeing eyes in its dark depths.

1. *Payām-i Mas͟hriq*, p. 12.

Love then is the motive force impelling the self towards its goal of perfection.

At this stage a logical objection suggests itself. It has been stated that the self must take the initiative in capturing the "grace of God" through intuition. The initiative is an effort or an act of will. But the question arises in view of the universal applicability of the law of causation: Is any initiative possible for the will? In other words, can the will be free? This is the crux of the problem. Science is all for determinism and many schools of philosophy too deny free will to human thought and action. Iqbāl's position is that the desire for free will must initiate from the mind. And since love and desire are in the very nature of Being, a man is free in his desires. Further, Iqbāl believes with Socrates in the innate goodness of human nature and suggests that man's desires are naturally attuned to God. His baser impulses are an impediment from the past, which he is carrying. When man addresses himself to God (say, through prayer) a connection is forthwith established through intuition. And the fruit of this connection is knowledge. And once full and clear knowledge of a thing has been achieved, right action is bound to follow. This was, in fact, the position of Socrates. In the end he confessed his inability to acquire knowledge—Socrates's famous affirmation of ignorance. It appears that he missed the possibilities of intuition. Thus an act of will, under the above circumstances, is free. And this is the meaning of the development of the self, as envisaged by Iqbāl.

Progressive perfection implies obstacles to be overcome. These are of two kinds, the physical obstacles presented by the outside environment, and the mental ones inherent in the personality of the self. The former are overcome by the mastery of nature through the discovery of its laws by the intellect, which faculty is evolved from experience and memory. Intellect extracts knowledge of the outer world from the indiscriminate stream of sense-perceptions. The mental obstacles to be overcome are our desires of the senses connected with that part of our personality which is a cumbersome heritage from the past. All these must be overcome by rigorous self-discipline and action based on moral

and spiritual values.

Our elementary contact with the outside environment is sense-perception. Is the environment real ? Yes, says Iqbāl. The environment is as much a manifestation of the Self as human personality. The difference is only one of degree. Mind and matter are not alien to each other. Their nature is identical. But one may object with Leibniz, that the world of each individual self is a private world, which it is impossible for another self to penetrate. Then how can I know that the universe is a "colony of selves", other than myself ? Leibniz himself attempted to answer this question by placing the connection of the selves in the Ultimate Ground (God). But I venture to suggest a more rational explanation. Love and Beauty are the connecting links between the selves. Beauty in the universe and Love for that Beauty reveal to the self the existence of the "world of selves". How, then, do we perceive the outside universe? Through God, says Iqbāl. "God is the Light of the heavens and the earth."[2] And Iqbāl says, "Without Thee it is impossible to awake from the sleep of non-existence. Without Thee it is impossible to be. With Thee it is impossible not to be." But philosophy is silent an the subject. Only Aristotle ventured to suggest that our sense-perception is intuitional. And he may not be far wrong, seeing that intuition is a means of direct connection with God!

Granting sense-perception, how does the intellect operate to gain knowledge ? Again the answer is, by intuition. Otherwise, how is it possible to know a thing which is not known? Plato conjectured that the process of acquiring knowledge is a renewal of past memory. We already had this knowledge in a previous existence ; learning only refreshes our memory. But a more satisfactory explanation is that knowledge through the intellect is intuitional in character. And finally our sense of moral values and spiritual significances is clearly intuitional. That is to say, their knowledge comes spontaneously, as if from without, as a kind of inspiration. The intervention of intuition at each step, from simple sense-perception to the assessment of moral and spiritual values, clearly shows man's intimate connection with God.

2. The Qur'ān, xxiv. 35.

It is, therefore, clear that man's purpose is running parallel to God's purpose in working out his own destiny. And fortunate is one whose purpose identifies itself with that of God. In Iqbāl's view this is possible only by developing the self on spiritual lines, through intuition, helped by prayer, and propelled by Love.

A logical question here arises: If sense-perception is real, how do we account for errors in perception? Iqbāl would reply (if he had been asked this question) that errors are due to the defective development of the self. Some errors arise out of a lack of attention; others are due to our own desires and inclinations supplying a wrong picture of a thing. Both these cases show lack of "tension" on the part of the self. The self to be free and real must be in a state of "awareness"; otherwise it is merely a passive automaton for receiving the outside stimuli or a slave of its own inclinations and desires. By acquiring knowledge, the self becomes more and more individualised. When I acquire fuller knowledge of an object, I "see" it more clearly. Why? Because, through knowledge, my self becomes more discriminating and more individual. And similarly through action, the self acquires a mastery over the environment and gains in uniqueness.

Is there an end to the development of the self? "None that I know of", says Iqbāl. There is no limit to the development of the self. Why? Because the self is potentially immortal, its nature being of the nature of Time or Pure Duration (of Bergson). The serial time is spurious time. It consists of slices cut out by the intellect from pure duration, for its own purposes of action. The self lives in the present, but carries its past with it. And its past is gnawing steadily at its future, at the razor-edge of the present. However, in Iqbāl's view, immortality cannot be achieved by the self as a matter of course. The self must work for this end, and it can only achieve immortality by remaining "in a state of tension". A self, having attained this state, survives the shock of death.

Lastly, God is also a Self, the Most Unique Self. In working towards uniqueness, human self approaches God, but retains his separate entity. This doctrine strikes at the root of all forms of pantheism.

According to Iqbāl, there is no fixed purpose in the universe. This is logical enough, for if there were a fixed far-off purpose in the universe, the whole scheme would turn into a gigantic mechanised toy with human beings as puppets or automata, with no freedom of will or moral responsibilities. The universe, moreover, is not a complete whole ; it is still in the making. And God's purpose is also still in the making ; and so with man and his purpose. In working out his own purpose righteously, man is helping God's purpose. Man has immense potentialities, and before him is God's Most Unique Self as an ideal and beacon-light to guide him.

In the above discussion the development of the individual self has been chiefly considered. How about the co-operation of the different selves ?

It has been suggested that Love and Beauty are the connecting links between the selves. Their mutual co-operation must, therefore, be based on love and sympathy. Do not hate your enemy ; pity him, for if his hate is due to his prejudice, he is proving false to his own self. Fight only in self-defence, and when you do so, have no fear, for the self in that exalted condition is literally immortal. Death has no meaning for it. But do not transgress. Remember, your adversary is also a self, though misguided, whose nature is identical with yours. The mutual co-operation of selves is vastly accelerated by having common ideals and aspirations, as a nation. The history of a nation is the record of the mutual co-operation or discord of its community of selves. Individual selves desire strength and sustenance from the fountain of the common ideals of the nations. The bond among the individual selves of a nation is essentially one of love and sympathy.

The high water-mark of Iqbāl's philosophy of the self is the development of the character of the individual through the development of the self. He clearly aimed at the creation of a race of supermen, possessing unlimited powers over the elements, through application of the intellect, and animated by godly ideals acquired through intuition or commnuion with God They shall be the vicegerents of God on earth. Nay, the earth and the heavens shall be their heritage. He also

envisaged a single individual, who by the irresistible magnetism of his noble personality, shall lead others to the path of glory—Iqbāl's conception of the Prophet.

In conclusion, I may mention one or two points of disagreement with Iqbāl. After all, who can claim to have said the last word in philosophy ?

Iqbāl does not attach any great value to art, or the pursuit of art, arguing that it leads to a relaxation of the "state of tension" necessary for the development of the self.

It has been suggested before that love and beauty are of the very nature of the self. And what is art but beauty ? In my humble opinion the faculty of the appreciation of art is a mark of high development of the self. A person endowed with this gift is highly sensitive to beauty, i e. to the spontaneous love expressed by other selves. His sympathies are broad. There can be no room for hate and meanness in his heart. Iqbāl seems to have overlooked the dual role of the self in dealing with the outside environment, namely, that of receiving impressions and making responses (or action). The appreciation of beauty belongs to the first category and, as such, is highly beneficial to self-development. No doubt, the individual must not neglect development of the other part of his self, namely, the necessity for action.

There is another point. Iqbāl observes that immortality of the self is not assured as a matter of course, but must be earned through effort. It would be more correct to say that the "grade" of immortality depends on the efforts of the self. For it is obvious that "being" cannot conceivably "ceases to be". Sheer annihilation means "nothing", and Bergson has rightly pointed out that it is impossible to conceive of a "nothing". Even before the universe came into existence, there must be some other order of existence, for it is impossible to conceive of "nothing". This is a powerful argument for the existence of God, and it applies equally to the immortality of the self.

July 1953

M. Rafiuddin

IQBAL'S IDEA OF THE SELF

From the earliest times men have endeavoured to solve the riddle of the universe, having had an intuitive conviction that the world is a unified whole. To the idealist philosopher or to the man of religion this view is quite natural, since he believes that the universe is the creation of a unitary Being and is permeated by a single purpose. Even the materialist philosophers have been unable to get away from the urge of their nature, common to all philosophers and all thinking men, to look upon the world as a unity. Indeed, if those who are engaged in search of knowledge were not to start with the idea that there is a unity and uniformity of design and purpose in the universe, neither science nor philosophy would have been possible. Iqbāl too looks upon the world as a unity.

No one, therefore, can do justice to Iqbāl unless he explains all his ideas with reference to a single central idea with which they may be shown to be rationally connected.

After the death of Iqbāl, a large amount of very able criticism of his works has come into existence, but an ordered and systematic exposition of his philosophy is yet to be worked out. No one has so far explained Iqbāl's ideas as parts of a comprehensive theory of the universe. He is our national poet-philosopher, and we claim and rightly so that his message is of supreme importance to the anxious humanity

now face to face with complete annihilation on account of a series of world wars in which it has got entangled and from which it knows no refuge. But unless we arrange his ideas in a logical order, work out their full implications and carry them to their conclusions, neither we nor the rest of the world can benefit from his valuable teachings.

One who undertakes this highly important task will have to satisfy at least two conditions. First, he should go back to the very source, the very fountainhead of his ideas, to that basic feeling or intuition of his mind from which all his ideas emanate. In other words he should acquire Iqbāl's own vision of reality, his own mystic or spiritual experience. Despite Iqbāl's repeated, unequivocal pronouncements it has been little realised that, although he is both a poet and a philosopher, he is fundamentally neither a poet nor a philosopher but a mystic. His gifts of poetic expression and philosophical knowledge both are subservient to his mysticism. All that he has done is to interpret his mystic experience in the conceptual and abstract language of philosophy and to express his philosophical ideas born in this way through the forceful medium of verse that influences deeply and strongly the minds of others. It is not his object to please his readers by songs or stories of love like other poets; he even abhors the idea of being called a poet of their like.

نہ پنداری کہ من بے بادہ مستم
مثال شاعراں افسانہ بستم
نہ بینی خیر ازاں مرد فرو دست
کہ بر من تہمت شعر و سخن بست[1]

* * * *

او حدیث دلبری خواہد ز من
رنگ و آب شاعری خواہد ز من
کم نظر بے تابیٔ جانم ندید
آشکارم دید و پنہانم ندید[2]

* * * *

1. *Zabūr-i 'Ajam*, p. 204. 2. *Payām-i Mashriq*, p. 3.

نغمہ کجا و من کجا ساز سخن بہانہ ایست
سوئے قطار می کشم ناقۂ بے زمام را[3]

He also dissociates himself from all philosophy that is the outcome of a distorted and incomplete vision or intuition of Reality on the ground that it is divorced from the love of God.

تڑپ رہا ہے فلاطوں میان غیب و حضور
ازل سے اہلِ خرد کا مقام ہے اعراف[4]

* * * *

نہ فلسفی سے نہ مُلاّ سے ہے غرض مجھ کو
یہ دل کی موت ، وہ اندیشہ و نظر کا فساد[5]

* * * *

بلند بال تھا لیکن نہ تھا جسور و غیور
حکیم سرِّ محبت سے بے نصیب رہا
پھرا فضاؤں میں کرگس اگرچہ شاہیں وار
شکار زندہ کی لذت سے بے نصیب رہا[6]

What Iqbāl says about Hegel applies equally to other philosophers.

حکمتش معقول و با محسوس در خلوت نرفت
گر چہ بکرِ فکرِ او پیرایہ پوشد چوں عروس
طائر عقل فلک پرواز او دانی کہ چیست ؟
ما کیاں کز زور مستی خایہ گیرد بے خروس[7]

On the other hand, Iqbāl openly and repeatedly claims for himself the experience of a mystic. He often uses such words as *suz-i darūn* (inner fire) ; *shauq-i nigāh* (pleasure of insight), *jān-i betāb* (restless soul), etc.

عصر حاضر را خرد زنجیر پاست
جان بے تابے کہ من دارم کجاست ؟[8]

* * * *

3. *Zabūr-i 'Ajam*, p. 79.
4. *Bāl-i Jibrīl*, p. 112.
5. Ibid., p. 101.
6. Ibid., p. 218.
7. *Payām-i Mashriq*, p. 245.
8. *Jāvīd Nāmah*, p. 3.

اے پسر! ذوقِ نگاہ از من بگیر
سوختن در لا الٰہ از من بگیر[9]

* * * *

مرے کدو کو غنیمت سمجھ کہ بادۂ ناب
نہ مدرسے میں ہے باقی نہ خانقاہ میں ہے[10]

* * * *

اعجمی مردے چہ خوش شعرے سرود
سوزد از تاثیر او جاں در وجود[11]

He loves to use for himself such words as *dervīsh*, *qalandar*, *faqīr*, etc., each of which signifies a mystic.

درویش خدا مست نہ شرقی ہے نہ غربی
گھر میرا نہ دلّی نہ صفاہاں نہ سمرقند[12]

* * * *

سر آمد روزگار ایں فقیرے
دگر دانائے راز آید کہ ناید[13]

* * * *

قلندر جز دو حرف لا الٰہ کچھ بھی نہیں رکھتا
فقیہِ شہر قاروں ہے لغت ہائے حجازی کا[14]

Secondly, in order to understand Iqbāl's philosophical interpretation of his own spiritual experience, one should have a thorough knowledge of philosophy and of the latest discoveries of science. Evidently, when such a man begins to systematise Iqbāl's philosophical rendering of his own mystic experience (which will be common between him and Iqbāl), he will build upon that rendering and carry it a step further.

But these two conditions are such that, while each of them may be fulfilled by different persons individually, their combination in a single

9. Ibid , p. 234.
10. *Bāl-i Jibrīl*, p. 100.
11. *Pas Cheh Bāyad Kard*, p. 7.
12. *Bāl-i Jibrīl*, p. 34.
13. *Armughān-i Ḥijāz*, p. 14.
14. *Bāl-i Jibrīl*, p. 50.

man is rare. There is a great dearth of intellectual mystics in this age of irreligious intellectualism and intellectual barrenness of religiosity.

It is not possible for me to attempt a systematic exposition of Iqbāl's idea of the self in this small article. But I shall endeavour to give below its salient features and to explain each as much as I can within the space at my disposal.

(A) Khudī *is the Fundamental Reality of the Universe.*

پیکر ہستی ز آثار خودیست
ہرچہ می بینی ز اسرار خودیست[15]

* * * *

زمین و آسمان و چار سو نیست
درین عالم بجز الله هو نیست[16]

Khudī signifies mind or consciousness. Since, wherever there is mind or consciousness, there is life, Iqbāl has frequently used the words *ḥayāt* and *zindgī* for *khudī* or consciousness. We know that consciousness is to be found in both man and animal. But the standard of human consciousness is higher than that of animal consciousness. Because an animal is conscious, it knows, feels and thinks. But a human being not only knows, feels and thinks, but when he does so, he also knows that he knows, feels and thinks. Thus in the human beings consciousness knows itself and human consciousness is of the nature of self-consciousness. It is this self-consciousness which is described more briefly by the word "self". Iqbāl gives the Urdu or Persian translation of this words as *khudī*. It was hardly possible to find a more appropriate Urdu or Persian equivalent of this old and simple philosophical term. Yet, unfortunately, it has been widely misunderstood by the readers of Iqbāl. The reason is that this word is already in use in Urdu and Persian in a very different sense, in the sense of pride and selfishness, and Iqbāl, too, in view of our present lassitude, has stressed one out of the several characteristics of *khudī*, the characteristic, namely, of self-

15. *Asrār-o-Rumūz*, (*Asrār-i Khudī*), p. 12. 16. *Armughān-i Ḥijāz*, p. 170.

assertion. This has led many persons to imagine that the philosophical term *khudī* has something in common with the meaning of this word in everyday language. This, of course, is not true.

Iqbāl's view of the reality of consciousness is not a new idea in philosophy. It is a view that has been very popular with philosophers throughout. Most of the philosophers have been idealists, i.e. have believed in the primacy of mind. Consciousness in man and the universe is the one great theme not only of mediaeval European philosophy—the object of which was the rationalisation of Christianity—but also of the great philosophical systems of the modern age expounded by philosophers like Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Croce, Bergson, etc.

This view, however, received a serious set-back on account of the eighteenth-century science which, on the basis of actual experiments in the laboratory, concluded that matter was indestructible and, therefore, self-existent and the only reality behind the universe. Consequently, it was believed that mind or life was only a property of matter that appeared when matter assumed a particular chemical composition. Berkeley challenged the conclusion of the scientists and stood up boldly against them, defending the view of the idealist philosophers. But his contention appeared to be a losing one. Twentieth-century hypotheses in physics and biology like Relativity Theory, Quantum Theory, Second Law of Thermodynamics and the theories of Creative Evolution and Emergent Evolution have, however, entirely changed the situation. These hypotheses have compelled the scientists to revise their theory about the nature of matter and to favour, instead, the view, long advocated by religion and idealist philosophy, that consciousness is the basic force in the universe and that matter is its emanation. Thus materialism, the idol of science, has been shattered by science itself.

The result is that the materialistic philosophies, built on the eighteenth-century view of the nature of matter, are gradually losing ground and the idealistic philosophy is acquiring a new force. The scientists, bewildered by their own discoveries, are busy giving a spiritual explanation of the universe. They have wandered out of the realm of matter into the world beyond, because it is now there that

they hope to discover the Ultimate Reality. This is evident from the numerous books written by top scientists of the world like Einstein, Eddington, James Jeans and others on the subject. "The present state of physical knowledge", writes Joad, "seems to prominent scientists to point to conclusions directly contrary to those of old materialism and to favour a spiritual interpretation of the universe as strongly as the science of fifty years ago was thought to favour a materialist interpretation."

(B) *Evolution is a Fact.*

چو فطرت می تراشد پیکرے را
تماشش می کند در روزگارے[17]

* * * *

یہ کائنات ابھی نا تمام ہے شاید
کہ آ رہی ہے دمادم صدائے کن فیکوں[18]

But the cause of evolution is the creative activity of the consciousness of the universe. Evolution is the method of creation which is always gradual. Consciousness, in creating anew the universe from moment to moment for the sake of its own self-expression, is continually breaking through its own resistance and outgrowing itself, and, thereby, gradually advancing towards its goal, its destination or ideal. Consciousness is going on and on in search of that goal like a swiftly running stream that meets with obstacles of hills and rocks and turns right and left to avoid them or washes them away to make a passage for itself. The onward creative march of consciousness resulted in the evolution of matter till matter became ripe for the production of animal life. During the animal stage, stretched over a period of millions of years, the evolutionary process resulted in the production of innumerable species of animals out of which those that did not suit the purpose of evolution were destroyed while those that suited the needs of evolution

17. *Payām-i Mashriq*, p. 88.

18. *Bāl-i Jibrīl*, p. 44.

and bore promise for the future were perpetuated. The story of evolution is related by Iqbāl in *Asrār-i Khudī* and *Sāqī Nāmah* from which the following lines are quoted:

وہ جوئے کہستاں اُچکتی ہوئی
اٹکتی لچکتی سرکتی ہوئی
اُچھلتی پھسلتی سنبھلتی ہوئی
بڑے پیچ کھا کر نکلتی ہوئی
رکے جب تو سِل چیر دیتی ہے یہ
پہاڑوں کے دل چیر دیتی ہے یہ
ذرا دیکھ اے ساقیٔ لالہ فام
سناتی ہے یہ زندگی کا پیام

* * *

دمادم رواں ہے یمِ زندگی
ہر اک شے سے پیدا رمِ زندگی
اسی سے ہوئی ہے بدن کی نمود
کہ شعلے میں پوشیدہ ہے موجِ دود
گراں گرچہ ہے صحبتِ آب و گل
خوش آئی اسے محنتِ آب و گل
یہ ثابت بھی ہے اور سیّار بھی
عناصر کے پھندوں سے بیزار بھی

* * *

یہ عالم یہ بت خانۂ شش جہات
اسی نے تراشا ہے یہ سومنات

* * *

ٹھہرتا نہیں کاروانِ وجود
کہ ہر لحظہ ہے تازہ شانِ وجود

* * *

زمانے کے دریا میں بہتی ہوئی
ستم اس کی موجوں کے سہتی ہوئی
تجسس کی راہیں بدلتی ہوئی
دمادم نگاہیں بدلتی ہوئی [19]

* * * * * *

سازد از خود پیکر اغیار را
تا فزاید لذت پیکار را

* * *

می شود از بہر اغراض عمل
عامل و معمول و اسباب و علل [20]

* * * *

وا نمودن خویش را خوئے خودی است
خفتہ در ہر ذرہ نیروئے خودی است [21]

* * * *

پیکر ہستی ز اسرار خودی است
ہر چہ می بینی ز اسرار خودی است [22]

Passing through the earlier forms of life, consciousness came to its own and gained its freedom and self-consciousness in the human beings for the first time since the beginning of creation.

ازل سے ہے یہ کشمکش میں اسیر
ہوئی خاک آدم میں صورت پذیر

خودی کا نشیمن تیرے دل میں ہے
فلک جس طرح آنکھ کے تل میں ہے [23]

19. Ibid. (*Sāqī Nāmah*), pp. 166-72.
20. *Asrār-o-Rumūz* (*Asrār-i Khudī*), pp. 12-3.
21. Ibid., p. 14.
22. Ibid., p. 12.
23. *Bāl-i Jibrīl*, p. 173.

And now consciousness seems to make man the instrument of its own self-realisation. It will express itself in man more and more till in him it will behold itself in its full splendour. The perfect man of the future is the final objective of all this tedious and lengthy process of evolution.

آیۂ کائنات کا معنیٔ دیریاب تو
نکلے تری تلاش میں قافلہ ہائے رنگ و بو[24]

* * * *

یہ ہے مقصد گردش روزگار
کہ تیری خودی تجھ پہ ہو آشکار[25]

When the perfect man would appear the strife of the nations will end and peace and prosperity will reign on the earth. Iqbāl addresses the man of the future as follows.

اے سوارِ اشہبِ دوراں بیا
اے فروغ دیدۂ امکاں بیا
رونق ہنگامۂ ایجاد شو
در سواد دیدہ ہا آباد شو
شورش اقوام را خاموش کن
نغمۂ خود را بہشت گوش کن[26]

The process of evolution involves a good deal of waste and experimentation which is likely to be mistaken for cruelty or purposelessness in nature. For example, consciousness creates millions of solar systems in order to have one that suits its ends; it creates millions of species for the sake of one that is perfect; and it creates innumerable prophets before the Perfect Prophet makes his appearance. In all such cases the end justifies the means. Because the final result is extremely precious ; it more than compensates for the loss that is involved in its creation.

24. Ibid., p. 153.
25. Ibid., p. 174.
26. *Asrār-o-Rumūz* (*Asrār-i Khudī*), p. 51.

خود فریبی ہائے او عینِ حیات
ہمچو گل از خوں وضو عینِ حیات
بہریک گل خون صد گلشن کند
از پئے یک نغمہ صد شیون کند

* * *

شعلہ ہائے او صد ابراہیم سوخت
تا چراغ یک محمدؐ بر فروخت

* * *

عذر این اسراف و این سنگیں دلی
خلق و تکمیل جمال معنوی[27]

While Iqbāl's view of the causes of evolution is entirely Qur'ānic, it is also the one that is compatible with the most recent hypotheses of physics. These hypotheses point to consciousness as the sole reality of the world. This view is further supported by the most up-to-date scientific investigations in the field of biology. Serious students of biology, according to Professor Haldane, no longer entertain the view that life is the result of a definite chemical composition of matter. The experiments of the German biologist Driesch, in particular, have led to the conclusion that there is an internal regulating principle active in the organism which moulds and forms it in the interest of the whole, changing and directing its purpose to suit this interest. This regulating principle must be interested not only in the growth of the individual organism, but also in the growth and evolution of life as a whole. Bergson supports this contention in his book *Creative Evolution* by a series of highly cogent arguments.

Lamarck explained the evolution of life as a result of adaptation by living beings to the conditions of environment. Adaptation causes a slight alteration in the form of the animal—an alteration inherited by the offspring, which, being itself subjected to the necessity of adaptation, undergoes a further change. In this way, modifications go on accumulating gradually till we have a new species. But it is now well established that variations may not only be due to an accumulated

27. Ibid., pp. 12-3.

effect, but may also take place suddenly. This is impossible unless there is a conscious drive in the organism itself causing it to develop a sudden change or improvement. Briefly, the ninteenth-century view advocated by Lamarck and Darwin that evolution is the chance result of the play of mechanical forces, is now being abandoned in favour of the view that evolution is purposive and is the outcome of a conscious and creative activity in nature.

(C) *Self-consciousness.* Self-consciousness, whether as the Universal Self-Consciousness or as expressed in the human beings, has only one urge and that is love, or the urge or quest for Beauty. But how is self-consciousness related to love? Where is that Beauty which it seeks? The answer is that self-consciousness itself is Beauty. The human self-consciousness loves the Universal Self-Consciousness (which is really within it) and the Universal Self-Consciousness loves the human self-consciousness, and on account of this love. It is in a perpetual process of creation. As a result of this process, It will reach the height of Its beauty and perfection in due course of time.

حسن را از خود برون جستن خطاست
آنچه می بائست پیش ما کجاست؟[28]

Loving or seeking that is going on at both ends of consciousness, is really the cause of history or the process of evolution, leading to the perfection of the universe or rather to the perfection of man who is the essence of the universe.

ما از خدائے گم شدہ ایم او بجستجوست
چون ما نیاز مند و گرفتار آرزوست
گاہے بہ برگ لالہ نویسد پیام خویش
گاہے درون سینۂ مرغاں بہ ہاؤ ہوست
در نرگس آرمید کہ بیند جمال ما
چنداں کرشمہ داں کہ نگاہش بہ گفتگوست

28. *Zabūr-i 'Ajam* (*Gulshan-i Rāz-i Jadīd*), p. 255.

آہے سحر گہے کہ زند در فراق ما
بیروں و اندروں ، زبر و زیر وچار سوست
ہنگامہ بست از پئے دیدار خاکئے
نظارہ را بہانہ تماشائے رنگ و بوست

* * *

در خاکدانِ ما گہر زندگی گم است
این گوہرے کہ گم شدہ مائیم یا کہ اوست؟[29]

* * * *

یہ راز ہم سے چھپایا ہے میر واعظ نے
کہ خود حرم ہے چراغ حرم کا پروانہ[30]

* * * *

خود تجلی کو تمنا جن کے نظّاروں کی تھی
وہ نگاہیں نا اُمید نور ایمن ہو گئیں[31]

Man expresses his love for the Divine Self by worshipping It, adoring Its qualities and acting in Its service, i.e. by expressing Its qualities in his own actions. Self-consciousness (human or Divine) is Love and Beauty at the same time. When it is seeking self-consciousness it is Love ; and when it is being sought by self-consciousness, it is Beauty. The Divine Self is actual Beauty, but the human self-consciousness is potential Beauty that has yet to be actualised or revealed as a result of the creative process. Beauty includes all its qualities like Power, Goodness, Truth, etc., which are all lovable and admirable and which are always expressed in the service of Love. They belong to Universal Self-Consciousness and, therefore, also to man, to the extent to which he is able to increase his love and his knowledge of Beauty and thereby to evolve and display his latent self-consciousness.

By adoration and action the self evolves its self-consciousness, identifies itself more and more with the qualities of Beauty and adds to its knowledge of Beauty as well as to its power to give a better and

29. Ibid., pp. 132-3.
30. *Armughān-i Ḥijāz*, p. 267.
31. *Bāng-i Darā*, p. 207.

fuller expression to its urge for Beauty.

چیست جاں ؟ جذب و سرور و سوز و درد
ذوق تسخیرِ سپہرِ گرد گرد[32]

* * * *

از ہمہ کس کنارہ گیر صحبت آشنا طلب
ہم ز خدا خودی طلب ، ہم ز خودی خدا طلب[33]

* * * *

خودی کا سرِّ نہاں ، لا الٰہ الا اللہ
خودی ہے تیغ ، فساں لا الٰہ الا اللہ[34]

* * * *

دل ما آتش و تن موج دودش
تپید دم بدم سازِ وجودش
بذکرِ نیم شب جمیعتِ او
چو سیمابے کہ بندد چوبِ عودش[35]

Knowing the self-consciousness of the Universe and knowing one's own self, are one and the same thing, because the growth of the self's knowledge in one direction results simultaneously in the growth of its knowledge in the other.

تلاش او کنی جز خود نہ بینی
تلاش خود کنی جز او نیابی[36]

* * * *

تو رازِ کن فکاں ہے اپنی آنکھوں پر عیاں ہو جا
خودی کا راز داں ہو جا خدا کا ترجماں ہو جا[37]

* * * *

32. *Jāvīd Nāmah*, p. 20.
33. *Zabūr-i 'Ajam*, p. 162.
34. *Ḍarb-i Kalīm*, p. 7.
35. *Armughān-i Ḥijāz*, p. 167.
36. *Payām-i Mashriq*, p. 51.
37. *Bāng-i Darā*, p. 311.

اگر خواہی خدا را فاش بینی
خودی را فاش تر دیدن بیاموز[38]

(D) *Action.* Action is a tool which the self uses as a means for the satisfaction of its urge for Beauty. The self acquires knowledge (cognition) for the sake of action. All action is really directed to the removal of resistance in the path of the self's urge for Beauty. By effort and action it gains in power for further effort and action. When the self is obstructed in the achievements of its ends, it musters the whole of its power to smash resistance. The Divine Self and the human self are, therefore, both perpetually in action.

دما دم رواں ہے یم زندگی
ہر اک شے سے پیدا رم زندگی

* * *

ٹھہرتا نہیں کاروان وجود
کہ ہر لحظہ ہے تازہ شان وجود

* * *

سفر اس کا انجام و آغاز ہے
یہی اس کی تقویم کا راز ہے[39]

* * * *

یہ ہے خلاصۂ علم قلندری کہ حیات
خدنگِ جستہ ہے لیکن کہاں سے دور نہیں[40]

(E) *Love.* The fact that Love or the search for Beauty is the sole urge of human self-consciousness, has implications which bring to light some highly important facts of human psychology. Iqbāl alludes to this possibility when he addresses the psychologist in the following words :

جرأت ہے تو افکار کی دنیا سے گذر جا
ہیں بحرخودی میں ابھی پوشیدہ جزیرے
کھلتے نہیں اس قلزم خاموش کے اسرار
جب تک تو اسے ضرب کلیمی سے نہ چیرے[41]

38. *Armughān-i Ḥijāz*, p 154.
39. *Bāl-i Jibrīl*, p. 170-3.
40. Ibid., p. 75.
41. Ibid., pp. 221.

I give below a brief survey of the implications of these couplets :

(*i*) It is only the Divine Self and Its attributes that can really satisfy a man's urge for Beauty. Consequently, when a man is loving, and seeking by action and service, an ideal in the universe and its qualities, he is expressing his urge for Beauty in the right way. But when, owing to his ignorance of the real desire of his self, he is not doing so, his urge for Beauty finds expression in some other idea to which he wrongly attributes all the qualities of Beauty. The reason is that we cannot hold any urge of our nature, least of all the most powerful urge of all, in abeyance for a single moment. Thus a substitute ideal chosen by man becomes the ideal of his life, and dominates all his activities. The ideal of his choice, no doubt, appears to possess some qualities of the Real Ideal and that is the reason why he is allured to it. But his love for the wrong ideal will not endure long. Sooner or later, the urge of his true self, his inner criterion of Beauty, will begin to operate and the man will discover the elements or qualities of Beauty that his ideal is lacking. When this happens, he will be disillusioned and disappointed, and will come to know that the apparent qualities of Beauty in the ideal that had lured him to it were no more than illusions. Therefore, he will turn immediately to another ideal for the satisfaction of his urge for Beauty. In the new ideal he will try to avoid those elements of ugliness or imperfection of which he had become conscious. But in the absence of his knowledge of the Right Ideal and the qualities of Beauty, he introduces some other unknown elements of imperfection into it, and these, sooner or later, make him dissatisfied with it and then he abandons it totally for another ideal. This process of trial and error continues as long as he does not hit upon the Right Ideal. What ideal a person will choose as the ideal of his life at a particular time, will depend upon the state of his knowledge and experience at that time, and, therefore, as his knowledge and experience improve, he will approach nearer the qualities of true Beauty in the choice of his ideal. But this process is very long, for innumerable combinations of right and wrong, perfect and imperfect, are possible. It is also a difficult process as every new choice leads to new adjustments.

Thus the urge for Beauty in man takes the form of the urge for ideals and is capable of being fully satisfied by an ideal of the highest beauty and perfection, and that is the Divine Self. Ideals form stages in the development of the self. We are never absolutely wrong, but we advance from a lower to a higher and from a less perfect to a more perfect ideal. This is what Iqbāl means when he says :

زندگی شرح اشاراتِ خودی است
لا و الاّ از مقاماتِ خودی است[42]

"*lā*" stands for the self's stages of wrong ideals ; and "*illā*" stands for the Right Ideal.

(*ii*) Because the urge for Beauty or the urge for ideals is the only urge of man's self-consciousness, it is prior to his instinctual urges and is to rule them. Instincts are those psycho-physical dispositions or compelling tendencies of action which man inherits from his animal ancestors and shares with them. Evidently, their object is to compel the semi-conscious animal to act for the preservation of its life and race. Without them, the current of life would never have reached the human level and self-consciousness would never have come to its own. When the instincts reach higher up in man, they naturally perform in him their original function of compelling action for the preservation of life. But man preserves his life for the sake of the urge of his self for Beauty. The instincts in him do not obstruct the urge of the self, which is free to have its way, but only help it to satisfy itself, if called upon to do so. The proof of this is that man can oppose any of his instincts, even the most compelling of them, and even lay down his life whenever he thinks his ideal needs this sacrifice. Animals below man in the scale of evolution cannot do so, because they are not self-conscious and do not possess the urge for ideals. This urge in man, is stronger than his instincts. It is his ideal of Beauty and not any one of his instincts, or all of them together, that dominates his life.

(*iii*) Since politics is an aspect of the life of an individual which is completely dominated by his ideal, the individuals who form a State

42. *Jāvīd Nāmah*, p. 177.

have a common ideal—the ideal of their State—and that is the reason why they come together to form a State. Thus all the aspects of the life of a State are ruled and controlled by the ideal that it has come to adopt for the time being. The ideal of a State, i.e. the common ideal of its members, determines very precisely all its political, ethical, legal, economic, constitutional, educational and military activities. These activities take a definite direction, and there can be no change in them, unless the ideal from which they result is itself changed.

(*iv*) Since an ideal has to exercise a complete control over a man's relation to the universe arround him it answers, to the entire satisfaction of the man who loves it, all possible questions about himself, about the society of which he is a member and about the rest of the universe, no matter how vague, incorrect and even fantastic these answers may be to others. An ideal, therefore, develops around itself a system of ideas and becomes an ideology or a philosophy of life which may be vague or definite, developed or undeveloped, correct or incorrect, accoding to the intellectual stage of the society that believes in it.

(*v*) Variety of States is due to the variety of wrong ideals or ideologies and must persist or cause bloodshed as long as humanity does not agree upon a single ideology throughout the world. No wrong ideal can unite mankind permanently, for a wrong ideal is based on a part of our nature and satisfies only a part of our urge for Beauty. Therefore, even if it succeeds in uniting humanity for sometime it must, in due course, break up and give rise to a number of different ideals, dividing humanity again into hostile groups. The Right Ideology is the only stable and enduring foundation of our unity. Without it, unity or any other value will be difficult to achieve, and even if achieved, it will be impossible to maintain it.

(*vi*) Since an ideal is the ideal of the highest beauty or perfection known to the self, the self's efforts to realise it are really its efforts to amass as much glory and power as possible. Every State, i.e. every ideological group, has, therefore, an urge for unlimited expansion which brings it at once into a life and death struggle (sometimes open and sometimes concealed) with all the other States in the world. Thus a

perpetual war of ideals is going on. In this struggle only the Right Ideology can emerge victorious. The reason is that every wrong ideal is not only being smashed from outside by the attacks of other ideals, but is also being disrupted from within by the elements of its own contradictions and imperfections. It may protect itself from outside, but it cannot protect itself from its inner negations, which sap its vitality continuously and ultimately render it too weak to withstand external attacks. This must be the fate of every ideal except the Right Ideal which, alone, will survive the war of ideals.

(*vii*) As in the case of an individual, so in the case of a society, ideals must advance by a painful and laborious process of trial and error towards the Right Ideal. If the ideal of a society is wrong, a time must come sooner or later when its latent elements of imperfection become known to it. This may come about when the internal strength of an ideal is put to test and found wanting at a critical point of its struggle with other ideals or by a gradual realisation of its weaknesses. In any case, when this happens, the society at once begins to feel the real or imaginary beauty of another ideal and makes a rush towards it. This phenomenon is known as a political or social revolution. Philosophy deals with ideals, and that is why original thought in philosophy giving fresh theories of man's relation to the universe, is always the forerunner of political revolutions. We all know that there was no great revolution in history that was not preceded by a philosophy. Thus when a society abandons one ideal and adopts another, it rigorously avoids in the new ideal those elements of defect which marred the old ideal and caused its disruption. But in the absence of its knowledge of the Right Ideal (since it can have no means of making sure that new choice is correct), it tends to adopt an ideal which contains certain other unsuspected elements of imperfection, and then these elements prove to be the seeds of another revolution which becomes inevitable sooner or later. The potential revolution concealed in the nature of the ideal may take centuries to actualise, but it is there and must ultimately come to the forefront. No State, no political, economic or social set-up is stable or permanent, unless it is determined by the

Right Ideal. Thus, man's idea of Beauty is evolving with the growth of his knowledge and experience and is being conserved in history. One day he will come to know that nothing but the Right Ideal can satisfy him perfectly and permanently.

خیالِ ماکہ اورا پرورش دادند طوفانہا
ز گرداب سپہر نیلگوں بیروں شود روزے [43]

Then his devotion and service to the Right Ideal will enable man to unfold the deepest possibilities of his nature and reach the height of his perfection.

فروغ خاکیاں از نوریاں افزوں شود روزے
زمیں از کوکب تقدیر ما گردوں شود روزے

* * *

یکی در معنیٔ آدم نگر از من چہ می پرسی
ہنوز اندر طبیعت می خلد موزوں شود روزے [44]

This view contains the fundamentals of a new social psychology and of a new philosophy of history, which, in contradistinction to the Historical Materialism of Marx, may appropriately be described as Historical Idealism.

(*viii*) Since all the activities of man are dominated by his love of the ideal, reason plays only a subordinate role in his life.

زندگی سرمایہ دار از آرزوست
عقل از زائیدگان بطن اوست [45]

* * * *

من بندۂ آزادم عشق است امام من
عشق است امام من عقل است غلام من [46]

Reason is a discriminating faculty that only helps the self in the realisation of its ideal. An ideal is a judgment of Beauty which has to be made directly with the help of intuition. Intuition is the urge of

43. *Zabūr-i 'Ajam*, p. 159.
44. Ibid.
45. *Asrār-o-Rumūz* (*Asrār-i Khudī*), p. 17.
46. *Zabūr-i 'Ajam*, p. 197.

Beauty and it plays a cognitive role with regard to it. Ideas of Beauty are unanalysable wholes or totalities which have to be directly felt. Love makes its own judgments. Realisation of Beauty does not come within the scope of reason which cannot see things in their totality but only in parts. Even though reason cannot make judgments of Beauty it can spur the self to intuit Beauty. Thus it serves the self in two ways, by helping it how best to act in the service of its existing ideal and by enabling it to have the vision of a higher ideal. Reason by itself cannot enter the domain of Love and cannot feel Beauty, for it is the privilege of the urge of the self alone. Thus reason goes with us a part of the way only. Says Iqbāl :

خرد سے راہرو روشن بصر ہے
خرد کیا ہے ؟ چراغ رہگذر ہے
درون خانہ ہنگامے ہیں کیا کیا
چراغ رہگذر کو کیا خبر ہے[47]

According to this view of reason—and this view is certainly more consistent with facts of human psychology, more defensible and more convincing than any other—ethics, politics, education and philosophy are determined by Love and not by reason.

Ethics is the direct outcome of a person's ideal. Everybody knows that in order to achieve his ideal he has to do certain things and to avoid doing certain others. He is aware of a code of do's and dont's—a code of right and wrong which he follows strictly on account of an inner pressure created by his love of the ideal. Thus every ideal has its own moral system or moral law and there are as many moral laws as there are ideals. This is why States with different ideologies cannot agree on what is real justice, truth, goodness, morality, civilisation or culture. Unless nations have one ideology they cannot have the same moral viewpoint. The moral law which is dictated by the Right Ideal is the only moral law on which men can and must agree sooner or later.

47. *Bāl-i Jibrīl*, p. 120.

Politics, like ethics, is not a separate science. It is the image of our ideals, a reflection of our views on life generally. An ideological group or society cannot live without an interested organisation or government. As every ideal has its own ethics, so every ideal has its own politics, its own ideas and theories of the constitution and management of human societies. Since all aspects of the life of an individual or a State are strictly controlled by the single force of an ideal, a State or a nation that is able to banish religion successfully from its politics will be compelled to banish it from the whole of its life. This is what Europe has been forced to do.

The foundation of every system of philosophy is the philosopher's intuition or vision of the nature of Reality. While the philosopher actually rationalises his intuition, he imagines, and makes others imagine, that he has been led to his conclusions by a process of hard and close reasoning. But if his intuition is wrong, his rationalisation is obviously misplaced, leading to wrong conclusions. His reasoning never crosses the limits of his intuition or vision of Reality. But correct vision of Reality becomes availatle only to a prophet or to a sage who acquires a true spiritual experience on account of his being a true lover and follower of a prophet. All prophets had true vision of Reality, but there came then the last of the prophets who gave us a complete code of life based on the universal application of his vision to the multifarious problems of practical life. It is on the intuition of such a prophet passed on by him to the best of his followers, that we can construct an all-comprehensive philosophy, perfectly relevant to all the known and unknown facts of existence, and, therefore, capable of enduring till the end of the world. Such is the philosophy of Iqbāl. This explains why Iqbāl, in spite of being a philosopher himself, has attacked and condemned philosophy and philosophers. According to him, no philosophy, which is based on an incomplete or sectional vision of Reality, can be true.

Education, like ethics, politics and philosophy, is not an independent system of knowledge. Every system, programme, or plan of education is the creation of an ideal. The textbooks, the mentality of the teacher and his general attitude towards life, the views of the managing and

governing authorities, whether they are public or private bodies, the environment and the atmosphere of the school, etc. reflect that ideal. Therefore, the ideal is continually attracting pupils towards itself. Education is a servant of ideals, whether wrong or right, and can be adapted to serve every one of them equally. Moral behaviour, in accordnace with absolute and universal principles of morality, is impossible without a strong love of the Right Ideal which it should be the object of educational institutions to inculcate in the mind of the youth. The learners are inspired by the love of wrong ideals, imperceptibly through the agency of the schools that embody the educational system created by those ideals.

گلا تو گھونٹ دیا اہل مدرسہ نے ترا
کہاں سے آئے صدا لا الٰہ الا اللہ [48]

* * * *

مکتب از مقصود خویش آگاہ نیست
تا بجذب اندرونش راہ نیست [49]

* * * *

علم تا از عشق برخوردار نیست
جز تماشہ خانۂ افکار نیست [50]

* * * *

یہ بتان عصر حاضر کہ بنے ہیں مدرسے میں
نہ ادائے کافرانہ نہ تراش آذرانہ [51]

(F) *The Love of Ideal.* The principal form in which the urge for Beauty expresses itself is the love of an ideal, since the self attributes to the ideal that it loves all the beauty that it desires. But this urge finds an independent expression also in three other ways which are meant to serve the Right Ideal, the real embodiment of Beauty. These three ways of loving and seeking Beauty are :

(1) the love of Goodness ;

48. Ibid., p. 69.
49. *Jāvīd Nāmah*, p. 238.
50. Ibid., p. 4.
51. *Bāl-i Jibrīl*, p. 23.

(2) the love of Truth or the search for knowledge ; and

(3) the love of Art.

(*i*) Man has love not only for the consciousness of the world, but also for its qualities which are all beautiful and lovable. Each quality of consciousness is a quality of Beauty and implies all its other qualities. Hence an individual has a desire to express these qualities in action. But when he comes to love a wrong ideal, this does not allow him to judge correctly what a good action is. His urge for goodness comes into conflict with his love for the ideal, and in this conflict it is always the latter that wins. The result is that man feels inwardly dissatisfied with its decision, and cannot get rid of the idea that there is something wrong with it. On the other hand, the moral judgment of a man who loves the Right Ideal will bring a sense of inner satisfaction to him.

(*ii*) The man who loves a wrong ideal may try to engage himself in the search for knowledge dispassionately, but his love for such an ideal will twist his line of search in the wrong direction in spite of himself. This is the case now with philosophy, social and individual psychology, politics, economics, ethics, education and other social sciences. But in the case of mathematics (and the physical sciences, in so far as they use mathematics), the margin for the interference of a misplaced love is small, since mathematics is a form of tautology. But men who love wrong ideals use the results of their mathematical investigations in the wrong direction. The use of the atom bomb, resulting from the mathematical theories of Einstein, for the mass-destruction of peaceful citizens is an example.

It is, however, true that, on the whole, knowledge is evolving and more and more correcting its own errors in the course of its evolution. Since the universe is in the direction of the Right Ideal, all real advancement of knowledge in the domains of science and philosophy is meant to, and must ultimately, strengthen the Right Ideal in theory as well as in practice.

(*iii*) The source of art too is the urge of the self, and, therefore, it cannot be at its best and highest, unless it subserves that urge. Every

form of art that is divorced from Goodness, Beauty and Truth, the principal qualities of consciousness, deviates from the right course of evolution and so is low and inferior as art.

سرود و شعر و سیاست ، کتاب و دین و ہنر
گہر ہیں ان کی گرہ میں تمام یکدانہ

* * *

اگر خودی کی حفاظت کریں تو عین حیات
نہ کر سکیں تو سراپا فسون و افسانہ [52]

* * * *

اے اہل نظر ! ذوق نظر خوب ہے لیکن
جو شے کی حقیقت کو نہ دیکھے وہ نظر کیا

* * *

شاعر کی نوا ہو کہ مغنی کا نفس ہو
جس سے چمن افسردہ ہو وہ بادِ سحر کیا [53]

(G) *Moral Action.* Moral action is based on correct moral judgments and correct moral judgments are possible only at a high stage of self-consciousness.

نمود جس کی فراز خودی سے ہو ، وہ جمیل
جو ہو نشیب میں پیدا ، قبیح و نا محبوب [54]

But a higher stage of self-consciousness presupposes continued moral action. Moral evolution would have been impossible if consciousness had not created the phenomenon of prophethood which provides a natural agency for teaching the Moral Law to humanity and thus raising it to that high stage of self-consciousness where it can have an intimate personal realisation of the distinction between right and wrong—a distinction necessary for its continued advancement to ever higher and higher levels of self-consciousness.

خوب و ناخوب عمل کی ہو گرہ وا کیونکر
گر حیات آپ نہ ہو شارح اسرار حیات [55]

Prophethood is the natural outcome of the urge of the universe for Beauty, on account of which evolution takes the direction towards the

52. *Ḍarb-i Kalīm*, p. 98.
53. Ibid., p. 117.
54. Ibid., p. 79.
55. Ibid., p. 33.

Right Ideal. Whenever the actions of a society flagrantly violate the urge of the universe, i.e. whenever consciousness is confronted with serious obstacles in its search for Beauty through the process of creation, it takes—on account of its nature to crush resistance—a sudden push forward which results in the appearance of a prophet who teaches the Law of the Right Ideal to that society, revives its faith in truth and virtue, and thus brings it (and through it the rest of humanity as far as possible) back to the path of evolution.

The sudden appearance of a prophet in a deteriorating society is like the sudden appearance of a storm in an area where the pressure of atmosphere has lowered, or like the sudden reaction of an organism to disease which results in the restoration of its health.

The phenomenon of prophethood is really a continuation, in a different shape appropriate to the human stage of evolution, of the phenomenon of sudden variation of species which nature manifested earlier in the animal stage of evolution. Whenever the movement of life became too slack in the animal stage of evolution, consciousness made an extraordinary push forward and took a sudden leap which resulted in the sudden appearance, as if by miracle, of a distinct species, registering a considerable improvement upon the previous one. In the human world, the extraordinary leaps of consciousness on such occasions of retarded evolution resulted in the sudden appearance of men of genius whom we call prophets. One can assume that, just as in the animal world, the sudden variations of species came to an end with the appearance of man, so, in the human world, the phenomenon of prophethood came to an end with the appearance of a prophet who set before himself and others the Right Ideal in all its grandeur, i.e. whose life offered him full opportunities to set an example of how the human society of the future ought to live and grow, struggle and expand in the actual process of evolution. The career of such a prophet represents the full expression of the latent possibilities of life. Such a prophet therefore, must be the last link in the chain of prophethood, the last embodiment of the exceptional drives of consciousness in the human stage of evolution. He is the most perfect as well as the last one among

the prophets. The reason is that in him life has achieved its completion, a completion to be maintained and preserved by life in the form of a community of his followers who would keep alive his teachings till the end of the world. This explains why the appearance of a last and perfect Prophet is indispensable for the evolution of the world—this or any other.

ہر کجا ہنگامۂ عالم بود
رحمۃ للعالمینے ہم بود [56]

* * * *

خلق و تقدیر و ہدایت ابتداست
رحمۃ للعالمینے انتہاست

* * *

ہر کجا بینی جہان رنگ و بو
آں کہ از خاکش بروید آرزو
یا ز نورِ مصطفیٰ او را بہاست
یا ہنوز اندر تلاشِ مصطفیٰ است [57]

Thus, while Iqbāl's view of human nature, as sketched above, is entirely Qur'ānic, it is yet a challenge to the psychological theories of McDougall, Freud, Adler and Karl Marx.

According to McDougall, all the activities of man are due to the instincts which man inherits from his animal ancestors and shares with them now. Still labouring under the delusion created by the teachings of Aristotle about the place of reason in human nature, he thinks that reason is the only distinction enjoyed by man over the animals and, therefore, his higher activities like religion, morality and the search for knowledge are due to the control of reason over the instincts. He fails to see that reason is not an urge for action and cannot interfere with the instincts, each of which has an unchangeable course of activity, which, once started, must run its course, and that, if man is actually able to interfere with the

56. *Jāvid Nāmah*, p. 146. 57. Ibid., pp. 148-9.

activity of his instincts, it must be due to some other urge of his nature which is more powerful than these instincts. His theory cannot give an adequate explanation of that powerful impulse in man, known as volition, on account of which man is able to act for an ideal for its own sake and even to sacrifice his life in opposition to his instincts. McDougall traces the volitional effort of men to the instinct of self-assertion, which, although intended to enable the animal to overcome danger to its life, takes an entirely different course in man—a course involving even the necessity of endangering his life. According to McDougall, our instinct of self-assertion seeks its realisation in moral action, because human society admires our moral efforts and we like to win their admiration. The admiration of society for moral behaviour is, in his view, due to the tradition founded by rare personalities like saints and prophets by their admirable moral efforts. But he does not explain why the saints and prophets themselves act morally and why we admire their moral action as well as our own, if there is no independent urge in our nature for such action. Our admiration for all forms of activity that is above the plane of instincts is really due to the urge of the self for Beauty.

Freud thinks that the dominating urge in man which resides in his unconscious mind is sex. This urge operates from childhood onwards and the first sexual attachment of the child is for his parents. The child loves the parents and, therefore, fears their harshness and the loss of their love. When the child comes of age, the parents lose their charm for him gradually and their function is taken up by ideals which he calls the superego. According to Iqbāl's theory, the love of ideals is not a substitute of an earlier complex of sex-love, but it is itself an essential and independent urge of human nature. That Freud himself was not convinced of his fantastic theory will become apparent from this observation of his : "I cannot tell you", he says, "as much as I could wish about the change from the parental function to the superego . . . partly because we ourselves do not feel we have fully understood it."

Adler, a pupil and co-worker of Freud, came to differ with his master about the nature of the urge in the unconscious mind and

advanced his own theory about it. According to him, the fundamental urge of the unconscious human mind is for power and not for sex. The child develops not a sex complex but an inferiority complex on account of the presence around him of persons who are superior to him in everything ; the whole of his life, thus, becomes one long painful story of his endeavours to compensate for his inferiority. Iqbāl's answer is that man does really strive for power but, firstly, that power is a quality of Beauty itself. We feel inferior not only when we are unable to get power but also when we are unable to act morally. Thus, power partakes of Goodness, Beauty and Truth. Secondly, man's desire for power is not an end-in-itself. If we examine closely a person's motives in his search for power, we find that he seeks it for the sake of realising his ideal (his idea of the highest Beauty) which may belong to a lower plane like pleasing one's friends and vexing one's enemies or to a higher one like seeking to glorify a race, a nation, or a religion. The power that a man may have in a desolate desert is of no use to him.

Karl Marx's theory that the economic urge of food, shelter and clothing is the controlling urge of human life is unable to stand investigation. The economic urge is evidently subservient to self-maintenance. If the maintenance of life is the only source of human activity, how is it that one becomes ready to lay down one's life for an ideal ? Facts of human nature and human history lead very clearly to the conclusion that the ultimate desire of man is not the maintenance of life, but the maintenance of the ideal, and that the activity directed to the former end is really subservient to the latter. Men will give up their lives more easily than they will give up their ideals.

None of these theories can give an adequate explanation of man's higher activities. The scope of this article does not permit me to show in detail how Iqbāl's view of human nature has laid bare the fallacies of these theories and how it is capable of meeting them on their own grounds and smashing them by employing their own technique. Suffice it to say, that some of the greatest men of learning in the West, including psychologists, admit that their knowledge of human nature is inadequate and that this inadequacy of their knowledge has brought

their civilisation face to face with the danger of a final collapse. McDougall writes as follows :

> Our ignorance of the nature of man has prevented and still prevents the development of all the social sciences. Such sciences are the crying need of our time ; for lack of them our civilization is threatened gravely with decay and perhaps complete collapse. . . . My thesis is that in order to restore the balance of our civilization . . . we need to have far more knowledge (systematically ordered or scientific knowledge) of human nature and of the life of society than we yet have.
>
> Here, then, is the only remedy of the perilous and ever more dangerous state of our civilization. We musl actively develop our social sciences into real sciences; and, in order to do that, we must first create a science of human nature and of its activities.
>
> What, then, in practical terms, is the remedy? I can give my answer, most concisely, by suggesting what I would do if I were a dictator. . . . I would, by every means, seek to divert all our most powerful intellects from the physical sciences into research in the human and social sciences.

The knowledge of human nature is a matter of inner experience, and Iqbāl is, perhaps, the best exponent of that knowledge. Every social science, in order to be definite, has to develop around itself an ideal coveted by human nature. At present, all the social sciences are confused or vague, because none of them specifies what the ideal of man should be. No social science can be really a science unless it is directed towards the realisation of the Right Ideal. No social science, moreover, can be independent of other social sciences. All the activities of man are determined by the single uniting force of the ideal. These activities therefore, overlap and partake of each other. No activity of man can be purely political, economic, ethical, or educational. The purely economic man, whose existence is assumed by the economists in the formulation of their science, does not exist, because the economic man is also the social, ethical and political man, all in one. We cannot, therefore, have separate social sciences but only one science of society based on the Right Ideal.

Iqbāl's idea of the self, thus properly developed and unfolded, is

relevant to all the scientific facts known so far. It is a complete philosophy of the universe and, as such, it is a philosophy of economics, a philosophy of ethics, a philosophy of education, a philosophy of art, a philosophy of politics, a philosophy of law, a philosophy of history, all in one, as well as a psychology of the individual and society. It gives the lead to all these departments of knowledge and places them on a correct footing. It is this scientific *Weltanschauung*, or religio-socio-political ideology which has always been the search of all religions, philosophies and sciences.

Political equality known as democracy and economic equality known as communism are just the two aspects of the Right Ideal. But we cannot have one part of the Right Ideal and ignore the rest. If we do so, we shall not be able to realise the part that we wish to realise. These parts of the Ideal can be achieved only in the whole of which they are the parts, i.e. as parts of the Right Ideal. Only a State founded on the Right Ideology can make them realities by putting them into practice successfully. If we sacrifice a part of our nature to serve the rest of it, we shall fail miserably and shall not be able to serve any part of it whatsoever. Equality, political or economic, cannot be established by force. To be genuine, it needs an inner moral realisation which is made possible by an intense love of the Right Ideal. It can come only from within the hearts of men as a spontaneous expression of their nature at a very high stage of their self-consciousness. Education for the Right Ideal is the only means of achieving it, and since the State is the greatest instrument of education, it can be achieved only by a State founded on the Right Ideal.

It is futile to attempt to compare Islam with democracy or with communism and to show the superiority of Islam over them. The question is not what Islam and democracy or Islam and communism have and what they do not have in common with each other The question is whether democracy and communism can realise without Islam the ends for which they claim to stand. The answer contained in the immutable laws of the nature of man is: "They cannot", and the world will not take long to discover the correctness of this answer.

Dreams of world-peace and world-unity can never come out true unless all abandon their false ideologies and adopt the Right Ideology which has now fortunately taken a scientific shape in the philosophy of Iqbāl. Peace will come to the world, not because we shall succeed in harmonising conflicting ideologies, but because one ideology will replace the rest and dominate the whole world. The ideology that will dominate the world and bring everlasting peace can only be the Right Ideology as sketched by Iqbāl. He knows this fact and therefore writes:

سبزه نا روئیده زیب گلشنم
گل بشاخ اندر نہاں در دامنم

* * *

بامم از خاور رسید و شب شکست
شبنم نو بر گل عالم نشست
انتظار صبح خیزاں می کشم
اے خوشا زرتشتیان آتشم
نغمہ ام از زخمہ بے پرواستم
من نوائے شاعر فرداستم

* * *

نغمۂ من از جہان دیگر است
این جرس را کاروان دیگر است[58]

Signs af the emergence of Iqbāl's philosophy as a political force in the world are already visible.

All of us love and admire Iqbāl as a great man, but few of us know wherein lies his real greatness. Karl Marx is the intellectual king of the present Communist State of Russia. But Iqbāl is the intellectual king of the future world-State which will endure for ever, bringing to man all the blessings of permanent peace and unity and enabling him to achieve that highest progress—material, mental, moral and spiritual—of which the promise resides in the potentialities of his nature. It is for this reason that Iqbāl deserves our admiration and gratitude.

January 1953

58. *Asrār-o-Rumūz* (*Asrār-i Khudī*), pp. 4-5.

Aziz Ahmad

SOURCES OF IQBAL'S PERFECT MAN

The conception of the Superman or the Perfect Man is after all not a new one. The association of the concept with Nietzsche's nineteenth-century romanticism has attracted so much attention perhaps because his Superman is shockingly un-Christian. Yet he had his immediate simple source in Schopenhauer's "Will". Nietzsche, however, emphasised the essential role of Will to live as manifested not in the obvious and ordinary struggle to live, but in the Will as War, Will as Force, and Will as Super-Force. The aim and end of human effort is, therefore, not the progress of the human species as such, but the evolution of individuals (or groups of individuals) into supermen.

The conception of Nietzschean Superman is romantic in an extreme form. It denies the essential value of individualism, namely its composite contribution to the development of a free society. On the other hand, society becomes a mere means to the end of the development of the individual Superman who would ruthlessly rule it. When Superman becomes the ideal, all idealisation of the human race as a progressing organism is annulled.

The individualistic development of Nietzschean Superman is based not on natural selection but on methodical and careful training. This is a view diametrically opposed to the thesis of creative evolution worked out by Bergson and the one, to a large extent, accepted by Iqbāl.

Unlike Bergson, Nietzsche is very suspicious of biological evolution. He holds that the biological process of development is by the determination of its own nature inimical to the growth of the *extraordinary* individual. Nature is normally very cruel to the higher forms of organic life, and protects only the mediocre and the ordinary. The Superman must, therefore, grow out of the human society not by natural selection, but by a trained Will of distinction. That would manifest itself in the threefold structure of his personality based upon power, intelligence and arrogance.

The expression used by Nietzsche for his conception of the Superman is *Ubermensch*, an expression which he borrowed from Goethe. It is really a hangover from Goethe's earlier romanticism, before his conversion to neo-classicism which manifests itself in the second part of his *Faust* where the heroine is Helen, the essence of Hellenism, and no longer Gretchen.

If Nietzsche's Superman, like Milton's Satan or like Goethe's Mephistopheles or like the Marquis de Sade himself, should have remained purely romantic, all would have been well. Unfortunately, he was much too dynamic to remain peacefully within the circumscribed ring of the German literary *Sturm und Drang*; he became an intellectual force. He was taken seriously by the Teutonic dynamism in political and military idealism. Twice the Germanic romantic idealism, militarily expressed, gave a blood-bath to the world. It was due not entirely to Nietzsche's Superman; but then the Superman was not entirely guiltless.

Now, it will be impossible to deny the dynamic appeal which Nietzsche's *Ubermensch* made to Iqbāl, more particularly in his conception of Perfect Man; but Iqbāl has at various times tried to divest the beyond good-and-evil colossus of Nietzsche of many of his great immoral and anti-social forces. Iqbāl has categorically rejected Nietzsche's racialism, his denial of ethics in the definition of the value of power, his extolling of warfare as a value in its own right.

The comparison (with Islamic evolutionists) and critique of Nietzsche has been summed up by Iqbāl in his lecture "Is Religion

Possible?" in these wolds.

In modern Europe Nietzsche whose life and activity form, at least to us Easterns, an exceedingly interesting problem in religious psychology, was endowed with some sort of a constitutional equipment for such an undertaking. His mental history is not without a parallel in the history of Eastern Sufism. That a really 'imperative' vision of the Divine in man did come to him cannot be denied. I call his vision 'imperative' because it appears to have given him a kind of prophetic mentality which, by some kind of technique, aims at turning its visions into permanent lifeforces. Yet Nietzsche was a failure; and his failure was mainly due to his intellectual progenitors such as Schopenhauer, Darwin and Lange whose influence completely blinded him to the real significance of his vision. Instead of looking for a spiritual rule which would develop the Divine even in a plebeian and thus open up before him an infinite future, Nietzsche was driven to seek the realization of his vision in such schemes as aristocratic radicalism.[1]

This makes Iqbāl's position largely clear. The German romantic movement (Goethe, Heine and so many others) inspired and deeply influenced Iqbāl's *Payām-i Marshriq*. That was, however, a *literary* influence, largely emotional. The dynamics of Nietzschean idealisation of *Ubermensch* was comparatively a much greater intellectual force which impressed Iqbāl, who was simultaneously approaching the problem of the Perfect Man from two other premises: that of Bergsonian evolutionism, basically biological but idealistically tied to ethical values, and that of Islamic mysticism.

Let us recall therefore Iqbāl's observation on Nietzsche: "His mental history is not without a parallel in the history of Eastern Sufism." Among Eastern Sufis, 'Abd al-Karīm Jīlī has worked out a metaphysical thesis of the origin and development of the Perfect Man. Jīlī's thought stimulated Iqbāl's friend and translator Dr R. A. Nicholson and was one of the outstanding subjects of study during Iqbāl's years of research as a student at Cambridge and in Germany. He wrote a comprehensive article on 'Abd al-Karīm Jīlī,

1. *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, Lahore, 1954, pp. 194-5.

which he later incorporated into his doctorate thesis : *The Development of Metaphysics in Persia.*

The metaphysical theory of Jīlī's *Insān al-Kāmil* (Perfect Man) is based on his concept of *Ism*, the Name. The Name, as Iqbāl explains, imprints the Named on our consciousness and understanding, evokes His image in our minds, embodies Him in our imagination. The Name is a mirror in which all secrets of the Eternal Being are revealed. It is a light in which God sees Himself.

According to this concept of the Name, Iqbāl has summarised Jīlī's arguments used by him to explain the three stages through which the Pure Being passes after it has shed its Absoluteness. The three stages are: Oneness, Otherness, and Personality. In the first stage it is without dimensions and without relativity and is One. In the second stage the Pure Being is still free from expression. And the third stage is that of *separateness*. This stage is the circle of the Name of God. Here the obscureness of the Pure Being is illuminated. Nature comes face to face with it. The Absolute Being becomes conscious.

This, unlike Bergson's creative evolution, is an Absolute Evolution in the three stages, to which the three stages of the training and making of the Perfect Man correspond. This evolution is in a sense *devolution*, as the Absolute Being really takes a downward trend to articulate Its expression. However, in the first stage of his spiritual evolution the Perfect Man concentrates on the Name and studies the Nature to which the Name is applied. In the second, he sets foot within the circumference of dimension and space. In the third stage, he enters the limits of Essence, and it is here that he becomes the Perfect Man.

It is probably from this section of Jīlī's statement on the evolution of the Perfect Man that Iqbāl has borrowed the three stages which, according to him, are necessary for the development of the Self: Obedience, Abstinence and Vicegerency of God.

The third stage, that of Vicegerency of God, is the one where Jīlī's Perfect Man achieves perfection. Jīlī defines this stage as a

mirror in which God sees Himself. At this stage the Perfect Man comes face to face with the divine knowledge: his hearing is the Hearing of God, his sight is the Sight of God, his word is the Word of God, and his life is the Life of God, his knowledge is the Knowledge of God, and his will is the Will of God.

This has been summed up almost verbatim by Iqbāl in his poem the "Mosque of Cordova":

ہاتھ ہے اللہ کا بندۂ مومن کا ہاتھ
غالب و کار آفریں، کار کشا، کار ساز

خاکی و نوری نہاد، بندۂ مولا صفات
ہر دو جہاں سے غنی اس کا دل بے نیاز

* * *

نقطۂ پرکار حق، مرد خدا کا یقیں
اور یہ عالم تمام وہم و طلسم و مجاز

As is the hand of God, so the Believer's hand—
Potent, guided by craft, strong to create and to rule;
Fashioned of dust and light, slave with the Master's
Soul, Careless of both the worlds, beats his not
Humble heart. Round his servant's firm faith God's
Great compasses turn; All this universe else—
Shadow, illusion, deceit.[2]

Thus, according to Jīlī, man's passage on the road to perfection leads through three stages. In the first stage his life is one of concentration and deep reflection on the Name. He describes this as the stage of Enlightenment of the Name. At this stage his response to the questionings of others is the response of God. His anger is the Anger of God. His happiness is the Happiness of God.

The second stage on the road to perfection is the Enlightenment of Divine Qualities. Here the Divine Qualities are revealed one after

2. *Bāl-i Jibrīl*, p. 132 (English translation of Iqbāl's verses in this article is by Victor Kiernan).

the other, not in manifest detail, but in brief flashes. One is blessed with the vision of the Quality of Light, another with the Quality of Will, yet another with the Quality of Mercy and so on. To some lucky and deserving one are revealed all the Divine Qualities; he is blessed with the perfection of Total Qualities. The Divine Qualities, according to Jīlī, are absorbed by an individual according to his nature, capacities and potentialities.

Then comes the third and final stage, that of the achievement of perfection. Now the Perfect Man, who has already received Enlightenment from the Name and the Qualities of God, sets his foot in the realm of the Essence of the Absolute. At this stage the perfection of man is at one with Godhead. Thus the Divine Man is created.

This mystical view of the Perfect Man of Jīlī has been claimed by him to be in harmony with strict Monotheism. God's Being in Himself is his Absolute Existence; in others it is Relative Existence. Thus the Existence of God is by Itself Absolute and Eternal. All the creation is existent for God; its existence is relative and, therefore, mortal. But within the creation there are gradations and in the Perfect Man we have a creature who is existent in himself by an absolute and not a relative existence.

The sixtieth chapter of Jīlī's book deals at length with the essential characteristics of the Perfect Man. The totality of individual human beings, he says, consists of individuals each one of whom is an index of the others in addition to his own personal points of perfection. The quality of one is found in the other also, although there is an infinite variation of degrees. The same quality is found in one potentially, in the other actually; and then there are degrees in their capacity for perfection. But there are a few who actively *achieve* perfection. These are the Perfect Men.

The Perfect Man, adds Jīlī, is the axis on which the sphere of Existence revolves. The Perfect Man is the same in essence since the beginning of creation until its end. *His real name is Muḥammad*; in addition he has a separate name in each epoch of

time. He is the mirror of Divinity, and God Almighty has taken the decision to see the Reflection of His Names and Qualities in no other Mirror.

Jīlī's conception of the Perfect Man is metaphysical, Sufistic, and partly doctrinal. Yet the conception in itself travels in the same direction as that of atheistic Nietzsche, or the evolutionist Bergson. The difference lies in the fact that Jīlī has taken a road of absolute, doctrinal, indisputable moral values and ethical standards. These, in fact, the Perfect Man has to understand in the first stage of his journey and imbibe them (to the extent of identifying himself with them) in the second stage.

Iqbāl is critical of the illogical idealism of Jīlī's thought-sequence, just as he was critical of the divorce of idealism from ethics in the case of Nietzsche. Commenting on Jīlī's concept of the evolution of the Perfect Man in his *Development of Metaphysics in Persia*, Iqbāl points out that Jīlī has not been able to describe convincingly how the Perfect Man reaches the top of the spiral of spiritual evolution. Jīlī, however, describes that on this march of evolution the would-be Perfect Man passes through a specific kind of experience which is gathered into consciousness by what he calls *qalb*. This *qalb* is like a spiritual radar ("eye") which in turn measures names and spaces and eventually the Absolute Being.

The process of Jīlī's concept of spiritual evolution makes his Perfect Man, according to Iqbāl, a middle link between the creation and the Creator, who, on the one hand, receives enlightenment from all the Essential Names, and, on the other hand, is the reflection and expression of all Divine Qualities. Analysing these Qualities Iqbāl has enumerated them in the following order:[3]

1. Life or Permanent Being.
2. Knowledge, which is another form of life.
3. Will, which is the manifestation of the individuating force or being. (Jīlī has described it as a flash of the Divine Knowledge).

3. Cf. *The Development of Metaphysics in Persia*, London, 1908, pp. 172-4.

4. Power which manifests itself in the individuation of the self, that is creation.
5. The Word of God, or the Reflected Being. (According to Jīlī, all Possibility is the Word of God ; thus, Nature is the material form of the Word of God).
6. Hearing, or the power to hear what cannot be ordinarily heard.
7. Sight, or the power to see what cannot be ordinarily seen. (These last two really emphasise the power of the Perfect Man to transcend the ordinary physical senses).
8. The Beauty of Nature, which is Beauty Reflected but even so is Beauty in its real essence, and the element of evil in it is purely relative.
9. Dynamic Magnitude.
10. Perfection, this is God's unknowable Essence, and, therefore, limitless and infinite.

Iqbāl seems to agree with Jīlī when he endorses. in his thesis and in the bulk of his philosophical and poetical works, the view that the Perfect Man is the saviour of the Universe ; and therefore the manifestation of the Perfect Man is necessary for the continuity of all Nature.

Iqbāl accepted Nietzsche's dynamics of the Superman, but he rejected the immoral and anti-social qualities of Nietzschean Superman : his extremism, tyranny, racialism, ruthlessness, his pretension to be beyond good and evil, his distinction between *Herrenmoral* and *Heerdenmoral*, his identification with class-snobbery and his uncompromising atheism. From Jīlī's conception Iqbāl picks up, on the other hand, a number of *values* wilfully banished by Nietzsche from his Superman. These values apart from the fact that they have been created by established religious and ethical doctrines are *life*, *knowledge*, *will* (not merely for its own sake but as a flash of Divine knowledge leading to action), *beauty of nature*, *dynamic magnitude*.

These are the values which Iqbāl has enumerated in his analysis of Jīlī's Perfect Man. But these are also *established* values. And

therefore Iqbāl's Perfect Man, though not shockingly original as that of Nietzsche, is essentially a moral creature. On the other hand, Iqbāl avoids the extremely Sufistic interpretation of Jīlī, who when all is said and done, was a disciple of the great Murcian mystic Ibn 'Arabī, about whom Iqbāl's religious preceptor, Shaikh Aḥmad Sirhindī, had written :

مابہ نصوص می رویم نہ بہ فصوص

We follow the verses [of the Qurān] and not the *Fuṣūṣ* [*Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam* by Muḥy al-Dīn Ibn 'Arabī.]

او مقبول است و سخن او نا مقبول

We like him [Ibn 'Arabī], but we do not like what he has to say.

Iqbāl's own reaction to Ibn 'Arabī was more categorically repudiatory and even hostile. In a letter[4] to Sirājuddīn Pāl dated 19th July 1916, he categorically describes all that is in *Fuṣūṣ al Ḥikam* as anti-Islamic and mere recantation and blasphemy. It is, therefore, not surprising that while agreeing in details about the moral and spiritual qualities of the Perfect Man, he has rejected Jīlī's main thesis—namely, totally and essentially mystical and unworldly approach to the problem.

Between Jīlī and Nietzsche, Iqbāl has tried to strike a middle path, not very different from that of Bergson. Jīlī had really not touched upon either the biological or the psychological aspect of the evolution of the individual who becomes the Perfect Man. Without reservation Iqbāl accepts the biological approach of Bergson to the problem of organic evolution. He concedes Bergson's principle of the fundamental difference between organic life and the disorganised matter. He rejects like, Bergson, the mechanistic view of biological evolution, which began with Charles Darwin and which so profoundly influenced the mind of the nineteenth-century Europe as to lead to an almost uncompromising pessimism in Hardy, to ironical catho-

4. *Iqbāl Nāmah*, Lahore (first edition), p. 44.

licism in Chesterton and to misanthropic militant idealism in Nietzsche.

Out of the Bergsonian interpretation of biological evolution emerges the dynamic concept of *elan vital*, more realistic and less idealised than Jīlī's *Qalb* or Nietzsche's Will. This impetus of life, according to Bergson, "is implied in this movement itself, and that is just why it is found in independent lines of evolution."[5] Further he adds, "The direction of this action is not predetermined; hence the unforeseeable variety of forms which life, in evolving, sows along its path."[6] This was a challenge to the night of deterministic pessimism which had been imposed on the nineteenth-century intellectual romanticisim by Darwin's mechanistic view of the evolution of life.

The story of creative evolution as told by Bergson is a fascinating one, and Iqbāl has almost paraphrased it in his famous *Saqī Nāmah*.[7] Says Bergson:

> The resistance of inert matter was the obstacle that had first to be overcome. Life seems to have succeeded in this by dint of humility, by making itself very small and very insinuating, bending to physical and chemical forces, consenting even to go a part of the way with them. . . . Life had to enter thus into the habits of inert matter, in order to draw it little by little, magnetised, as it were, to another track.[8]

Having accomplished this extraordinary revolution from inorganic to organic stage, life which was "possessed of the tremendous internal push" of *elan vital* was faced with another problem. "Organized matter has a limit of expansion that is very quickly reached; beyond a certain point it divides instead of growing."[9] There were also real and profound causes of division within the bosom of life itself: "For life is tendency, and the essence of a tendency is to develop in the form of a sheaf, creating, by its very growth, divergent directions among which its impetus is divided."[10]

5. H. Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, Macmillan, London, 1954, p. 102.
6. Ibid.
7. *Bāl-i Jibrīl*, pp. 166-74.
8. Bergson, op. cit., pp. 103-4.
9. Ibid., 104.
10. Ibid.

This has shaped the course of the evolution of life.

The bifurcations on the way have been numerous, but there have been many blind alleys besides the two or three highways; and of these highways themselves, only one, that which leads through the vertebrates up to man, has been wide enough to allow free passage to the full breath of life.[11]

But in its march from unicellular stage to the development of rational man, "at the root of life there is an effort to engraft one to the necessity of physical forces, the largest possible amount of *indetermination.*"[12]

The tendency of life to divide itself led first to the division of life into vegetable and animal; and then within the animal kingdom there was evolution on two distinct tracks.

The evolution of the anthropods reaches its culminating point in the insect, and in particular in the Hymenoptera, as that of the vertebrates in man. Now, since instinct is nowhere so developed as in the insect world, and in no group of insects so marvellously as in the Hymenoptera, it may be said that the whole evolution of the animal kingdom apart from retrogressions towards vegetative life, has taken place on two divergent paths, one of which led to *instinct* and the other to *intelligence.*[13]

Intelligence and instinct, these two lodestars of divergent evolutions within the animal kingdom, have really been interpenetrating, and have retained something of their common origin. They are different and yet they are complementary. "*Instinct perfected is a faculty of using and even of constructing organised instruments : intelligence perfected is the faculty of making and using unorganised instruments.*"[14] Because of intelligence the *Homo Sapiens* has become *Homo Faber*, the manufacturing man.

But then, "*Instinct and intelligence respresent two divergent solutions, equally fitting, of one and the same problem.*"[15] Yet in themselves

11. Ibid., p. 105.
12. Ibid., pp. 120-1.
13. Ibid., p. 141 (italics mine).
14. Ibid., p. 147.
15. Ibid., p. 150

they are both weak and lack self-sufficiency and each one has the complementary need of the other. Bergson further points out :

"There are things that intelligence alone is able to seek, but which, by itself, it will never find. These things instinct alone could find; but it will never seek them.[16]

Intelligence, the instrument of man, comprehends the disorganised matter and uses it. In its evolution it has created language which has helped man in perception, and led him from image and idea and thus to some understanding of his own internal world. Unlike intelligence, instinct is moulded on the very form of life, and has grown from within.

There is yet another way out and ahead of the shortcomings of intelligence and instinct. It is *intuition.* In Bergson's own words, "It is to the very inwardness of life that *intuition* leads us—by intuition I mean instinct that has become disinterested, self-conscious, capable of reflecting upon its object and enlarging it indefinitely."[17] Compared to intelligence, intuition retains "a vague nebulosity" around it, but then intuition can grasp what the intelligence fails to give. The clue to the creative process of life itself is perhaps intuition, where instinct and intelligence, by themselves, have failed. Bergson continues : "Then, by the sympathetic communication which it establishes between us and the rest of the living, by the expansion of our consciousness which it brings about, it introduces us into life's own domain, which is reciprocal interpenetration, endlessly continued creation."[18] Here we are already on the threshold of the stage where man, with the help of intuition, reaches within the possibility of further evolution to the status of the Perfect Man.

But let us interrupt our sojourn with Bergson for a while to return to Iqbāl. The premise from where Iqbāl starts in his system of thought, explained in *The Reconsrtuction of Religious Thought in Islam*, is this very Bergsonian *intuition.* In the beginning of the first of his Lectures, "Knowledge and Religious Experience", Iqbāl bases

16. Ibid., p. 159. 17. Ibid., p. 186.
18. Ibid., p. 187.

his subsequent structure of argument on the same Bergsonian conclusion which he applies to religion:

Nor is there any reason to suppose that intuition and thought are essentially opposed to each other. They spring up from the same root and complement each other. The one grasps Reality piecemeal, the other grasps it in its wholeness. The one fixes its gaze on the eternal, the other on the temporal aspect of Reality. The one is present enjoyment of the whole of Reality; the other aims at traversing the whole by slowly specifying and closing up the various regions of the whole for exclusive observation. Both are in need of each other for mutual rejuvenation. Both seek visions of the same Reality which reveals itself to them in accordance with their function in life. In fact, intuition, as Bergson rightly says, is only a higher kind of intellect.[19]

Let us return to Bergson, for he in the end of his journey comes close to the discovery of the Perfect Man through creative evolution. With a superb flourish he sums up the entire vision of the progress of life until perfection is attained through intuition:

From our point of view, life appears in its entirety as an immense wave which, starting from a centre, spreads outwards, and which on almost the whole of its circumference is stopped and converted into oscillation: at one single point the obstacle has been forced, the impulsion has passed freely. It is this freedom that the human form registers. Everywhere but in man, consciousness had to come to a stand; in man alone it has kept on its way. Man, then, continues the vital movement indefinitely, although he does not draw along with him all that life carries in itself. On other lines of evolution there have travelled other tendencies which life implied, and of which, since everything interpenetrates, man has, doubtless, kept something, but of which he has kept only very little. *It is as if a vague and formless being, whom we may call, as we will,* man *or* superman, *had sought to realize himself, and had succeeded only by abandoning of himself on the way.*[20]

This is the definition of the Superman or the Perfect Man which Iqbāl has found much more acceptable than the purely mystico-

19. *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, pp. 2-3.
20. Bergson, op. cit., pp. 280-1.

idealistic one of Jīlī, or the unchained, beautiful and excessively dynamic monster of Nietzsche. What has really appealled to Iqbāl in Bergson's analysis and definition of the Perfect Man apart from the fascinating logic of the *Creative Evolution* is the *humaneness* of this concept; for Bergson's Superman is neither Jīlī's prophet nor Nietzsche's Mephistopheles-Frankenstein. He is distinguishable from man only as a higher form of human evolution through intuition.

On the greater part of this road of Creative Evolution, Iqbāl has followed Bergson, explaining and interpreting him and relating his views to other intellectual traditions of Muslim thought. I have already mentioned the *Sāqī Nāmah*. Let us return to it.

دما دم رواں ہے یم زندگی
ہر اک شے سے پیدا رم زندگی
اسی سے ہوئی ہے بدن کی نمود
کہ شعلے میں پوشیدہ ہے موجِ دود
گراں گرچہ ہے صحبت آب و گل
خوش آئی اسے محنت آب و گل
یہ ثابت بھی ہے اور سیّار بھی
عناصر کے پھندوں سے بیزار بھی
یہ وحدت ہے کثرت میں ہر دم اسیر
مگر ہر کہیں بے چگوں بے نظیر
یہ عالم یہ بت خانۂ شش جہات
اسی نے تراشا ہے یہ سومنات[21]

Perpetual rolls life's ocean; all
That is shows life ephemeral,
From it, like smoke-curls immanent
In fire, the body emerges, blent
Of earth and moisture, irksome, yet

21. *Bāl-i Jibrīl*, p. 170.

In their leading life delights : life, set
In the labyrinth, chafing, of the gross
Elements ; undying, transient ; close
Captive, thus indivisible,
To diversity, yet in all things still
Unparagoned, single. This immense
Idol-temple, the world of sense,
This world the three-dimension fence,
Was reared by Life.

اسی کے بیاباں اسی کے ببول
اسی کے ہیں کانٹے اسی کے ہیں پھول

* * *

کہیں جرہ شاہین سیماب رنگ
لہو سے چکوروں کے آلودہ چنگ
کبوتر کہیں آشیانے سے دور
پھڑکتا ہوا جال میں ناصبور[22]

Its are the sands forlorn,
And the desert tree ; the flower, the thorn ;

* * *

A falcon now, quicksilver-hued
Dabbling its claws in pheasants' blood ;
Now fluttering, snared dove far from the nest,
Against the meshes, with frantic breast.

فریب نظر ہے سکون و ثبات
تڑپتا ہے ہر ذرّۂ کائنات
ٹھہرتا نہیں کاروان وجود
کہ ہر لحظہ ہے تازہ شان وجود
سمجھتا ہے تو راز ہے زندگی
فقط ذوق پرواز ہے زندگی

22. Ibid.

بہت اس نے دیکھے ہیں پست و بلند
سفر اس کو منزل سے بڑھ کر پسند[23]

Deathlessness, changelessness—all dreams
When every atom in Nature teems
Unrest : existence, a caravan shot
With glory ever renewed, halts not.
Life, that you make a mystery,
To this : the passion of soaring high ;
Life, that on many a deep abyss,
Many a tall cliff has looked, loves, less
Arrival than migration.

ہؤا جب اسے سامنا موت کا
کٹھن تھا بڑا تھامنا موت کا
اتر کر جہان مکافات میں
رہی زندگی موت کی گھات میں
مذاق دوئی سے بنی زوج زوج
اٹھی دشت و کہسار سے فوج فوج
گل اس شاخ سے ٹوٹتے بھی رہے
اسی شاخ سے پھوٹتے بھی رہے[24]

When it met death, stern was the embrace,
Bitter, of death ; but the world of strife
Necessity rules once entered ; life
Struck death from ambush, instinct grew rife
With myriad-fold polarity : from it
As desert and hill their legions vomit,
Roses, and new blossoms on its stem,
Faster than death could gather them,
Burgeoned.

This is the paraphrase of Bergson's views on Creative Evolution. But then at the zenith of this Creative Evolution how will the Perfect

23. Ibid., p. 171.

24. Ibid.

Man or Superman be attained? Will *elan vital* produce him in a meta-biological upsurge of intuition, or is there any scope for the individual Free Will?

It is at this stage that Iqbāl turns back again to his old doctrine of the Self (very largely inspired by a Nietzsche-Fichte idealistic dynamism harnessed to the concept of Islamic ideals of the Perfect Man).

The Free Will of the individual can, then, strike, as it were, a short cut to the achievement of the Perfect Man through the development of the Self. It is this shot in the arm, the Self, which helps man to cross the bridge that links man with the Perfect Man; whereas the passage of this bridge was left undefined by Bergson.

یہ موج نفس کیا ہے تلوار ہے
خودی کیا ہے تلوار کی دھار ہے
خودی کیا ہے راز درون حیات
خودی کیا ہے بیداریٔ کائنات
خودی جلوہ بدمست و خلوت پسند
سمندر ہے اک بوند پانی میں بند
اندھیرے اجالے میں ہے تابناک
من و تو میں پیدا من و تو سے پاک
ازل اس کے پیچھے ابد سامنے
نہ حد اس کے پیچھے نہ حد سامنے[25]

What but a sword that breath's tide? What
The Self but that sword's keen edge,—but
Life's innermost, veiled inscrutably,
Then universe's sleepless eye.
Drunk with glory, of solitude
Enamoured, all an ocean mewed
In a water-drop; in shadow or flame
A splendour that's in, but we misname,

25. Ibid., p. 172.

Mere I and You, for before it and
Behind it stand no frontiers, stand
Eternities.

Thus we come to Iqbāl's Perfect Man, or rather we catch several glimpses of him. For at times he is romanticised as *qalandar* having something of the Sufi mystic and some "romanesque" elements of Nietzsche's Zarathustra; at other times he is *Mu'min*, the Perfect Man who has passed the three stages of Jīlī's mystical training—has been through what Christians call the life active and life contemplative to emerge in the "mixed life", where his outstanding virtue is again an idealised contentment, divine poverty. Occasionally there is a glimpse of the Mephistophelian Superman in an individual, whom Iqbāl tries to recondition and rehabilitate; but this is rare. The philosophical structure of the edifice on the top of which the Perfect Man is in communion with God, men and the universe, remains, however, strongly Bergsonian.

July 1958

Jamilah Khatoon

IQBAL'S PERFECT MAN

The vision of the perfect man that Iqbāl presents is unique and fascinating. But he is not the first thinker to propound this conception. Many a thinker before him endeavoured to develop the idea of the ideal man. Ibn Sīnā and Ibn Ṭufail expounded their ideas about the perfect man in their famous allegories commonly known as *Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān*. Ibn 'Arabī was the first Muslim thinker who presented the conception in a definite form. It was further elaborated by 'Abd-al-Karīm Ibn Ibrāhīm al-Jīlī. Though Iqbāl is indebted to his predecessors, yet the picture that he paints is lively and dynamic. His terms such as *Mard-i Mu'min*, *Mard-i Ḥaq*, *Faqīr*, *Qalandar*, are the expressions which stand for the ideal man.

In addition to poetical susceptibilities Iqbāl was also endowed with a practical insight. He condemns all the teachings which lead to self-annihilation or detachment from the world.[1] He calls us to return

1. Iqbāl's letter to Sirāj-ud-Dīn Pāl, *Iqbāl Nāmah*, pp. 34-7.

Hindu Intellectualism and Islamic Pantheism, according to him, are the main causes of Eastern inaction and passivity. (*The Serects of the Self*, Introduction, p. xiii). He traces Islamic Pantheism with its philosophy of self-annihilation to Persian Pantheism, Vedantism and Buddhism (Iqbāl's letter to Ẓafar Aḥmad Siddīqī, *Iqbāl Nāmah*, p. 203), and criticises Neo-Hegelianism (*The Secrets of the Self*, Introduction, p. xiii), Platonism (Ibid., pp. 56-9), and all other philosophical systems which negate life (Ibid., pp. xxii-xxiii).

to it again and again and to utilise it for the purposes of moral, intellectual and social elevation.[2] His perfect man is the crystallisation of his ideas presenting the solution to human misery. In his philosophy he aims to give us not a mere abstract ideal, whose colourful vistas may vanish in the glare of reality, but practical guidance as well.

The universe, according to him, is not a block universe, a finished product or completed Reality, incapable of change.[3] With all its diverse and manifold phenomena, it is not the outcome of a divine will at a definite moment like a "full-fledged Minerva from Jove's head". According to him, the transformation of chaos into cosmos and the emergence of life, mind and consciousness can be referred to an envolutionary process.[4] But this evolution is neither ungodly—taking matter as inert, static and lifeless[5]—nor does it take man's present structure, mental as well as physiological, as full fruition of the process of biological evolution.[6] Life is immanent in the universe.[7] Everything organic or inorganic can be traced to a common source of creation, the Self or *Wujūd-i Basīṭ*. This common source of creation or the Self was an indivisible whole in the beginning, possessing definite powers of perception and volition. In order to manifest itself, it posited the not-Self; the latter is to serve the former on the one hand as a mirror and on the other as an objective operation. Moreover, the existence of opposition or the not-Self is to provide the Self with an immense scope for struggle—the necessary basis of all evolution.[8]

2. *The Secrets of the Self*, Introduction, p. xviii-xx.
3. *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, London, 1934, p. 10.
4. *The Secrets of the Self*, Introduction, pp. xviii-xix ; *Bāl-i Jibrīl* p. 44.
5. He agrees with Prof. Whitehead, according to whom, "nature is not a static fact situated in a-dynamic void, but a structure of events possessing the character of a continuous creative flow" (*The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, pp. 33). "To my mind there is nothing alien to the Quranic outlook than the idea that the universe is a temporal working out of a preconceived plan . . . an already completed product which left the hand of its maker ages ago and is now lying stretched in space as a dead mass of matter to which time does nothing, and consequently is nothing" (Ibid., p. 52).
6. Ibid., p. 115.
7. *Bāl-i Jibrīl*, "*Sāqī Nāmah*".
8. S. A. Vahid, *Iqbāl : His Art and Thought*, p. 42 ; see also *Asrār-o-Rumūz*, p. 12.

It should not be thought that the not-Self or matter is entirely devoid of life or egohood. It rather consists of a colony of egos of a lower order; and finite life and higher consciousness emerge out of them, when their association and interaction reach a certain degree of co-ordination. Thus, egos designated as matter are only less developed, while perfection is measured with the scale of individuality. The different levels of existence signify different stages in the development of egohood. The urge of self-manifestation and self-development is present in everything and is expressed in every living being—from a unicellular organism to man's highly developed personality. "Throughout the entire gamut of being", says Iqbāl, "runs the gradually rising note of Egohood, till it reaches its perfection in man."[9] Man's individuality or selfhood is highly developed; hence, his supremacy in the universe. Nevertheless, it has not yet reached its fullest development, which is the "seal" of man's perfection and which entitles him to Divine vicegerency.

All this clearly shows that Iqbāl's whole emphasis is upon the Self or *Khudī*, and it is the nucleus of his ideal man or *Mard-i Mu'min.* He does not agree even with the common interpretation of Ḥallāj's *Anā'l-Ḥaq*, which, according to him, is only an emphatic assertion of Reality and the unique significance of man's self, and does not in any way imply his identity with God, i.e. man's merging in the Divine Being like a drop of water slipping in the ocean.[10] Nay, life with all its complexity and diversity is not a mere phenomenon or appearance of the underlying principle of Reality or Godhead. It does have reality of its own—developing, self-manifesting, and having the Ego for its centre. Hence, what is to be aimed at, is not self-mortification and self-effacement but self-expression, self-development and inner richness of our being. It is the fortification and fullest expression of individuality that brings us nearer to God without depriving us of our selfhood. Iqbāl says: "The end of Ego's quest is not emancipation from the limitations of individuality; it is on the other hand a more precise difinition of it."[11] The value of life is in proportion to

9. *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 68.
10. Ibid., p. 91.
11. Ibid., p. 187.

the uniqueness and the intensity of the Self.[12] It is the urge of self-existence and self-expression that transforms a worthless drop of water into a pearl and makes the grass cleave the breast of the garden.[13]

Thus, the moral and religious ideal of man, as Iqbāl emphasises in his letter to Nicholson, lies in the fortification of his personality and the increasing uniqueness of his individuality. Man, both spiritually and physically, is a self-contained centre. Still he is not a complete individual, he can become more and more so by creating in him the Divine Attributes, i.e. by evoking the Divine in his ego, and thus coming nearer to God without effacing his own selfhood.[14] He is to be bathed and saturated in the Light of God or the Supreme Ego. This assimilation of God's attributes in himself strengthens and solidifies man's personality and lends him divinity. In other words the experience of unity does not imply the absorption of the finite Ego into the Infinite Ego, but rather the passing of the latter in the loving embrace of the former.[15] The true Infinite does not efface the finite; on the other hand, it embraces the finite without effacing its finitude, and explains and justifies its being.[16] The Light of God, instead of extinguishing the candle of individuality, increases its glow. Hence, man's perfection can be determined in proportion to the degree of his self-possession in the presence of God.[17] The complete individual can see God face to face without losing his own self. He can "retain full self-possession even in the case of direct contact with the all-embracing Ego."[18] This conception of the Ego presents an optimistic point of view about the future of man. Self, being the reservoir of immense potentialities, opens before us the vistas of infinite and real possibilities, at the end of which we have the perspective of our Perfect Man—the final cause and ultimate end.

Man is a dynamic centre of energy placed in a dynamic universe.

12. *The Secrets of the Self*, pp. 9-12.
13. Ibid., pp. 20-1.
14. Ibid., Introduction, pp. xiii-xiv.
15. *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 104.
16. Ibid., p. 28.
17. *Zabūr-i 'Ajam*, p. 32.
18. *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 111.

Although he is conscious of his own insignificance, his own imperfection as well as of that of the world, he is endowed with a free personality, initiative and creative power, which place him in a position to mould and change what lies in him and outside.[19] He is free in the sense that, in spite of the limitations of his own nature and obstructions imposed upon him by his surroundings, his real self, unlike a physical event, is not fettered by space and serial time.[20] Space and time, according to Iqbāl, are not objective realities external to and independent of man's Self. The Self is the only ultimate reality, while space and serial time are the ways in which the Self manifests itself.[21] The problem of time is the more important of the two,[22] and is vitally connected with the problem of immortality, which is a neccessary condition of the perfection of personality.[23] Real time is not periodic—a succession of events, which can be enumerated like the pearl beads in a thread.[24] It is not a straight line divided into the past, the present and the future, which we have partly traversed and partly have to traverse irrespective of our will.[25] The analysis of the Self shows that pure time or duration is identical with life itself, while serial time is a fetter that is forged by life for itself, in order to assimilate the present environment. The Self is either efficient or appreciative. The efficient Ego is related to physical existence, which, while retaining its unity as a totality, expresses itself as a series of specific and consequently numerable states that can be conceived as spatial points, like so many stages in a journey. It lives in serial time. The appreciative Ego corresponds to the spiritual realm. Its unity is "like the unity of the germ in which the experiences of its individual ancestors exist, not as a plurality, but as a unity in which every experience permeates the whole"[26] and all elements interpenetrate. It lives in pure duration unadulterated by space—"in a single now" which, in

19. Ibid., pp. 11-2. 20. Ibid., p. 94.
21. *Jāvīd Nāmah*, p. 7.
22. Dr M. Raziuddin Siddiqi, "Iqbāl's Conception of Time and Space" in *Iqbāl as a Thinker*, p. 31.
23. *The Secrets of the Self*, Introduction, pp. xvi-xvii.
24. *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 46.
25. Ibid., pp. 45, 47. 26. Ibid., p. 45.

spite of change and movement, remains indivisible. Space is closely allied to pure time; it is to time what body is to mind.

Thus, space and serial time are both relative to the Self. Because of our interpretation, they appear to us as made up of points and instants. "In our constant pursuit after external things, we weave a kind of veil round the appreciative self, which thus becomes completely alien to us."[27] The efficient self gets the upper hand in those who consider space or serial time a reality, while pure duration sinks into abeyance. But the struggle on the part of man can reverse the position. If he realises the significance and power of his Self, he can transcend space and time, and can shatter the universe—and thus regenerate his personality.[28] A revolution in his consciousness can free him from the shackles of serial time, while pure duration becomes a sword in his hand, enabling him to conquer the whole of existence.[29]

According to the common view, all destiny is given ready-made somewhere in Eternity, and the temporal order of events is a mere imitation of the eternal mould. This view is only mechanism in another form, in which fate or destiny takes the place of rigid determinism, leaving no scope for human or even Divine freedom.[30] This conception, with its paralysing and deadly effect, is the source of pessimism and inaction. Passive resignation to the will of God deprives man of his active will, creative power and the zeal and zest of life. Iqbāl opposes this view in these words: "The destiny of a thing is an unrelenting fate which overrules like a task master; it is the inward reach of a thing, its hidden and realisable possibilities, which serially actualize themselves without any feeling of external compulsion."[31] It is "time regarded as prior to the disclosure of its possibilities. It is time freed from the net of causal sequence. . . . In one word, it is time as felt and not as thought and calculated."[32] A true man is not fettered by destiny; it is he who governs it.[33] God is Omnipotent and the Creator

27. Ibid. 28. *Jāvīd Nāmah*, pp. 15-6.
29. *Asrār-o-Rumūz*, pp. 80-5.
30. *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 51.
31. Ibid., p. 47. 32. Ibid.
33. *Asrār-o-Rumūz*, p. 38.

of the universe, but if the universe does not suit man's desires and purposes, it can be shattered.[34] Man himself can demand from God his fate, because fates are innumerable and he is free to make a choice.[35] He can elevate himself even to that lofty height where God will consult him before assigning him his destiny.[36]

Thus, man is the possessor of tremendous powers and immense potentialities. Iqbāl has done away with the conception of space, time, and destiny as untraversable barriers to man, and has thus given a satisfactory basis to novelty, originality and initiative. No doubt, man is brought to "the lowest of the low" and is placed amidst an obstructing environment. But all this provides him with an opportunity to develop and assert his potentialities and powers. His imperfection becomes a necessary condition for his perfection. He is not satisfied with his self and his surroundings as they are and complains to God for making them such. But possibilities of his nature compensate him for all the limitations imposed upon him and enable him to become a co-worker of God.[37] He is placed amidst the forces of obstruction, but he is equipped with the most suitable faculties of adjustment, which enable him to overcome obstacles. He is a restless being, capable of inflicting pain on himself, in order to realise his ideals and to find fresh scopes for self-expression. In spite of all his failings, he, the trustee of a great responsibility, which even heaven, earth and mountains could not bear, stands superior to his surroundings. He is destined to become a permanent element in the constitution of being. In spite of the limitations imposed upon him from the external world, he possesses an ascending spirit which enables him to rise from one state of being to another.[38] Man can transform both his being and his surroundings according to his own desires and aspirations. He actually makes improvements upon what is created by God. God created night, he invented the lamp; God created clay, and from it he made the cup; God created deserts,

34. *Jāvīd Nāmah*, p. 196. 35. Ibid., p. 123.
36. *Bāl-i Jibrīl*, p. 81.
37. *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 12.
38. Ibid., p. 11.

mountains, forests, and he, orchards, gardens, and groves. He makes glass out of stone and turns poison into an antidote.[39] God created the world, but he made it more beautiful.[40]

Iqbāl's reasoning amply justifies belief in the ascendancy of man over the universe and his predicted perfection. The perfect man is the ultimate end of the revolutionary process, and he is developed out of the present man, just as the full moon is developed from the crescent.

July 1952

39. *Payām-i Mashriq*, p. 132. 40. Ibid., p. 16.

S. F. Mahmud

THE MAN OF ACTION IN IQBAL'S POETRY

"Poetry is words which can become action."

—Robert Frost

Of all the definitions of poetry, this saying of Robert Frost appears to fit Iqbāl's poetry most. Poetry has performed many functions since the beginning of time. In it have been sung great deeds of heroism, sacrifice, love, renunciation, despair, and triumph. It has been a toy in the boudoirs of ladies, an ornament in the courts of kings or the salons of noblemen, though with mystics it has served as a rainbow bridge to God.

Poetry came to the rescue of the Muslims of this Subcontinent at a time when our character, our values, and our destiny were in the melting-pot. It upheld the skies for us in the twenties, thirties, and forties of this century, when we were fighting for our lives and our future. In fact, it served us at that crucial stage of our spiritual history when we had barely come out of the death-like swoon into which the political and economic pressures of the latter half of nineteenth century had flung us.

It is true that Akbar Allāhabādī provoked us with his taunts and stung us with his wit and irony. It is also true that Ḥāli lashed out at us and shamed us for our lethargy, our defeatism, our pettiness and our isolation. But the voice which made men of us, which galvanised

us as a nation into action, had to have more than the flickering fire of Akbar or the solemn rhetoric of Ḥālī. It needed burning passion and a prophetic vision, and these were supplied to it by Iqbāl.

In this brief discussion, I wish to take up only one small idea. It is the concept of the Man of Action in Iqbāl's poetry. I wish to dissociate it from Iqbāl's dynamic concept of Love (*'Ishq*) and the philosophiccult of Personality (*Khudī*). I do not even wish to refer to his idea of Good Man, the Perfect Man or the Man of Faith (*Mard-i Mu'min*). My aim is to detach the concept of the Little Man whom Iqbāl expects to be an operative organ of society, i.e. the *Mard-i Kār*—or the Man of Action—and whom he likes to invest with unwonted powers.

One misunderstanding should be cleared away at the beginning. Poets are not magicians. They cannot turn a stone into a jewel or a thistle into a rose. They say that they sing men to battle or their muse makes them dream great dreams; they may even call themselves legislators of the world, but whatever they say will lie inert in our hearts unless either our minds are prepared beforehand to receive this manna from heaven or we deliberately train our faculties and use all our imaginative sensibility to understand and be affected by the evocative words and images of the poet. Now this preparedness does not include a psychological frame of mind only. It cannot be equated with receptivity, because good reception does not include either the desire for action or the ability for it. It may only indicate a capacity for understanding the full implications of a chain of reasoning, or merely ensure a certain ideational affinity with the poet's thoughts or perhaps the sensibility to reconstruct and relive the poet's experience but it cannot guarantee the imagination to see the same vision as that of the poet.

It is exactly in this that the main weakness in reacting to a poet like Iqbāl lies. One may have all the readiness, all the mental and emotional capacity to see and feel what Iqbāl says, but does one also have the energy, the creative zest, the endurance, the love of danger, and the intellectual verve to *do* what Iqbal asks us to do? This must

be accepted once for all, that Iqbāl does not want any passive listeners, twanging away at their guitars and sighing away for paradise beside a lissom female underneath a bough and all that nonsense.

Is there any utterance, any word, be it even the Word of God, which does not ask for effort, in order that great deeds be done? In fact, the higher the source of the Call, the more demands it makes on our nervous system, on our emotional reserves, on our physical energies and our intellctual capital. Iqbāl demands instant mental co-operation and a continuous emotional commitment from his readers.

He does so, because he feels that he has a great message to give. He is like a minor Hebrew prophet who feels impelled to remind people that they are the chosen people of God, that God is jealous of His bounties: He does not like His gifts to be squandered; He gives greatly if you deserve greatly. But you must first deserve His Grace, His Mercy. When Iqbāl made his famous "Plaint to God" called *Shikwah*, the answer that came down was dampening:

ہم تو مائل بہ کرم ہیں کوئی سائل ہی نہیں
راہ دکھلائیں کسے ؟ رہروِ منزل ہی نہیں
تربیت عام تو ہے جوہرِ قابل ہی نہیں
جس سے تعمیر ہو آدم کی یہ وہ گل ہی نہیں
کوئی قابل ہو تو ہم شانِ کئی دیتے ہیں
ڈھونڈنے والوں کو دنیا بھی نئی دیتے ہیں[1]

We are inclined to be bounteous, only no one asks for the right thing. Whom should We show the way, when there is no seeker of the way?

Training is common, but talent is rare. [Surely] this is not the clay out of which a new Adam can be made.

We bestow the glory [of Chosroes] on those who show ability and We give New Worlds to those who ask for them.

But Iqbāl kept working on the material, however intractable it was. Year after year he summoned men first to self-realisation and then to

1. *Bāng-i Darā*, p. 222

action. He said quite early :

نہیں ہے وابستہ زیرِ گردوں کمال شانِ سکندری سے
تمام ساماں ہیں تیرے سینے میں تو بھی آئینہ ساز ہو جا[2]

Underneath the skies, greatness is not linked to the splendour of an Alexander.
You have all the makings, you too can become a maker of mirrors [a creator].

His verses to Shaikh 'Abdul Qādir begin with this clarion call :

اٹھ کہ ظلمت ہوئی پیدا افقِ خاور پر
بزم میں شعلہ نوائی سے اجالا کر دیں[3]

Rise ! for darkness spreads on the Eastern horizon.
Let us bring light to our society by the flame of our words.

He foresaw much, and many times his seer-like vision pierced the future. In 1907 he said :

نکل کے صحرا سے جس نے روما کی سلطنت کو الٹ دیا تھا
سنا ہے یہ قدسیوں سے میں نے وہ شیر پھر ہوشیار ہوگا[4]

I have heard from the Cherubim that the lion which overturned the Roman Empire has risen in its desert lair.

We must remember that when Iqbāl sang out in this manner, he got carried away by the force of his prescience. In 1907 when this poem was written, it *was* rather a wild statement. It was certainly very optimistic in view of the fact that the Muslim world had been in retreat before the advancing arms of the West for nearly two centuries then. The Ottoman Empire was but a ghost of itself. Muḥammad 'Alī of Egypt had won freedom early in the nineteenth century. Greece had won her independence about ninety years ago. Rumania and Wallachia had gone. Bosnia had been snatched away by Austria.

2. Ibid., 138.
3. Ibid., p. 140.
4. Ibid., p. 150

Serbia was made into an Austrian Protectorate. The Russians had been kept away from Istanbul by the European powers, because they did not want Russia to capture the Dardanelles and threaten Suez.

The Qāchār dynasty in Iran had made a sorry scheme of things in Persia. Afghanistan was but a Protectorate. The British possessed Egypt, Aden, Bahrein, the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent. The French were masters of Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and almost the whole of West Africa. The Italians were threatenting Tripoli. The Balkan Powers did not want the Turks on the European soil. The Dutch owned the East Indies. Malaya was with the British. The Muslims of the world were vanquished. The Turkish Sulṭān-Caliph, the only Muslim sovereign, had been treated like the Sick Man of Europe for more than a century. Under these circumstaces it required extraordinary courage in Iqbāl to say :

سفینۂ برگ گل بنا لے گا قافلہ مور ناتواں کا
ہزار موجوں کی ہو کشا کش مگر یہ دریا سے پار ہوگا[5]

The caravan of the weak ants will use as boats, the rose leaves that float on the waves.
And this caravan will succeed in crossing the river even if a thousand waves bar the way.

So when Iqbāl said this, he did not think of himself. He was thinking of the millions of Muslims who had been shaking off their torpor and had been steeling themselves to meet the massive and paralysing attack of Westernism. It was in 1907, seven years before the First World War and thirty-two years before the Second, that he wrote the following verses :

دیارِ مغرب کے رہنے والو ! خدا کی بستی دکاں نہیں ہے
کھرا جسے تم سمجھ رہے ہو وہ اب زرِ کم عیار ہوگا
تمہاری تہذیب اپنے خنجر سے آپ ہی خود کشی کرے گی
جو شاخِ نازک پہ آشیانہ بنے گا ناپائدار ہوگا[6]

5. Ibid., p. 151. 6. Ibid., p. 150.

O denizens of the West, the world that God has created is not a market-place. What you consider good currency will be found to be mere counterfeit coin.

Your civilisation will commit suicide with its own dagger. The nest built on a perilous shoot cannot last long.

In March 1932, in one of my meetings with him, I asked Iqbāl for the meaning of this last verse. It was the year when the world had nearly forgotten the horrors of the First World War and Hitler had not yet emerged in Germany. Iqbāl said that he believed the world of the West would be rent asunder by the forces of Labour and Capital and Western civilisation would be destroyed by this conflict. This was the tender branch on which the West had built its nest.

But he believed that out of this turmoil the world of Islam would emerge triumphant. This was his faith and he seldom swerved from it. He said in his poem *Ṭulū'i- Islām*.

عقابی شان سے جھپٹے تھے جو بے بال و پر نکلے
ستارے شام کے خون شفق میں ڈوب کر نکلے

* * *

غبارِ رہگذر ہیں کیمیا پر ناز تھا جن کو
جبینیں خاک پر رکھتے تھے جو اکسیرگر نکلے[7]

Those who swooped like eagles came out with shorn wings. The stars of the evening dived in seas of blood (the blood-red sunset) to come bright and luminous.

* * *

Those who prided themselves on the discovery of elixir now lie low like the dust of the wayside, while those who humbled themselves before God are the true finders of the Secret of Eternal life.

But this faith in the destiny of the Muslims was no pipe-dream. He did not expect miracles except those created by men themselves. Endless effort, ceaseless pursuit, selfless devotion are asked for. He says:

7. Ibid., p. 310.

جس کا عمل ہے بے غرض اس کی جزا کچھ اور ہے
حور و خیام سے گذر بادہ و جام سے گذر

* * *

کوہ شگاف تیری ضرب تجھ سے کشادِ شرق و غرب
تیغِ ہلال کی طرح عیشِ نیام سے گذر[8]

The reward of the man whose devotion is selfless is greatly different. Give up thoughts of tents and houris, of wine-cups and wine.

* * *

Your powerful stroke can cleave mountains and you are the opener of East and West. Come out of your safe refuge like the scimitar as it leaps out of the luxurious case of the scabbard.

And the Muslims *did* cross the stormy seas of the past in 1918, when not a single sovereign Muslim State was allowed to exist. By 1939 when the Second World War broke out, Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey, Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Egypt were free. By 1950 the entire Muslim World, except for Algeria and Malaya, was independent and in another ten years the World of Islam from Indonesia to Morocco only accepted God Almighty as its Lord.

And all this was done not by princes and potentates, but by commoners. The last Muslim ruler, whose father had been a reigning sovereign (even though in name only), was thrown out of Egypt by General Najīb and General Nāṣir in 1956.

Iqbāl never says that only a few can do these wonderful things. His addressee is the average man, who does not know what powers he has; who has to be told that he is as good as the best man. He has only to gain self-confidence; he has only to gird up his loins and then even *he* can cleave mountains.

میانِ شاخساراں صحبتِ مرغِ چمن کب تک
ترے بازو میں ہے پروازِ شاہین قہستانی[9]

How long will you keep company with the birds, among the green leaves of the garden?

You have the might of the eagle of the mountains in your arms!

8. *Bāl-i Jibrīl*, p. 46. 9. *Bāng-i Darā*, p. 308.

This latent power of conquering time and space, of being again the torch-bearer of East and West can be realised only if this un-extraordinary man sheds his habit of dependence, of always seeking guidance and of following tamely the counsels of others. He must learn to take risks. Iqbāl says :

وہی ہے صاحب امروز جس نے اپنی ہمّت سے
زمانے کے سمندر سے نکالا گوہرِ فردا[10]

He is the Man of Today who by dint of his own efforts, brings out the pearl of Tomorrow from the seas of Time.

Here the emphasis is on the motto : "Learn to rely on yourself". And this is the point which he continued to stress for thirty years.

Way back in 1921 he says in *Khiḍr-i Rāh* :

ہو صداقت کے لیے جس دل میں مرنے کی تڑپ
پہلے اپنے پیکرِ خاکی میں جاں پیدا کرے[11]

He, who has the keeness to die for Truth must first create burning life in his earthly body.

پھونک ڈالے یہ زمین و آسمانِ مستعار
اور خاکستر سے آپ اپنا جہاں پیدا کرے[12]

Let him blast out his borrowed earth and sky [his world] and out of their dust and ashes create a new world.

Make your own world, work out your own destiny. But you will be able to do so only if you blow into a roaring flame the tiny spark which flickers somewhere in the deeps of your being.

To people of small heart and weak wills, tiny ambitions and narrow vision, he says :

ہمّتِ عالی تو دریا بھی نہیں کرتی قبول
غنچہ ساں غافل ترے دامن میں شبنم کب تلک[13]

10. *Bāl-i Jibrīl*, p. 40.
11. *Bāng-i Darā*, p. 294.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid., p. 298.

Great hearts are not satisfied even by the waters of rivers! O ignorant man! how long will you be content with the dribblings of dew?

But life requires great courage, an iron will, and the fortitude to take a lot of beating and yet keep undaunted and unbeaten. Iqbāl says:

ہے یاد مجھے نکتۂ سلمان خوش آہنگ
دنیا نہیں مردان جفا کش کے لیے تنگ
چیتے کا جگر چاہیے شاہیں کا تجسس
جی سکتے ہیں بے روشنیٔ دانش و فرہنگ[14]

I remember the point made by Salmān of melodious voice [sayer of good words]: the world has no confines for men of stout heart.

Only the courage of a leopard is required and the keen curiosity of an eagle; we can then do without the light of [so-called] learning and wisdom.

The basic theme of Iqbāl's poetry is his call to the average man, the man who has no big stakes in life, who has no vested interests, who has no external push. The man to whom he is calling our attention is the Little Man who has been forsaken by the high and mighty, but who still shares a little hidden glory with the great ones of the land. Only this glory needs a lot of care and maintenance and it will not let the Little Man rest. He must wage a ceaseless war against the forces of Nature and also against his circumstances. Consequently, Iqbāl sneers at those who take life easy and are mere spectators of life:

اے کہ آسودہ نشینی لب ساحل بر خیز
کہ ترا کار بگرداب و نہنگ است ہنوز[15]

O thou who seekest thy ease on the banks of the river [of life], rise; for you have a great task before you, of battling with the crocodiles and the whirlpools.

It is possible that life may be hard and one may not find an easy

14. *Bāl-i Jibrīl*, p. 109. 15. *Zabūr-i 'Ajam*, p. 98.

way out of the tangles of social and economic involvements. Iqbāl is not blind to such situations ; he says :

مردانِ کار ڈھونڈ کے اسباب حادثات
کرتے ہیں چارۂ ستم چرخ لاجورد[16]

> Men of Action seek out the causes of the storms and stresses of life and find remedies for the cruelties of the pitiless Heavens.

For him who ventures, there are always opportunities. One has only to dare, as he says :

ریگِ عراق منتظر کشتِ حجاز تشنہ کام
خونِ حسینؓ باز دہ کوفہ و شام خویش را[17]

> The sands of Iraq are waiting and fields of the Hijaz are thirsty.
> Give again to your own Kufa and Syria the blood of a Ḥusain !

Nothing comes easy to man ; one has to win one's heart's desire with one's blood. One has to stake one's life to make a way. Iqbāl says :

تختِ جم و دارا سرِ راہے نفروشند
ایں کوہِ گران است بکاہے نفروشند
با خونِ دلِ خویش خریدن دگر آموز[18]

> The throne [power and glory] of a Jamshed or a Darius is not sold by the wayside.
> This is a mighty mountain [of treasure], it cannot be purchased for a blade of grass.
> Learn again to buy it with your heart's blood.

The Man of Action is, therefore, not a puffed up balloon or a man with powerful lungs who can shout loudest ; he is also not one who is skilled in the devious ways required for success in our mundane world. The Little Man, the real hero of Iqbāl's poetry, has enough

16. *Bāng-i Darā*, p. 248.
17. *Zabūr-i 'Ajam*, p. 14.
18. Ibid., p. 115.

force of character to stand on his own legs. Besides, he has integrity and can resist beguilements and the temptations of expediency. He falters on the way but keeps the distant goal in sight. He is harassed by circumstances but is never daunted or cowed down by them. He is a little man but he has the spark of infinity in him. This is Iqbāl's Man of Action. In him lies the hope of mankind. He is the Unknown Soldier on whom depends the destiny of nations.

July 1966

Mazher-ud-Din Siddiqi

IQBAL'S CONCEPT OF EVOLUTION

Iqbāl has nowhere put forward a systematised theory of evolution, but it is possible to piece together from his isolated statements a more or less complete view of evolution as understood by him. It would have been surprising, indeed, if a poet-philosopher of Iqbāl's stature, whose thought encompasses almost the entire field of modern philosophy, had left us in the dark about his view of a theory which has exercised an ever-widening influence on almost all branches of human knowledge and effected a profound revolution in our modes of thinking. Iqbāl's idea of evolution is derived from many sources. It gathers up elements the most diverse and mutually opposed to each other, but finds expression in a synthetic unity bearing the stamp of our poet's personality.

The theory of evolution, as propounded by Darwin, took the religious world by storm. It seemed to sweep away before it the deeply-cherished faith of millions of human beings, held for long centuries, in the ultimate sanctions of religious morality. For a time the spiritual faith of mankind suffered a recession which appeared final and irrevocable. In vain did the champions of orthodoxy, like Bishop Wilberforce, direct their attacks and lampoons against this formidable heresy. It not only held its own but completely battered down the defences built up laboriously by the champions of faith.

The triumph of irreligion was complete.

Darwin had, in fact, proved nothing against God or religion, for, as Bertrand Russell has pointed out, even if we take for granted that the evidence of fossilised remains in primeval rocks is an indubitable testimony to the slow and progressive evolution of life from its lowest forms and provides convincing disproof of the doctrine of special creation, there is nothing impossible in the world having been created with man in it at a single instant, complete with all sedimentary rocks and fossilised vestiges. Although no one believes that God would play such tricks upon human beings merely to test their faith, yet such creation cannot be dismissed as inherently impossible, if we believe in the omnipotence of God.

The tremendous shock administered by Darwin to religious beliefs, which seemed so impregnable, cannot be ascribed to any inherent irrationality of those beliefs and certainly not to their core and content, but to their intellectual formulations and the logical explanations attached to them. In the Preface to his drama, *Back to Methuselah*, Bernard Shaw gives a brilliant exposition of the reasons for the extraordinary popularity achieved by the Darwinian theory of evolution and the ignominy of the defeat suffered by the protagonists of religion. Shaw says that the mind of European intellectuals was so much oppressed by the notion of an outside creator whose arbitrary will seemed to override every law and superimpose itself in a most uncertain manner on the regularity and orderliness of physical causation that the people heaved a sigh of relief when Darwinism eliminated God, Mind and Consciousness from the Universe. All the worst and most ghastly features of Darwinism such as the reign of blind chance, the pitiless cannibalism of Nature manifested in the insensate struggle for survival and the picture of a world which thrived on eternal warfare, priding itself on the philosophy of "Devil take the hindmost", were actually received with tumultuous welcome. Darwin pleased all sections of opinion in Western society which had an axe to grind. The war-mongers were happy, because Darwin seemed to justify mutual extermination as a legitimate mode of natural selection.

Capitalist exploiters felt at ease when they learned that they were committing no sin in depriving their fellow-men of the profits of hard labour; they were in fact copying merely the normal processes of nature. Socialists were pleased, because Darwinism had dispensed with the need of individual and personal reform by ascribing every beneficial change to environmental factors. Such was the enthusiasm evoked by the Darwinian interpretation of natural processes that nobody cared for the utter banishment of mind from the universe effected by Darwin. In the brilliant simile used by Bernard Shaw, Darwin seemed to imply that all the books in the British Museum would still have been written, word for word, in exactly the same style and phraseology, even if there were not a single mind in the universe, just as the trees put forth flowers and yield their fruits without the least tinge of consciousness.

Darwin accomplished in the biological and social realms what the physical scientists had done in the world of matter. Teleological causation involving the idea of purposiveness in nature and society was given short shrift. Everything happened according to blind chance. All changes were induced by external factors. Natural selection, the key to all biological advance, was an outside agency. The purposes of men and animals, their desires, aspirations and strivings were ineffective in the struggle for survival, because its issue depended on factors over which they had no control and which lay outside of them. These conclusions were uncritically accepted by an age which was proud of its rationality. And yet, closely examined, the Darwinian principle of "natural selection" justified no such conclusions, nor did it furnish the slightest proof of the omnipotence of external factors. If natural selection is likened to a policeman who guards the door of evolution and knocks down everyone who does not enter with a new and better equipment for the strife, even then the secret of evolution will be found not in the obstructing policeman but in the genius and qualities of the individuals who devise the new equipment. In other words, survival does not depend on outside factors, but on the inner qualities of organisms, their faculty for resistance, adaptation, etc. Nature works

from within, not from without.

For a long time Darwinian hypotheses seemed so unchallengeably entrenched that nobody could doubt their validity, and religious faith seemed to have suffered a permanent set-back. Soon, however, the tide began to turn. It was felt that the doctrine of external causation, involving, as it did, the repudiation of teleology, was inadequate to explain the phenomena of organic and social life. Lamarck had already stressed the role of desire, striving and conative energy in the process of natural selection. The theme was later resurrected by philosophers and psychologists, like Bergson, Lloyd Morgan, William McDougall and J. C. Smuts. Evolution was viewed in an entirely new perspective which tilted the balance in favour of the religious world-view.

The evidence of purposiveness in organic evolution was too strong to be ignored, and it could not be explained on purely mechanical principles or as an effect of external causation. The question arose: Is there, from the biological viewpoint, any initial agency which may serve to explain the constructive work of nature and which we may think of as the cause of those structures whose functional activity is life ?

Bergson sought to trace this agency in the *elan vital.* With him *elan vital* is the basic reality of all beings, the source and ground of evolution, a vital impulse or push or creative flow pervading matter, insinuating itself in it, overcoming its inertia and resistance, and determining the direction of evolution as well as evolution itself. This ever-changing free activity is life. The earliest animate forms, tiny masses of protoplasm, were possessed of a tremendous internal push, "that was to raise them even to the highest forms of life". The evolution of life is a process that goes on for ever by virtue of an initial movement. In his epoch-making work, *Creative Evolution,* Bergson says :

Whether we will or no, we must appeal to some inner directing principle in order to account for this convergence of effects. Such convergence does not appear possible in the Darwinian and specially

the neo-Darwinian theory of insensible accidental variations, nor in the hypothesis of sudden accidental variations.

Lloyd Morgan, whose theory of Emergent Evolution has found wide acceptance, came still nearer to the religious viewpoint when he declared :

> Without denying a felt push from the lower levels of one's being—a so-called driving force welling up from below—to me it feels like drawing upwards through activity existent at a high level than that to which I have attained. This sounds like Plato's notion of the Deity whom the Greek philosopher conceives of as a magnet pulling all beings towards itself.

Even those evolutionists who would not affirm the existence of a Divine Creator setting the direction of evolution, had to find refuge in the doctrine of an immanent cause of the evolutionary process, thus directly negating the Darwinian postulate of an external agency, like the natural selection, determining the pace and trend of evolution. William Morton Wheeler of Harvard University, for example, writing as a biologist, thinks that organisation in animals is the work of the components of the organism and that it is not directed by extra-spatial and extra-temporal "entelechies" or organising factors, or *elan vital*, or any metaphysical agency. The organising agency or tendency is immanent, not transcendent. Wheeler himself is an ardent supporter of the theory of Emergent Evolution and it is interesting to learn that this view does not necessarily suppose the existence of any transcendental agencies. But why do the components of a unitary complex have a tendency to organise themselves ? Wheeler believes that they are by nature "social". They have an irresistible tendency to cohere and organise themselves into more and more complex and emergent wholes, so that association may be regarded as the fundamental condition of emergence.

This is an attempt to escape from the difficulties of vitalism by postulating certain fundamental trends in evolution which help to explain its later and higher forms involving a greater complexity of organisation. Whatever those fundamental trends may be, it is clear

that the evolutionists have moved far away from Darwin and taken up a position which, without directly corroborating the religious view-point, certainly makes its postulates look more reasonable.

Among the psychologists who stressed the purposive nature of organic life and indirectly repudiated the Darwinian theory of natural selection as the prime agency of evolution, William McDougall stands out the most prominent. Although primarily a psychologist, McDougall really worked out a theory of social evolution by applying evolutionary methods to social psychology. McDougall reasserted the reality of mind which Darwin had banished from the realm of organic evolution. His main importance lies in rehabilitating teleology in the domain of science from where it had been banished by Darwin and his contemporaries. In *Modern Materialism and Emergent Evolution*, McDougall explains how the Darwinian theory of evolution was really an extension into the field of biology of principles derived from the mechanical explanations of the physical sciences. Attacking the postulates of mechanical materialism as applied to the physical world, McDougall says :

In the course of the nineteenth century, Atomic Materialism had invaded the young science of biology, permeated and shaped its teachings, and received from it new confidence. Two great fields of biological research yielded results that seemed to harmonize with it and, therefore, to confirm it. Physiology claimed to show that the functioning of all the organs of the human body, specially of the brain, could be explained mechanically, in terms consistent with Atomic Materialism ; it seemed thus to render untenable Descartes' theory that the human brain was the seat of interaction between the world of matter and the world of Mind, that in and through the brains of living men intelligent purpose could and did effectively intervene in the course of physical events, bending them towards the fulfilment of men's desires. Secondly, Darwin's theory of the origin of species by natural selection led to the general acceptance of the theory of organic evolution and made it seem that all the marvels of nicely adapted structure and function displayed by living things were the products of a purely mechanical process of adaptation continued through many millions of years.

Thus, Atomic Materialism engendered a Biological Materialism

that harmonized with it and seemed to confirm it. Atomic Materialism was, in origin and substance, a theory of the inorganic world. Biological Materialism was an extension of the same general type of explanation to the sphere of living things, to man himself, his every thought and action. And, now that Atomic Materialism has collapsed into ruins, Biological Materialism remains, confident of its own findings and still claiming the support of physical sciences.[1]

Criticising the postulates of Biological Materialism. McDougall says :

If the mechanistic assumption is valid, we cannot validly postulate any, even the slightest, degree of freedom of choice, or any effectiveness of our ideals and of our aspirations for their fulfilment ; we cannot believe in the reality of moral effort or of creative activity of any kind ; our belief that we can by our afforts contribute in some degree to the realization of our ideals ; our belief that by taking thought we may refine our ideals, or give preference to the better over the less good ; our belief that by self-discipline and culture we may raise ourselves in some degree in the scale of personal value and contribute however little towards the conservation of values—all such beliefs are illusory.

. . . the mechanistic assumption is incompatible with all those religious beliefs which to the plain man are of the very essence of religion, those beliefs the destruction of which would leave religion (if it at all survived) merely a system of pale abstract propositions, propositions incapable of evoking enthusiasm, devotion, loyalty or reverence, however sincerely he might believe them.[2]

Dissatisfied with Biological Materialism, McDougall has built up a whole system of animal and social psychology on the basis of teleological causation as opposed to mechanistic causation, explaining animal and human actions in terms of inner drives. In his *Outline of Psychology* and *Social Psychology*, McDougall really presents a teleological view of social evolution, showing how the actions of animals and men are moulded not by external factors, as maintained by Darwin, but by the forces inherent in animal nature. Animal and

1. W. McDougall, *Modern Materialism and Emergent Evolution*, Methuen, London, 1929, pp. 10-11.

2. Ibid., pp. 12-3.

social evolution is, therefore, a process which works itself out from within, not from without. McDougall thus repudiates the basic stand of Darwinism. In elaborating a well-reasoned theory of internal causation, he has done great service to religion and indirectly confirmed its conception of a creative God. For the notion of a transcendent Deity which modern physics and Darwinian evolution successfully repudiated, is an incomplete version of religious teaching, especially as set forth by the Holy Qur'ān. The Qur'ān describes God as the First and the Last, as Outer Appearance and Inner Reality. Here is a combination of transcendence with immanence which might form the basis of a new science of religion. If external Reality is not opposed to the Reality which guides and moulds organic evolution from within, but is only one aspect of that which manifests itself in the inner working of organic development, then the whole quarrel between science and religion is reduced to a battle of words and terminology.

Iqbāl, as the greatest philosopher of Islam in modren times, believes in just that conception of the Deity to which I have referred. He does not deny a personal and transcendent God, but he also conceives Him as the inner creative activity. His conception of evolution is a synthesis of the Qur'ānic teachings with the latest trends in evolution developed by Bergson, Smuts and McDougall in opposition to the Darwinian concept of evolution as proceeding from external causation. From this viewpoint, Iqbāl represents a synthesis of the latest Western thought with the essential core of the Qur'ānic teachings. Like any great man, Iqbāl had an extraordinary capacity for assimilation. He took his material of thought from sources so diverse as Nietzsche, Hegel, Bergson and McDougall among the modern philosophers, and from Rūmī among the medieval Islamic mystics. And it is a tribute to his originality and creative genius that he synthesised them into a new unity which bears the stamp of his unique individuality.

Iqbāl believes that the multiplicity of phenomena arises from a unity which broke itself into its components. All life-activity is, therefore, an incessant craving and strife to regain this original, primal

unity which is the source of being and its energy :

می شود از بهرِ اغراضِ عمل
عامل و معمول و اسباب و علل

* * *

شعلۂ خود در شرر تقسیم کرد
جز پرستی عقل را تعلیم کرد

خود شکن گردید و اجزا آفرید
اندکے آشفت و صحرا آفرید[3]

Here Iqbāl says that subject and object, cause and effect, are only projections of a single being which sometimes appears as the one and sometimes as the other in order to attain its ends. These diverse aspects of the primal being are as sparks into which the flame divides itself. It is this self-division of the primal unity which has produced the human intellect and confined its sphere of activity to the understanding of the parts. It seems that Iqbāl here refers to analytical reason which has to break up things, objects and concepts into their components, before it is able to grasp their import. But if the import of a thing lies not in its components but in its fullness, completeness and its rounded wholeness, the intellect must be incapable of fully diving beneath the surface of partial phenomena and getting at the full view of reality. In other words, the intellect cannot attain to synthesis. This is in fact Iqbāl's view and is supported by what he says about Reason as contrasted with Love. It is Love in Iqbāl's opinion which can reach the unity of things. Reason by itself is unable to do this, unless it is charged and inspired with Love. We shall discuss this subject later.

What is relevant to the evolutionary conception in these lines is the idea, suggested by Iqbāl, that the driving force of evolution lies in the conative tendency of things, that is, in their striving for the resumption of their original unity. It is true that Iqbāl does not expressly mention this, but in my view this is implicit in Iqbāl's description of life-activity as springing from the disintegration of some original unity.

3. *Asrār-o-Rumūz* (*Asrār-i Khudī*), pp. 13-4.

There is a Hegelian note in this conception of the evolutionary process. Hegel stressed that the world is the self-realisation of the Absolute Idea, through the conflict of opposites. Iqbāl assigns no such leading role to the self-activity of the Idea. At the same time he seems to believe that the world process is the self-realisation of an original unity broken up into its components. Action, not thought, is the key-note of Iqbāl's philosophy. With Hegel the real world is but a pale copy of the progress of the Absolute. Therefore, whatever is real is also rational, because it represents the stage of the self-development of the Absolute. Iqbāl, however, repudiates the claim of Idea or Reason to represent the reality of life to be its sole creative force. In this he is opposed to Hegelianism as well as the intellectualism of early Greek philosophy which saw nothing in the universe but the activity of Reason. Iqbāl thinks that Reason cannot stand alone. To be really fruitful, it must submit to the guidance and control of Love, which is more fundamental and more primary of the two.

انجامِ خرد ہے بے حضوری
ہے فلسفۂ زندگی سے دوری
افکار کے نغمہ ہائے بے صوت
ہیں ذوقِ عمل کے واسطے موت
دیں مسلک زندگی کی تقویم
دیں سرّ محمدؐ و براہیم ۴ [4]

* * * *

عشق کی گرمی سے ہے معرکۂ کائنات
علم مقامِ صفات ، عشق تماشائے ذات
عشق سکون و ثبات ، عشق حیات و ممات
علم ہے پیدا سوال ، عشق ہے پنہاں جواب [5]

* * * *

پیدا ہے فقط حلقۂ اربابِ جنوں میں
وہ عقل کہ پا جاتی ہے شعلے کو شرر سے

* * *

4. *Ḍarb-i Kalīm*, pp. 10-11. 5. Ibid., p. 13.

یا مردہ ہے یا نزع کی حالت میں گرفتار
جو فلسفہ لکھا نہ گیا خونِ جگر سے[6]

As these lines show, Iqbāl is not opposed to Reason as such but only to that form of it which sets itself up as independent activity of man and becomes disconnected with the flow of life. True Reason, according to Iqbāl, can only arise through activity, through Love and through striving after nobler objects. When not associated with such activity and striving, it becomes dead, empty and devoid of value and creativity. This is why the highest type of intellect is reached in men of action, specially in prophet-like persons with a deep sense of mission and destiny upon them. The idea that life progresses through oppositions, and that man's struggle against nature as well as the social conflicts generated by his own activity is a necessary condition of his perfectibility, occurs in more than one place in Iqbāl's poetry :

در جہاں تخم خصومت کاشت است
خویشتن را غیرِ خود پنداشت است

سازد از خود پیکرِ اغیار را
تا فزاید لذتِ پیکار را

* * *

عذرِ این اسراف و این سنگیں دلی
خلق و تکمیلِ جمالِ معنوی[7]

These verses indicate that Iqbāl, like Hegel, conceived of life as creating its own oppositions and contradictions in order to reveal its full possibilities and enrich its contents. It seems that what is called the object is nothing but the self-projection of the subject ; and not-self, similarly, is the creation of the self and instrument for its further self-development. Accordingly, Iqbāl here seems to deny the independent reality of the external world, except in a derivative sense. The world of nature and material objects has a value only in the sense that it provides the spiritual self of man with opportunities for self-

6. Ibid., p, 37.
7. *Asrār-o-Rumūz* (*Asrār-i Khudī*), pp. 12-3.

perfection through the oppositions and obstacles that it creates. In so far as it does this, it has got an instrumental value. Beyond this, it is not possible to affirm its reality or value. In this evaluation of external realities Iqbāl differs profoundly from Marx and other philosophers of Communism who are equally well convinced of the necessity of oppositions and contradictions in life. Marx too believes that life evolves through overcoming oppositions and contradictions inherent in nature. As soon as the social process has reached a certain stage of development, says Marx, "it creates its own contradictions which have to be faced and reconciled in a higher synthesis". But in the Communist philosophy contradictions and conflicts are regarded as a means for the development and progress of social systems. It is the social process and social organisation as a whole that gains in richness, content and variety. There is no mention in it of the individual. The individual in Communist philosophy does not count at all. He is a cog in the wheel, a passive instrument of deeper social processes. With Iqbāl, however, the social process is not so important. The self-development and self-perfection of individual men and women are greater achievements which come through the oppositions, contradictions and conflicts in nature as well as in society. Iqbāl seems to reject the mythical entity known as "society" or the "social process", for society is only the name of the relations in which certain individuals stand with one another. Apart from concrete individuals, society is an abstraction, so that the process of struggle against opposition and contradiction leads not to the enrichment of society or the perfection of the social organisation but to the self-development and progress of individual men and women.

The creative role of oppositions and conflicts in life is again and again stressed by Iqbāl, who believes that material strength and spiritual power can develop only through successful resistance against opposing forces.

راست میگویم عدو ہم یارِ تست

ہستیٔ او رونقِ بازارِ تست

هر که دانائے مقامات خودی است
فضلِ حق داند اگر دشمن قوی است [8]

Evil itself becomes a creative and evolutionary force, according to Iqbāl, because its existence awakens the yearning for good in the human breast and calls forth the power of human resistance. Life would not be worth living if there were no evil forces to be fought against and overcome. The existence of Satan or the evil principle is a necessary condition for the promotion of virtue and the advancement of life. Iqbāl would not like to live in a world where God alone held undivided authority and which did not allow Satanic forces to exist and operate :

مزی اندر جهانے کور ذوقے
که یزدان دارد و شیطان ندارد [9]

Life and struggle are synonymous with each other and one implies the other. Right to existence does not inhere in nature as such; it is the reward of successful effort.

زندگی جهد است و استحقاق نیست
جز بعلم الفس و آفاق نیست [10]

It follows from this assertion that Iqbāl does not believe in the theory of natural rights put forward by political philosophers. According to him, all rights are acquired and conditional. Absolute rights as such have no existence or justification. Life confers rights on those who are ready to take up its challenge. People who shun resistance and show unwillingness to meet its challenge can claim no rights.

Purpose, again, holds a fundamental position in Iqbāl's concept of evolution. It is the driving force of all progress and dynamic activity :

زندگانی را بقا از مدعاست
کاروانش را درا از مدعاست [11]

* * * *

8. Ibid., p. 59.
9. *Payām-i Mashriq*, p. 154.
10. Ibid., p. 5.
11. *Asrār-o-Rumūz* (*Asrār-i Khudī*), p. 16.

چون ز ربطِ مدعائے بستہ شد
زندگانی مطلع برجستہ شد
مدعا گردد اگر مہمیز ما
ہمچو صرصر می رود شبدیز ما
مدعا رازِ بقائے زندگی
جمع سیمابِ قوائے زندگی
چون حیات از مقصدے محرم شود
ضابط اسباب ایں عالم شود
خویشتن را تابع مقصد کند
بہرِ او چیند گزیند رد کند

* * *

ہمچو جان مقصود پنہاں در عمل
کیف و کم از وے پذیرد ہر عمل
گردش خونے کہ در رگہائے ماست
تیز از سعئی حصول مدّعاست

* * *

مدّعا مضرابِ ساز ہمت است
مرکزے کو جاذب ہر قوّت است [12]

As these verses show, life is preserved, according to Iqbāl through purpose which is an integrating and harmonising principle in that it enables man to concentrate his energies on a single object. But for purpose, the powers and energies of life would flow out in different channels and dissipate themselves in mutually incompatible and antagonistic efforts. It is purpose which brings unity in man's life and makes him a coherent whole. The purpose-dominated man represents the higest type of integrated personality. In a man who is not swayed by some dominant passion, or controlling purpose, there is a reign of anarchy. Competing and conflicting desires keep his inner self divided. He is whimsical, unpredictable, pulled by one desire and then by another in different directions, amenable to outside influences and a prey to all kinds of temptations. Purpose hardens us against external influences, strengthens us against temptations and saves us from following

12. Ibid., pp. 159-60.

incompatible aims. The purpose-dominated man alone is free in the sense that his life, character and conduct are moulded from within, and external conditions cannot turn him away from his life-mission. The reverse is the case with persons who are feeble-purposed. Their lives and characters are shaped from without. Lack of a strong purpose makes them soft, pliable and amenable to outside pressures. They cannot put up resistance and struggle against the influences around them. Same is the case with those nations which cannot develop a purpose of their own, strong enough to permeate their life-activity and overcome their internal conflicts and divisions. Such nations are bound to fall in some form or other into political and economic servitude. Having no purpose of their own, they must become the instrument of purposes cherished by others. They have to follow the line of least resistance and submit to any pressure from outside that happens to be the strongest for the moment. It is the idea of a national mission, the conception of a national destiny and the possession and pursuit of a conscious, clearly-defined purpose that enable nations to sink their internal differences, reconcile the conflicts of various groups and overcome the opposition and divergence of class interests. Where there is no consciousness of purpose, no idea of a goal to be realised, the nation suffers from lack of internal unity and solidarity, and wastes its powers and energies in mutual conflicts, thus weakening itself against external enemies. Purpose, in other words, is the unifying, binding and dynamic force in all activity, individual as well as national. Its absence means stagnation, disintegration and decay.

In stressing the role of purpose in the life of the individual and the community, Iqbāl seems to uphold the theory of teleological causation which had fallen into disrepute with the development of natural sciences. During the nineteenth century, faith in strictly mechanical or Newtonian causation had become so well established that it was regarded adequate for the explanation of all events not only of the inanimate world but also of the world of human activity. It was taken as the one and only type of naturalistic causation. But now it is being increasingly realised that mechanistic causation cannot explain everything, specially in the region of human activity. With this

realisation, teleology, long banished from the physical and social, sciences, has again come to hold a place of respect. But it is no longer the supernatural external teleology of the theologians who always conceived of God as working from without. The teleology which is coming to be re-established is intrinsic teleology, the explanation of human events from psychic causation, from causes which operate in the form of internal drives or natural instincts. Many modern psychologists recognise, the creative, purposive role of instincts in animal action. Primarily and traditionally the words "instinct" and "instinctive" point to those types of animal actions which are complex activities of the whole organism ; which lead the creature to the attainment of one or other of the goals natural to the species ; which are in their general nature manifested by all members of the species under appropriate circumstances ; which exhibit nice adaptation to circumstances ; and which though often suggesting intelligent appreciation of an end to be gained and the means to be adopted, yet owe very little or nothing to the indvidual's prior experience. "Instinct" implies that unknown something, which expressess itself in the train of instinctive action directed towards a particular natural goal. What is the nature of that "x" to which the word instinct points ? The problem has provoked much speculation all down the ages ; the answers range from the "finger of God" to "a rigid bit of the reflex nervous mechanism".

Iqbāl believes in the efficacy of these internal drives, and his theory of Love is little else than a theory of intrinsic telelogy operating from within the mind and spirit of man in the shape of instinctive desires. This type of causation does not dispense with the idea of God ; but God as conceived by the intrinsic teleologists, is a not a supernatural, external creative agency. He is the creative principle of life, the Guide that makes every organism conscious of its goal, implants in it the desire for the attainment of the goal and releases the internal dynamic force that is adequate to carry it along the path of struggle and strife necessary for its successful pursuit. In the words of the Qur'ān :

الذی اعطیٰ کل شیٔ خلقہ ثمّ ہدیٰ [13]

13. Al-Qur'ān, xx. 50.

He Who vouchsafes to everything its appropriate constitution and guides it to its proper function.

This internal desire which impels men and animals to activity in pursuit of vaguely or clearly defined goals, is variously characterised by Iqbāl sometimes as *tamannā* (desire), sometimes as *ārzū* (yearning) and what he calls *'ishq* or love is only a more intense form of the same conative tendency. It is a primal urge to live, create, improve and adorn. Religion, art, civilisation, industry, production and distribution of goods, all such activities are ultimately traceable to this innate tendency of things and living beings for ceaseless activity in pursuit of goals appropriate to their nature. Iqbāl finds the secret of life, progress and self-preservation in this striving and yearning of things and beings for unattianed but attainable objects.

زندگانی را بقا از مدعاست
کاروانش را درا از مدعاست

زندگی در جستجو پوشیده است
اصل او در آرزو پوشیده است

آرزو را در دلِ خود زنده دار
تا نگردد مشت خاکِ تو مزار

از تمنا رقص دل در سینه ہا
سینه ہا از تابِ اوآئینه ہا

* * *

آرزو ہنگامه آرائے خودی
موجِ بے تابے ز دریائے خودی

آرزو صید مقاصد را کمند
دفترِ افعال را شیرازه بند[14]

* * *

ما ز تخلیقِ مقاصد زنده ایم
از شعاع آرزو تابنده ایم[15]

14. *Asrār-o-Rumūz* (*Asrār-i Khudī*), p. 16.
15. Ibid., p. 18.

Life as described in these verses is nothing but desire and pursuit of goals ; we live by the successive creation and achievement of fresh goals. For the same reason, Iqbāl is opposed to the Buddhist philosophy of self-renunciation, because it cuts at the root of desire which is the ground and source of all activity.

گرم خون انسان ز داغ آرزو
آتش این خاک از چراغِ آرزو
از تمنّائے بجام آمد حیات
گرم خیز و تیز گام آمد حیات

* * *

زندگی صید افگن و دام آرزو
حسن را از عشق پیغام آرزو

* *

حسن خلّاقِ بہارِ آرزوست
جلوه اش پروردگارِ آرزوست[16]

* * * *

مرگ را سامان ز قطع آرزوست
زندگانی محکم از لا تقنطوا ست
تا امید از آرزوئے پیہم است
نا امیدی زندگانی را سم است

* * *

زندگی را یاس خواب آور بود
این دلیلِ سستیٔ عنصر بود
چشمِ جان را سرمہ اش اعمیٰ کند
روزِ روشن را شبِ یلدا کند
از دمش میرد قوائے زندگی
خشک گردد چشمہائے زندگی[17]

Desire and yearning are held up by Iqbāl as great constructive forces, vital principles of progress and sources of life and activity,

16. Ibid., p. 37. 17. Ibid., p.1(8.

while despair is condemned as leading to inactivity. The same thought is repeated in the following verses :

جہاں یک نغمہ زارِ آرزوئے
بم و زیرش ز تارِ آرزوئے
بچشمم ہر چہ ہست و بود و باشد
دمے از روزگارِ آرزوئے[18]

It is true that in its lower forms desire leads to individual and social conflicts, because the pursuit of power and ambition is productive of jealousy, hatred and many other moral evils. Nevertheless, it is capable of refinement and spiritualisation and supplies the driving force of all constructive, useful and spiritual activity as well. Between the selfishness and power lust of ambitious politicians and the burning reforming zeal of the prophets and religious reformers, desire acts as a common denominator. If there were no desires, there would be no activity, good or bad. All higher moral conduct is based ultimately on the promptings of desire; its elimination, therefore, would result not only in the disappearance of evil but also in the annihilation of the good. Modern psychology has shown that moral idealism and spiritual sublimity, which are characteristic of nobler humanity, are rooted in man's primitive, crude instincts and his appetitive faculties. Man's animal nature with its interplay of desires and appetites is the foundation from which the nobler sentiments of humanity arise. The moral progress of mankind consists in the transformation, sublimation and refinement of animal instincts in their crude and primitive state. This is also the attitude of Iqbāl with regard to the creative role of desire. What he calls *'ishq* or Love is nothing but the same crude, appetitive desire in its higher, transfigured state, and this love in Iqbāl's philosophy is the driving force of all evolutionary progress, a principle of life and creativity, a source of moral uplift and spiritual advancement in human history.

Love as described by Iqbāl is not a physical, sexual or biological principle. It is the inward drive of all life to attain to its full maturity

18. *Payām-i Mashriq*, p. 68.

and development. It is a primal urge to live, to progress and bring out all the inner wealth and resources of being. Every phenomenon and activity that is not related to this primal urge and does not subserve its purposes, leads to stagnation and decay. That is why Iqbāl voices strong condemnation of scientific reason, art and religion when they carve out for themselves autonomous fields of action or set themselves up as independent forces. According to Iqbāl, all specialised activity, whether it is intellectual, artistic or religious, is a differentiation of the primal urge which he calls Love and apart from it has no title to independent, autonomous existence:

علم بے عشق است از طاغوتیان
علم با عشق است از لاہوتیان

بے محبت علم و حکمت مردۂ
عقل تیرے بر ہدف ناخوردۂ[19]

* * * *

پیدا ہے فقط حلقۂ اربابِ جنوں میں
وہ عقل کہ پا جاتی ہے شعلے کو شرر سے

* * *

یا مردہ ہے یا نزع کی حالت میں گرفتار
جو فلسفہ لکھا نہ گیا خونِ جگر سے[20]

Here Iqbāl says that a philosophy which does not spring from the depths of life is so much empty trash; and thought which is not inspired by love or the will to progress, construct, create and beautify the world is dreadening. Similarly a religion without the flame of love of the urge to advance, improve and enrich life is only lifeless ritualism.

اگر ہو عشق تو ہے کفر بھی مسلمانی
نہ ہو تو مردِ مسلماں بھی کافر و زندیق[21]

Disbelief and atheism are as good as Islam, if inflamed by Love, while Islam is no better than paganism if it is devoid of Love.

19. *Jāvīd Nāmah*, p. 83. 20. *Ḍarb-i Kalīm*, p.37.
21. *Bāl-i Jibrīl*, p.54.

This incidentally explains the fall and decay of Muslims, despite their loud professions of high moral and religious principles. In the eyes of Iqbāl, to be a Muslim and hold allegiance to Islam, means really to feel a dynamic urge for the improvement of life and society, to be seized by an insatiable craving to enrich the world morally and materially, to give and create where others are trying to grab and acquire. If a person has this dynamic urge, he is a Muslim, even though he may deny the doctrinal part of Islam. Similarly if a man lacks this dynamic urge and inner drive and remains satisfied with things as they are, he is really an atheist, even with his full acquiescence in Islamic doctrines. Iqbāl then goes on to condemn an art which is inexpressive of this primal urge for social and moral improvement.

مقصودِ ہنر سوز حیات ابدی ہے
یہ ایک نفس یا دو نفس مثل شرر کیا ؟
جس سے دل دریا متلاطم نہیں ہوتا
اے قطرۂ نیساں وہ صدف کیا وہ گہر کیا ؟

* * *

بے معجزہ دنیا میں ابھرتی نہیں قومیں
جو ضربِ کلیمی نہیں رکھتا وہ ہنر کیا ؟[22]

The poet gives no weight to that art or literature which is unable to inspire men and nations with a sense of their destiny, for, he says, the purpose of art is not to rouse ephemeral emotions and transient feelings which spend themselves like flickering sparks. It should be the aim of art to evoke and bring into play emotions of lasting power and efficacy such as may prove effective in moulding human destiny.

Thus Love, in Iqbāl's poetry, stands for the principle of dynamic activity, a primal urge to live and not merely to live but to so live as to enrich, increase, improve and advance life. This principle of activity does not admit of scientific scepticism which retards action by making men uncertain of the ends and means of action, whereas Love demands and requires implicit faith unassailed by doubt and hesitation.

22. *Ḍarb-i Kalīm*, p. 117.

عقل در پیچاکِ اسباب و علل
عشق چوگان بازِ میدان عمل
عشق صید از زور بازو افگند
عقل مکار است و دامے می زند
عقل را سرمایہ از بیم و شک است
عشق را عزم و یقیں لاینفک است[23]

Strength of conviction strengthens determination and releases a fund of creative energy that is otherwise incapable of being roused to activity. Where there are doubts and lack of certainty, men and nations become cowardly and hesitant. Strong beliefs are necessary to bring into play the dynamic energy of men. It is for this reason that Love, not Reason, lies at the basis of all progressive and higher cultures. Convictions and beliefs, not logic-chopping, set the ball of human progress rolling:

زندگی را شرع و ائین است عشق
اصل تہذیب است دیں، دیں است عشق!
ظاہر او سوزناک و آتشیں!
باطنِ او نورِ ربّ العٰلمیں!
از تب و تابِ درونش علم و فن
از جنونِ ذو فنونش علم و فن!
دیں نگردد پختہ بے آدابِ عشق
دیں بگیر از صحبتِ اربابِ عشق[24]

Here Iqbāl says that all that is best in science, art and religion comes from Love or is expressive of the primal urge to live and beautify life. Civilisation derives its inspiration and dynamism from religion and religion is little else but Love. What Iqbāl means is that force of religious conviction creates and supports cultures. People devoid of conviction, lacking in faith and uninspired by moral idealism can build neither society, nor State, or any of the paraphernalia of civilisation. A strong State and virile society is the expression of men's deeper

23. *Asrār-o-Rumūz* (*Rumūz-i Bekhudī*), p. 125.
24. *Jāvīd Nāmah*, pp. 129-30.

convictions in abiding values. Faith releases not only creative energy, it serves to illumine the path of future action. It acts as a lamp-post, a lighthouse, in the dark unknown of futurity. It is vision supplied by faith and conviction that lays down the broad principles in statecraft. True statesmanship is the fruit of intellectual wisdom supplied by depth of conviction.

زمانہ عقل کو سمجھا ہوا ہے مشعل راہ
کسے خبر کہ جنوں بھی ہے صاحبِ ادراک[25]

* * * *

پیدا ہے فقط حلقۂ اربابِ جنوں میں
وہ عقل کہ پا جاتی ہے شعلے کو شرر سے[26]

Love is the moving principle not only of cultures, societies and civilisations and all forms of higher human activity, even animals and inorganic objects feel its push and attain to their highest development and maturity by the force of Love:

بباغاں بادِ فروردیں دہد عشق
براغاں غنچہ چوں پرویں دہد عشق

شعاع مہرِ او قلزم شگاف است
بماہی دیدۂ رہ بیں دہد عشق[27]

Here Iqbāl traces the activity of plant life to the same primal urge and conative desire that manifests itself in its higher forms in art, civilisation and statecraft. He says that it is Love which gives vision to the fish and enables it to see its way in the darkness of oceanic waters. His idea, which appears unscientific at first sight, finds corroboration from a school of modern psychologists whose chief representative is McDougall. T. Percy Nunn, for example, writes in his *Education : Its Data and First Principles* :

We need a name for the fundamental property expressed in the incessant adjustments and adventures that make up the tissue of life. We are directly aware of that property in our conscious activities as

25. *Bāl-i Jibrīl*, p. 97.
26. *Ḍarb-i-Kalīm*, p. 37.
27. *Payām-i-Mashriq*, p. 12.

an element of "drive", "urge" or felt tendency towards an end. Psychologists call it *conation* and give the name of *conative process* to any train of conscious activity which is dominated by such a drive and receives from it the character of unity in diversity.

Referring, then, to the subconscious activities of bodily and mental organs, he says :

None of these purposive processes may be called conative, for they lie below and even far below the conscious level ; yet a superhuman spectator, who could watch our mental behaviour in the same direct way as we can observe physical events, would see them all as instances of the same class, variant in detail but alike (as we have said) in general plan. In other words, he would see that they all differ from mechanical processes by the presence of an internal "drive" and differ from one another only in the material in which the drive works and the character of the ends towards which it is directed.[28]

McDougall himself has stressed in his *An Introduction to Social Psychology* the creative role of desire, striving or Love in the terminology of Iqbāl. He has written a whole chapter on the "Hormic Psychology" which explains all animal and human activity from its simplest beginning to its most developed and complex form as being due to a fundamental life-urge, a desire for the attainment of some goal which satisfies the innermost being of the organism. Referring to the development and transformation of bodily organs in the evolutionary process, McDougall says :

The hormic theory insists that the differentiation of instinctive tendencies has been, throughout the scale of animal evolution, the primary or leading feature of each step. Bodily organ cannot be supposed to have acquired new forms and functional capacities that remained functionless until some congruent variation of instinctive tendency brought them into play. Rather, it is necessary to believe that, in the case of every new development of form and function, the first step was the variation of the instinctive nature of the species towards such activities as required for their efficient exercise the

28. T. Percy Nunn, *Education : Its Data and First Principles*, London, 1923, pp. 20-1.

peculiarities of form and function in question. Given such variation, we can understand how natural selection may have brought about the development in species of the peculiarities of bodily form and function best suited to subserve such modified or new instinctive tendency.[29]

McDougall connects his Hormic Theory with the principle of "organic selection" put forward by Lamarck. McDougall goes on to say :

Given some changed environmental conditions, (*e.g.*, a growing scarcity of animal food for the carnivorous land ancestor of the seal), the intelligence common to all members might well lead all of them to pursue prey by a new method (the method of swimming and diving). And if this relatively new mode of behaviour became fixed, if the tendency to adopt it became stronger through repeated successful efforts to secure prey in this fashion, natural selection might well perpetuate all congruent bodily variations and might eliminate variations of an opposite kind ; and thus convert the legs of the species into flippers. This is the principle that has been named "organic selection," rendered effective by the recognition of the causal efficacy of hormic striving and the reality of Larmarckian transmission, a principle which without such recognition remains of a very dubious value.[30]

In upholding Love or, in psychological terms, conation as the source and moving power of all organic and inorganic life, all artistic, cultural, scientific and religious activity, Iqbāl, it appears, sets aside scientific reason as a thing of little value. In some of his verses, he is so unsparing in his condemnation of the reasoning faculty that an impression has come to prevail about him that he represents some of the modern school of thought which are saturated with anti-intellectualism. After an age of scientific optimism and confidence in the powers of reason, European thought took a sharp anti-intellectual turn. The movement began with Kant who, in his *Critique of Pure Reason*, brought out the limitations of human knowledge. He argued

29. W. McDougall, *An Introduction to Social Psychology*, Methuen, London, 1950, p. 480.

30. Ibid., pp. 480-1.

that human knowledge does not extend to the "things in-themselves" (or noumena) but only to their appearances (or phenomena), because in the act of knowing, the mind impresses its own forms and categories on the objects of knowledge. Kant, however, did not say that scientific knowledge was not true within its own sphere. All that he said was that knowledge of God and of future life is beyond human experience and can neither be proved nor disproved. Schopenhauer, however, identified ultimate reality with a blind, irrational will. According to him, life does not depend on reason but on blind appetites and unsatisfied cravings which lead nowhere. Nietzsche attempted a synthesis of Kant, Schopenhauer and Darwin. The inference he drew from Kant's theory of knowledge is that there is no such thing as knowledge. Truth is not discovered but invented. Beliefs are not all alike, but the proper distinction is between those which are useful and those which are useless, not between those which are true and false. Like Schopenhauer, he identified ultimate reality with will, but he characterised this will as a will to power, not merely as a will to live. "The love of power is the demon of mankind", he wrote. Nietzsche depicted the world in sombre hues, as Schopenhauer had done ; but far from preaching a life of renunciation, he stood for dangerous and energetic living. The struggle for existence, in his opinion, has the merit of bringing superior men to the top.

In some of his verses Iqbāl appears to share the anti-intellectualism of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, and a cursory reader might class him as an enemy of reason. I cite a few verses below which are apt to produce this impression :

زندگی کچھ اور شے ہے علم ہے کچھ اور شے
زندگی سوزِ جگر ہے علم ہے سوزِ دماغ [31]

* * * *

خرد کی گتھیاں سلجھا چکا میں
مرے مولا مجھے صاحبِ جنوں کر ! [32]

* * * *

31. *Ḍarb-i Kalīm*, p. 78. 32. *Bāl-i Jibrīl*, p. 24.

انجام خرد ہے بے حضوری
ہے فلسفہ زندگی سے دوری [33]

* * * *

عقل در پیچاک اسباب و علل
عشق چوگاں باز میدان عمل

عشق صید از زور بازو افگند
عقل مکار است و دامے می زند

عقل را سرمایہ از بیم و شک است
عشق را عزم و یقیں لا ینفک است [34]

In all these verses Iqbāl upholds Love as against Reason. He says that philosophy leads us away from life, and reason is always beset with doubts and hesitation. And finally he is so disgusted with the insoluble enigmas posed by the intellect, that he prays for a life of supreme unreason. It would be a false deduction from all this to bracket Iqbāl with Nietzsche and Schopenhauer. What Iqbāl denies is the autonomy of reason, its claim to go its own way irrespective of man's life-urges. According to Iqbāl, reason is a product of life. It should, therefore, subserve the purpose of life and give up its claim to partial or complete independence. True reason can subsist only as the servant of man's life-urges, as an instrument of man's higher desires and conative dispositions, because it is the creature of instinct and human urge towards more and improved life.

کبک پا از شوخیٔ رفتار یافت
بلبل از سعیٔ نوا منقار یافت

* * *

زندگی سرمایہ دار از آرزوست
عقل از زائیدگانِ بطنِ اوست

* * *

33. *Ḍarb-i Kalīm*, p. 10.
34. *Asrār-o-Rumūz* (*Rumūz-i Bekhudī*), p. 125.

دست و دندان و دماغ و چشم و گوش
فکر و تخییل و شعور و یاد و ہوش

زندگی مرکب چو در جنگاه یافت
بہر حفظ خویش این آلات ساخت

* * *

علم از سامان حفظ زندگی است
علم از اسباب تقویم خودی است
علم و فن از پیش خیزان حیات
علم و فن از خانہ زادان حیات[35]

Here Iqbāl explains his real attitude towards reason and knowledge. He equates life with instinct, appetite, desire, craving, all of which in their higher forms express themselves in man's religious and social ideals and in the dynamic urge to improve and beautify life. Now this basic drive, this primal urge and dynamic force needs certain instruments for its activity. Therefore, it differentiates itself in thought, imagination, memory and consciousness. Hence knowledge and reason are the servants of man's life-urge and its instruments for self-preservation. Beyond this, it is not possible to affirm their worth and reality. Modern psychology has much to say in favour of Iqbāl's view. Reason has been shown to be dependent on perception. Reason proceeds by analysis and synthesis to build on the material supplied by perception. It is the faculty of generalising and unifying experience. But both perception and experience depend on man's interests, desires and conative dispositions. The range and quality of our experience and perception is determined by our desires, the unconscious drives which keep us moving. Leighton writes in his book *Social Philosophies in Conflict* :

The basic determinants of man's actions are his loves and hates. These are the roots of his valuations. They are not only the springs of his overt actions. They actually determine to a great extent what the individual shall perceive and not perceive, by attention and inattention both in the surrounding world and in his own organic processes. Of course, the perceptions of the world or self depend on the *normality*

35. *Asrār-o-Rumūz (Asrār-i Khudī)*, pp. 17-8.

of the capacities of the sense organs and are limited by the nature of these organs. But, within this general human circle of possible experience, *what* specifically the individual actually experiences, consciously and clearly, depends on *attention*, which is determined by his interests—his desires, loves, aversions and hates. There are many features and relalionships in nature that I see because I like them; others that I ignore because they do not interest me. The same is true, of course, of my conscious recognition of the characteristics of my fellow men and myself. I do not wish to see certain of my failings; I do not desire to see certain qualities in other persons. . . . The individual of wide and keen perceptive experience and sympathies is individual of keen and wide *interests*.

This, I take it, is Plato's meaning in making love (Eros) the mainspring of human actions and knowledge. My world is primarily what I love.[36]

Iqbāl's view of the function and capacities of reason is further corroborated by the discoveries and facts of intinct psychology. Instinct is an urge to action and it creates its own perceptual instruments. Without instincts, without the fundamental drives operating in men and animals, perceptual activity, of which reason is a developed form, cannot stand by itself. Take the sex instinct as an example. Even at the relatively simple level of sex activity displayed by the fish, the operation of the instinct presupposes a differentiation of the two sexes in respect of external or perceptible characters which serve as recognition marks of sex. In the absence of such perceptible differences between the sexes, it would be impossible for the male to distinguish the female of his species. Accordingly, we find that in all animal species the two sexes are distinguished by the possession of such recognition marks of sex-marks which may be perceptible by every one of the senses, but which in the the higher animals most commonly appeal to the eye. The innate capacity or disposition to recognise the other sex by the aid of the recognition marks of sex is an essential condition of sex activity. Without this perceptual side the instinct would be well-nigh useless to the animals; it would

36. J. A Leighton, *Social Philosophies in Conflict*, New York, 1937, pp. 231-2.

achieve the first essential step of the process of fertilisation but very wastefully. Says McDougall :

The sex instinct then illustrates very clearly a much-neglected fact of instinct on which I have insisted in the earlier chapters of this volume, the fact, namely, that an instinct is not only an innate disposition to act and feel in a more or less specific manner *but is also an innate disposition to perceive or perceptually discriminate* those things towards which such reactions are demanded by the welfare of the species.[37]

Thus the psychology of instinct claims that knowing is always for the sake of action, and the function of cognition, perception and reason at a higher level, is to initiate action and guide it in detail. Where there is no conative disposition, no latent tendency of action to become overt, no Love in Iqbālic terminology, reason and perceptual activity cannot come into play, or if it does, its reach will be severely confined. This is what Iqbāl means when he condemns scientific reason which is only an attempt to understand things. But since understanding is always for the sake of action, cold scientific detachment becomes impossible for men and cultures moved by dynamic urges. As Karl Marx puts it : "The philosophers try to understand the world, but the problem is to change it." Far from being anti-intellectual or opposed to reason, Iqbāl fully upholds the creative role of reason when it subserves the dynamic urges of humanity and becomes a guide and lamppost in the pursuit of higher goals and nobler ends :

غربیان را زیرکی سازِ حیات
شرقیان را عشق رازِ کائنات
زیرکی از عشق گردد حق شناس
کارِ عشق از زیرکی محکم اساس
عشق چون با زیرکی ہمبر شود
نقشبندِ عالمِ دیگر شود

37. W.McDougall, *An Introduction to Social Psychology*, p. 334 (italics mine).

خیز و نقش عالم دیگر بنہ
عشق را با زیرکی آمیز دہ[38]

Here the poet says that Love allied to reason and working in co-operation with it becomes a highly creative force. In conjunction with the dynamic forces of life, reason is a truly potent thing. Love, under these conditions, derives strength and force from reason. The poet criticises reason only where it refuses to subserve the interests of life and severs its connection with the moral urges of man, when it claims autonomy for itself and asserts its independence of moral values :

ایں تماشا خانہ سحر سامری است
علم بے روح القدس افسونگری است

* * *

بے تجلی زندگی رنجوری است
عقل مہجوری و دیں مجبوری است[39]

* * * *

علم بے عشق است از طاغوتیاں
علم با عشق است از لاہوتیاں
بے محبت علم و حکمت مردۂ
عقل تیرے بر ہدف ناخوردۂ[40]

Without love, says the poet, reason is a positive evil, a satanic force ; but suffused with moral idealism, it becomes a divine power.

This, incidentally, should resolve the agelong conflict of faith and reason, of religion and science. Religion and faith are urges towards moral activity. The truly religious man is he who is moved by an impelling urge to create a better world which reflects and embodies his highest moral ideas. It is the moral idealism of the religious man which constitutes the essence and spirit of his faith. All other manifestations of the religious spirit, forms of worship, rules of discipline and social regulations accompanying it, are the instruments with which the religious urge seeks its fulfilment and destination. Now this is

38. *Jāvīd Nāmah*, p. 71.
39. Ibid., pp. 4-5.
40. Ibid., p. 83.

nothing but conative disposition which in its simplest form finds expression in animal instincts and appetites. As conative activity always creates its perceptual media, the religious disposition which is a primal urge for better and improved living, must also have its perceptive side, which can guide it to its appropriate goal and provide it with means for attaining its end. Thus, reason is a natural ally of religion. But this reason is not of the order of scientific and analytic intellect, because the latter would not go beyond what is strictly verifiable and demonstrable. In other words, scientific, analytic reason rests on and craves for certainty. What is not absolutely certain, that is not borne out by facts, it rejects as unprovable. This sort of reason works well as far as the past and present are concerned. But action such as the religious urge craves for involves the future which contains an element of uncertainty. You can measure and analyse the past, you can study the present with a fair degree of accuracy, but when you come to the future, no amount of scientific analysis or synthesis can provide you with unerring guidance or rules of action resting on absolute certainty. All actions which have a reference to the future involve an element of faith. If men were to wait for the absolute certainty required by science, no action on any plane would be possible. Why should any man step out beyond his threshold for his normal daily routine work, if there is no certainty that he will safely come back to his place? Columbus ought to have abandoned his epoch-making voyage if he had gone by the cold calculations of analytic reason. No revolution could have come off in history if the revolutionaries had not the courage to face an uncertain future, — with all the knowledge of history and man's social nature as well as all possible preparations for unforeseen eventualities and predictibilities, the next big step in any direction may be productive of unexpected consequences. It requires some faith and vision to move forward in any line and the greater and more heroic the task, the greater is the risk and uncertainty attendant upon it calling for deeper faith. Thus, faith is truly creative, as it moves forward with courage and daring, despite risks and uncertainties. Now, if this is true of every human

action from the lowest to the highest, it is impossible for the type of action such as religion implies, to give more than its due weight to scientific reason. It seeks, no doubt, and obtains help from reason in devising means, making preparations and arriving at the knowledge of probable consequences, but when all done, it has to take the last, final and decisive step on its own initiative without waiting for reason to pronounce its verdict; for in this last decisive step, unknowable, immeasurable and unverifiable elements are involved which in their very nature lie outside the scope of scientifie reason. So faith and reason have to work side by side as co-operative factors, until a stage comes when reason can go no further. It is then that faith takes the leap in the dark unknown leaving reason behind. That is what Iqbāl meant when he said:

بے خطر کود پڑا آتش نمرود میں عشق
عقل ہے محو تماشائے لب بام ابھی[41]

Does faith, then, accept uncertainties and move forward without knowledge? No, because, like all conative urges, it evolves its own perceptual instruments. Just as instinct in animals has its perceptual side which guides it and provides the means for the attainment of the desired goal, similarly the religious urge creates in intuition or revelation its appropriate perceptual tool that brings certainty and removes vagueness as to means and ends. The truly religious man is able to dive into the future by means of an uncanny foresight, which Iqbāl designates as *baṣīrat*. This *baṣīrat* or foresight is not a self-subsisting, independent faculty. It is only a differentiated form of the primal urge operative in the higher type of humanity. The prophet or the revolutionary does not act blindly by the propulsion of unconscious urges. The life-urge in him becomes fully conscious of its goal and is freed from all vagueness and uncertainty that are commonly characteristic of the activity of semi-conscious humanity. But this certainty is not provided by scientific analytic reason. It is the supernormal perceptive faculty sometimes called intuition and sometimes revelation

41. *Bāng-i Darā*, p. 318.

which rends asunder the clouds of doubt and ignorance and makes the future fully transparent as if it were a present reality already grasped and understood.

We have seen that Iqbāl takes Love or conative energy as the basic principle and driving force of evolution from which reason at a lower level and intuition at the higher emerge as co-operating factors. Love or conative energy displays its activity in goal seeking. Hence the importance of purpose in life. By the pursuit and attainment of purpose human beings gain in power and self-control. The purpose-dominated man displays the highest type of conative energy and achieves a fully-integrated personality in which all inner conflicts have been resolved and reconciled. But Iqbāl is no finalist. He does not believe in a final purpose. All purposes are for him but stages which lead on to renewed activity as soon as the immediate goal has been achieved. Man lives by successively creating and accomplishing new purposes. The activity is endless. If it came to stop, if complete self-satisfaction followed the attainment of any purpose, the spring of energy would go dry, life activity would come to a sudden halt and instantaneous death would ensue.

من فدائے این دل دیوانۂ
هر زمان بخشد دگر ویرانۂ
چون بگیرم منزلے گوید که خیز
مردِ خود رس بحر را داند قفیز
زانکه آیات خدا لا انتہاست
اے مسافر جاده را پایان کجاست ؟ 42

* * * *

چو نظر قرار گیرد به نگار خوبروے
تپد آن زمان دل من پئے خوبتر نگارے
ز شرر ستاره جویم ز ستاره آفتابے
سر منزلے نه دارم که بمیرم از قرارے

42. *Jāvīd Nāmah*, p. 133.

چو ز بادۂ بہارے قدحے کشیدہ خیزم
غزلے دگر سرایم بہ ہوائے نو بہارے
طلبم نہائت آں کہ نہائتے ندارد
بہ نگاہ نا شکیبے بہ دلِ امید وارے
دلِ عاشقاں بمیرد بہ بہشت جاودانے
نہ نوائے دردمندے نہ غمے نہ غمگسارے[43]

Here Iqbāl says that stagnation and inactivity is the cessation of life, since it is the nature of man to desire and pursue the infinite. He cannot stop at any stage of achievement and look back to exult over it. If he does this, it is his end as a self-conscious being. For the same reason Iqbāl does not like the common concept of an eternal paradise in which there are no fresh goals to be pursued. The same idea is repeated with small, inconsequent variation in the following verses:

اے مسافر جاں بمیرد از مقام
زندہ تر گردد ز پروازِ مدام[44]

* * * *

من از ذوق سفر آنگونہ مستم
کہ منزل پیش من جز سنگ رہ نیست[45]

* * * *

دوام ما ز سوز نا تمام است
چو ماہی جز تپش برما حرام است
مجو ساحل کہ در آغوشِ ساحل
تپیدِ یک دم و مرگِ دوام است[46]

Iqbāl's theory of the achievement and creation of successive goals is capable of fuller illustration in the life of the community. A community lives only so long as it is inspired by positive urges. As soon as the urge of self-preservation obtains hold over its mind, its career as a progressive force comes to an end, because self-preservation

43. *Payām-i Mashriq*, pp. 148-9.
44. *Jāvīd Nāmah*, p. 30.
45. *Payām-i Mashriq*, p. 42.
46. Ibid., p. 69.

is a negative ideal. We desire freedom from foreign control and the right to mould our destiny for definite, ascertainable purposes, not merely that we may live and preserve ourselves. No virile individual and group desires self-preservation for its own sake or freedom from outside control as a self-sufficient end. It is because the inward urge for self-determination is thwarted that we chafe and fret under external domination. But self-determination implies the existence of a positive purpose. The desire for freedom and liberty among nations is only a preliminary goal, not a final end whose attainment may bring self-satisfaction and stop further progress. When the community has achieved its preliminary goal of freedom, it goes on to pursue its real, positive goals. Every success on the collective plane of action intensifies its desire for further victories. Living communities do not stop to exult over their triumphs and glories, for every victory opens new vistas and possibilities of fresh achievements, so that there is no time for self-congratulation. This is what Iqbāl hints at in the following verse :

میسر آتی ہے فرصت فقط غلاموں کو
نہیں ہے بندۂ حر کے لیے جہاں میں فراغ[47]

The poet says that only slave nations and individuals can afford to rest on their laurels. The truly free individuals and nation have no time to indulge in holidaying, because they are incessantly impelled by fresh goals and driven by new urges. If a nation has no other goal except to preserve its gains and reap the fruits of its past struggle, its life-energy is dirverted to internecine quarrels and group rivalries for the division and distribution of spoils. The mass energy that could have been utilised for the pursuit of fresh goals and the achievement of new victories is driven in upon itself and wastes itself in self-destroying internal conflicts. The unity of the nation is broken owing to the absence of new positive purposes and lack of a well-defined goal. The community becomes like a sick man who having no outward interests becomes self-centred and quarrels with his own members. The healthy

47. *Ḍarb-i Kalīm*, p. 84.

man wars against outside forces in pursuit of his life-interests, the unhealthy wages a war against himself. Similarly, a living nation goes on from one pursuit to another, successively achieves and creates new and higher goals for itself, aspires for fresh victories and never stops to take a moment's rest. Its social components and internal groups become integrated and unified in a single collective personality fused out of the common purpose that runs through them all. A dying nation having no other aim except the enjoyment of victories already won, is broken asunder by internal disunity and becomes a prey to disruption and self-division for lack of a positive purpose. Self-preservation, it seems, is best achieved on the national level by the pursuit of ever fresh and higher goals.

That States and communities perish when they give up the incessant pursuit of fresh ends and cease to create new goals for their activity, is a historical fact to which attention has been called by more than one political thinker in recent times. A famous Spanish writer, Ortega Y Gasset, says in one of his remarkable books entitled *The Revolt of the Massess.*

Once again, I repeat: the reality which we call the State is not the spontaneous coming together of men united by ties of blood. The State begins when groups naturally divided find themselves obliged to live in common. This obligation is not of brute force, but implies an impelling purpose, a common task which is set before the dispersed groups. Before all, the State is a plan of action and a programme of collaboration. The men are called upon so that together they may do something. The State is neither consanguinity, nor linguistic unity, nor territorial unity, nor proximity of habitation. It is nothing material, inert, fixed, limited. It is pure dynamism—the will to do something in common—and thanks to this the idea of the State is bounded by no physical limits.

There was much ingenuity in the well-known political emblem of Saavedra Fajardo: an arrow, and beneath it, 'It either rises or falls'. That is the State. Not a thing, but a movement. The State is at every moment something which *comes from* and *goes to*. Like every movement, it has its *terminus a quo* and its *terminus ad quem*. If at any point of time the life of a State, which is really such, be dissected there will

be found a link of common life which *seems* to be based on some material attribute or other—blood, language, 'natural frontiers'. A static interpretation will induce us to say : That is the State. But we soon observe that this human group is doing something in common—conquering other peoples, founding colonies, federating with other States ; that is, at every hour it is going beyond what seemed to be the marerial principle of its unity. This is the *terminus ad quem*, the true State, whose unity consists precisely in superseding any given unity. When there is a stoppage of that impulse towards something further on, the State automatically succumbs, and the unity which previously existed, and seemed to be its physical foundation—race, language, natural frontier—becomes useless ; the State breaks up, is dispersed, atomised.[48]

Since the secret of individual and social evolution lies in the pursuit of higher aims and activity directed to more or less conscious purposes, Iqbāl believes that a real abiding life can come to the individual only from his self-identification with the larger and fuller life of the State or the community. The man who cannot rise above his private interests is only half-alive. He remains ill-developed, unspiritualised, a kind of glorified animal, because he is self-enclosed and refuses to share the ideals and purposes of the community. Participation in communal purposes confers a fuller and richer life on the individual. The enlargement of purpose, according to Iqbāl, is the enlargement of life and personality, and this is possible only through the life of the community and identification of the individual self with socially accepted or socially oriented goals. Hence, only those individuals can achieve real immortality who sink their lives and private interests in the life and interests of the community. By so doing they enrich and enlarge their own lives. Men absorbed in narrow self-interests are men of cramped and narrow individuality. A richer and higher individuality is the outcome of one's self-identification with broader social objectives.

فرد تا اندر جماعت گم شود
قطرهٔ وسعت طلب قلزم شود

* * *

48. Ortega Y Gasset, *The Revolt of the Masses*, London, Unwin Books, 1961, pp. 124-5.

وصل استقبال و ماضی ذاتِ او
چون ابد لاانتها اوقاتِ او

* * *

لفظ چون از بیت خود بیرون نشست
گوہر مضمون بجیب خود شکست

* * *

فرد تنها از مقاصد غافل است
قوتش آشفتگی را مائل است[49]

* * * *

فصل گل از نسترن باقی تر است
از گل و سرو و سمن باقی تر است

کان گوہر پرورے گوہر گرے
کم نگردد از شکست گوہرے

صبح از مشرق ز مغرب شام رفت
جام صد روز از خم ایام رفت

باده ہا خوردند و صہبا باقی است
دوشہا خون‌گشت و فردا باقی است [50]

But communal life may also become narrow and cramped, if the community identifies itself with its own narrow secular interests and forgets its identity with the larger universal humanity. Iqbāl does not like his community to become the slave of passing national self-interests. If the individual can rise higher in the scale of being only by identifying himself with broad social objectives, nations and communities must also work for the broader and more inclusive interests of humanity in general and mould their corporate life on the basis of universal human values to achieve a higher degree of spiritual and moral development. Iqbāl is opposed to modern secular nationalism for this very reason ; since it refuses to look beyond particular group interests and lives by ignoring and trampling upon the universal life of mankind

49. *Asār-o-Rumūz*, (*Rumūz-i Bekhudi*), pp. 98-9.
50. Ibid., p. 136.

at large. He advises his nation to rise above narrow territorial patriotism and race or colour prejudices.

صورتِ ماہی بہ بحر آباد شو
یعنی از قید مقام آزاد شو
ہر کہ از قیدِ جہات آزاد شد
چون فلک در ششجہت آباد شد[51]

* * * *

آن چنان قطع اخوت کردہ اند
بر وطن تعمیر ملت کردہ اند
تا وطن را شمع محفل ساختند
نوع انسان را قبائل ساختند

* * *

روح از تن رفت و ہفت اندام ماند
آدمیت گم شد و اقوام ماند[52]

* * * *

قوم تو از رنگ و خون بالا تر است
قیمتِ یک اسودش صد احمر است

* * *

فارغ از باب و ام و اعمام باش
ہمچو سلمان زادۂ اسلام باش

* * *

گر نسب را جزو ملت کردہ ای
رخنہ در کارِ اخوت کردہ ای[53]

* * * *

نیست از روم و عرب پیوندِ ما
نیست پابندِ نسب پیوندِ ما

* * *

51. Ibid., p. 132.
52. Ibid., p. 133.
53. Ibid., pp. 188-9.

عشق در جان و نسب در پیکر است
رشتهٔ عشق از نسب محکم تر است

عشق ورزی از نسب باید گذشت
هم ز ایران و عرب باید گذشت

* * *

هر که پا در بند اقلیم و جد است
بے خبر از لم یلد لم یولد است[54]

* * * *

In the above lines Iqbāl argues that the Divine Being knows no limitations of time and space. God is neither a begetter nor a begotten being. If, therefore, corporate life is to be moulded on the model of Divine attributes, as Islam seeks to do, Muslims must free themselves from the narrow parochial outlook of modern nations. Blood, colour, family, tribe and descent should cease to form the basis of human interests. Society must be shaped on the universal regard for humanity. It is this internationalising and universal aspect of Islam which appeals most to Iqbāl. His championship of Islam does not proceed from his desire for the material welfare of the Muslim community, but because he feels that in the modern world with its scientific, industrial and technical power and its faster and more improved means of communication, the Islamic ideals of international brotherhood and human equality—which could be realised only partially in the society of seventh-century Arabia—are capable of fuller realisation. He does not stand for the rights and welfare of the Muslim nations and Muslim peoples only. His interests are broader and more universal and his sympathies are larger and far more inclusive. But he feels that because the Muslims are free from the narrow racial and colour prejudices and have the best historical background for evolving an international and equalitarian outlook, they can be more easily galvanised into mass efforts directed at the remoulding of human society in accordance with the broad, universal principles of Islam. His advocacy of Pakistan sprang from the self-same desire. Pakistan

54. Ibid., p. 190.

of Iqbāl's imagination was to be a nation and State moulding its entire collective existence on the pattern of Divine attributes. Iqbāl believed that a real, true and living God must furnish light and guidance in the larger affairs of life, in the momentous affairs of collective existence and the vital decisions which affect the happiness and well-being of millions. He did not believe in a powerless and impotent God who could be excluded from any sphere of existence where His interference was felt to be irksome by men bent on pursuing their own desires and interests. If the Divine Being is not limited by space and time, His message and inspiration too cannot be limited to individual affairs or acts of formal worship. Religion, to be real and effective in any sense of the word, must be a society-shaping and State-building force. If not, it is empty ritualism and saint-worship, an instrument for furthering human selfishness which, through the repetition of a few magical formulae and the intermediation of bribe-accepting saints, condones every social misconduct of the individuals, whatever its consequence for the welfare and happiness of humanity in general.

Iqbāl has been designated as a reactionary by a section of self-styled progressives. The main counts against him are that he looks back to the social pattern of seventh century Arabia for remoulding human society. In holding up to admiration ancient heroes like 'Umar, 'Alī, Abū Dhar, he is really trying to push back humanity. Similarly, because his concept of State and society is modelled on the social and political structure of early Islam, his ideals are incapable of realisation in the present-day complex society. These claims and charges have not been substantiated so far. The "progressives" have not even taken pains to define their concept of progress. We should defer judgment on these matters until we have defined the term "progress". It may be that Iqbāl's view of progress was different from those of our new-fangled theorists who have neither the learning nor depth of thought to explain and establish their own concepts.

No one can deny that there has been social evolution in the history of mankind, and that social structure has become more elaborate, more complex and functionally more differentiated at every successive stage of history. But social evolution does not and cannot mean social

progress. The evolutionary changes of society are welcome to some people and disgusting to others. It all depends upon our valuations. Such values as contentment, abiding faith, economic security, freedom from overstrain are not realised in highly evolved types of society. The simpler and more primitive societies embody these values to a much larger extent. Confusion arises when we think that greater complexity, more elaborate structural development, or better technological resources also mean improved human behaviour, richer individual development and greater regard and respect for human life and personality. Progress has had a different significance for different individuals and societies. To the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, progress meant emancipation from the bonds of tradition and the tyranny of power. To the nineteenth-century America, progress meant better and more efficient exploitation of the resources of the earth. To the twentieth-century Russia, progress denotes greater social security and more elaborate planning. Which of these are to be regarded as the real constituents of progress? Freedom and individual liberty, social security, economic equality, or all of these worked up into some synthesis may or may not be regarded as adequate to the concept of progress. Whatever the decision in regard to the different theories of progress, one thing is clear : progress does not lie in the external paraphernalia of civilisation, in economics, technology or improved industrial methods. It is something subjective, something that relates to men's intellectual and moral attitudes, something which concerns the way in which and the ends for which the material resources of mankind are utilised. When Iqbāl or any other thinker and philosopher of his type dreams of a better world, there is no desire in his mind to go back to more primitive methods of social organisation, because the scientific, technical and industrial advance of mankind is irreversible. The clock of civilisation cannot be put back. The complexities and increasingly differentiated functioning of social institutions cannot be simplified into their original, undifferentiated unity. There is no escape from evergrowing organisation and elaboration of structural details in the organs of society. If this means progress, no man in his senses would protest against its consequences,

far less an intellectual of Iqbāl's calibre. But this is not definitely progress. It is evolution. Writing in his recent book, *The Meaning of Evolution*, an eminent evolutionist, Mr. George Gaylord Simpson, says :

It is a childish idea—but one deeply ingrained in our thinking, specially on political and social subjects—that change *is* progress. Progression merely in the sense of succession occurs in all things, but one must be hopelessly romantic or unrealistically optimistic to think that its trend is necessarily for the good. We must define progress not merely as movement but as movement in a direction from (in some sense) worse to better, lower to higher, or imperfect to more nearly perfect. A description of what has occurred in the course of evolution will not in itself lead us to the identification of progress unless we decide beforehand that progress *must* be inherent in these changes. In sober enquiry we have no real reason to assume, without other standards, that evolution, over-all, or in any particular case, has been either for better or for worse. Progress can be identified and studied in the history of life only if we first postulate a criterion of progress or can find such a criterion in that history itself.[55]

This shows that progress is an ethical concept based on moral valuations, while evolution is a scientific fact and the two must not be confused. Progress lies in the moral attitudes of men, in their sense of justice and passion for equality. It denotes broader human sympathies, improved social and class relationships and more equitable distribution of material wealth. It implies the unity and brotherhood of nations and the elimination of such barriers as race-feeling, national egoism and narrow religious sectarianism. It means a higher conception of man's place and mission in life and of his destiny in the universe. It involves a more refined and ennobled view of that totality of existence and the life-force running through it which by the athiest is often erroneously called Nature and by the theist rightly designated as God.

If this is the true concept of progress, the religious man, the social reformer, the revolutionary and all others who have stood up

55. George Gaylord Simpson, *The Meaning of Evolution*, Mentor Books, 1953, pp. 108-9.

for the higher ideals of life in opposition to vested interests in any age or clime and at any stage of human development are men of the same line, because their life, attitudes and standards of evaluations have always been the same. They differed in the range of their understanding, in their methods and techniques, but in their ideals and aspirations they expressed fundamentally the same life-urge, the same conative energy, the same sense of human fellowship. The modern age can, have its own 'Umars, 'Alīs and Abū Dhars in a different setting. In progressive nations it has already evolved these types of finer humanity. They might not be exactly similar in all respects, because nature does not repeat itself. They might differ in their methods and techniques, because their historical setting and the situations, which they might be called upon to meet, will be different. Their scale and scope of activity may also vary and yet they will represent the same particular type of humanity. So in holding up to admiration certain approved patterns of conduct which may serve as models for new aspirants, Iqbāl is not guilty of any obscurantism or revivalism.

Similarly, when Iqbāl refers to the social and political structure of the early Islamic age as the standard pattern on which we might model our corporate life, he is not calling for the revival of the dead past. He does not mean that society should be pushed back to its primitive state, with the same simple habits, customs and institutions. What he means is that the same ideals and standards of conduct should inspire and guide the life of advanced humanity. If individuals belonging to different ages and separated by the chasm of centuries can express in their lives and behaviour the same ideals, aspirations and human values, social and political institutions can also be made to embody the same ideals, whatever the stage of technical and economic development which society might have attained. Of course in their structural details, in the degree of their complexity and the extent of their functional differentiation, human institutions will show wide variations in accordance with the degree of scientific and technical advance, but there is no logical and historical necessity preventing their makers and moulders from so adjusting and adapting them that they might become the expression and embodiment of those higher

ideals of which the Islamic society was itself a product. The same sense of human fellowship and sympathy for the poor man that found expression in the simple primitive system of Zakāt might evolve a more elaborate and complex structure of social security, infinitely different in detail and technique. The same love of democratic freedom and regard for the common man's right to have a say in the affairs of the government that led to the institution of *Shurā*, primitive mode of consultation, might assume the form of a complex structure of political and constitutional organs in which the ordinary voter might make his influence felt. It is a wrong notion that human institutions are subject to rigid and inexorable laws of their own which leave man with no choice or freedom to mould them in accordance with his aspiration, or stamp his ideals upon them. One of the most striking characteristics of the evolutionary process has been the increasing measure of control, self-direction and self-determination which it seems to confer on social humanity and the growing independence of man from the subjecting influence of external environment. Says the author of *The Meaning of Evolution*:

> Control over environment, is still more clearly progress, if we agree to consider progress frankly as defined from the human position. At least it leads us to the position that only man is really progressive in the history of life. Actual *control* of environment, as opposed to the ability merely to move about in search of suitable environments, means of escape from unsuitable ones, or the ability to get along in varied and varying environments, is almost exclusively a human ability. . . .Means of *protection* from the environment are practically universal among organisms, although they vary greatly in nature. They may exemplify progress on some other standard, but they do not help particularly to define it. The fact that the control of environment is so nearly exclusive to man does not mean that it is not progress, but that it is a peculiarly *human* sort of progress, part of the larger wonder that man is a new sort of animal that has discovered new possibilities in ways of life.[56]

It is this increasing independence of external environment that

56. Ibid., p. 116.

enables man to mould his social, political and economic institutions in such a manner that they become the expression of his developed spirituality. He is not free in the sense of being able to dispense with social institutions or simplify them and turn them to their more primitive and less developed forms. But he is free to stamp them with his moral idealism and make them vehicles and agencies of his spiritual aspirations. The reactionary is one who worships outmoded forms, who thinks that institutions, laws and social structures can be revived in their original shape, without variation in detail and the addition of new factors. But Iqbāl did not desire to return to the institutional simplicity of early Islam. He accepted the complexities of the modern world, its increasing division of labour and the differentiation of functions which all progress involves. But he rejected many of the ethical concepts and moral evaluations of modern civilisation. He wanted to mould and adapt the modern political and economic institution to a scheme of human values derived from Islamic teachings. If this is revivalism or reaction, then every true Muslim should be proud to call himself a reactionary and a revivalist.

January 1954

B. A. Dar

IQBAL AND BERGSON

Bergson's main contribution to the thought of the twentieth century lies in his forceful attack against the mechanistic interpretation of life, against an over-emphasis on intellect and against dualism of body and mind, all of which had been the legacy of seventeenth-century development of new scientific method introduced by Descartes and Galileo. At the peresent time when, not to speak of biology and psychology, even physics has abandoned its stand vis-à-vis materialism, we cannot imagine the magnitude of the task which Bergson was called upon by destiny to perform. After him a host of thinkers like McDougall and Driesch supported his thesis by their researches, but in 1889 it was, indeed, his pioneering genius that took up the cudgels on behalf of a cause that appeared to all to be a forlorn hope. Mechanism, like the proverbial jinn, set free unwittingly from its hide-out by the untutored hands of the scientists and bent upon destroying its rescuers, was once again brought under control and put back to its real place by Bergson.

Though pre-eminently a philosopher, he left the beaten track so far followed by the members of his profession, and chalked out for himself a totally new way of dealing with the problems of his time. He presented his point of view not only on the basis of mere abstract logical reasoning and *a priori* truths, but marshalled verifiable and

scientific facts in support of his theory. His brilliant style, his lucid exposition, his beautiful similes and metaphors, his deep-rooted conviction in the truth of his viewpoint, all contributed towards convincing the hard boiled people of his age that even though total truth might not be on his side, he was not far from truth.

When William James, the celebrated American thinker, read his *Creative Evolution*, he wrote: "It seems to me that nothing is important in comparison with that divine apparition, . . . a marvel, a real wonder in the history of philosophy." He concluded by adding, "There is so much that is absolutely new, that it will take a long time for your contemporaries to assimilate it . . . ."[1] And there is no doubt that Bergson said much that was unpalatable to the people of his age, people who under the influence of rich harvest from scientific materialism and machine age, had developed a distaste for the finer things of the Spirit. To an age steeped in the thought of the present and forgetful of the past, he gave a message of the future; to the people who had been forced to abandon faith in free-will and immortality, he held out a bright hope of a new and exhuberant life not only in this world but in the world hereafter. Men of science had woven round themselves a hallow of false sanctity, and the general people, struck by the enormous material benefits that followed their researches, could hardly tear it to pieces, though their hearts yearned for something else. Bergson boldly stepped forward and pulled down with ease what appeared to be impregnable. He had the honour to break the idol, and now it lies trampled under the feet of all. Even the scientists themselves now disown it. And all this came about at the hands of one whom we may appropriately call a mystic seer.

Iqbāl had to face an equally formidable situation. The Muslims of this Subcontinent were living only in their past. They had nothing to go by in the present and lacked any clear vision of the future. On a mere past, however glorious, nothing tangible and permanent could be built. Intellectually inferior, morally bankrupt, materially powerless, psychologically frustrated, they were being crushed between the

1. *Letters of William James* (1920), pp. 290-1.

demands of the present and the needs of the future. They had lost faith in the revitalising power of their religion and were thus being driven to different blind alleys which brought no relief. Their self-confidence was lost and with it everything else seemed to disappear. The mystic path which once claimed to be the sure antidote, was proving of no avail, for it had lost touch with the brute facts of reality. Life—this day-to-day life—seemed all too important and engaging to be brushed aside by the meaningless and insignificant spell-devices of the mystics. Mere intellectual pursuits had also not proved to be the promised sesame. The door still remained banged against their faces. At such a time Iqbāl put before them a way out of this predicament. He not only understood the real problem but also gave them the key with which the doors of our future destiny could be easily opened. To him it was not the problem of East versus West but of East-cum-West. Belonging to the East, he could not set his foot against the best traditions of this land of the Sun. Nor could he accept what the West claimed to offer without qualifications. Both had to offer something valuable, but there was much in both which needed purging. Iqbāl tried to appropriate what was best in the two. From the West he learned what he claimed was really the legacy of Muslim thought, viz., the scientific attitude and love of the concrete. But he could not accept the anti-religious and anti-moral implications of this culture. The moral and religious fervour of the East was contaminated by too much indulgence in the other-worldly prejudices and so needed to be based on the concrete facts of reality.

In this respect Iqbāl owed much to Bergson. Except Nietzsche, no other contemporary Western philosopher had looked upon the problems of life, culture and science as deeply as Bergson. When Iqbāl went to Europe in the early twentieth century, Nietzsche and Bergson were the two leading thinkers that occupied the scene. Of the two, Nietzsche was more negative and destructive, while Bergson more positive and constructive. Bergson's emphasis on the deeper levels of consciousness or, in other words, on the spiritual inwardness of human life and the part which intuition plays in bringing into play this dynamic experience, fascinated Iqbāl. It was in reality an echo of

the East in the very heart of the almost paganised West and Iqbāl captured and enlarged this impulse. The theory of evolution once hoped in the West to be the last nail in the coffin of religion, was expounded by Bergson—on the basis of hard facts—in a way which tended to dissipate this false hope. Not only his way of dealing with these problems but also the conclusions which he arrived at were in most cases allied to Rūmī's thought and it was perhaps this fact which brought Iqbāl nearer both to Rūmī and Bergson. All the three viewed Reality as dynamic and creative with this difference that to Iqbāl and Rūmī, this Reality is spiritual while Bergson, handicapped by the tradition of the West, fought shy of such a bold step. Iqbāl's view of time is mainly derived from Bergson, while on the question of freedom of will all the three stand on the same ground. The contrast of reason and intuition had been an old problem among Muslim thinkers and Rūmī's point of view is, perhaps, much more impressive though less philosophical. But both Bergson and Rūmī, in their zeal for intuition, tend to look down upon thought and intellect, while to Iqbāl the Ultimate Reality is an organic Unity in which thought and intuition have an equally important place. There may be difference, rather antagonism, between the two at the lower level but both become one at a higher plane. True love and true reason become identical. Rūmī and Iqbāl part company with Bergson when the latter calls the Reality, the *ealn originel*, to be moving towards no goal. A goal-less movement, a progression that has no objective, no far-off end towards which it is constantly moving, would be no movement in the real sense, but the cyclic motion of the Greeks which would not only make time unreal but consider Reality to be mechanical, non-creative and governed by blind necessity. This, in short, amounts to reversal of the whole of Bergson's position and therefore Iqbāl improves upon it and advocates that the process of evolution tends towards a particular goal, viz., the production of an ideal race of more or less unique individuals who will become befitting parents of the Perfect Man.[2]

2. Introduction to *The Secrets of Self* (English translation of *Asrār-i Khudī*), Lahore, 1950, p. xix.

II

When Bergson started thinking about the problems of philosophy, the mechanistic physics was wedded to materialism, and biology as expounded by Darwin and his followers was treading the same path. The concepts of life and mind lost all significance which once attached to them, and along with it, all moral and aesthetic values, faith and religion were in danger of being thrown overboard. The situation at that time can be clearly grasped from the following words of Professor Tyndal who, at a meeting of the British Association in 1874 (during Bergson's early teens), declared that science would soon be able to explain all that happened and will happen in terms of the "ultimately purely natural and inevitable march of evolution from the atoms of the primeval nebula to the proceedings of the British Association for the Advancement of Science."[3] In fact, Bergson began his philosophical career with Spencer as his model. His early efforts were directed towards achieving the results envisaged by Professor Tyndal. He dreamt of extending the application of mechanistic explanation to the entire universe. Having a sound training in science and mathematics, he was confident of reaching some fruitful conclusion. But very soon he found himself against a blank wall. The evidence of facts seemed to him to be too overwhelming to fit in within this preconceived framework; his scientific training, therefore, compelled him to abandon this hypothesis. He studied Spencer's *First Principles* once again with the intention of discovering where the defect lay. When he came to the idea of time, it at once struck him that there lay the main stumbling block. He realised that evolution as viewed by Spencer was no evolution at all, and the idea of time presented by the mechanistic philosophy was not real time but distorted and materialised by contact, as it were, with space. It became the starting point of Bergson's new research. He spent full seven years in retirement thinking over this problem. It was in reality a problem of far-reaching importance which affected the life of all men beneath the sun. If man is nothing but a conglomeration of atoms and molecules with no

3. C. E. M. Joad, *Guide to Modern Thought*, p. 46.

suprasensual aspirations and only obeying the inexorable law of causation, then there is no sense in striving for higher ends and purposes. If man's sense of inner freedom is only an illusion and his multifarious activities are no more than the movement of a stone thrown haphazardly by a naughty boy as Spinoza viewed man to be, then why all this fuss about values, and faith, goodness and beauty? And seven years of Bergson's intensive contemplation over this problem proved indeed very fruitful. Prophet-like he emerged out of his retirement and began to preach a new gospel of life to a despairing humanity. To the people of his age, who were being nourished on pure materialism, Bergson's message was the first glimmer of a new dawn. In 1889 his first book *Time and Free Will* was published and since its appearance, materialism and the concomitant belief in the mechanistic interpretation of the whole universe, have been gradually losing ground until today both have been discarded even in circles where they were once most ardently defended. He stood for the primacy of life and freedom of will and thus had the honour of bringing to the notice of the scientists of his age, especially the psychologists and biologists, that life and mind are vitally different from inert matter and therefore need a different method of approach and treatment.

The concept of time commonly accepted by this type of philosophy was defined by Newton thus :

Absolute, true, and mathematical time, in itself, and from its nature, flows equally, without relation to anything external. The flow of absolute time cannot change . . . . Duration remains the same whether motions are swift or slow or none at all.

Time is conceived as infinite, homogeneous, of one dimension, continuous and irreversible. Bergson lays particular stress upon its homogeneity and continuity. It is an empty, qualityless or indifferent homogeneous medium in which points are distinguished as "now" and "not-now", as successive, or as first, second, third, etc. This homogeneous medium is distinguished from space, another qualityless, infinite and infinitely divisible medium, homogeneous in all its parts, in which points are distinguished as "here" and "not-here", as simultaneous, or as co-existing in one moment of time. Bergson contends that

this conception of time is not pure but adulterated with space. But if mechanism is not a true interpretation of the problems of life and does not give a true conception of time which, according to Bergson, is the very life itself, then where are we to seek its true nature? The answer is: In consciousness, in the very heart of life itself. To reach the true nature of reality, we must study not the crust but the core. We must install ourselves at the very heart of life-movement.

A study of our consciousness, however, reveals that self has two different aspects, social and fundamental. The self with which psychology deals is the social self which is viewed in spatial terms. We say that states succeed one another and can be quantitatively measured and determined. The time of the social self is the time of which we predicate long and short and can conceive of it as a straight line composed of spatial points which are external to one another like so many stages in a journey. But when we look into deeper self, we find that the boundaries of "states" gradually melt away, the multiplicity of definitely outlined feelings, volitions, images becomes less definite, less a multiplicity. The unity of the fundamental self is like the unity of the germ in which the experiences of its individual ancestors exist, not as a plurality but as a unity in which every experience permeates the whole. This organisation of the facts of consciousness is the work of time; it is time itself.

Corresponding to these two selves, there are two methods of approach. Our social self, that part of our life where we are most concerned with material world around us, is amenable to mechanistic and analytic treatment. But our fundamental self, which is the core of our life, resists this interpretation. It is truly free and cannot be grasped in deterministic terms. Thus, Bergson was led to the important distinction of intellect and intuition. This problem was the legacy of Kantian philosophy. Kant, in his examination of the limits of pure reason, reached a conclusion that was, in fact, a denial of the possibility of knowing the Reality. Bergson accepted this challenge and by his subtle logic tried to prove that Reality was accessible to men but not through reason. He agreed with Kant that reason by its nature of logical analysis cannot grasp what is beyond logic. But then he took

the bold step and asserted that intuition is the key which not only can reveal the hidden door of Reality but also open it. We need only to look within and come face to face with what Kant called the thing-in-itself. With the help of this new method, viz., intuition, Bergson proved that Reality is pure time, duration, free and creative.

In order to prove his point of view, Bergson took up the hypothesis of evolution as presented by different biologists. In the classical interpretation, evolution was conceived as a mechanical process wherein fitness of the organism to the environment was the criterion of survival. According to Darwin, evolution proceeds through chance variations in which the individual organism has no part to play. Those variations which are most suited to the environment tend to survive and to reproduce themselves. The whole process is a result of mere accident. Whether these variations are gradual or sudden, in either case the role of life in the whole affair is merely passive and negative. It does not contribute anything. According to Lamarck and his followers, the adaptation to environment determines the pace of evolution. When environment changes because of climate or other factors, it produces a corresponding effect on the organisms. Those who are successful in adapting themselves to the changes survive, while others are eliminated. Though differing in other respects, both these explanations agree in looking upon the whole process of evolution as proceeding on mechanical lines. Bergson brought forth a wealth of facts based on the study of insect, animal and vegetable life, pursued for eleven years, to prove that both these classical theories fail to prove how evolution proceeds. Leaving aside general cosiderations, Bergson presents a concrete example. Here is the eye of a vertebrate and beside it that of a mollusc such as the common Pecten. The same essential parts, composed of analogous elements, exist in both. The eye of a Pecten exhibits a retina, a cornea, a lens, with cellular construction like our own. Whatever opinion one may hold as to the origin of molluscs, it will be agreed that they and vertebrates had been separated from their common trunk long before the appearance of an eye as complex as that of a Pecten. How, then, is the analogy of structure to be explained ? Bergson explains that both the theories fail to explain this

wonderful phenomenon of the existence of eye in two divergent lines of evolution and he asserts that this fact in itself is a sufficient refutattion of mechanism. "*Pure mechanism . . .*", he says, "*would be refutable . . . if it could be proved that life may manufacture the like apparatus, by unlike means, on divergent lines of evolution . . . .*"[4]

Besides these particular instances, Bergson put forward another important point which, as he claims, destroys the whole basis of classical theories of evolution. If survival of the fittest or adaptation to environment had been the only criteria, evolution should have ceased long ago. There are many lower organisms perfectly adapted to the environment. So he is driven to the conclusion that there is an impulse within the process itself which moves it along the path. He says:

> A very inferior organism is as well adapted as ours to the conditions of existence, judged by its success in maintaining life; why, then, does life, which has succeeded in adapting itself, go on complicating itself more and more dangerously? Why did not life stop wherever it was possible? Why has it gone on? Why, indeed, unless it be that there is an impulse, driving it to take ever greater and greater risks towards its goal of an ever higher and higher efficiency?[5]

Thus, in opposition to the usually accepted interpretation, Bergson asserts that there is a vital urge behind this process of evolution. So far the thinkers had been concerned only with the outer crust of change in the body of the living organism. But Bergson penetrates to the core of the evolutionary process and discovers a life-impulse, *elan vital*, which determines the tortuous course of evolution. To explain variations by reference to chance is meaningless, for there is some unsuspected teleological signifiance behind these variations. There are "risks" which life takes towards the goal which it has set itself to achieve. But is there any goal to this process of evolution? Denying mechanism, one would expect that Bergson would accept teleological explanation. But he rejects both.

The essence of mechanical explanation, in fact, is to regard the future and the past as calculable functions of the present, and to sub-

4. *Creative Evolution*, London, 1954, p. 58.
5. Ibid., p. 54.

mit that *all is given.* On this hypothesis, past, present and future would be open at a glance for a superhuman intellect capable of making the calculations.[6]

If so, then change, growth, evolution and creation would be utterly foreign to the universe. Creative activity and spontaneity would become impossible. But what about teleology? To Bersgon the explanation of human activity with reference to motives or ends is equally defective. It is as inapplicable to the creative activity of men as mechanism. There is a form of teleology in which beings and things realise a cut-and-dried programme which is actualised in the course of time. Here again, then, all is given, present, past and future and all so-called free activity is simply the realisation of a predetermined plan. Teleology thus understood, Bergson holds, is merely mechanism in the reverse order. Evolution means growth, and growth implies untold possibilities that cannot be foreseen. Life is history, and history never repeats itself. Life consists in creative evolution, that is a succession of absolutely heterogeneous, quite disparate, qualitative changes.

If there were any plan in the working of evolution, Bergson argues, there would have been complete harmony in nature. We find, instead, lack of harmony, disorder and disorganisation. Harmony at the start of life was the result of the same impulsive urge; but as evolution advanced, conflicts and divergences appeared. In looking backwards, the direction of life can be traced and it will appear as if it were attaining an end. There is a unity of impulsion and not of aspiration. In order to save the novelty and unforeseeability of new events, Bergson had to abandon the teleological view. Like the mechanist, the advocate of teleology seeks the reason for the harmony in the past rather than in the future. But to Bergson the vital impulse, instead of producing only identity, repetition and death, as the mechanist conceives it, is a creative impulsion, continually welling forth in new and unforeseeable events. If mechanism had its way, all evolution would be the result of a series of accidents which add up together to produce the existing form. But in the Bergsonian conception, though the end is not predetermined, it has nevertheless been obtained by a

6. Ibid., pp. 39-40

process which in some way resembles a voluntary act of will. This original and vital impulse operates in such a way that its activities cannot be predicted. The universe grows at every moment and the gates of future are always open. Life produces novelties, makes fresh creations, advances on unchartered seas, devising charts for itself as it sails away. It is just because the vital impulse is active and creative that the future of living beings can never be predicted. If history is a record of such creative, vital and unforeseeable acts, then every event of the past and the present is unique in itself and cannot be repeated in exactly the same form. No past can be re-created in its original form, for life must ever move along new, fresh and original paths.

This creative impulse which is of the character of "pure will" or "consciousness" does not, however, proceed without interruption. At one point its continuous flow is interrupted and, like the recoil of a spring, turns back upon itself. This inverse movement is matter. Reality is, no doubt, ceaseless change and flow, but matter is a flow in a direction opposite to that of the vital surge itself. Bergson expresses the relation of matter to reality in different metaphors. Life impulse is a rocket whose extinguished remains fall to the ground as matter. It is a fountaln which is playing in ever increasing abundance. Jet of the fountain is vital activity while the drops which fall back are the creative movement dissipated and are matter. Matter is, then, "a flux rather than a thing", but its flow is in the direction opposite to that of the spirit. The flux of spirit is creative evolution ; the movement of matter is towards stability, towards a present which is unceasingly renewed. Bergson seems to arrive at these two opposing tendencies in the universe on the analogy of the movement in our consciousness. Natural direction of mind involves interpenetration of parts, continuous creation, free activity but as soon as this movement is interrupted, the opposite movement towards repetition and necessity begins. So the experience of an individual seems to be projected into the cosmic organism, and thus Bergson explains the presence of matter.

Bergson's problem of the appearance of matter is allied to Fichte's similar problem of the emergence of the non-ego ; both, in

reality, failed to explain it satisfactorily. Fichte started with the pure Ego which, according to him, holds the key to the universe. In self-consciousness he discovered the clue to all reality. I am, I exist, only as I act. But then out of this ego as active subject appears a non-ego as object which limits the activity of the subject. Why should there be a non-ego at all ? According to Fichte, the answer to this question lies in the very nature of the ego itself as infinite activity or impulse. Activity of the subject in order to release itself, demands, an object which it must overcome ; so it creates out of itself a limiting reality. To Bergson, the Reality is also a creative movement and impulse, a pure will. But experience points to the limitation of this will which according to Bergson, is due to the inversion of the free activity of the *elan vital*. But the question is : Why should the free activity ever become inverted ? Why should there be any interruption in the free flow ? Bergson fails to give any definite answer and his metaphorical language shows that it is a problem which cannot be stated in cold logic. It is nothing more than an interesting and ingenious cosmic speculation.

Whether Bergson has been able to solve this problem or not, the more important point is the opposition between these two forces. The universe is an intermingling of the two directions ; the direction of the life force and the force retarding it. Life started as total and undiminishing activity but at a certain stage it meets the resistance of matter, a force moving in the opposite direction. From this meeting of the two opposed movements, this universe of ours originated. The world of pure tension becomes extension, freedom is changed into necessity. Perfect life would be incessant change and creation, but matter leads to periodicity. Without matter there would be no struggle. Effort can be provoked only when resistances are met with and when there are obstacles to be overcome. And so it is owing to matter that the force of life is tested and intensified. Meeting with resistance of matter, the *elan vital* at once devises means to overcome it. Instinct and the organic tools with which it works in insects and animals, intelligence and the presence of sense-organs, are all diverse means employed by this impulse to attain its object.

The *elan vital* is an activity, but whether it is conscious or unconscious is not definitely explained by Bergson. In its continuous march forward this activity is met by an activity of opposite nature. The result is a kind of compromise as in the case of plants. The *elan vital* (which is the same thing as will or freedom) may gradually overcome the activity which is matter. An organism is formed thereby — a *modus vivendi* between the two activities. Two paths are open to it to continue its conquest over matter. It may do so immediately, by creating an organised instrument with which to work; or it may do so mediately— in an organism which, although it is not endowed with the natural instinct, will itself manufacture it by fashioning inorganic matter to its needs. The line of development which ends in insects represents the first alternative while the other line, starting with the vertebrates, ends in man. In the former instinct is the means, while in the second case intelligence is the required tool. These two : instinctive activity and intelligence, represent two divergent solutions of the problem which presented itself to the original *elan* in its action upon matter. The problem was to "create with matter, which is necessity itself, an instrument of freedom; to make a machine which should triumph over mechanism and to use the determinism of nature to pass through the meshes of the net which this very determinism had spread."[7] Hence, if life force assumes the form of intelligence in man, and thus for a while suffers diminution, it is all but necessary for achieving the ultimate purpose. Intelligence becomes allied with matter so much so that materiality and intellectuality become identical terms with Bergson. The force which threads its way through matter has chosen to adopt the form of matter, to insinuate itself into matter, in order that it might ultimately conquer that which it has, so to speak, ingratiated itself. Intellect is simply a stage of the life force in the progress of free activity. Matter does not determine the form of intelligence as Spencer tried to advocate, neither does intelligence impose its form upon matter as Kant held, nor have matter and intelligence been regulated by some pre-established har-

7. Ibid., p. 278.

mony as Leibniz contended, but matter and intelligence have been progressively adapted to each other, and ended in a common form. The life force, as if voluntarily, purposefully and cunningly adopted the form of matter. This temporary degradation becomes essential so that the spirit can discover and overcome the order of matter and this is possible only, as if, by stooping to conquer.[8]

According to Bergson, these two modes of the *elan,* intinct and intelligence, do not appear in one line of evolution. He combats most strongly the view commonly held by biologists of modern times as well as Aristotle. He says:

The cardinal error which, from Aristotle onwards, has vitiated most of the philosophies of nature, is to see in vegetative, instinctive and rational three successive degrees of development of one and the same tendency, whereas they are three divergent directions of an activity that has split up as it grew.[9]

Bergson argues that instinct and intelligence have appeared in their developed forms on two divergent lines of evolution and each represents an attempt at solution of one and the same problem, the conquest of mind over matter. Originally they formed part of the creative impulse immanent in life. They are thus complementary, yet opposed faculties. Intelligence is concerned with the form of matter; instinct with the activity of life. Although man, as endowed with intelligence, is inclined towards mechanism and materialism, yet the basic force of life in him compels him to look deeper within himself. It is impossible for him not to rise to the higher point of view. He is not pure intelligence; he is not "in entire forgetfulness" of the source whence he, as an intelligent being, sprang.

There pulses in him, though feebly enough at times, the will which created him and which surges through innumerable worlds. Let him resist the distractions of matter, which has hypnotised his spirit; let him get back into this will, listen to it, feel it—the antinomies will disappear, and he will feel himself living the life of the world-will, for

8. J. M.Kellar Stewart, *A Critical Exposition of Bergson's Philosophy*, p. 121.
9. *Creative Evolution*, p. 142.

he has placed himself at the heart of world-progress, the cosmic life, the universal will. We are, all of us, as human, artisans by nature but we are also, as superhuman, artists to a greater or less extent. Fugitive instincts, fleeting direct visions of reality in its inwardness, appear through the turmoil and the din of the artisan work in which contact with matter has involved spirit—let us develop these, and our vision of life becomes clear and full.[10]

The principle of life in its march towards creative activity meets resistance of matter. From this resistance emerges the whole problem of life and thenceforward this principle works with the set purpose of attaining greater and greater freedom. The presence of matter hinders this progress to a degree, but at the same time its resistance proves useful. The goal towards freedom lies only through conquest of matter, and man alone has succeeded in this direction. Thus, man alone is free, and he is free because of the marvellous complexity of his brain structure. Freedom has been achieved through mechanism. In this sense we may say that man is the goal of evolution. It does not imply that any fore-ordained plan has been fulfilled in man. The freedom which consciousness lost by its contact with matter has been most completely regained in man. Man is essentially intelligence : it is necessary that he should be so if he is to gain conquest over matter. A complete and perfect humanity is one in which intelligence is supplemented by intuition and both are fully developed. According to Bergson, the philosopher is the nearest approach to the perfect man. He conquers matter not by ignoring it but by patiently deciphering its meaning. But then he must surpass it. Intelligence is a means and not an end. When it has fulfilled its purpose, it must be thrown aside. We must then turn our face towards the eternal light through intuition. It is then alone that we can experience in ourselves the very source of life. It is only then that we can appreciate the real significance of true creative freedom and participate in the cosmic life of humanity. Then we no longer feel ourselves isolated in humanity ; humanity no longer seems to us isolated in nature which it dominates. Says Bergson :

10. J. M.Kellar Stewart, op. cit., p. 136.

As the smallest grain of dust is bound up with our entire solar system, drawn along with it in that undivided movement of descent which is materiality itself, so all organized beings from the humblest to the highest, from the first origins of life to the time in which we are and in all places as in all times, do but evidence a single impulsion, the inverse of the movement of matter, and in itself, indivisible. All the living beings hold together, and all yield to the same termendous push.

The animal takes its stand on the plant, man bestrides animality, and the whole of humanity, in space and in time, is one immense army galloping beside and before and behind each of us, in an overwhelming charge able to beat down every resistance, and clear the most formidable obstacles, perhaps even death.[11]

III

In the Qur'ān we come across some very instructive verses which throw light on the nature of Reality.

It is of Him that the night returneth on the day, and that the day returneth on the night.[12]

And of Him is the change of the night and of the day.[13]

In the creation of the heavens and of the earth, and in the succession of the night and of the day, are signs for men of understanding.[14]

He (i.e. God) adds to His creation what He wills.[15]

All these and several other verses of the Qur'ān emphasise that it is the duty of Muslims to reflect on the signs and not to pass by them as if they were blind and deaf. This description of the universe as dynamic in origin, as finite but capable of increase, was totally against the whole tenor of Greek philosophy which influenced early Muslim speculation. For Plato, e.g., the Ultimate Reality, the World of Ideas, was static, immutable, lying above and beyond the world of change and becoming. Change and movement meant for him unreality. But then the question was how this change and movement which characterise this so-called unreal world came about. Plato was unable

11. *Creative Evolution*, pp. 285-6.
12. The Qur'ān, xxxix. 5.
13. Ibid., xxiii. 82.
14. Ibid., iii. 189.
15. Ibid., xxxv. 1.

to give any satisfactory answer and it was to remove this defect in Plato's theory, viz., the absence of dynamism, that Aristotle postulated God as a principle of movement, as the Prime Mover of the Universe. But the nature of Reality conceived by Aristotle was equally inadequate to explain what he wanted to explain. God, according to him, is no doubt the Prime Mover but His activity is no better than inactivity. Aristotle himself calls it "an activity of immobility". Removed from this world of pain and suffering, change and becoming, sunshines and storms, and having no interest in the welfare of His creatures, Aristotle's God is no God but a mere mechanical principle that does nothing and therefore is nothing. In fact the view of Reality as envisaged by the Greeks was totally static quite at variance with what the Qur'ān describes it to be. The conception of life as a creative, continuous and dynamic process was totally foreign to Greek temperament. Even if some thinkers, like Heraclitus regarded movement and change as real, it was not creative and dynamic change but circular which had no beginning and no end. Everything in the world was recurrent, enternally rotating and governed by cyclic motion. According to Islam—and, as a matter of fact, all Semitic religions before it, Christianity and Judaism—the world is conceived as an historical fulfilment. This dynamic conception of life introduced by Islam was the consequence of certain basic ideas which had no place in Greek thought. The first is the idea of freedom to choose between good and evil which each individual man possesses and on account of which he is morally responsible for what he does. A world with no evil in it and no freedom of choice, would be a world without beginning, mere fulfilment, the perfect Kingdom of God, a complete and perfect cosmos—an idea contrary to the spirit of the Qur'ān. In such a world the conception of life as a continuous, creative and dynamic process could not arise. The Greeks had no real knowledge of freedom. Submission to fate was the most prevalent idea in the whole Hellenistic speculation. To them form was always more important than content. The second basic idea is that of the goal of life. It is absolutely essential for the elaboration of the idea of life as a significant progression or movement, that we must have a definite doctrine of the goal of life,

and of its fulfilment. Without an elaborate eschatology it would be impossible to conceive of life process as dynamic. An evolutionary process that neither leads towards a determinate end nor has any such end in view, tends to be governed by the cyclic motion. The Greek thought had been dominated by the idea of frequency and recurrence of events, while the Qur'ān taught that events were immediate, non-recurrent; and this fact more than anything else introduced dynamism in its conception of life and Reality.

It was to emphasise this dynamic and creative aspect of Reality that the Qur'ān refers time and again to the ever changing and continuously growing aspect of the universe, the idea which Iqbāl has so beautifully expressed in the following verse:

یہ کائنات ابھی ناتمام ہے شاید
کہ آ رہی ہے دما دم صدائے کن فیکون[16]

Finding support for this thesis in Einstein's Theory of Relativity Iqbāl says:

Einstein is quite right in saying that the universe is finite but boundless. It is finite because it is a passing phase (*shan* in the Quranic language) of God's extensively infinite consciousness and boundless because the creative power of God is intensively infinite. The Quranic way of expressing the same truth is that the Universe is liable to increase. This simple truth mentioned in the Quran was the greatest blow given to the Deductive systems of thought that existed before Islam, and to the circular view of the movement of Time, common to all the Aryan modes of thought.[17]

Iqbāl expresses the same idea in the following verses:

کرانِ او درون است و برون نیست
درونش پست بالا کم فزون نیست
درونش خالی از بالا و زیر است
ولے بیرونِ او وسعت پذیر است[18]

16. *Bāl-i Jibrīl*, p. 44.
17. Iqbāl, "Self in the Light of Relativity", *A Study in Iqbal's Philosophy*, p. 398.
18. *Zabūr-i 'Ajam*, (*Gulshan-i Rāz-i Jadīd*) p. 216.

Following Bergson, Iqbāl starts upon the quest of determining the true nature of Reality in the light of our conscious experience which is the most privileged case of existence, where, as Iqbāl asserts, we are in direct contact with Reality.[19] If we go deeper into our self we shall find ourselves face to face with the Real in Its full glory.

بیا بر خویش پیچیدن بیاموز
بناخن سینہ کاویدن بیاموز
اگر خواہی خدا را فاش بینی
خودی را فاش تر دیدن بیاموز[20]

Come and learn to look within yourself and it is, indeed, a process which involves painful effort.

If you wish to see the Real directly and immediately, learn to look to the unfolding of your self in the deeper recesses of your heart.

اسرارِ ازل جوئی ؟ بر خود نظرے وا کن
یکتائی و بسیاری ، پنہانی و پیدائی[21]

If you are desirous of knowing the secret of Reality, well, look within.
And your experience of deeper levels of consciousness will reveal that you are one and many, apparent and hidden [as much as the Real which you are seeking].

Bergson writes;

I pass from state to state. I am warm or cold, I am merry or sad, I work or do nothing, I look at what is around me or I think of something else. Sensations, feelings, volitions, ideas—such are the changes into which my existence is divided and which colour it in turns. I change, then, without ceasing.[22]

19. Bergson's *Creative Evolution* opens as follows: "The existence of which we are most assured and which we know best is unquestionably our own, for of every other object we have notions which may be considered external and superficial, whereas, of ourselves, our perception is internal and profound."

20. *Armughān-i Ḥijāz*, p.154. 21. *Payām-i Mas͟hriq*, p. 200.

22. *Creative Evolution*, p. 1.

Iqbāl agrees with the conclusion drawn from this analysis of inner life that there is nothing static and immobile in it. All is constant mobility, an unceasing flux of states, a perpetual flow in which there is no stoppage, no halt, no resting place:

فریبِ نظر ہے سکون و ثبات
تڑپتا ہے ہر ذرۂ کائنات
ٹھہرتا نہیں کاروانِ وجود
کہ ہر لحظہ ہے تازہ شانِ وجود
سمجھتا ہے تو راز ہے زندگی
فقط ذوقِ پرواز ہے زندگی[23]

* * * *

دما دم رواں ہے یمِ زندگی
ہر اک شے سے پیدا رمِ زندگی[24]

Rest and immobility are mere illusions; every particle of the universe pulsates with life.

The caravan of Life never stops; it has no resting place on its way. At every stage it manifests itself in a new form.

You think that Life is a mystery. No, it is not. It is nothing but duration, a continuous flow.

* * * *

This flow of Life is continuously marching on, growing and developing. Everything in the universe manifests this durational aspect of the Life-Principle.

It is this continuous, ever changing, developing aspect of life which Bergson calls duration.

But are rest and immobility, in reality, illusions? To the common man it would be absolutely preposterous to deny the facts which his eyes report and his reason corroborates. Nor do Iqbāl and Bergson belie the evidence of facts and reason. It is not the question of validity or otherwise of what we perceive of the outer world by our senses. To

23. *Bāl-i Jibrīl*, p. 171. 24. Ibid., p. 170.

them it is the question of the *way* or the *method* by which we look at the universe. The method that we shall adopt in our inquiry is determined in the last resort by the object we have in view. If we wish to deal with our material environment, then the view of the universe, accepted by commonsense, as consisting of static and immobile things, is practically true and useful. But if we are in search of the Ultimate Reality, then this way of looking at the universe surely leads us nowhere. It lands us in the intricate maze of antinomies out of which it becomes impossible to extricate ourselves. Corresponding to these two distinct aims, there are thus two ways of looking at the universe around us. In the first way, we see objects in juxtaposition with other objects. They are repeated and characterised by multiplicity and spatiality. Then there is recollection of past events that helps us to interpret these objects. Looking back on them, we imagine them as distinct from one another, arranged somehow in the order of their occurrence. In ourselves, we find distinct states, and the more we analyse them, the more defined do they become. They too repeat former states. But if we go a little deeper, we see a tendency towards reciprocal interpenetration. Our living and acting self is no longer divided into distinct states. They fuse and interpenetrate till there is simply a continuity, indivisible perpetual becoming. In this ceaseless change, no one moment is the same as any other moment; there is complete qualitative heterogeneity and incommensurability between past and present. No sensation, no feeling can repeat itself. The present is forever unforeseeable and new, though organised with the past and so animated by a common life that the whole self may express itself in one state. This indivisible continuity of change is what characterises true life. It is experienced and lived time, the unfolding of our conscious life. There is no absolute distinction in it of past, present and future. It is only our engagements in the external world that keep back from us this process of eternal becoming. The necessities of our daily life weave a sort of mask over this fundamental reality and instead of continuous change and becoming, we find distinct and static objects, time divided into past, present and future and events happening as if in a line of succession. This conception of time is

false, spatialised and is at the basis of all our difficulties that remain unresolved in the field of metaphysics. Zeno's proof in favour of unreality of change and movement was based on this wrong notion of time. What is an indivisible act of change, when divided into component parts, becomes a series of motionless acts and thus we are led to a conclusion that is absolutely paradoxical. What, in reality, Zeno was able to prove was not the unreality of change and motion but the inadequacy of this spatialised time to grasp the true nature of change. This conception of time is the result of our practical necessity. Superficially we perceive what is useful for our daily needs. Man is in perpetual struggle with his environment : he must act on the things around him if he is to preserve himself. And this is why it is so important for him to perceive things in the form most conducive to his being able to make use of them. In reality everywhere there is change but we localise it on the surface of things, for this is the view of things that is useful to us. But if we wish to get at what is most fundamental, we must eliminate these practical habits of perception. We must take off the spectacles through which we are enabled to act on the things around us and try to look at these things in a distinterested fashion. It is only by the help of intuition, or what Iqbal calls love, that we are able to penetrate behind this mask :

فروغِ دانشِ ما از قیاس است
قیاسِ ما ز تقدیرِ حواس است

چو حس دیگر شد ، ایں عالم دگر شد
سکون و سیر و کیف و کم دگر شد[25]

Development of (theoretical) wisdom proceeds through reason, and reason depends upon the constitution of our sense-perception.

But if we change the "senses" [i.e,, if we leave reason aside and employ intuition], the nature of the universe correspondingly undergoes change ; its immobility and change, quantity and quality assume different meanings.

25. *Zabūr-i 'Ajam* (*Gulshan-i Rāz-i Jadīd*), p. 236.

But how can we transform the "senses" as desired by Iqbāl? What is the nature of the method which can help us in grasping the secret of the self? He says:

چه پُرسی از طریق جستجویش
فروِ آرد مقامِ ہائے و ہویش
شب و روزے که داری بر ابد زن
فغانِ صبحگاہے بر خرد زن
خرد را از حواس آید متاعے
فغاں از عشق می گیرد شعاعے
خرد جز را فغاں کل را بگیرد
خرد میرد فغاں ہرگز نمیرد
خرد بهرِ ابد ظرفے ندارد
نفس چوں سوزنِ ساعت شمارد
تراشد روز ہا، شب ہا، سحر ہا
نگیرد شعله و چیند شررہا[26]

You want to know how you can experience the Real within you;
then come down to the stage of (bewailing) intuition.
Throw away your days and nights for eternity and cast away
your reason.
Reason fattens on sense-perception, while intuitive insight receives light from Love.
Reason deals with many, with parts, while Love grasps the
Whole, the One. Reason is ephemeral, while Love is immortal.
Reason has no power to grasp eternity and therefore divides it
into moments.
It manufactures days and nights, mornings and evenings. It
cannot understand the whole flame and therefore revels in
mere individual dying sparks.

When one follows this method and tries to capture the One by journeying within oneself, what is the result? Iqbāl describes it in the following verses:

26. Ibid., p. 229.

سفر در خویش ؟ زادن بے اب و مام
ثریا را گرفتن از لبِ بام
ابد بردن بیک دم اضطرابے
تماشا بے شعاعِ آفتابے
ستردن نقش ہر امید و بیمے
زدن چاکے بدریا چوں کلیمے
شکستن ایں طلسمِ بحر و بر را
ز انگشتے شگافیدن قمر را
چناں باز آمدن از لا مکانش
درونِ سینہ او در کف جہانش [27]

What is the meaning of looking in the deeper recesses of the self and journeying within? It is to be reborn without father and mother and to bring down the Pleiades from the high Heavens.

It is to capture eternity in one grasp and to see without the rays of the sun.

It is to obliterate all the signs of hope and fear and to cleave the river into two like Moses.

It is to break the spell of this universe of land and sea [i.e., this world of time and space] and to split the moon with a finger like our Holy Prophet.

And when one returns from this experience of eternity from within oneself, the whole universe is within the palm of one's hand.

This intuitional way of looking at the Reality in contradistinction to the intellectual way, can be easily illustrated by certain very instructive examples. In the process of perceiving colour red it has been calculated that the frequency of waves reaching our eyes is four hundred billion per second. If it were possible for us to count these waves at the rate of 2,000 a second which is supposed to be the limit at which they could become perceptible, it would take 6,300 years to complete the enumeration of the waves which occur in one second. Thus we grasp or hold together in one single mental act of vision that which is practically

27. Ibid., p. 225.

incalculable.[28] The Qur'ān, in describing the act of creation, refers to two different things.

Who in six days created the Heavens and the earth, and what is between them, then mounted His Throne ; the God of mercy ![29]

All things We have created in due measure ; Our command was but one, swift as the twinkling of an eye.[30]

Commenting on these two apparently different statements, Iqbāl says :

If we look at the movement embodied in creation from the outside, that is to say, if we apprehend it intellectually, it is a process lasting through thousands of years ; for one Divine day, in the terminology of the Qur'ān . . . is equal to 1,000 years. From another point of view, the process of creation, lasting through thousands of years, is a single indivisible act, 'swift as the twinkling of an eye.'[31]

ضمیر زندگانی جاودانی است
بچشم ظاہرش بینی ، زمانی است[32]

Life by its nature is ever-progressing and immortal. But if you look at it from the outside, i.e. from the intellectual point of view, then it is limited within time.

The intellectual aspect of life is not useless and insignificant. In its evolution, life encounters the resistance of matter and in order to continue its original movement, life adopts the form of matter. Thus, the conquest of matter and material forces becomes essential in the interest of the emancipation of life from its fetters. The world of Nature for Iqbāl, as for Fichte, is the training ground for man as a moral being. In the absence of obstacles to be overcome, nothing can be accomplished by man. I know and exist as a moral object, and the world exists for me only as the field of my moral activity.

28. Cf. Bergson, *Memory*, p. 229 ; see also Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, Lahore, 1951, p. 49.
29. The Qur'ān, xxv. 59.
30. Ibid., liv. 49-50.
31. *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 48.
32. *Zabūr-i 'Ajam* (*Gulshan-i Rāz-i Jadīd*), p. 228.

خویشتن را چون خودی بیدار کرد
آشکارا عالمِ پندار کرد

* * *

در جهان تخمِ خصومت کاشت است
خویشتن را غیرِ خود پنداشت است
سازد از خود پیکرِ اغیار را
تا فزاید لذتِ پیکار را

* * *

بہر یک گل خونِ صد گلشن کند
از پئ یک نغمہ صد شیون کند

* * *

عذرِ این اسراف و این سنگیں دلی
خلق و تکمیلِ جمالِ معنوی [33]

When the Self awoke to consciousness,
It revealed the universe of Thought.

* * *

By the Self the seed of opposition is sown in the world :
It imagines itself to be other than itself.
It makes from itself the forms of others,
In order to multiply the pleasure of strife.

* * *

For the sake of a single rose it destroys a hundred rose-gardens
And makes a hundred lamentations in quest of a single melody.

* * *

The excuse for this wastefulness and cruelty
Is the shaping and perfecting of spiritual beauty.

It was largely due to the influence of Neoplatonic philosophy that the true significance of this aspect of self's development was completely ignored by the Muslim thinkers with the result that a life of total passivity with regard to nature became a common feature of Islamic

33. *Asrār-o-Rumūz* (*Asrār-i Khudī*), pp. 12-3,

mysticism. One of the main purposes of the Qur'ān in referring repeatedly to the observable aspect of Reality is to awaken in man the true conception of his relation to the universe. According to Christianity, the spiritual life of man can be developed only through the revelation of a new world within one's self. In other words, Christianity tried to build the spiritual life of man only on the intuitional aspect and completely ignored the intellectual aspect. Islamic mysticism followed in the footsteps of Christianity in denouncing this world of matter as evil and thus urging upon the Muslims to confine all their activities to the inner world of heart. Islam, however, while accepting the truth advocated by Christianity goes forward and asserts that this new world revealed from within is nothing foreign to the world of matter. Says Iqbāl :

The ultimate Reality, according to the Quran, is spiritual, and its life consists in its temporal activity. The spirit finds its opportunities in the natural, the material, the secular. . . . All this immensity of matter constitutes a scope for the self-realization of spirit.[34]

As explained in the Qur'ān in reference to the point raised by the angels, God establishes the superiority of Adam over them through man's capacity for naming things. It means that man is endowed with framing concepts of things. To form concepts is to grasp them in the literal sense of the term "grasp". With this weapon of the ideational capacity of mind, of the ability to form images and ideas and to weave the latter into trains of thought, in short, intellectual power, man approaches the observable aspect of Reality. The greater his capactiy, the greater is his control and mastery of the environment. Intellect not only effects direct contact with Reality but also achieves this contact on an ever-widening scale that has, in principle, no limit. The result is science in all its glory—science, the expression of man's constant effort to know and master :

ماسوا از بہر تسخیر است و بس
سینۂ او عرضۂ تیر است و بس

34. *The Reconstruction af Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 155.

از کُن حق ماسوا شد آشکار
تا شود پیکانِ تو سندان گذار

* * *

خیز و واکن دیدهٔ مخمور را
دون مخوان این عالمِ مجبور را
غایتش توسیعِ ذات مسلم است
امتحانِ ممکناتِ مسلم است

* * *

جستجو را محکم از تدبیر کن
انفس و آفاق را تسخیر کن

* * *

علم اسما اعتبارِ آدم است
حکمتِ اشیا حصارِ آدم است[35]

One of the ways by which life seeks to overcome the hindrances is its invention of instruments. In Schopenhauer we come across such an idea when he says that the body is the Will made visible or objectified. The several organs of the body correspond to the principal desires through which the Will manifests itself. Teeth, throat, and bowels are objectified hunger; the organs of generation are objectified sexual desire. The tiger's teeth and claws manifest its will to live by predation. Iqbāl says:

Life is a forward assimilative movement. It removes all obstructions in its march by assimilating them. Its essence is the continual creation of desires and ideals, and for the purpose of its preservation and expansion it has invented or developed out of itself certain instruments, *e.g.* senses, intellect, etc., which help it to assimilate obstructions.[36]

چیست اصلِ دیدهٔ بیدارِ ما؟
بست صورت لذتِ دیدارِ ما
کبک پا از شوخئ رفتار یافت
بلبل از سعئ نوا منقار یافت

* * *

35. *Asrār-o-Rumūz* (*Rumūz-i Bekhudī*), pp. 164-8.

36. Introduction to the *Secrets of the Self* (English translation of *Asrār-i Khudī*), p. xiv.

دست و دندان و دماغ و چشم و گوش
فکر و تخییل و شعور و یاد و ہوش
زندگی مرکب چو در جنگاه باخت
بہر حفظِ خویش این آلات ساخت[37]

What is the source of our wakeful eye ?
Our delight in seeing hath taken visible shape.
The partridge's leg is derived from the elegance of its gait,
The nightingale's beak from its endeavour to sing.

* * *

Nose, hand, teeth, brain, eye, and ear,
Thought, imagination, feeling, memory, and understanding—
All these are weapons devised by Life for self-preservation
In its ceaseless struggle.

But this intellectual way of making the world our own by understanding the world as a rigid system of causes and effects—though essential and indispensable—is not final. It must be surpassed. We must outgrow its utility. The other way of approaching the universe is what Iqbāl calls vital. The causal chain wherein we try to find a place for the ego is itself an artificial construction of the ego for its own purposes. The ego is called upon to live in a complex environment, and it cannot maintain its life in it without reducing it to a system which would give it some kind of assurance as to the behaviour of things around it. The view of its environment as a system of causes and effects is thus an indispensable instrument of the ego, and not the final expression of the nature of Reality.

ابد را عقلِ ما ناسازگار است
'یکی' از گیر و دار او ہزار ست[38]

* * *

'یکی' را آن چنان صد پاره دیدیم
عدد بہر شمارش آفریدیم[39]

* * *

37. *Asrār-o-Rumūz* (*Asrār-i Khudī*), p. 17.
38. *Zabūr-i 'Ajam* (*Gulshan-i Rāz-i Jadīd*), p. 216.
39. Ibid., p. 217.

چو لنگ است او سکون را دوست دارد
نہ بیند مغز و دل بر پوست دارد

حقیقت را چو ما صد پاره کردیم
تمیز ثابت و سیاره کردیم[40]

Reality is not amenable to our intellect, which [by the very nature of its working] divides every unity [which it contemplates] into multiplicity.

* * *

It is to account for this multiplicity that numerals have been invented.

* * *

As it is lame, it deals with categories of immobility; it ignores the kernel and confines itself only to shell.

The distinction of being and becoming, mobility and immobility is the result [an inherent defect in its mode] of intellectual apprehension, which divides the unity of Reality into multiplicity.

As a consequence, it becomes imposible for reason to recapture the original unity and movement. Opposed to it is the vital way of looking at the universe. It is the absolute acceptance of the inevitable necessity of life regarded as a whole which in evolving its inner richness creates serial time. The vital way of appropriating the universe is what the Qur'ān describes as *'īmān.* Only men of exceptional brilliance and vitality are capable of such power in its full glory. Ḥallāj's "I am the Creative Truth" and Ḥaḍrat 'Alī's "I am the living Qur'ān" are the expressions of this deep-rooted conviction. All creative activity and moral idealism have their origin in it. No reform, no constructive revolution in politics, religion, or art, no cultural advance, no scientific discovery and invention has been possible without it. In the following verses of *Jāvīd Nāmah,* Iqbāl has brought out the difference between these two modes of approach which he calls as *'aql* and *'ishq*, reason and intuition :

40. Ibid., p. 216.

عقل ہم خود را بدیں عالم زند
تا طلسمِ آب و گل را بشکند
می شود ہر سنگِ رہ او را ادیب
می شود برق و سحاب او را خطیب
چشمش از ذوقِ نگہ بیگانہ نیست
لیکن او را جرأتِ رندانہ نیست
پس ز ترسِ راہ چوں کورے رود
نرم نرمک صورتِ مورے رود

* * *

کارش از تدریج می یابد نظام
من نہ دانم کے شود کارش تمام
می نداند عشق سال و ماہ را
دیر و زود و نزد و دورِ راہ را
عقل در کوہے شگافے می کند
یا بگردِ او طوافے می کند
کوہ پیشِ عشق چوں کاہے بود
دل سریع السیر چوں ماہے بود[41]

This intellect of ours, no doubt, aims at breaking the spell of time and space.

In the attainment of this object, every hindrance in its way spurs it on to intenser and greater efforts.

It does possess the art of looking beneath the superficialities of Appearance, but by its very nature it is slowfooted in the sphere which involves incalculable risks and unforeseeable surprises.

* * *

It works by stages and as such it can never hope to achieve its object working under these handicaps.

Love, on the other hand, is unmindful of all hindrances. For it the span of years and months and distance of near and far are of no significance.

41. *Jāvīd Nāmah*, p. 17.

To cross a mountain, the intellect would either dynamite it or circle round it. Before Love, a lofty mountain reduces itself to a tiny straw.

Hence, in order to enjoy fuller and richer life by which alone the ego is able to achieve true freedom and immortality, we must outgrow the intellectual outlook and go down into the deeper levels of consciousness. Intellect must be replaced by Love. This transition must be made in the interest of the self.

حکیماں مردہ را صورت نگاراند
ید موسیٰ ، دم عیسیٰ ندارند

* * *

زمانے با ارسطو آشنا باش
دمے با ساز بیکن ہم نوا باش
ولیکن از مقام شاں گذر کن
مشو گم اندریں منزل ، سفر کن
باں عقلے کہ داند بیش و کم را
شناسد اندرون کان و یم را
جہان چند و چوں زیر نگیں کن
بگردوں ماہ و پرویں را کمیں کن
ولیکن حکمت دیگر بیاموز
رہاں خود را ازیں مکر شب و روز[42]

The scientist looks upon this universe of ours [which is, in reality, a perpetual flux, continually growing and enriching itself] as dead and static. He does not possess the talisman of vitalising it.

* * *

Yet we should cultivate the company of intellectualists like Aristotle and Bacon for some time. But then it is not the end of our journey. We should strive to go beyond that stage.

42. *Zabūr-i 'Ajam (Gulshan-i Rāz-i Jadīd)*, p. 218.

With the help of intellect which is well versed in quantitive measurements we can well explore the depths of earth and ocean.

We should gain mastery over the material enviornment and entrap heavenly bodies like moon and Pleiades.

But then we must continue our march and learn wisdom of another sort by which we can free ourselves from the chains of night and day.

This "wisdom of another sort", as Iqbāl calls it, is the vital way of assimilating the universe by inserting oneself in the inner centre of experience.

بخود رس از سرِ ہنگامہ بر خیز
تو خود را در ضمیرِ خود فرو ریز[43]

Leave aside all this hustle and bustle and look within,
Drop yourself into the inner depth of your self.

And when we dip into the stream of consciousness, we discover the continuous flow of life in its exuberance which is pure time, duration, life in its original purity. In it there is no distinction of past, present and future. It is an organic whole in which past operates along with the present related to the future as an open possibility. Like life or consciousness, real time is an existence in which all reality is the actually present, moving, changing "now". It is when we grasp the true nature of our experience of time and distinguish it from its spatial representation, that the real nature of free will appears. It is spatial time which makes us think of ourselves as made up of elements that can be measured and counted like material and static objects of science, and of our actions as the play of these elements.

If time is real, and not a mere repetition of homogeneous moments which make conscious experience a delusion, then every moment in the life of Reality is original, giving birth to what is absolutely novel and unforeseeable. . . . To exist in real time is not to be bound by the fetters of serial time, but to create it from moment to moment and to be

43. Ibid., p. 216.

absolutely free and original in creation. In fact, all creative activity is free activity.[44]

اے اسیرِ دوش و فردا در نگر
در دلِ خود عالمِ دیگر نگر
در گلِ خود تخمِ ظلمت کاشتی
وقت را مثلِ خطے پنداشتی
باز با پیمانۂ لیل و نہار
فکرِ تو پیمود طولِ روزگار

* * *

وقت را مثلِ مکاں گستردۂ
امتیازِ دوش و فردا کردۂ
اے چو بُو رم کردہ از بُستانِ خویش
ساختی از دستِ خود زندانِ خویش[45]

Look within, O thou enthralled by Yesterday and Tomorrow!
Behold another world in thine own heart!
Thou hast sown the seed of darkness in the clay,
Thou hast imagined Time as a line :
Thy thought measures length of Time
With the measure of night and day.

* * *

Thou hast extended Time, like Space,
And distinguished Yesterday from Tomorrow.
Thou hast fled, like a scent, from thine own garden ;
Thou hast made thy prison with thine own hand.

In the following verses Iqbāl further elaborates this idea of free creativity of the ego by drawing a distinction between a slave and a free man :

عبد گردد یاوہ در لیل و نہار
در دلِ حُر یاوہ گردد روزگار

* * *

44. *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 50.

45. *Asrār-o Rumūz* (*Asrār-i Khudī*), pp. 81-2.

عبد را تحصیلِ حاصل فطرت است
وارداتِ جان او بے ندرت است
* * *
دمبدم نو آفرینی کارِ حر
نغمہ پیہم تازہ ریزد تارِ حر
* * *
عبد را ایام زنجیر است و بس
بر لبِ او حرفِ تقدیر است و بس
ہمتِ حر با قضا گردد مشیر
حادثات از دستِ او صورت پذیر
رفتہ و آیندہ در موجودِ او
دیرہا آسودہ اندر زودِ او[46]

A slave is one who, engrossed in the activities necessitated by his being born in the material environment, lacks the necessary initiative to pass beyond his intellect to love. He is slave to his body, to mechanical habits, to matter, to nature, to necessity. He becomes naught within the limits of day and night, while for a free man who, in a single jump, has crossed into the frontiers of love, days and nights themselves become naught. A slave deals in imitations and second-hand material, and his life-experience lacks originality. A free man is constantly engaged in creating and singing new songs at every moment of his life. For a slave, time becomes his fetters, and he sings of *taqdīr*, the inevitable fate which awaits him. A free man, on the other hand, is a co-worker of fate, and new events take shape at his hands. His present carries past and future in in its sweep, and his moments are expressive of ages.[47]

46. Ibid., pp. 82-3.

47. Cf. the following verses of Iqbāl in *Armughān-i Ḥijāz* (p. 255), and *Bāl-i Jibrīl* (p. 107).

خرد دیکھے اگر دل کی نگہ سے
جہاں روشن ہے نورِ لا الہ سے
فقط اک گردشِ شام و سحر ہے
اگر دیکھیں فروغِ مہرومہ سے
* * *
کھو نہ جا اس سحر و شام میں اے صاحبِ ہوش
اک جہاں اور بھی ہے جس میں نہ فردا ہے نہ دوش

If we should try to prove this creative freedom enjoyed by the free man by any logical arguments, we shall find it well-nigh an impossible task. As soon as an attempt is made to define a free act, it becomes solidified in concepts and words and then the deterministic position becomes inevitable. In a world conceived of in conceptual, i.e. intellectual way, there can be no room for freedom. We are left with nothing but to deny it, as the determinist rightly asserts, or to relegate it, as Kant did, to the timeless domain of things-in-themselves, a domain inaccessible to consciousness. Free-will, i.e. the power of free creative action, is not the so-called liberty of choice which the indeterminists have asserted and the detetminists have equally vehemently denied. Free-will is the very nature of our lives as individual wholes, the expression of the individuality of life. The free act is a veritable unity, lived and perceived from within, and never repeated. Our inner life is not mathematics, at the mercy of the inevitability of the mechanical laws, but history which proceeds dynamically and creatively without repetition; we do not live in space but in the world of soul.

زندگانی را سرِ تکرار نیست
فطرتِ او خوگرِ تکرار نیست

* * *

زندگانی نیست تکرارِ نفس
اصلِ او ازحیّ و قیوم است و بس [48]

Our [real] life does not countenance recurrence or repetition; this is against its very nature.

* * *

Life is not what one may call a continuity of homogeneous breaths; its real nature is allied to the ever-living and ever-creating God.

Assuredly, free act, in this sense, is very rare and for this reason we are most often not free. Our life is made up of actions, largely

48. *Jāvīd Nāmah*, p. 226.

automatic, habits and conventions forming a crust around it. It is only at moments of crises or when we are touched with deep emotions that we seem to burst through this crust. We live for the external world rather than for ourselves ; we speak rather than think ; we are acted upon rather than act ourselves. To act freely is to regain possession of oneself, and to get back into pure duration. Free act is the result of our being mind or spirit, while all automatic habitual actions are the result of our being body. If we had been all mind or spirit, all our actions would, no doubt, have been free ; all past would have been ever present with us. But we are bodies as well and so need to live in the present. According to Iqbāl, our body is not a receptacle of our soul or mind as is commonly understood. It is the instrument which our mind, has made in order to act. By our bodies we are attached to this life of action and by our mind or spirit we tend towards detachment, and thus Iqbāl is able to solve the problem of relation of body and mind, which has been taxing the minds of thinkers since Descartes birfurcated the original unity of life. The mind or *nafs*, he says, is the pure act ; the body is only the act become visible. He quotes with approval the following famous verse of Rūmī :

باده از ما مست شد، نے ما ازو
قالب از ما ہست شد ، نے ما ازو[49]

It is *not* we that get intoxicated through wine ; it is rather the wine which gets intoxicated through us.
It is *not* we that live through body ; it is the body that receives life through us.

In *Gulshan-i Rāz-i Jadīd*, he explains this relation in the following verses :

تن و جاں را دوتا گفتن کلام است
تن و جاں را دوتا دیدن حرام است
بجاں پوشیده رمزِ کائنات است
بدن حالے ز احوالِ حیات است

49. *Mathnavī*, i. 1812.

عروسِ معنی از صورت حنا بست
نمودِ خویش را پیرایه ها بست
حقیقت روئے خود را پرده باف است
که اورا لذتے در انکشاف است[50]

It is wrong, rather a wilful crime to view body and mind as two different independent entities.

Spirit or the mind is the real thing and body is one of its different ways of expressing itself.

Reality, which is spirit, wanted to manifest itself.

It throws round itself a veil because it desires itself to be unveiled by those who wish to see it in its naked glory.

This body is thus a mere veil which must be removed by our efforts, and then we can see the epiphany of Reality in its full splendour. But even then the need for body remains. It is a mode of Reality and, as such, necessary. As long as we are to live in the present environment, we need action; and body performs its function as an instrument of mind for action. Therefore both attachment and detachment are essential. As Bergson puts it: "Attachment and detachment, these are the two poles between which morality oscillates. . . . If we are not attached to life, our effort will be lacking in itself. If we do not detach ourselves in some small degree . . . our efforts will be lacking in aim and direction." Thus we are constantly moving from the plane of detachment to the plane of attachment, from the sphere of the dream to the sphere of action. A truly faithful life consists in a balanced movement which crosses from one plane to the other and never consents to be confined to either. He who is content with the sphere of action alone as, for example, the business man of today, sets machines at work, acts mechanically himself, lives in matter and ends by acquiring the stiffness and materiality of that which he handles. He reduces himself to an automaton. The other person who would be content to dream his life away and be cut off from action, would be all spirit, but his life would be equally barren, for he lives in a world of illusion

50. *Zabūr-i 'Ajam (Gulshan-i Rāz-i Jadīd)*, pp. 216-7.

which has no connection with the world of action in which he was born and in which he is required to live. The limitations imposed by body on mind tends to make men mechanical, and, therefore, it is necessary that man should, at regular intervals, look within his inner self so that by coming into direct contact with the springs of the ever-changing, creative life-force, he may regain his original freedom. Man, being a part and parcel of life, is essentially free and creative ; but by the necessity of the environment in which he has been placed, he often falls a prey to automatism and, therefore, it is essential that he must regain his true spiritual self and thus retain his freedom and creativity. The method by which this power of freedom can be regained, according to Islam, is prayer. In prayer, the deeper self of man, what Iqbāl calls the appreciative self in contradistinction to efficient self of our daily life, comes into direct contact with Reality ; and by this contact the individual regains his initiative and freedom. "Prayer as a means of spiritual illumination," says Iqbāl, "is a normal vital act by which the little island of our personality suddenly discovers its situation in a larger whole of life."[51]

So long as we retain this body of ours, intellectual approach is not only necessary but inevitable. And it is for this reason that Iqbāl strongly protested against what he calls false anti-intellectualism advocated by the mystics. It is not reason that is defective but the way it is used that leads to disaster. Reason and intuition must combine to give a true picture of Reality. It is only when intellectual approach gradually develops and merges into the vital that one can hope to realise the true idea of manhood. It is for this reason that, according to Iqbāl, McTaggart, e.g., is a greater philosopher than either Bergson or Plotinus. Both the latter thinkers started with intuition and afterwards tried to rationalise their vision, while McTaggart started with reason and ended with intuitive insight that brought to him deep conviction in the truth of what he knew. A thinker who begins and ends with intellectual pursuits contributes very little to the cultural heritage of humanity. Mere intellectual approach may produce an

51. *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 90.

acute thinker who can work out of the diverse impressions a coherent system of ideas, but it cannot shape our clay into an ideal human being. It is rather the vital mode of approach which succeeds in creating true human beings who not only react to external stimuli but mould the stimuli to ideal ends and purposes. It is only in this way that the total self of man realises itself as one of the greatest feats of nature. This vital way of dealing with the universe is strengthened by prayer. It brings us back from the plane of attachment to the plane of detachment, from mechanism to freedom, from habit to creation. Says Iqbāl :

Indeed Islam recognizes a very important fact of human psychology, *i.e.*, the rise and fall of the power to act freely, and is anxious to retain the power to act freely, as a constant and undiminished factor in the life of the ego. The timing of the daily prayer which, according to the Quran, restores 'self-possession' to the ego by bringing it into closer touch with the ultimate source of life and freedom, is intended to save the ego from the mechanizing effect of sleep and business. Prayer in Islam is the ego's escape from mechanism to freedom.[52]

It is, thus, only through love and intuition, that is through the reconstruction of the finite ego by bringing it into direct contact with an eternal life-process, that man can hope to gain liberation from the mechanistic influence of daily routine. It is this stage which Iqbāl calls the period of "discovery" in the life of man, when religion becomes a matter of personal assimilation of life and power and the individual achieves a free personality, not by releasing himself from the fetters of law, but by discovering the ultimate source of law whithin the depths of his own consciousness.[53]

In *Jāvīd Nāmah*, Iqbāl describes the process of assimilating the universe as a sort of "second birth" which has a dual aspect, apparent and hidden, corresponding to the intellectual and vital modes of apprehension. One is nourished by intellect and reason while the other is developed through intuition and love. Reason grappling with this universe of water and clay and with each obstacle in its way, marches

52. Ibid., p. 109.

53. Cf. Ibid., p. 181.

forward to its goal. It has a knack of understanding and grasping the Real, but it is not as bold and sweeplng as love. Owing to its slow-footedness, its process is trying and the end always seems far off. But with love, it becomes easy. With the help of reason, we can hope to attain only what is called *ṣifāt,* attributes, the observable aspect of the Real, while with the help of love, we can enjoy the *dhāt*, the Real Person, the Ultimate Ego. He alone is the true man who can enjoy the epiphany of the Ego. Such a man alone is truly free and creative. Iqbāl sums up the whole problem of free-will and creativity in the following verses :

اے کہ گوئی محملِ جان است تن
سرِّ جاں را در نگر برتن متن
محملے نے ، حالے از احوالِ اوست
محملش خواندن فریبِ گفتگوست
چیست جاں ؟ جذب و سرور و سوز و درد
ذوقِ تسخیرِ سپہرِ گرد گرد
چیست تن ؟ با رنگ و بو خوکردن است
با مقامِ چار سو خو کردن است
از شعور است ایں کہ گوئی نزد و دور
چیست معراج ؟ انقلاب اندر شعور
انقلاب اندر شعور از جذب و شوق
وا رہاند جذب و شوق از تحت و فوق
ایں بدن با جانِ ما انباز نیست
مشتِ خاکے مانعِ پرواز نیست[54]

You say that body is the receptacle of soul. Don't be foolish ; try to realise true significance of soul.

Our body is not a receptacle of soul but its tool.

What is soul or mind ? It is the very essence of Reality, life and consciousness ; it is pure duration which holds the whole universe in one grasp.

54. *Jāvīd Nāmah*, p. 20.

What is body ? It is meant to adapt itself to this mechanistic world of quantitative dimensions, of day and night, of far and near.

The way to relieve one's soul from the cramping influence of materialism and mechanism is to adopt the free and creative mode of the ultimate life-principle, to attain direct contact with Reality in prayer which our Holy Prophet styled as the Ascension of every Muslim.

It is through prayer or love that man can come face to face with the Ultimate Ego.

And in this flight, this body of ours is no hindrance.

Thus Iqbāl agrees with Bergson in looking upon Reality as a free creative impluse of the nature of volition. In his early writings, we often come across verses where Iqbāl seems to be voicing this view of Bergson without any qualifications. To the latter, the *elan vital* is the sole reality. It serves no purpose, it evolves with no goal before it :

زندگیٔ رہروان در تگ و تاز است و بس
قافلۂ موج را جادہ و منزل کجاست[55]

Life is constantly on the move, struggling and marching on its way, and that is all.

Can you imagine any destination or goal for the caravan of waves of the ocean ?

But soon Iqbāl realised that this form of goalless and aimless evolution is meaningless. It would be identical with Schopenhauer's blind incessant Will that leads us nowhere. If *elan vital* is blind, unconscious and moving towards no goal, then Schopenhauer was right in concluding that we should run away from this Reality which not only produces evil and suffering but is itself evil. Though Nietzsche adopted Schopenhauer's doctrine of the primacy of Will, he saved himself from his pessimism by assigning a particular aim to the working of this Will. The objectifications of this Will are not for the fun of malice and vengeance but for good. The destination of evolution, according to Nietzsche, is the creation of the Superman.

55. *Payām-i-Mashriq*, p. 204.

Here Iqbāl parts company with Bergson. He learned much from him, but, as Nietzsche turned in horror from his erstwhile guide, so Iqbāl turned his back upon Bergson. With the tradition of purely teleological evolutionary theory as evolved by Muslim thinkers before him, Iqbāl could not conceive Reality to be an aimless and blind impulse, however vital and creative it might be. The Qur'ān is clear in this respect : "We have not created the heavens and the earth and whatever is between them in sport. We created them not but with truth ; but most of them know not."[56]

The point of departure with Bergson, as we have seen, was a revolt against mechanisation of life. He could not view life as something given and settled, with no scope for free will, spontaneity and creation. He was right so far. An intuitive insight in our conscious experience surely confirms that the actions of living organism from lower to higher are motivated by some sort of inner impulse which manifests itself in ever new upredictable patterns of behaviour. But his revolt against mechanism led to the other extreme and his analysis of conscious experience, on which he bases his whole theory, remained defective. In order to save the spontaneity and creativity of Reality, he not only rejected mechanism but also discarded its teleological character. If there is no purpose, no direction in which the evolutionary process is seeking expression, religion loses all and ethics a large part of its meaning. Therefore, it was impossible for Iqbāl to ignore the teleological aspect. According to Iqbāl, the mistake of Bergson arose out of his defective analysis of conscious experience.

> He [Bergson] regards, conscious experience as the past moving along with and operating in the present. He ignores that the unity of consciousness has a forward aspect also. Life is only a series of acts of attention, and an act of attention is inexplicable without reference to a purpose, conscious or unconscious. Even our acts of perception are determined by our immediate interests and purposes.

Further eleborating this point, Iqbāl continues :

> Thus ends and purposes, whether they exist as conscious or sub-

56. The Qur'ān, xliv. 38-9.

conscious tendencies, form the warp and woof of our conscious experience. And the notion of purpose cannot be understood except in reference to the future. The past, no doubt, abides and operates in the present ; but this operation of the past in the present is not the whole of consciousness. The element of purpose discloses a kind of forward look in consciousness. Purposes colour not only our present states of consciousness, but also reveal their further direction. In fact, they constitute the forward push of our life, and thus in a way anticipate and influence the states that are yet to be. To be determined by an end is to be determined by what ought to be.[57]

Thus the presence of purpose means that our acts are being determined by ideals. Without ideals, it is not possible to bring unity in the behaviour of individuals. A multiplicity of diverse actions does not make an integrated personality. It is only when they are strung together by the unity of purpose that these actions become significant and important. Without the existence of a purpose, individual cannot be fully creative and free. All creative activity can be understood only in relation to a fixed ideal.

زندگانی را بقا از مدعاست
کاروانش را درا از مدعاست
زندگی در جستجو پوشیده است
اصلِ او در آرزو پوشیده است

* * *

آرزو صیدِ مقاصد را کمند
دفترِ افعال را شیرازه بند[58]

Life is preserved by purpose ;
Because of the goal its caravan-bell tinkles.
Life is latent in seeking and striving,
Its reality is hidden in desire.

* * *

Desire is a noose for hunting ideals,
A binder of the books of deeds.

57. *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, pp. 52-3.
58. *Asrār-o-Rumūz* (*Asrār-i Khudī*), p. 16.

Not only is the whole evolutionary process an unfolding of a purpose but even at the different stages of this process, we can perceive its operation. According to Iqbāl, social organisation, customs, laws, sciences, arts, and all cultural achievements, are the result of this purpose. Says Iqbāl :

What is the essence of the mind that strives after new discoveries and scales the heavens ?
Knowest thou what works this miracle ?
'Tis desire that enriches Life—

* * *

What are social organisation, customs and laws ?
What is the secret of the novelties of science ?
A desire which realised itself by its own strength
And burst forth from the heart and took shape.

But Bergson was partly justified in rejecting teleological causation. Aristotle who was a teleologist viewed the universe as a process of development from potentiality to actuality. This process of eternal becoming aims at realising the Form which is represented as the final cause. Every process has for Aristotle a last stage in which the Form which was once latent in the developing organism becomes fully realised. The end which each thing is striving to bring into being, towards which it is evolving, pre-exists the movement. In Aristotle's system this end or goal is God, the Unmoved Mover, Who is Himself outside the universe, in whose evolution He is not at all interested and in the creation of which He had no hand. Aristotle's God is, thus, neither moral, nor personal. This teleological causation which is working from without and which makes the whole process of evolutionary development as already given, deserved to be discarded, and Bergson was, therefore, right in rejecting it *in toto*. If teleology means working out of a plan in view of a pre-determined end, it takes away all creativity and spontaneity from life. If all is given somewhere in eternity, then what is the significance of all this great panorama of human history and man's achievements in the diverse fields of culture? No doubt, this form of teleology is nothing but mechanism in

an inverted form. But there is another sense of teleology which avoids these defects. There is no distant goal which we are striving for. At every stage of our life, we are working, developing and shaping our behaviour in the light of new aspirations. There is a sort of hormic drive in us which does not let us rest at any moment. We wish to achieve an object, we struggle hard and attain it. But then our restless spirit does not allow us to stop at this. We are, as if, pushed forward and backward from within ourselves. "To live is to shape and change ends and purposes and to be governed by them." The Kantian categorical imperative is based on the assumption of "I can" and it is this "I can", this experience of inner freedom and realisation of an internal hormic push, which moves us every moment to *be* something. This continuous activity of man to *be* something attains its end by forming ideals and purposes, realising them and then again guided by other and higher ideals. The evolutionary process in this sense, is not moving towards a fixed destination. Says Iqbal :

> To endow the world process with purpose in this sense is to rob it of its originality and its creative character. Its ends are terminations of a career ; they are ends to come and not necessarily premeditated. A time-process cannot be conceived as a line already drawn. It is a line in the drawing—an actualization of open possibilities. It is purposive only in this sense that it is selective in character, and brings itself to some sort of a present fulfilment by actively preserving and supplementing the past. To my mind nothing is more alien to the Quranic outlook than the idea that the universe is the temporal working out of a pre-conceived plan.[59]

This kind of teleological causation can be understood in reference to the creative activity of a poet or an artist. Take, for instance, the common example of a college student who is engaged in preparing an essay on a subject which requires reading, reflection and originality. He may start with a tentative plan in his mind but as he begins to write, thoughts develop and he finds that he cannot stick to his original plan. He makes and modifies his scheme as he goes on. His

59. *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 55.

essay may turn out to be a brilliant piece of work. But before he started, with all the schemes and plans, he could not predict just what he was going to write. This sort of inner purpose has been called immanent teleology. Here future pre-exists but only as an open possibility and not as a fixed order of events with definite outlines and contours.

Iqbāl is thus led to view Reality as a pure duration in which life and purpose interpenetrate to form an organic unity. It is of the nature of vital impulse which is constantly changing, developing and creating. But he goes a step further and calls this Reality a Self—an all-embracing concrete Self which is the ultimate source of all individual life and thought. It is not blind and aimless but a rationally directed Will, whose creative activity has no limit and who appears in a fresh glory every moment. Iqbāl calls this Reality an Ego, because He responds to our invocations. We are aware of our minds directly and immediately, but our consciousness of other minds is only inferential. We talk and gesticulate in order to express our thoughts. When we see other people talking and gesticulating we infer that they also possess minds. On the basis of this simple fact, Iqbāl argues that the Ultimate Reality must be an Ego because our calls are responded to and our invocations are answered. The Qur'ān says of Him : "And your Lord says, call Me and I respond to your call."[60] To call the Ultimate Reality an Ego does not mean that we are fashioning God after the image of man. Intuition, says Iqbāl, reveals ? Life as a centralising ego. "It is only to accept the simple fact of experience that life is not a formless fluid, but an organizing principle of unity, a synthetic activity which holds together and focalizes the dispersing disposition of the living organism for a constructive purpose."[62] This Reality, the rationally directed, spiritual, creative Ego, is not only transcendent but also immanent. God is in close personal touch with the universe and man and yet He is far above them. He is not the purely transcendent God of Aristotle who lies totally outside the whole evolutionary process

60. The Qur'ān, xl. 60.
61. *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, pp. 60-1.

of life, uninterested and unperturbed by its ebbs and flows. The Qur'ān, on the other hand, describes Him as nearer to man than his neck-vein though this nearness is not spatial. He loves those who love Him and answers the call of those who invoke Him. "Say : Allah is one. Allah is He on whom all depend ; He begets not, nor is He begotton. And none is like unto Him." These verses beautifully sum up both transcendence and immanence. They emphasise the most intimate relation of God to the universe : it is on Him that everything depends. In spite of the fact that everything lives through Him, nothing is like Him and He transcends everything. He is immanent because He is in everything and specially in the soul of man. He breathed of His own Spirit into man. He works with and seeks the co-operation of human beings in the evolution or development of this universe which does not exist in relation to Him as something "other". What we call Nature or not-self is only a fleeting moment in the life of God, an expression of His continuous creative activity.

کہن دیرے کہ بینی مشتِ خاک است ؟
دمے از سرگذشتِ ذاتِ پاک است[62]

Don't think that this old universe before you is a mere handful of dust.
It is in reality one of the phases of the creative activity of the Lord.

In short, the nature of Reality, as viewed by Iqbāl, can be best described in the words of the Qur'ān : "He is the First and the Last, the Apparent and the Hidden." The whole evolutionary process started from this Unitary principle which split itself into multiplicity and it will reach the same goal whence it started. "And verily towards thy Lord is the limit."[63]

It was in this truly dynamic and teleological sense that first Ibn Miskawaih and then Rūmī interpreted the evolutionary development of life on this earth. Ibn Miskawaih (d. 431/1039) holds, in the light

62. *Zabūr-i 'Ajam* (*Gulshan-i Rāz-i Jadīd*), p. 217.
63. The Qur'ān, liii. 14.

of the Qur'ānic teachings, that all things proceeded from God and to Him will they return. The detail of biological evolution that he describes is, in reality, meant to illustrate how the Many is gradually and imperceptibly proceeding towards the goal, regaining and enriching those characteristics the loss of which became the starting point of the whole evolutionary process. It is the presence of what he calls the Spirit that determines the position of a being in the scale of evolution. This element, according to Ibn Miskawaih, is present in the whole chain of beings starting from inert matter to the highest manifestation of it in the prophet or the Perfect Man, with this difference that it is potential in the early stages but as we rise higher it goes on becoming increasingly actual till in the Perfect Man it is fully actualised. The process of descent or diversity started when the principle of Life, the Spirit, assumed the form of corporeality. But the urge to express itself led the Spirit to assume different forms, each higher than the first. Each higher form is better able to give expression to the yearning of the immanent life-principle, till passing from matter, plant and animal life, we reach man and then the prophet. There is a rising note of self-consciousness appearing at each stage. In the mineral, Spirit is, as if, asleep while in the Perfect Man, it attains complete freedom and self-consciousness so much so that the limits of space and time and corporeality cease to act as fetters for him. It is in him that the whole process of evolution reaches its goal.

Rūmī (d. 672/1273) further developed this idea of Ibn Miskawaih. The inner drive of the principle of life not only assumes gradually higher forms but also invents certain instruments for its expression suitable to its different stages and needs. In this respect Rūmī's conception is amazingly reminiscent of Bergson's point of view. The environment in which we are placed requires certain forms of action and so the spirit has adopted the form of body to enable it to express itself in a better way. Life of the spirit is of the past as well as of the future, while life of the body is of the present only. We live, though not exclusively so, in the past and the future, by means of the mind which is both memory and freedom. We also live in the present by means of the body which inserts and actualises the imme-

diate past in the imminent future. This relation of body and spirit,l Bergson expresses by the metaphor of a coat and a nail. "Coat is solidary with the nail on which it hangs ; it falls if the nail is removed ; it sways if the nail is loose and shaky ; it is torn or pierced if the nail is too pointed." Thus, he holds, the spirit is solidary with body as its instrument and not as its cause. Without the body, the mind cannot work and act, though it can exist without it. Body is one of the various instruments which spirit in its march towards fuller manifestation adopts.

باده از ما مست شد، نے ما ازو
قالب از ما ہست شد، نے ما ازو[64]

It is the internal impulse, the purpose to live a higher life, in order to participate in the splendour of the Spirit Divine, that creates everything and leads to higher and still higher manifestations.

زانکہ بے حاجت خداوند عزیز
مے نہ بخشد ہیچ کس را ہیچ چیز
پس کمند ہستہا حاجت بود
قدر حاجت مرد را آلت بود
پس چو حاجت شد کمند ہستہا
قدر حاجت مے رسد از حق عطا[65]

If there is no desire on the part of a person, he gets nothing. It is this hormic drive which brings different things into being. It is purpose which gives man his organs. As existence and being are dependent on desire, i.e. the hormic conative impulse, so man's position in this world depends on the intensity of his desire. It is this purpose that moves the whole evolutionary process, from matter to plants, animals, and man.

First man appeared in the class of inorganic things,
Next he passed therefrom into that of plants.

* * *

64. *Mathnavī*, i. 1812.   65. Ibid., ii. 3274 ff.

And when he passed from the vegetative to the animal state,
He had no remembrance of his state as a plant,

* * *

Again the great Creator, as you know,
Drew man out of the animal into the human state.
Thus man passed from one order of nature to another,
Till he became wise and knowing and strong as he is now.[66]

This whole process of evolution proceeds by what Rūmī calls the assimilation of the lower by the higher. It is definitely not the result of mere chance variations. The internal necessity pushes lower organism to higher forms and in this process life presents a constant struggle for existence. Says Rūmī :

When you consider, this world is all at strife, mote with mote, . . . one mote is flying to the left, and another to the right in search. One mote (flies) up and another down ; in their inclination (movement) behold actual strife. . . . War of nature, war of action, war of speech—there is a terrible conflict amongst the parts.[67]

In this constant struggle and strife consists the development of different beings. Matter is assimilated by plant, plant is assimilated by animal and animal is assimilated by man and thus the process of evolution goes on. The driving force behind this process is what Rūmī and Iqbāl both call Love. This process started when the One manifested itself in Many, and the return of the Many to One is the love for the Beloved. It is this love that forces matter up to the stage of plants, and the plants to the higher plane of animality and then to manhood. Says Iqbāl :

Beneath this visible evolution of forms is the force of love which actualizes all strivings, movement and progress. Things are so constituted that they hate non-existence, and love the joy of individuality in various forms. The indeterminate matter, dead in itself, assumes, or more properly, is made to assume by the inner force of love, various forms, and rises higher and higher in the scale of beauty.[68]

66. *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, pp. 121-2.
67. *Mathnavī*, v. 36-8, 46-7 (translation by R.A. Nicholson).
68. *The Development of Metaphysics in Persia*, London, 1908. p. 39.

دور گردونہا زموج عشق داں
گر نبودے عشق بفسردے جہاں

کے جمادی محو گشتے در نبات
کے فدائے روح گشتے نامیات[69]

The revolutions of the sky are due to Love,
Had there been no Love, this universe would have frozen to death.
How could inorganic matter be assimilated and changed into plants ?
How could vegetation assume self-consciousness ?

Iqbāl has very beautifully expressed this idea in several of his poems. In the following verses, he says that matter, plants and animals, all are driven by this inner necessity of their being. The various hues and smells of plants and flowers, the constant struggle on the part of man, the revolutions of sky and stars and earth, the movement of the fish in the water, of animals in the air, and of insects on the earth, are all so many ways of the expression of this Love.

بہ برگِ لالہ رنگ آمیزیٔ عشق
بجانِ ما بلا انگیزیٔ عشق

اگر ایں خاکداں را وا شگافی
درونش بنگری خوں ریزیٔ عشق[70]

* * * *

بباغاں بادِ فروردیں دہد عشق
براغاں غنچہ چوں پرویں دہد عشق

شعاعِ مہر او قلزم شگاف است
بماہی دیدۂ رہ بیں دہد عشق[71]

Not only this ; all this hustle and bustle of life, this struggle against unfavourable circumstances, this constant endeavour to attain higher goals, is all the result of Love.

69. *Mathnavī*, v. 3854-5.
70. *Payām-i Mashriq*, p. 13.
71. Ibid., p. 12.

تہی از ہائے و ہو میخانہ بودے
گل ما از شرر بیگانہ بودے
نبودے عشق و ایں ہنگامۂ عشق
اگر دل چوں خرد فرزانہ بودے[72]

This Love, as Iqbāl himself explains, means the desire to assimilate and to absorb. Life is a forward assimilative movement. It removes all obstructions in its march by assimilating them. Its essence is the continual creation of desires and ideals, and for the purpose of its preservation and expansion, it has invented or developed out of itself certain instruments which help it to assimilate obstructions. The greatest obstacle in the way of life is the world of Nature with its categeories of space, time and causation. It is in reality the way our intellect interprets it. The world of nature, according to Iqbāl, is not a static fact situated in an a-dynamic void, but a structure of events possessing the character of a continuous flow, which our thought cuts up into isolated immobilities out of whose mutual relations arise the concepts of space and time. It is the expression of the creative act of God, and it is only through our intellectual mode of apprehending the life of God that we cut this continuous work of creation into the moulds of space and time. But if we leave aside this intellectual way and rise to the vital way of assimliating the universe, all these limitations of space and time come to an end. Thus, it becomes possible for man, through Love, to attain Perfect Manhood.

عشق سلطان است و برہانِ مبیں
ہر دو عالم عشق را زیرِ نگیں
لا زمان و دوش فردائے ازو
لا مکان و زیر و بالائے ازو[73]

Love is a power and a divine light; both the worlds are under its rule.
For it there is no time and space, no todays and yesterdays, no ups and downs.

72. Ibid., p. 20. 73. *Jāvīd Nāmah*, p. 18.

The intellectual approach leads us only to see the Attributes of the Ultimate Ego, i.e. the observable aspects of Reality; while the approach of Love brings us face to face with the Ego Himself. This vital act deepens the whole being of the ego, and sharpens his will with the creative assurance that the world is not something to be merely seen or known through concepts, but something to be made and remade by continuous actions. It is this vital act, born of Love, that is supremely creative of new values and standards and changes the life of individuals and communities. Comparing the two different attitudes, the stages where one can only see *ṣifāt* (attriubtes) and where one sees *dhāt* (the Ego), Iqbāl refers to the following verse of a Persian poet in which he contrasts the religious experience of Moses with that of our holy Prophet :

موسیٰ ز ہوش رفت بیک جلوۂ صفات
تو عین ذات می نگری و در تبسمی[74]

Moses fainted by one epiphany of *ṣifāt*, while our holy Prophet enjoyed the *dhāt* with a smile.

According to Iqbāl, this vision of *dhāt* through direct intuition is the characteristic of the Perfect Man and it is he alone who is able to lead humanity to peace and welfare. In *Gulshan-i-Rāz-i-Jadīd*, he expresses this idea :

کمالِ زندگی دیدارِ ذات است
طریقش رستن از بندِ جهات است

* * *

کسے کو 'دید' عالم را امام است
من و تو ناتمامیم او تمام است[75]

The perfection of Life is to see *dhāt*,
And its method is to be free from directions [i.e., space, time and causality].

* * *

He alone is the true leader who "sees",
Before him we are all imperfect.

74. Quoted in *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 118.
75. *Zabūr-i 'Ajam* (*Gulshan-i Rāz-i Jadīd*), p. 232.

In *Jāvīd Nāmah* he quotes a line from Rūmī to the same effect.

ہر کہ عاشق شد جمالِ ذات را
اوست سیّد جملہ موجودات را[76]

He who fell in love with the Divine Person (*dhāt*) is the lord of all creation.

It is the Perfect Man who, according to Iqbāl, is the goal of evolution. This Perfect Man is not only the man of love but also of reason. In his person reason and love commingle to form a unique personality. It is through this combination of intellect and intuition in him that he is able to give to the world both peace and stability, material progress and spiritual illumination. Through him our reason will be able to achieve greatest possible mastery over the forces of nature so much so that the elements would reveal their innermost secrets for the material benefit of mankind. But this wider and comprehensive nature will, at the same time, save humanity from the destructive consequences of rational approach. He will unveil the secret of the hidden springs of self and thus bring about a perfect harmony between the contradictory demands of our nature. Without love, intellect is destructive—so well illustrated in the life of present-day soulless activities of the modern man. Without intellect, love remains unproductive and fruitless, as is clearly proved by the history of mysticism. True life consists in a combination of the two and the Perfect Man is the true embodiment of this.

زیرکی از عشق گردد حق شناس
کارِ عشق از زیرکی محکم اساس
عشق چون با زیرکی ہمبر شود
نقشبندِ عالمِ دیگر شود[77]

Intellect becomes God-conscious through Love, while Love becomes fruitful only though reason.

76. *Jāvīd Nāmah*, p. 10. 77. Ibid., p. 71.

When both Love and reason combine, a new world comes into being.

In Iqbāl's words :

Vision [i.e., love] without power [attained through intellect] does bring moral elevation but cannot give a lasting culture. Power without vision tends to become destructive and inhuman. Both must combine for the spiritual expansion of humanity.[78]

It is this idea which he expresses in the following beautiful verse :

دلبری بے قاہری جادوگری است
دلبری با قاہری پیغمبری است[79]

It is this unique combination of the two, i. e. vision and power that characterises the Perfect Man. Says Iqbāl :

He is the completest Ego, the goal of humanity, the acme of life both in mind and body ; in him the discord of our mental life becomes a harmony. . . . In his life, thought and action, instinct and reason, become one. He is the last fruit of the tree of humanity, and all the trials of a painful evolution are justified because he is to come at the end.[80]

طبعِ مضموں بندِ فطرت خوں شود
تا دو بیتِ ذاتِ او موزوں شود
مشتِ خاکِ ما سرِ گردوں رسید
زیں غبار آں شہسوار آید پدید

* * *

از وجودِ تو سر افرازیم ما
پس بہ سوزِ ایں جہاں سوزیم ما[81]

* * * *

78. *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 92.
79. *Zabūr-i 'Ajam*, p 264.
80. Introduction to the *Secrets of the Self*, pp. xviii-xix.
81. *Asrār-o Rumūz* (*Asrār-i Khudī*), pp.5I-2.

نوعِ انساں مزرع و تو حاصلی

کاروانِ زندگی را منزلی[82]

Nature travails in blood for generations
To compose the harmony of his personality.
Our handful of earth has reached the zenith,
For that champion will come forth from this dust !

* * *

It is to thee that we owe our dignity,
And silently undergo the pains of life.

* * * *

Mankind is the cornfield and thou the harvest,
Thou art the goal of Life's caravan.

July 1954

82. Ibid., p. 51.

Hafiz Abbadullah Farooqi

IQBAL AND BERGSON ON TIME

Bergson distinguishes between time proper and duration. When he speaks of time and space each implying the other, he seems to suggest homogeneous time and homogeneous space. Duration for him is altogether different from the uniform and spatialised succession of instants ; it is life itself : movement, activity, and constant flux in which each moment includes within it the whole of the past, and nothing suffers repetition. Duration thus is symbolised as a flowing stream in which nothing is ever lost and in which multiplicity signifies complexity with no tinge of quantitativeness, analogous to the complexity of a musical composition and not to that of a heap of bricks. Bergson appeals to intuition, to establish that duration is reality itself. The duration which constitutes the reality of each experiencing individual is a part of the larger duration which is described by him as *elan vital*, i.e. the vital impulse. Iqbāl, however, rejects this view of Bergson, as it palpably makes time prior to the self. It is the creative activity of the self alone which, according to Iqbāl, brings about a change in time. Self exists in its own right ; its nature is directive, free, and creative.

As every ego, according to Iqbāl, partakes of reality, he passes from human self to the ultimate self and from the ultimate self to the universe. The material universe for Iqbāl is not a finished product, created once for all. It is a creation in progress, and it is an act, rather than a thing. The emergence of life and consciousness are the result of a process of evolution : a process that has no limit or

predetermined end. Life is essentially an incessant struggle, a state of tension between the ego and its environment. It may be noted here that as Iqbāl believes in the existence of external world, he makes allowance for the duality of subject and object as the necessary basis of all knowledge. Bergson takes a different view: according to him, the knowledge of reality is possible only if subject and object are not kept apart from each other. For him, the relation between the knowing subject and the object is that of identity. A can know B only by becoming B and hence having experiences which are not merely like B's but are actually B's. Now this, as James Ward puts it, is an epistemological impossibility. Iqbāl rightly insists that one apprehends reality intuitively without obliterating one's own self which is the basis of all knowledge. The aim of individual self is not to merge into reality but to absorb it in his own finite being. Reflection on one's own consciousness not only gives knowledge of self, but also a peep into the nature of reality or pure duration. Hence, Iqbāl says:

اے اسیرِ دوش و فردا در نگر
در دلِ خود عالمِ دیگر نگر[1]

Oh! thou enthralled by Yesterday and Tomorrow
Behold another world in thine own heart!

Iqbāl assiduously maintains the distinction between time which is measured in terms of past, present and future and the non-serial time or duration in which past merges into present and future is constituted of open possibilities. Duration is change without succession, in which life, thought, and purpose interpenerate to form a unity, much like the unity of multiple experiences of a single ego. It is a creative movement, the path of which is to be determined ever anew. The ego, which is prior to time, with its ever-rising aspirations and hopes constantly creates new ideals with the result that every moment in its life is a fresh moment. To exist in duration is thus to be

1. *Asrār-o-Rumūz (Asrār-i Khudī)*, p. 81.

creative and free from the clutches of serial time. Hence for Iqbāl all the activities of life are due to the free creative movement in time.

In duration, the present, the past, and the future being given simultaneously form an organic unity. Now, though duration is not something apart from the ego, in an attempt to assimilate it intellectually, ego becomes fettered in serial time. We thus break up the organic unity of time (duration) into instants and even spatialise time for relating instants, one with the other. Here it is significant to note that while according to Bergson the activity of intellect is merely analytic, according to Iqbāl it is both analytic and synthetic. Thus even though intellect usually breaks up pure duration into an infinity of instants, it also has the capacity to comprehend it as an organic whole. In this connection the remarks of Dr M. M. Ahmad in his exposition of "Iqbāl's Appreciative Self" are quite to the point :

> It [self] is made co-extensive with space and time, as far as the human vision can take it. It is made one with the sphere of space encircled by time. It breaks the life of the whole and shines with its consciousness. All the manifolds are given in it. But they are given in universals. Only their qualitative distinctions are left. These distinctions merge with each other like the various colours of rainbow, or the various notes in a piece of music. There is a tendency in the unifying process to assimilate all the distinctions in a unique state of unity. But Iqbal is not referring to the transcendetnal unity. The transcendental unity is as much implicit in it as in any other state of consciousness. He is referring to the unity of self-consciousness, in which the diversity is also given.[2]

According to Iqbāl, the experience of duration becomes possible only on the realisation of the inherent potentialities within the ego. In other words, one can transcend space and time only if one is able to attain to true egohood. A revolution alone in one's ego-consciousness can liberate one from the fetters of serial time and raise one to the level of pure duration. He who is able to attain to this happy stage surely masters his destiny. Says Iqbal :

2. *Iqbāl Review*, Karachi, October 1961, p. 16.

زندہ از عرفانِ اصلش زندہ تر
ہستی اُو از سحر تابندہ تر[3]

Gnosis of its root [of time] quickens the living with new life ;
Its being is more splendid than the dawn.

Iqbāl's significant distinction between the appreciative self and the efficient self is particularly noteworthy here. The appreciative self lives in pure duration, while the efficient self lives in serial time. Pure duration is wholly qualitative and is indeed peculiar to the appreciative self. The serial time is the result of the efficient self's traffic with the world of cause and effect. The appreciative self being highly creative in its nature rises above the world of mechanical causation. Enthused with new hopes and new aspirations, it creates ever new ideals. Its ceaseless creative activity is constantly inspired by new visions and new horizons.

July 1966

3, *Asrār-o-Rumūz* (*Asrār-i Khudī*), p. 82.

Niaz Erfan

IQBAL AND EXISTENTIALISM

No doubt Iqbāl has much in common with existentialists, yet it cannot be denied that the two philosophies : existentialism and Iqbāl's system, are at variance with each other in many vital aspects. While comparing the one with the other two important things must be kept in mind. First, existentialism is basically a philosophy of revolt and as such tends to promote negativisim and extremism. Secondly, Iqbāl derives his inspiration essentially and primarily from the Holy Qur'ān which gives mankind a positive outlook. Islam teaches us moderation and cautions us against extremism of one form or the other. An action based on the spirit of moderation is judged to be the best action by both the Qur'ān and the Hadīth. Differences that there are between existentialists and Iqbāl, spring, in the final analysis, from this basic divergence of outlooks.

The first important point of difference between the two is the one regarding the idea of evolution. Whereas in Iqbāl's system this notion occupies an important place, existentialists seem on the whole almost to shelve it, either because they consider it too commonplace a subject to need an elaborate discussion or, and this is more important, they do not believe in the reality of the group and race. For them what matter is the individual.

No doubt, both Iqbāl and existentialists refer to the occasion

of man's gaining consciousness or rather self-consciousness. In Iqbāl's philosophy man's gaining self-consciouness is occasioned by transition from animal state to the human state that once occurred in the history of the human race. It indeed is one of the greatest landmarks in the process of evolution. For existentialists, on the contrary, the moment of gaining consciousness is the occasion when the individual meets himself to be already there ; they do not speak of a stage of transition from the animal state to the state of manhood.

Existentialists as well as Iqbāl emphasise the freedom of human individual but there is a basic difference in their approach to this subject. Existentialists stand for an unlimited liberty of the human individual—to the extent that it turns out to be licence. Sartre, for example, does not see a third possibility between total determinism and perfect indeterminism. Thus he writes in *Being and Nothingness* : "Either man is wholly determined . . . or else man is wholly free."[1] Sartre casts his vote in favour of total indeterminism. Man, according to him, is indetermined to the extent that his volition is conditioned neither by heredity nor by environment, nor by any goal, nor by traditional values. He creates his own value in every action. Since every action has a uniqueness, no ready-made ethical code can be of any help in guiding our moral conduct. As many critics have observed, this sort of freedom is in reality its own negation.

To reach somewhere a man must not only be free to move but must have a goal or purpose. In other words, he is determined by the goal he pursues. Since the ends pursued by man are the projections of his own inner self or character, he is essentially determined by his own character. Thus a more reasonable view of human freedom is that of self-determinism and it is the one advocated by Iqbāl. According to him, " . . . the element of guidance and directive control in the ego's activity clearly shows that the ego is a free personal causality."[2] Again he writes :

1. J.P. Sartre, *Being and Nothingness* (English translation by Hazel E. Barnes), Philosophical Library, New York, 1956, p. 442.

2. Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, Oxford University Press, London, 1934, p. 102.

To live is to shape and change ends and purposes and to be governed by them. Mental life is teleological in the sense that, while there is no far-off distant goal towards which we are moving, there is a progressive formation of fresh ends, purposes, and ideal scales of value as the process of life grows and expands . . . . But there is a system in the continuity of this passage. Its various stages, in spite of the apparently abrupt changes in our evaluation of things, are organically related to one another. The life-history of the individual is, on the whole, a unity and not a mere series of mutually ill-adapted events.[3]

These quotations from Iqbāl amply show that his conception of the freedom of the human self is opposed to the view held by existentialists, particularly by Sartre and Heidegger. And so it must be; for existentialists, notably the atheistic existentialists, do not believe in any system of values, ethics and religion, while Iqbāl insists on a faithful observance of the divine Law of *Sharī'ah*.

According to Sartre, human freedom, nay human life itself, is absurd. The character of Sartre's "in-itself" as well as "for-itself" is such that neither the former nor the latter can be accounted for in terms of reason. Life just happens. Why and what for? Nobody knows. Thus human existence or life is absurd. Man has no say in the matter and is simply to accept life as given. He is free but is not free to be not free. Life and freedom both are equally purposeless.

Iqbāl draws his inspiration essentially from the Holy Qur'an which says :

'We have not created the heavens and the earth and whatever is between them in sport : We have not created them but for a serious end : but the greater part of them understand it not.' (44 : 38.)[4]

Again, the Holy Qur'an tells us :

"Verily in the creation of the Heavens and of the earth, and in the succession of the night and of the day, are signs for men of understanding ; who, standing and sitting and reclining, bear God in mind and reflect on the creation of the Heavens and of the earth and

3. Ibid., p. 52. 4. Ibid., p. 9.

say : "Oh, our Lord ! Thou hast not created this is vain." ' : (3:188.)[5]

Against the existentialists, Iqbāl thus believes that life is through and through purposive and has specific ends to fulfil. Each human individual life has a unique significance of its own. Man has to play a vital role in the scheme of things. Endowed with freedom, he is to be the deputy or co-worker of God in the creation of a new universe.

Existentialists make much of the psychological states of guilt, anguish and despair. This, all is in all, is a gloomy view of life and itis principally the outcome of their peculiar notion of human feedom as well as of peculiar analysis of the situation of man in the world. Man does not will the time or place of his birth, i.e. in a particular family and in a particular environment. Nor does he have any choice with regard to his physical or mental abilities and aptitudes. When he gains consciousness he meets himself to be already there. He does not know why he is there or what his destiny in this world is. He is simply to accept himself and his situation. All the same he alone is to shoulder the responsibility of all the evil tendencies in him and the evil consequences of his decisions and deeds. He lives in an alien world, for he has no real knowledge about it. He cannot foresee the consequences of his actions and yet his fate, nay the fate of the entire world, rests on the decision he takes in a particular situation.

This strange predicament in which man is placed leads the existentialists to the view that man suffers from an inescapable sense of guilt before God and the consequent despair and anguish. This sense of guilt is obviously rooted in the Christian doctrine that man is born with an original sin. No wonder that existentialism as a philosophy paints a gloomy picture of man's life in the world and spreads on the whole a diseased outlook. This also explains the queer concept of human freedom which the existentialists advocate. Iqbāl, on the contrary, is the exponent of the philosophy of hope and aspiration. He takes into consideration the existence both of good and evil in the world ; but he is the champion neither of rosy optimism nor of morbid pessimism. He criticises these extreme views in the following

5. Ibid.

words :

To the optimist Browning all is well with the world ; to the pessimist Schopenhauer the world is one perpetual winter wherein a blind will expresses itself in the infinite variety of living things which bemoan their emergence for a moment and then disappear for ever. The issue thus raised between optimism and pessimism cannot be finally decided at the present stage of our knowledge of the universe. Our intellectual constitution is such that we can take only a piecemeal view of things. We cannot understand the full import of the great cosmic forces which work havoc, and at the same time sustain and amplify life. The teaching of the Quran, which believes in the possibility of improvement in the behaviour of man and his control over natural forces, is neither optimism nor pessimism. It is meliorism, which recognizes a growing universe and is animated by the hope of man's eventual victory over evil.[6]

This meliorism of Iqbāl is to be found in a large number of his verses which give us the message of hope and a new level of aspiration.

قناعت نہ کر عالمِ رنگ و بو پر
چمن اور بھی آشیاں اور بھی ہیں

* * *

اسی روز و شب میں اُلجھ کر نہ رہ جا
کہ تیرے زمان و مکاں اور بھی ہیں[7]

You should not become contented with the world of matter with its sweet smelling multi-coloured flowers ;
There are gardens and nests elsewhere too.

* * *

Don't be lost in the world of serial time ;
There are other forms of time and space for you.

عروجِ آدمِ خاکی سے انجم سہمے جاتے ہیں
کہ یہ ٹوٹا ہوا تارا مہِ کامل نہ بن جائے[8]

6. Ibid., p. 77.
7. *Bāl-i Jibrīl*, pp. 89-90.
8. Ibid., p. 14.

Even the stars are afraid of the rise of man,
Lest this broken star (i.e., man) should become full moon (i.e., the perfect man).

ہر اک مقام سے آگے مقام ہے تیرا
حیات ذوقِ سفر کے سوا کچھ اور نہیں[9]

Your destination is beyond any destination ;
Life is nothing but a desire for an unending journey.

Religious existentialists hold that the true mode of prayer is offering it in the privacy of one's self rather than saying it in congregation or assembly. In order really to be able to pray, an individual, they believe, is to concentrate on and sink into the inwardness of his soul. This is possible only in privacy and not in congregation. Man being alone, he alone is responsible before God ; he can pray to God in loneliness only. While dwelling on communion with God, existentialists always speak of the "I-Thou" relationship and never of the "We-Thou" relationship.

While Iqbāl is not averse to an individual's praying in privacy, he attaches greater importance to congregational prayer. He writes :

The real object of prayer is better achieved when the act of prayer becomes congregational. The spirit of all true prayer is social . . . . A congregation is an association of men who, animated by the same aspiration, concentrate themselves on a single object and open up their inner selves to the working of a single impulse.[10]

As against the existentialists' view that congregational prayer obstructs concentration of mind, Iqbāl observes :

It is a psychological truth that association multiplies the normal man's power of perception, deepens his emotions, and dynamizes his will to a degree unknown to him in the privacy of his individuality.[11]

The congregational prayer, according to Iqbāl, serves one very

9. Ibid., p. 70.
10. *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 87.
11. Ibid.

important purpose, which the existentialists ignore. It is a means for the eradication of status-consciousness among the members of a community. Iqbāl says :

> Its form in general creates and fosters the sense of social equality inasmuch as it tends destroy the feeling of rank or race-superiority in the worshippers.[12]

In this connection a fallacy of existentialism becomes evident. On the one hand the existentialists bemoan the tendency of self-estrangement among men and the tendency of estrangement from God; on the other, by preaching a morbid type of religious individualism, they advocate estrangement from fellow-beings. Iqbāl, an adherent of the philosophy of the Qur'an, has evolved a system in which the individual, the society and God are given due place.

In the field of political theory too, existentialists stand for an extreme form of individualisim which if practised in its true form would lead to a state of anarchy. On the contrary, Iqbāl holds a balanced view in this respect. He is opposed to over-organisation and totalitarianism : his ideal State gives enough liberty to the individual to cultivate his potentialities. All the same Iqbāl insists that an individual can realise his potentialities only in a social order. The individual and society are indispensable to each other.

فرد می گیرد ز ملت احترام
ملت از افراد می یابد نظام[13]

The individual gets his dignity through the community,
And the community has its organisation through the individual.

فرد را ربطِ جماعت رحمت است
جوہرِ او را کمال از ملت است[14]

The relation of the individual with the group is a blessing for him;

12. Ibid., p. 88.
13. *Asrār-o-Rumūz* (*Rumūz-i-Bekhudī*), p. 98.
14. Ibid., p. 97.

His nature and potentialities find realisation through the community.

فرد قائم ربطِ ملت سے ہے تنہا کچھ نہیں
موج ہے دریا میں اور بیرونِ دریا کچھ نہیں[15]

The individual has his being in relation to society ; outside the society he is a mere nonentity.
A wave has significance only in the ocean ; outside of it, it is just nothing.

January 1966

15. *Bāng-i-Darā*, p. 210.

Taj Muhammad Khayal

IQBAL'S CONCEPTION OF SATAN AND HIS PLACE IN IDEAL SOCIETY

For modern psychology virtue and vice and good and bad are equally important objects of study. The attitude of traditional theology, according to which evil is simply to be detested and all its mention to be considered indecent and so to be avoided, is not scientific in a positivistic sense. It believes that Satan is the personification of evil, and all you have to do about him is that, when his name is mentioned, you curse him and he will run away. In fact, a verbal curse does Satan no harm. He retains control of man's heart just as much as he did before the curse, perhaps more so. For Iqbāl, evil, as an integral part of man's nature, is a force that moves him to activity, and Satan is vested by Iqbāl with such magnificence and grandeur as to make him appear the tragic hero of the cosmic drama of man's creation. In his usual forceful way, Iqbāl treats this problem from a scientific as well as philosophical point of view.

The problem of evil is an integral part of every philosophical system and anyone who tries to give a world-view has to consider a number of very important and fundamental questions about it. What is evil? What is its nature? Is evil real or only an unreal appearance, caused by man's narrow vision and lack of understanding of ultimate reality? If evil is real, what is its source? What is its value in

the scheme of things ? What purpose, if any, does it serve ? How is it related to human personality ? How far is man responsible for the presence of evil in human society and how can it be removed ? In fact, a complete discussion of the problem of evil will extend to an almost complete metaphysical system ; for these questions cannot be answered without clearly understanding the nature of reality, its course of development and the ultimate end to which it is progressing.

Iqbāl undoubtedly, is, one of the greatest thinkers that the world has known. Even though his thoughts are mostly expressed in poetry, which cannot be expected to be a consistent presentation of a world-view, he will, I believe, go down in history as the propounder of a great religio-philosophic system of thought. In his clebrated prose work : *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, in particular, and poetic compositions, in general, he has made a superb effort to bring about a reconciliation between the fundamental ideas of religion and the basic demands of modern scientific knowledge. He says in the preface to *The Reconstruction* that he has tried to meet "the demand for a scientific form of religious knowledge". His writings impress one as a scientific interpretation of religion or a religious humanisation of science. To a superficial observer, Iqbāl seems to be a strong supporter of blind faith in religious dogmas and an adverse critic of modern science. I do not deny that Iqbāl has strongly criticised the limitations of modern civilisation, and sometimes also modern science, but I must assert that he has equally strongly, or perhaps more so, criticised dogmatic religion, supine mysticism and ineffectual theoretical theology. The truth is that Iqbāl wants to combine the highest reason with the highest faith and tries to bring about a harmonious amalgamation of the two into a single whole. He says :

زیرکی از عشق گردد حق شناس

کارِ عشق از زیرکی محکم اساس

عشق چون با زیرکی ہمبر شود

نقشبند عالمِ دیگر شود

خیز و نقش عالم دیگر بنہ
عشق را با زیرکی آمیزدہ[1]

I have no hesitation in saying that the world has seldom known a supporter greater than Iqbāl of a rationalistic faith that is neither blind like the religious dogmas of a pre-scientific age, nor cold like formal logic or ultra-intellectual like the narrow empirical theories of the eighteenth-century English philosophers whose enthusiasm for the importance and reliability of human experience led them to ignore its limitations. In reading Iqbāl, one is immediately struck by the thoroughly inductive spirit, in which he tries to investigate the nature of reality, as well as by the deep concern that he has for fundamental moral values. He ignores the agelong theories of the theologians about the miracles of the prophets and puts on them an interpretation so exactly fitting in with the present day moral and psychological tendencies that even the most scientific of sociologists cannot help being convinced. Discussing the significance of legends in the Qur'ān, Iqbāl says in *The Reconstruction* :

The object of the Quran in dealing with these legends is seldom historical ; it nearly always aims at giving them a universal, moral or philosophical import.[2]

The co-existence of the "the rod" and "the shining hand" as the miracles of the prophet Moses is, for Iqbāl, a proof of the combination of physical power and spiritual light in human personality. The Prophet Muḥammad's visit to the Heavens signifies to Iqbāl the infinitude of the powers of man and the possibility of their extending over the heavens.

سبق ملا ہے یہ معراجِ مصطفیٰ سے مجھے
کہ عالمِ بشریت کی زد میں ہے گردوں[3]

Though Iqbāl may be convinced that science and reason, in their narrow sense, cannot, by themselves, succeed in giving to man a comp-

1. *Jāvīd Nāmah*, p. 71.
2. *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, London, 1934, p. 77.
3. *Bāl-i Jibrīl*, p. 44.

lete way of life, the spirit of Iqbāl's thought is through and through scientific. He never loses touch with the realities of life and never makes religion a mysterious entity that cannot be understood and practised in the natural world by the common man. Iqbāl's interpretation of the finality of Prophethood in Muḥammad leaves no doubt that, according to him, the emancipation of man lies in the full development and proper use of his intellect which will give him complete control of the powers of nature. He says:

The Prophet of Islam seems to stand between the ancient and the modern world. In so far as the source of his revelation is concerned he belongs to the ancient world; in so far as the spirit of his revelation is concerned he belongs to the modern world . . . . The birth of Islam . . . is the birth of inductive intellect. In Islam prophecy reaches its perfection in discovering the need of its own abolition. This involves the keen perception that life cannot for ever be kept in leading strings; that in order to achieve full self-consciousness man must finally be thrown back on his own resources.[4]

The Prophet, in fact, is the originator of the modern scientific spirit, and Iqbāl is its greatest propagator in the East. The greatest fruit of scientific knowledge is man's confidence in himself. It immensely extends man's powers and thereby makes him depend entirely on himself, instead of looking to supernatural agencies for guidance. This spirit of independence and self-confidence is misunderstood by the religious dogmatists who condemn science because it seems to make man irreligious. This tendency of scientific thought finds its culmination in Iqbāl's conception of selfhood, the full development and manifestation of which for him, is the ultimate end of life. This is the fundamental basis of all his philosophy, and in reaching it, he has made use of the most recent findings of the various branches of scientific knowledge, especially physics and psychology. His conception of the self, as developing in direct and close relationship to the environment yet maintaining a uniqueness of its own in the midst of, and in spite of all the changes around it, is in consonance

4. *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 120.

with the view of the scientific school of psychology represented by Shand, McDougall and Stout. It was, in fact, the leading school of psychology in the first quarter of the present century—a time when Iqbāl was thinking vigorously and trying to be at grips with the fundamentals of life. It is because of the psychological background of his views that Iqbāl emphasises the importance of the role of action in human life. Modern psychology has exploded the ancient theory, to which most theologians still subscribe, that reason, thought, or intellect is the guiding light of man's life. It is, at best, one of the many aspects of man's life and certainly not the strongest. The psychologists have shown that the conative tendency is definitely stronger than the cognitive. Experience is born of an interaction between the subjective tendencies of an individual and his objective environment. Without the inner urge of life in the individual there can be no experience and no knowledge. Intellect develops in the course of and in the service of activity, and all activity is the expression of an individuality in relation to an object. All life is dynamic. It means continuous change in the course of which the individual leaves an impress of his own personality on his surroundings. In the interaction between the individual's subjective tendencies and the objective conditions, the relatively stronger controls the weaker which has to yield to and be absorbed in the former. Human personality is to be perfected through a life of continuous effort, action and ceaseless change. To this view, Iqbāl has given the most beautiful and impressive expression that any mortal could, and, by his masterly talents, has impressed it on the minds of millions of people in a measure that could hardly be reached by scores of psychologists, writing for generations together. In numerous vigorous verses he pours out his heart and exhorts the weak to gain strength, to be masters of their destiny by developing their own powers and, thereby, defying the forces outside, whether social or physical. The stronger a personality is, the more free it is from the subjugation of others ; and, as its strength increases, it goes on becoming, more and more a determining factor for the decisions of others instead of being deter-

mined by external forces. Iqbāl wants every man to acquire complete independence through his own self-development, and his ideal society is composed of absolutely free individuals.

با توانائی صداقت توام است
گر خود آگاہی ہمیں جامِ جم است
زندگی کشت است و حاصل قوت است
شرحِ رمزِ حق و باطل قوت است
مدعی گر مایہ دار از قوت است
دعوایٔ او بے نیاز از حجت است [5]

To Iqbāl divinity and lordship lie in the growth and consolidation of selfhood.

تعمیرِ خودی میں ہے خدائی [6]

How great is the value that Iqbāl attaches to this effort at self-manifestation and self-development is evident from the following verse in which he is not prepared to give up the human level of existence for the divine, since the former includes the pangs and burning of desire.

متاعِ بے بہا ہے درد و سوزِ آرزو مندی
مقامِ بندگی دے کر نہ لوں شانِ خداوندی [7]

To Iqbāl, the highest value lies in eternal search and everlasting growth. Man's greatest value and happiness lie in ceaseless effort. The contemplative life, even if it may give the so-called calm of emancipation, is not of much value.

All this is in tune with the modern scientific spirit and its emphasis on man as the central figure and the controller of nature's forces. Iqbāl believes in the value of strength, power and self-confidence. He expects man to be a law unto himself.

A true man revolts against all authority and submits to no power other than his own. It is only the strong who can, by word and action, defy false gods and give practical expression to the spirit of the Islamic

5. *Asrār-o-Rumūz* (*Asrār-i Khudī*), p. 56. 6. *Bāl-i Jibrīl*, p. 79.
7. Ibid., p. 21.

Kalimah that starts with the denial of all gods : "*lā ilāh*" (there is no god). A man, who gives such a view of life with a background of scientific psychology, cannot consider evil to be devoid of all value, for evil is, after all, a defiance of the established traditions and customs. It needs strength to do evil and it also needs strength to defy the false gods. Strength is, in reality, the basic condition for doing good as well as evil. It needs courage to think and do what people do not approve of and, ordinarily, do not do it. The man who never does anything wrong is usually one who never deviates from the path approved by society. He has the courage neither to pass a judgment of his own, nor to face public criticism and censure. Such a man has no strength. If the standards current in a society change, he changes along with them. He believes in adjusting himself to the demands of the times. He is in fact "faultily faultless".

Iqbāl, who is the prophet of power and self-confidence, cannot regard such a man of any value to society. To him, a wide-awake and alert non-believer or one who sincerely worships the idols, is better than a weak Muslim who doses in the Ka'bah. "Act, act, and manifest yourself" is Iqbāl's clarion call : and he represents Satan, who is the embodiment of evil in traditional theology, to have given a lead in revolting against authority, passing an independent judgment of his own as against accepting what is given to him as right, and thereby initiating a struggle between the inner tendencies of living individuals and their external environment. He (Satan), of all the angels, did not submit to God's order to prostrate before Adam. To God's query why he (Satan) did not prostrate himself before Adam, Satan's answer, as given in the Qur'ān, is : "I am better than he. Thou hast created me out of fire and Thou hast created him out of clay". In the poem *Taskhīr-i Fiṭrat*, Iqbāl gives a forceful interpretation to this verse of the Qur'ān and I refer the reader to the stanza beginning with the lines :

نوریٔ نادان نیم ، سجده بآدم برم
او به نهاد است خاک ، من به نژاد آذرم [8]

8. *Payām-i Mashriq*, p. 97.

Here Iqbāl represents Satan as giving free expression to what is in him—the desire to excel, to be considered better than others and to dominate. Satan is, thus, an allegorical representation of a tendency in living creatures to react, to stand up to and influence the environmental forces. This tendency is the very essence of life and is really responsible for the birth of all desire, longing, effort and achievement--also of suffering and sorrow, but a "sweet sorrow" like Romeo's "parting", without which all life will be colourless and dull.

Anyone, who reads Iqbāl's poem *Jibrīl aur Iblīs* is struck by the grandeur and majesty of Satan who is identified with "the inner fire of existence" (*suz-i darūn-i kā'ināt*) by which Iqbāl means the urge for change and development. In fact, it sometimes seems questionable whether this "fire" has been derived by man from Satan or by Satan from man, for in *Armug̲h̲ān-i Ḥijāz* Iqbāl says, addressing Satan :

بغیر از جانِ ما سوزے کجا بود
ترا از آتش ما آفریدند[9]

Satan does not need the wine, but only the search and the desire for the wine to intoxicate him. He does not want to have his cup full, for his broken cup has intoxicated him by its very breaking.

کر گیا سرمست مجھ کو ٹوٹ کر میرا سبو[10]

Satan refuses even to consider the question of finding means of going back to the heaven, for it is too dull and lifeless. He sneers at Gabriel for looking at the oceanic storms from the shores, safe and without any danger. Satan has found the joy of facing and fighting the storms in the middle of the ocean. He, in fact, claims the credit of creating all the floods in the rivulets, the rivers and the seas. He goes to the extent of asking Gabriel to inquire of the Almighty, whenever he happens to be alone with Him: "Whose blood has given colour to Adam's story?"

گر کبھی خلوت میسر ہو تو پوچھ اللہ سے
قصہ آدم کو رنگیں کر گیا کس کا لہو ؟[11]

9. *Armug̲h̲ān-i Ḥijāz*, p. 177.
10. *Bāl-i Jibrīl*, p. 192.
11. Ibid., p. 194.

Here Iqbāl affirms that all that is of interest in man's life is due to the spirit of independence and revolt initiated in him by Satan without which there will be no life—at least no life worth living. Iqbāl says :

مزی اندر جہانے کور ذوقے
کہ یزداں دارد و شیطاں نہ دارد[12]

Satan, thus, represents the birth of free thought, independent judgment and power of action. Most writers on Iqbāl, considering him to be representing the current views of religion and so of Satan, have not done justice to this aspect of his views. They take Satan as a symbol of evil and nothing else, and do not find in Satan anything commendable and worthy of respect, whereas Satan, as represented by Iqbāl, is almost a hero who claims to create all movement and initiate all change. In Iqbāl's poem : *Iblīs kī Majlis-i Shūrā,* Satan claims to have full control of the material world and to hold unlimited sway over man's hearts.

ہے مرے دستِ تصرف میں جہانِ رنگ و بو
کیا زمیں کیا مہر و مہ کیا آسمانِ توبتو

* * *

کیا امامانِ سیاست کیا کلیسا کے شیوخ
سب کو دیوانہ بنا سکتی ہے میری ایک ہو[13]

In the world, as conceived by Iqbāl, such a personality or force is not without its value. Similarly most students of Iqbāl's poetry find nothing but evil in European civilisation. This view is so very common among such Muslims in the East as are proud of their past glory and religion and have, perhaps, not yet fully understood the rational orientation of Islam with its scientific and natural background as presented by Iqbāl.

All change, all progress, and all that makes life worth living springs from action. Iqbāl wants man to be a creator. His conception of man is that of a free agent who co-operates with God in the creation,

12. *Payām-i Mashriq*, p. 154. 13. *Armughān-i Ḥijāz*, pp. 222-3.

progress, and ultimate realisation of values. Even if man cannot create something out of nothing, he does improve upon the world as created by God. Reference may be made to the poem : "*Muḥāwrah mābain Khudā wa Insān*" in *Payām-i Mashriq.*[14] How can this be possible if man has to lead a life of passivity, inaction and helpless servility to God's wishes? Iqbāl wants man not only to be a master of his own destiny but to be so strong that his voice may be God's voice; his actions may be God's actions; and he may even determine the destiny of others. Iqbāl seems to me to be supporting the view that even God functions through human agency. He says :

صفِ جنگاہ میں مردانِ خدا کی تکبیر
جوشِ کردار سے بنتی ہے خدا کی آواز[15]

As the life of action is so very important and Satan symbolises independence, effort, desire and action, he must occupy a very high place in the scheme of things. And so he does.

If the only thing of value in human life were unqualified self-assertion and unhindered self-manifestation, as some European thinkers believe and all modern nationalist States practise, Satan will be unmixed goodness and all distinction between good and bad will vanish. There is no doubt that, according to Iqbāl, Satan is the symbol of *lā*, the denial of gods in human society and he thinks *lā* to be an absolutely necessary constituent of a perfect and ideal social order. In fact, Iqbāl believes that *lā* and *illā* imply each other. As every negation implies the affirmation of its opposite and both the contradictories cannot be false, the denial of gods is really the acceptance and affirmation of God. Even Satan's disobedience is but a form of acceptance. In *Jāvīd Nāmah*, Satan is made to say:

از وجودِ حق مرا منکر مگیر
دیده بر باطن کشا ظاہر مگیر

* * *

من 'بلے' در پردۂ 'لا' گفته ام
گفتهٔ من خوشتر از نا گفته ام[16]

14. *Payām-i Mashriq*, p. 132.
15. *Bāl-i Jibrīl*, p. 201.
16. *Jāvīd Nāmah*, p. 158.

And in *Pas Cheh Bāyad Kard ay Aqwām-i Sharq*, Iqbāl brings out the interdependence of *lā* and *illā* in the following verses:

نکتہ می گویم از مردانِ حال
امتاں را 'لا' جلال 'الا' جمال

* * *

درجہاں آغازِ کار از حرفِ لاست
ایں نخستیں منزلِ مردِ خداست[17]

* * *

لا و الا ساز و برگِ امتاں
نفی بے اثبات مرگِ امتاں[18]

All change and all progress is the result of this tendency to revolt against authority:

پیش غیر اللہ لا گفتن حیات
تازہ از ہنگامۂ او کائنات[19]

I would like to give here Iqbāl's interpretation of the Qur'ānic legend of the Fall of man which as he says:

Has nothing to do with the first appearance of man on this planet. Its purpose is rather to indicate man's rise from a primitive state of instinctive appetite to the conscious possession of a free self, capable of doubt and disobedience. The Fall does not mean any moral depravity; it is man's transition from consciousness to the first flash of self-consciousness . . . . Man's first act of disobedience was also his first act of free choice.[20]

All this is true, but Iqbāl is too great and too wise to give a lop-sided view of life. He is conscious of the presence of moral values as well as of the need of propagating and creating them in the world. He knows full well that if man should aim merely at the possession and enhancement of power, the existence of a just and stable social order will become impossible. Man will remain a mere brute, and the fruit of his knowledge and intellect will be the destructive powers placed in his hands by scientific advancement. Just as Iqbāl is bold

17. *Pas Cheh Bāyad Kard*, p. 19. 18. Ibid., p. 22.
19. Ibid., p. 19.
20. *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 80.

enough to say that a world in which there is only God to the exclusion of Satan, is not worth living, similarly a world in which there is only Satan, power, self-confidence and dominance to the exclusion of goodness, toleration and order, could not find approval with him. Howsoever different his view of Satan may be from that of traditional theology, Satan is after all Satan. Howsoever grand his personality, and howsoever important his role in human life, if the tendencies represented by Satan are to be followed by man in their entirety, the result will be nothing but chaos, eternal conflict, misery and ruin. A social structure that is raised on such foundations will be satanic. It will have "power" without "vision". The opposite extreme of having "vision" without "power", to Iqbāl, is equally objectionable because it is equally satanic. The tendency to justify one's weakness by ascribing it to fate is described by Iqbāl as having been created by Satan.

میں نے ناداروں کو سکھلایا سبق تقدیر کا
میں نے منعم کو دیا سرمایہ داری کا جنوں[21]

Satan represents two tendencies, namely, to dominate and to yield to domination. It is the presence of people who can submit to others, that makes domination possible. The willingness to give up the struggle and leave the world to the strong is the essential counterpart of the will to excel, to construct and dominate. The development of merely intellectual and aesthetic life of man, whether individually or socially, without the power of effort and action is not acceptable to Iqbāl. The poet who believes in art for art's sake, the mystic who is sunk in contemplation and leaves the affairs of the world to the management of others, the poor man who submits to and serves the rich because he believes that "God's will is such", are all misled by Satan. They are all indirect props to exploitation, injustice and inequality. For Iqbāl, selfish supremacy of man over man as well as submission to it are both evil and satanic.

This is admirably expressed by Iqbāl in *Jāvīd Nāmah*. Ahriman tries to persuade Zoroaster to sit in seclusion worshipping God, be sunk

21. *Armughān-i Ḥijāz*, p. 214.

in spiritual meditation and give up the struggle for the good, because it will save him from the necessity of facing persecution and death. Ahriman says that this is the way of the mystic which Ahriman wants Zoroaster to adopt as against the way of the Prophet who faces danger and even death. Ahriman tries to dissuade Zoroaster from the prophet's way of life by saying :

زہر با در بادۂ گلفام اوست
ارّہ و کرم و صلیب انعام اوست[22]

If Zoroaster had accepted Ahriman's advice, he would have fallen into Satan's snares. He refuses to do so and, instead, prefers to lead the life of action and goodness which will need the blood of Ahriman for decoration. A prophet combines spiritual values with practical values, vision with power. The man of vision just lives only for himself and goes alone to the heavens. The prophet takes others along with him :

چیست آں ؟ بگذشتن از دیر و کنشت
چیست ایں ؟ تنہا نہ رفتن در بہشت

* * *

راہِ حق با کاروان رفتن خوش است
ہمچوجاں اندر جہاں رفتن خوش است[23]

Iqbāl condemns Western civilisation, with its unlimited control of material forces, its political domination and economic exploitation, because it has ignored moral values and aims at nothing but aggrandisement. The possession of material power, its use for narrow sectarian interests at the express cost of the poor and backward countries, the blind worship of mammon, the unscrupulous and selfish exercise of intellect in the press, on the platform, and over the radio, for duping the simple and credulous backward races, the efforts to divide people in the sacred name of democracy and freedom, are all severely criticised by Iqbāl as the various ways in which Satan is working in the West. In all the institutions of Europe, democratic, socialistic, or otherwise, Iqbāl finds "the spirit of monarchy" alive,

22. *Jāvīd Nāmah*, p. 52. 23. Ibid., p. 54.

which is the creation of Satan. The West represents power and knowledge. It believes in and practises *lā* (No), the denial of all gods, which is, no doubt, essential for man's recognition of his own powers and position on earth but which, if left uncontrolled, is the source of trouble, misery and corruption. It leads man to ignore all moral values and creates a godless society like the one in modern Europe. Addressing God, Iqbāl says :

بنایا ایک ہی ابلیس آگ سے تونے
بنائے خاک سے اس نے دو صد ہزار ابلیس [24]

Iqbāl assails the East for its weakness, for its puerile satisfaction of having "the next world" by becoming indifferent to this, for its acceptance of slavery and for its supine mysticism that has led Eastern nations to economic poverty and political degradation. In the East, religion yet holds the minds of the masses, but it is the religion of the weaklings who shun the responsibilities of practical life. It is the religion in which worship is reduced to the level of ritual, and God is worshipped in words without denying the worldly gods in practice. Addressing the worshipper, Iqbāl says :

اے کہ اندر حجرہ ہا سازی سخن
نعرۂ لا پیشِ نمرودے بزن [25]

A society, with such a background, makes a virtue of necessity and its claim of moral superiority, as compared with its stronger masters as explained by modern psychology, is but an example of "rationalisation" which is another name for self-deception. Such people only *seem* to worship God. They seem to stand for the second half of the Islamic *Kalimah* (*lā ilāh*: "except God"), but their belief in God is meaningless and hyprocritical, because it is not preceded by the denial of all gods—wealth, social status, fear of the rulers, love of ease and comfort and what not. Without worldly power, contentment and spiritual eminence (*faqr*) degrade human personality and Iqbāl has written hundreds of verses deriding

24. *Ḍarb-i Kalīm*, p. 144. 25. *Pas Cheh Bāyad Kard*, p. 22.

such contentment and sublimity. Iqbāl scoffs at such fear which is very common in the East, and which does, in fact, form the essential psychological basis of the present-day Eastern culture. To Iqbāl all this is satanic. Satan directs his disciples to keep the Muslims lost in prayer and speculation of this kind, and to strengthen their adoration for the mausoleums of the saints :

مست رکھو ذکر و فکرِ صبحگاہی میں اسے
پختہ تر کر دو مزاجِ خانقاہی میں اسے[26]

Both these tendencies—the will to dominate and the acceptance of domination—have to be chastened by avoiding the extremes and having society of free individuals who are strong enough to defy all powers—deny all gods—but are sensible and good enough to willingly impose restrictions on themselves for the sake of leading moral life. He believes in the morality of the free man who is self-sufficient but respects the law of good of his own accord. Iqbāl attaches no value to morality that is born of fear, may be that of God or society. True morality is that of the free man, who does the good and suffers for it, because he himself, and none else, has decided to do so. His power is meant for service and not for suppression. His obedience is given to the law of God and to no external power or inner temptation. Such a man considers himself to be neither inferior to anybody nor superior to anyone. He is the living symbol of perfect human equality. It is such men over whom Satan has no influence and of whom he is afraid. It is such men who truly imbibe the spirit of *lā ilāh illallāh* ("there is no god, except God") and are the living embodiments of God's will. Such a man believes in and submits to God's law, because it is also the law of his own nature. He combines in his person power, wisdom and vision. His morality is born not of fear, but of love. Hence, Iqbāl lays great emphasis on love (*'ishq*). The negative and positive aspects of the good life, *lā* and *illā* are living realities in such a man's personality. He is a law unto himself and determines the trends of events in history. Iqbāl expresses this idea thus:

26. *Armughān-i Ḥijāz*, p. 228.

لا و الاّ احتساب کائنات
لا والاّ فتح باب کائنات [27]

Satan himself longs to meet a foe who combines power with moral elevation. His own desire to find a man worthy of respect, to whom he may surrender, finds beautiful expression in "*Nālah-i Iblīs*" in *Jāvīd Nāmah*[28]. Satan complains to God that he has not found in man an adversary worthy of himself and that man is too weak to say "No" to him. He is fed up with the sort of prey who follows and is himself in search of the hunter. Satan reminds God of his past long worship and, in return, requests God to be given the joy of meeting a man capable of catching Satan by the neck and, thus, giving him the pleasure of tasting defeat.

Before I conclude, I may mention that Iqbāl does not try to explain the "why" and "wherefrom" of evil or Satan, nor does he bring out the ultimate purpose for which evil or Satan was created by God. Addressing God, he writes the following verse:

اے صبح ازل انکار کی جرات ہوئی کیونکر ؟
مجھے معلوم کیا وہ رازداں تیرا ہے یا میرا ؟ [29]

This shows that Iqbāl does not try to answer the question of the cause of Satan's refusal to carry out God's behest to prostrate before Adam. He seems quite indifferent to this question. He just accepts evil and Satan as facts that lie before him and have to be understood.

In another poem, a self-respecting poor man, who does not mind his poverty, asks of God whether the angels give riches and leadership to the worthless with or without His permission.

اک مفلس خوددار یہ کہتا تھا خدا سے
میں کر نہیں سکتا گلۂ دردِ فقیری
لیکن یہ بتا تیری اجازت سے فرشتے
کرتے ہیں عطا مردِ فرومایہ کو میری ؟ [30]

27. *Pas Cheh Bāyad Kard*, p. 19.
28. *Jāvīd Nāmah*, pp. 160-1.
29. *Bāl-i Jibrīl*, p. 7.
30. Ibid., p. 203.

The question expresses a doubt whether the presence of injustice or evil is according to God's wishes and direction or it is due to some other agency. Iqbāl does not seem to be sure about the source of evil, nor does he definitely assign responsibility for it to man or God. He says:

روزِ حساب جب میرا پیش ہو دفترِ عمل
آپ بھی شرمسار ہو مجھ کو بھی شرمسار کر [31]

This shows that man's evil actions are partly God's doing, partly man's.

There are only two places where Iqbāl seems to explain, very briefly, the purpose of the creation of Satan—the existence of evil. In *Jāvīd Nāmah,* he inquires from Sayyid 'Alī Hamadānī about the nature of good and evil and as to why evil was created. Sayyid Hamadānī replies that association with Satan leads to man's fall, but struggle with Satan leads to man's perfection. Human personality is a sword that needs a whetstone to be sharpened. This whetstone is Satan and evil, and without them human personality cannot find its full growth and expansion.

بزم با دیو است آدم را وبال
رزم با دیو است آدم را جمال
خویش را بر اہرمن باید زدن
تو ہمہ تیغ آں ہمہ سنگِ فسن
تیز تر شو تا فتد ضربِ تو سخت
ورنہ باشی در دوگیتی تیرہ بخت [32]

Secondly, in the last stanza of "*Taskhīr-i Fiṭrat*" in *Payām-i Mashriq* man is face to face with God; presenting his apology for being led astray by Satan he tries to justify his action by saying that this was necessary in order to develop power, essential for controlling and directing nature's forces.

31. Ibid., p. 9.

32. *Jāvīd Nāmah*, p. 186.

رام نگردد جہاں تا نہ فسونش خوریم
جز بکمندِ نیاز ناز نہ گردد اسیر
تا شود از آہِ گرم این بتِ سنگیں گداز
بستنِ زنارِ او بود مرا ناگزیر
عقل بدام آورد فطرتِ چالاک را
اہرمنِ شعلہ زاد سجدہ کند خاک را[33]

I draw particular attention of the readers to the word intellect in the last verse. It is the power of knowledge that is needed for controlling nature and so also Satan, because the foundations of blind faith once shaken by reason can never be laid again. The only cure for the ills of thought is more and more thought till one reaches the stage of a rationalistic faith in which reason, intuition and love become a unity and form a harmonious whole. I feel that in assigning this end to the drama of life, Iqbāl has been a little sentimental. This is inconsistent with the whole trend of his thought. To a thinker for whom life is endless struggle, with infinite possibilities of development for human personality and for whom the fundamental reality is just change and growth, the question of finding a suitable end for this process is quite insignificant; and, I think, Iqbāl is indifferent to it.

Without bothering for the source or the ultimate end of evil or Satan, he just tries to elucidate the part that Satan plays in the world. Iqbāl has done a great service to philosophical and religious thought by resolving the dualism of mind and body. Qualitatively considered, reality according to Iqbāl, is a unity. It seems to me that though he has succeeded to a considerable extent in resolving the traditional dualism of mind and body, he has not been able to resolve the other equally important dualism—that of good and evil. Iqbāl is not inclined to be unduly optimistic or pessimistic. In *The Reconstruction* he says :

The issue thus raised between optimism and pessimism cannot be finally decided at the present stage of our knowledge of the universe. Our intellectual constitution is such that we can take only a piecemeal

33. *Payām-i Mashriq*, p. 101.

view of things. We cannot understand the full import of the great cosmic forces which work havoc and at the same time sustain and amplify life. The teaching of the Quran which believes in the possibility of improvement in the behaviour of man and his control over natural forces, is neither optimism nor pessimism.[34]

Iqbāl does not conceive the world to be either entirely good or entirely evil. Good and evil are both undeniable facts of human life. He does not try to prove whether the nature of reality is ultimately good or evil; nor does he seem to be sure whether at any stage one will merge into the other and disappear. The only place at which he seems to hint at the ultimate defeat of Satan and his prostration before the Ideal man as the climax of this drama of existence is in the last verse of the above quoted poem. Throughout his poetic or prose works, I have not been able to find any support for the idea that, according to him, good will ultimately and necessarily triumph. It is so, because Iqbāl believes that ultimate reality is neither good nor evil. It simply "is". He says:

چہ گویم نکتۂ زشت و نکو چیست
زباں لرزد کہ معنی پیچدار است
بروں از شاخ بینی خار و گل را
درونِ او نہ گل پیدا نہ خار است[35]

The distinction of good and evil appears merely in the process of struggle and growth which are the peculiar characteristics of life. In this process of struggle, power is the standard of value; but power, for Iqbāl, is not merely brute force or physical power. It springs from a full growth of human personality, and in this growth, mental and moral elements are equally essential and important.

July 1953

34. *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 77.
35. *Payām-i Mashriq*, p. 54.

B. A. Dar

THE IDEA OF SATAN IN IQBAL AND MILTON

The character of Satan as depicted in Iqbāl's works has two aspects. In its first aspect, it represents the forces of evil, and in its second aspect, the active dynamism of life itself.

(1) Iblīs is the Satan of the scriptural text, the seducer of Adam from the path of rectitude, who resides in Hell and is condemned for ever. As such he is the principle of evil. The concept of Iblīs as evil incarnate raises the most thorny problem of good and evil which has taxed the brains of innumerable thinkers of all ages, and which, as Taylor says, no religion can claim to have explained to the satisfaction of man who undergoes untold suffering and pain, both physical and moral.[1]

There have been some periods in the history of the world when evil has been most obstrusive in the form of constant wars, abrupt changes in governments, resulting in insecurity of life and honour, evils of cruelty, savagery, oppression, violence, egotism, and lust for power. And it is in such periods of predominance of evil that men have turned unconsciously towards faith in God and religion. Rationally it is difficult to argue that God, Who is benevolent and good, could

1. *The Problem of Evil*, p. 29.

allow the existence of evil in a world claimed to be the best of all the possible worlds. How is it, then, possible to reconcile the goodness and omnipotence of God with the immense volume of evil in His creation ? This obstrusiveness of evil, says Iqbāl, is the most thorny problem of theism and yet paradoxically it is the same obstrusiveness of evil that leads men to the path of God, religion and morality.[2]

In the nineteenth century when Europe achieved greater control over the forces of nature, certain thinkers came to hold the opinion that evil could be totally eliminated if certain social reforms were introduced. Some socialist writers regarded economic inequality and injustice as the root cause of evil. Bernard Shaw, for instance, very forcefully and eloquently asserted that poverty was at the root of all misery and pain. If society, by concerted effort, should succeed in providing to every individual enough daily allowance, there would be no disease, no exploitation, no cruelty, no oppression, in short, no evil. Then, psychoanalysts came forward with a new solution. Evil, in their view, is the result of early psychological maltreatment and consequent maladjustment. The unconscious, the hidden spring of all our conscious activities, it is alleged, takes its shape in the early years of life and if a child at the tender age is left at the mercy of ignorant parents, nurses and teachers, he is sure to develop a perverted personality and his criminal actions will recoil on the society which neglected his healthy growth. You need only bring up a child in a free environment, without any over-emphasis or under-emphasis, and you will get right type of men and women who shall be the embodiment of all good. Then evil will die its natural death.[3]

But it is difficult to believe that all cruelties in the modern world, let alone those in the past, have been due to untoward circumstances, or to psychological maladjustment of the people. In the course of thousands of years many men have been the victims of psychological maltreatment. Rich and poor, strong and weak, rulers and ruled have alike, when chance came to them, contributed their mite to the total

2. *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, London, 1934, pp. 76 ff.
3. Cf. C. E. M. Joad, *God and Evil*, pp. 20-1.

evil that one meets everywhere in the world. Evil there is, no doubt, but these are mere superficial accounts of it, touching only a fraction of its intensity. Its roots are much deeper, and it needs moral and religious treatment rather than social, psychological or economic one. Obstrusiveness of evil in almost every period of history has led thinkers and reformers in different climes to look to moral and religious values to solve this problem, and herein lies its only possible solution.

Early Greek thinkers were interested in the study of the world of nature. But soon Socrates appeared. He focused the attention of the people of his age on their inner selves. And so did Plato. This transition from outside to inside, from the world to the self, from the physical to the psychological, was the result of the after-effects of the troubled times through which Greece had passed. Corruption, cruelty, injustice, ignorance, intrigue and egotism were prevalent everywhere. To remedy this state of affairs, Socrates preached that salvation lay only in pursuing the path of wisdom and truth, and Plato took upon himself to define and illustrate the true nature of justice. Amid the moral and political chaos of the age, when traditional religious values were being destroyed by sophistry and economic and political stability were being shattered to pieces by bloody wars, both Socrates and Plato strove hard to find a way out. They found it in moral regeneration of man.

In the history of Muslim thought, two types of solution have been offered with regard to the problem of evil. Pantheists like Ibn 'Arabī and his followers represent one school of thought, while Rūmī stands out as a representative of the other school which, in this context, may be called theistic. Ibn 'Arabī was a man of great calibre. Temperamentally he was a philosopher, but to meet the demands of the age and partly also because of his early training, he gave the exposition of his philosophy in mystical terminology. To a true pantheist, there is no question of good and evil or moral values. But Ibn 'Arabī discusses it and, as it is usual with him, his statements are often obscure. As there is nothing real but One and that One is Absolute Good, there can be no evil at all. Yet in the phenomenal world, he says, there are

both good and evil. Good is from God and evil from man, not in the sense that man actually does evil but because his actions are judged to be good or evil.[4] Not only evil but also good, according to him, are relative. What appears to us as evil may in reality be good in itself. What is good according to one standard may be evil according to another and vice versa.[5] Jāmī, a disciple of Ibn 'Arabī, has put the matter more clearly. Though attributes and actions of men are all God's, Who is manifested in them, yet it is not proper for us to attribute evil, that follows from our actions, to God ; for Being *qua* Being is absolute Good. Evil arises on account of absence of something else. Everything that is evil is due to lack of some inherent capacities of the *'ayn* (عین). Take, for instance, the case of cold. It destroys fruit and so it is evil in that particular respect. Its evil element arises because it does not allow the fruit to ripen. Similarly slaying is evil. But its evil character is not due to the power of the slayer or the capacity of the physical limb to be cut off from the body but to the disappearance of life, and that is the negation of something positive. Being, wherever it is, is good without doubt. Every evil is due to non-being.[6]

Among Western thinkers, Spinoza, being a pantheist, held the same view. According to him, our aesthetic conceptions (like beauty and ugliness) and moral standards (like good and evil), freedom of man and teleological conception of the universe, are all so many ways of imaginative thinking which we erroneously ascribe to Reality.

The nature of things is neither good nor bad, neither well-arranged nor disordered. It has neither beauty nor ugliness; it does not strive to realise our ends, nor fight against them. Sweet tastes and sounds, virtuous conduct and good intentions, no more belong to things as they really are than the inequities of the criminal or the horrors of putrefaction.[7]

He held that the evil element in Nero's matricide was not positive but negative, not reality but defect of reality, viz., want of natural affection and pity.

4. Cf. A. E. Affifi : *The Mystical Philosophy of Muḥyid Dīn-Ibnul 'Arabī*, Cambridge University Press, 1939, pp. 156-7.

5. Ibn 'Arabī, *Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam* (Urdu translation), pp. 285-6.

6. Jāmī, *Lawā'ih,* No. 30.

7. H.H. Joachim, *A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza*, pp. 169-70.

Pantheism as a philosophical doctrine fails when confronted with the problem of evil. It throws overboard all moral considerations. It denies the objective reality of evil and tries to create a mood of false optimism. But when we come into contact with actual reality, the hard facts of life shake our complacency. We may say that evil is due to man as a relative non-being and not to any action of God, but the question still remains : How is the world to be relieved of it ? Pantheism affords no solution. The only logical position for a consistent pantheist is to renounce the world. Theism, with the basic conception of man's freedom of choice, offers a better solution. This was the point of view adopted by Rūmī. Unlike the majority of mystic writers, Rūmī was a great advocate of the moral freedom of man and waged a relentless war against determinism and life of renunciation and quietude. Struggle against what lies across our path towards the goal is the very part and parcel of our fate, and "this endeavour is not a struggle against Destiny because Destiny itself has laid this (endeavour) upon us."[8] The advantage of this struggle against odds, according to Rūmī, is that it actualises the hidden potentialties of man.

The High God lays upon our body, O man of fortitude, heat and cold, grief and pain, fear and hunger and impairment of wealth and body, all have been brought into sight for the sake of the riches of the soul.[9]

This aspect of Rūmī's thought is allied to Fichte's ethical monism, according to whom resistance offered by the non-ego (which in one respect has its source in the ego itself) helps in the development of the

8. با قضا پنجہ زدن نبود جہاد
زانکہ این را ہم قضا بر ما نہاد
(*Mathnavī*, i. 976.)

9. حق تعالیٰ گرم و سرد و رنج و درد
بر تن ما می نہد اے شیر مرد
خوف و جوع و نقصِ اموال و بدن
جملہ بہر نقدِ جان ظاہر شدن
(Ibid., ii. 2963-4.)

ego.[10] It is in constant creation of resistance and then overcoming it that the human ego can aspire to achieve its destiny.

Rūmī, no doubt, concedes that everything is not good on this earth, but, unlike Buddha and Schopenhauer, he holds that man, by his nature, is capable of overcoming evil. We find both good and evil intermixed[11] in the world, and this presence of evil is essential for the appreciation and realisation of values. When foolishness and vice disappear, there can be no wisdom and virtue. It is the resistance of the air which enables a bird to fly. Good and bad, true and false, are mixed by God with the purpose that man may create within himself a touchstone. When there is no enemy, the Holy War is inconceivable ; if you have no lust, there can be no obedience to the Divine Command.[12] Man has no right to complain of evil, because it is the presence of evil that has raised man to be the paragon of creation.[13]

Iqbāl accepts this theistic interpretation of Rūmī. He says that we can fully agree neither with optimists like Browning nor with pessimists

10. Cf. the following verses of Iqbāl's *Asrār-o-Rumūz* (*Asrār-i Khudī*), p. 12:

صد جهان پوشیده اندر ذاتِ او
غیرِ او پیداست از اثباتِ او
در جهان تخم خصومت کاشت است
خویشتن را غیرِ خود پنداشت است
سازد از خود پیکرِ اغیار را
تا فزاید لذتِ پیکار را

11. آنکه گوید جمله حق است ، احمقے است
وانکه گوید جمله باطل او شقے است

(*Mathnavī*, ii. 2942.)

12. چون عدو نبود جهاد آمد محال
شهوتت نبود نباشد امتثال

(Ibid., v. 575-6.)

13. در حقیقت هر عدو داروی تست
کیمیا و نافع و دلجویِ تست
زین سبب بر انبیا رنج و شکست
از همه خلق جهان افزون تر است

(Ibid., iv. 94, 100.)

like Schopenhauer. The Qur'ān teaches neither of these but meliorism, which recognises a growing universe and is animated by the hope of man's eventual victory over evil. The best possible explanation of this problem is given in the legend commonly known as the Fall of Adam. The Qur'ānic description of the event, according to Iqbāl, does not deal with the first appearance of man on the earth.[14] It rather refers to the primitive state when man was practically unrelated to his environment, and, consequently, did not feel the sting of human want, the birth of which alone marked the beginning of human culture. It depicts a stage when man comes to possess a free self capable of doubt and disobedience. An unrestrained, Devil, whom God allows free scope, is the symbol of man's liberty and freedom. In no case does it symbolise fall to moral depravity. It is rather transition from simple consciousness to the first flash of self-consciousness; and with its appearance man for the first time felt the throb of the freedom of choice, though his very first act turned out to be an act of disobedience. It was forgiven merely because the power of free choice given to man involved this risk. We cannot expect goodness from an individual who is moved from outside. It is the self's free surrender to the moral ideal, and arises out of a willing co-operation of free egos. Goodness without freedom is impossible. But while freedom leads to good, it may often lead to what is the opposite of good. The fact that in spite of this risk man was given the freedom of choice, proves that God had full faith in the capacity of man to resist evil and overcome it. It is now for man to justify this faith. "Perhaps such a risk alone makes it possible to test and develop the potentialities of a being who was created of the 'goodliest fabric' and then 'brought down to be the lowest of the low'. As the Quran says : 'And for trial will We test you with evil and wiṭh good.' (21 : 36.) Good and evil, therefore, though opposites, must fall within the same whole."[15] Thus Iqbāl reaches the same conclusion as Rūmī. God's trial of man through misfortune, as mentioned in the Qu'rān, is interpreted by both as a means of actualising the possibilities of man. Such being the case,

14. Cf. *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 80.
15. Ibid., p. 81

Satan as the embodiment of all that is evil, as the enemy of man, becomes indispensable for the moral development of man.[16] It is our duty to fight Satan at every step, and Satan in this context stands for all those forces in life which tend to loosen the tension of personality, i.e. which lead to its relaxation and utter dissolution. Adam was placed, after his first act of disobedience, in an obstructing and trying environment not as a punishment for his sin, but an act of favour pregnant with untold possibilities for his future benefit. Says Iqbāl :

> It was meant rather to defeat the object of Satan who, as an enemy of man, diplomatically tried to keep him ignorant of the joy of perpetual growth and expansion. But the life of a finite ego in an obstructing environment depends on the perpetual expansion of knowledge based on actual experience. And the experience of a finite ego to whom several possibilities are open expands only by the method of trial and error. Therefore, error which may be described as a kind of intellectual evil is an indispensable factor in the building up of an experinence.[17]

Thus, according to Iqbāl, the only way to meet the challenge of Satan is to adopt a way of life which perpetuates the tension of personality and thus keeps it ever active. It lies in the scientific attempt of the modern man to overcome material obstructions.

16. Cf. Rūmī, *Mat̲h̲navī*, iv. 94 :

در حقیقت ہر عدو داروی ِ تست
کیمیا و نافع و دلجوی ِ تست

and Iqbāl, *Asrār-o-Rumūz* (*Asrār-i K̲h̲udī*), p. 59 :

راست میگویم عدو ہم یارِ تست
ہستیٔ او رونقِ بازارِ تست

* * *

کشتِ انسان را عدو باشد سحاب
ممکناتش را بر انگیزد ز خواب

* * *

سنگ رہ گردد فسانِ تیغِ عزم
قطعِ منزل امتحانِ تیغِ عزم

17. *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 82.

ماسوا از بہر تسخیر است و بس
سینۂ او عرضۂ تیر است و بس

* * *

ہر کہ محسوسات را تسخیر کرد
عالمے از ذرۂ تعمیر کرد

* * *

غایتش توسیع ذات مسلم است
امتحان ممکنات مسلم است

* * *

اے کہ از تاثیر افیوں خفتۂ
عالم اسباب را دوں گفتۂ
خیز و وا کن دیدۂ مخمور را
دوں مخواں این عالم مجبور را [18]

The path of the mystic has proved ineffective to meet this challenge of evil forces. The Qur'ān testifies to the futility of this approach.[19] A mystic forgets that the surest way to reach the core of reality lies through its appearances. Study of empirical sciences is the indispensable stage in the moral evolution of man. But this scientific study should be only for "moulding the stimuli to ideal ends and purposes, and it is thus only that the total self of man realizes itself as one of the greatest energies of nature. In great action alone the self of man becomes united with God without losing its own identity, and transcends the limits of space and time. Action is the highest form of contemplation."[20] Thus, in empirical study and creative and dynamic action can we meet the challenge of Satan most satisfactorily.

جہاں اور بھی ہیں ابھی بے نمود
کہ خالی نہیں ہے ضمیر وجود

18. *Asrār-o-Rumūz* (*Rumūz-i Bekhudī*), pp. 164-5.

19. The Qur'ān, lvii. 27. See also *Ma'ārif al-Qur'ān*, Vol. II (Delhi), p. 84.

20. Iqbal : "Self in the Light of Relativity" in *A Study in Iqbal's Philosophy*, pp. 399-401.

ہر اک منتظر تیری یلغار کا
تری شوخیٔ فکر و کردار کا
یہ ہے مقصدِ گردشِ روزگار
کہ تیری خودی تجھ پہ ہو آشکار[21]

But, as already stated, in the works of Iqbāl we meet another Iblīs who is not a hideous personality of the traditional religion, who may or may not have seduced our first parents, but who no doubt rebelled against the "tyrannical" rule of the all-powerful monarch of the Heaven. He is a charming personality, a creature of heroic blood, the personification of forceful, abundant and ever-growing life, who rebels against authority with the sole object of enabling man to enjoy abundance of life, rich and invigorating. He is not condemned to eternal predition in Hell, but enjoys the company of Ghālib and Ḥallāj, roaming restlessly in the vastness of the celestial sphere, with a soft corner in his heart for the "wretched and writhing worm" called man.[22]

Unlike Dante's Satan who is hideous and static, immersed in ice up to the waist, Iqbāl's Iblīs is all aflame, clad in black and surrounded in by a cloud of smoke. Rūmī introduces him to Iqbāl as an outlaw and *mullā*, a philosopher and a mystic, active and dynamic. His figure is quite unlike the Satan of the traditional religion and is more like a being of iron will and constant dynamic activity, the sole object of whose creation seems to lie in awakening mankind to the realisation of higher ideals.[23]

This description of Satan as a heoric figure, for whom we have nothing but sympathy and admiration, was not peculiar to Iqbāl. Before him some mystic writers in the East had expounded a similar conception of Satan. To them, Satan was not a wretch eternally damned for his disobedience to God, but a hero to be emulated for his constancy in belief in the Unity of God.[24] They acted as the advocates of the Devil, "sometimes ranking the Devil with the prophets and sometimes plac-

21. *Bāl-i Jibrīl*, p. 174.
22. See *Jāvīd Namāh*, pp. 133-61.
23. Ibid.
24. A.E. Affifi, op. cit., p. 161, note 4.

ing him even above them. In his dialogues Ḥallāj triumphantly asserts the Devil's superiority to Adam and to Moses, though he has made a concession to orthodoxy by raising Muḥammad above him—but a later Persian poet had the boldness to assert their equality."[25]

In the West, a similar tendency to idolise Satan is noticeable in Milton and particularly in Goethe. This transformation in the traditional role of Satan took place under the influence of Mānī.

Mānī's new religion, which he began to preach about 242 C.E. in Western Asia, was eclectic in character, based mostly on Zoroastrianism and Christianity. He started with a dualism of Light and Darkness and ended in a moral system of an extreme form of renunciation and self-mortification. On one side, there is the realm of Light, and on the other, the realm of Darkness, both existing eternally apart. In the past, Darkness invaded the realm of Light and thus Evil began. The great event, to which is due the existence of this world, came to pass through the unlicensed activity of the Powers of Darkness. The dynamic principle, therefore, is supplied by the forces of evil. "In Darkness—the feminine Principle of Nature—were hidden", according to Mānī, "the elements of evil which, in course of time, concentrated and resulted in the composition, so to speak, of the hideous looking Devil—the principle of activity."[26]

It is due to the activity of Satan that Adam came into being.[27] Adam was born with "sin", "cupidity" and "desire" inhered in him. But the Spirit of Darkness also thrust into his being the stolen portions of light in order to dominate them. Hence, Adam is a discordant being created in the image of Satan but carrying within him also the strong sparks of light.

Mānī was faced with the eternal problem of good and evil and he offered a bold solution to it. His dualism and moral asceticism

25. Khalīfa 'Abdul Ḥakīm, *The Metaphysics of Rumi*, Lahore, 1959, pp. 88-9 :

در مذہب عاشقان یک رنگ
ابلیس و محمد است ہم سنگ

26. Iqbal, *The Development of Metaphysics in Persia*, London, 1908, pp. 15-6.
27. F.C. Burkitt, *Religion of the Manichees*, London, 1925; pp. 22, 30.

made a great appeal to the people of his age, and in spite of severest persecutions Mānī's followers flourished for about one thousand years. Mānī's religion influenced almost all religious fraternities. Muslim Sufis owe a great deal of their practical asceticism to this religion which advocated celibacy and other forms of extreme renunciation.

According to Christianity and Islam, God created men and angels, including Satan. But in practice Satan was believed to be an independent power, who won victories among men against the will of God, and was destined to live for ever in the company of those souls whom he had dragged down to Hell. God created Satan, no doubt, and afterwards Satan rebelled. But who created the impulse which led Satan to rebel ? Was it eternally there ? It is impossible to argue further, but there seems to be much in the view held by the common man which resembles Mānī's dualism. Schopenhauer's conclusions were allied to Mānī's. When we pierce the veil of *māyā*, he says, we behold not God but Satan, the wicked omnipotent Will, perpetually busy in weaving a web of suffering for the torture of its creatures. Terrified by this diabolical vision, Schopenhauer sought refuge in non-existence, *fanā'* or self-annihilation. Mānī held Satan to be independently co-existent with God, while Schopenhauer thought that the principle of objectification (the "sinful bent" of the Will to life) existed in the very nature of the Primal Will and not independent of it.

Even before Schopenhauer, al-Jīlī, in his famous book *Al-Insān al-Kāmil*, described the principle of Evil as a part of the Godhead. "God", said he, "created *Nafs-i Muḥammadīyah* from Himself and God is a Unity in diversity. From Him were manifested two opposite tendencies. The Angels of Light reflected the Attributes of Beauty (*Jamāl*), Light and Righteousness, while Satan and his host reflected His Attributes of *Jalāl*, Darkness and Vice (*ḍalāl*)."[28] Mānī's influence is easily discernible here. In the Kabbalist literature of the Jews we meet with the same view. The authors of Kabbalah look upon God as having an evil side. Evil exists as a possibility in God Himself. When

28. *Al-Insān al-Kāmil* (Urdu translation by M. Faḍl Mīrān), p. 240.

God abandons certain parts of Himself to their latent impulses, evil is expressed. "There existed in the Infinite a sort of latent life which God has liberated, given over to its own forces, and which developed and expressed itself, in the good towards joy eternal, in the evil towards pain eternal. God has intensified His own existence, raising to glory the good parts of Himself."[29]

The Manichee creed influenced Christendom through the person of St Augustine, who for nine years was a follower of this religion. The imprint of Manichaeism on his mind was so strong and enduring that its impress can still be seen in his books. "He carried about with him more Manichee ideas than he was conscious of. Those who look for it can still trace the Manichean imagery in the Book XI of Augustine's great work. Augustine knew that Darkness was no more than the absence of Light, but for all that when in Book XI. 33, he is making a contrast between the two Angelic Societies, the one *tranquil* in its *luminous* piety, the other *turbulent* with its *dark* cupidities and *smoking* with the unclean mouth of its own loftiness, he uses language with a curiously Manichaean ring. And while he was doing this he was binding the imaginations of fifty generations to come."[30]

It was mostly through Augustine and other Manichee missionary activities and partly through Kabbalist literature that the figure of Satan assumed a form different from one depicted in the religious literature of Christianity and Islam. In Muslim thought this concept of Satan as a hero remained confined to a very few mystic writers like Ḥallāj and Ibn 'Arabī who were greatly influenced in their speculations by Christian philosophical thought. In the West, however, the fascinating figure of Satan as an embodiment of Power, and the concept of eternal struggle between good and evil, became the theme of several poems. A poet dealing with this theme writes :

Out of all (the angels) He (God) gave him (Satan) the greatest power in mind and body. In the heavenly kingdom, he was the highest in authority after Him. He was made very bright. His figure, which God gave him in the Heaven, was exceedingly majestic. He was like

29. Denis Sauret, *Milton : Man and Thinker*, p. 110.
30. F.C. Bukritt, op. cit., p. 103.

shining stars.

Satan's revolt is described in the poem under the title : "Why should I toil ?" He says :

I need no lord. I can perform as many miracles as He whom people call their Lord. I have power enough to build a throne better than His in Heaven or even above that. Why should I look up to His grace? Why should I prostrate before Him in such humility ? I can be a Lord as He is.[31]

Milton was definitely influenced by all these currents of thought. His *Paradise Lost* bears ample testimony to all these diverse influences. Referring to the evil aspect of God he says :

Evil into the mind of God or Man
May come and go, so unapprov'd, and leave
No spot or blame behind.[32]

Satan confirms it when he says :

The Son of God I also am.[33]

The common religious tradition attributes the fall of Satan to pride, and it is pride and self-conceit that mark the character of Milton's Satan. But in the *Paradise Lost* this pride loses its immoral significance. It stands rather for self-confidence and self-reliance :

seek
Our own good from our selves, and from our own
Live to our selves.[34]

In such a mood of of self-confidence Satan says in another place :

We know no time when we were not as now ;
Know none before us, self-begot, self-rais'd
By our own quick'ning power.[35]

Satan is all-powerful and denies that there is another being who can be more powerful than he :

while they feel
Vigour Divine within them, can allow
Omnipotence to none.[36]

31. Cf. Aziz Ahmad, *Iqbāl Na'ī Tashkīl* (Urdu), p. 240.
32. *Paradise Lost*, v. 117-9.
33. *Paradise Regained*, iv. 518.
34. *Paradise Lost*, ii. 252-4.
35. Ibid., v. 859-61.
36. Ibid., vi. 157-9.

He is a rebel, no doubt, but a rebel who refuses to recognise defeat, and will go an fighting for a cause which is hopeless. He is the personification of high ambition, undying spirit which fears no opposition. What do failures and the triumphs of the enemy matter, if one is resolved not to submit ? None is vanquished who remains strong in his own spirit. Passion and ambition form the very core of Satan's character. It is the character so often seen on the political stage. It exhibits all the restlessness, temerity and cunning which have marked the mighty hunters of mankind from Nimrūd and Chingīz Khān to Hitler and Mussolini. They are looked upon as great men and their greatness arises from the fact that their personalities are dynamic and they act from some great motive. Milton's Satan represents absolute power in its naked form, and his sole motive of action is intense selfishness, the alcohol of egotism. He would rather reign in Hell than serve in Heaven.[37]

This fascinating figure of Satan made a great appeal to Iqbāl. In a way he was a prophet of power and for him power ultimately decides the value of good and evil. In *Asrār-i Khudī*, he says :

زندگانی قوّت پیدا استے
اصلِ او از ذوقِ استیلاستے

* * *

ناتوانی زندگی را رہزن است
بطنش از خوف و دروغ آبستن است

* * *

با توانائی صداقت توام است
گر خود آگاہی ہمیں جامِ جم است
زندگی کشت است و حاصل قوّت است
شرحِ رمزِ حق و باطل قوّت است
مدعی گر مایہ دار از قوت است
دعویٰ او بے نیاز از حجت است

37. A.H. Gilbert, *On the Composition of Paradise Lost*, pp. 55-6.

باطل از قوت پذیرد شانِ حق
خویش را حق داند از بطلانِ حق
از کنِ او زہر کوثر می شود
خیر را گوید شرے شر می شود[38]

Life is *power* made manifest,
And its mainspring is the desire for victory.

* * *

Weakness is the plunderer of Life,
Its womb is teeming with fears and lies.

* * *

Strength is the twin of Truth;
If thou knowest thyself, strength is the Truth-revealing glass.
Life is the seed, and *power* the crop:
Power explains the mystery of truth and falsehood.
A claimant, if he be possessed of power,
Needs no argument for his claims.
Falsehood derives from power the authority of truth,
And by falsifying truth deems itself true.
Its creative word transforms poison into nectar;
It says to Good, "Thou art bad," and Good becomes Evil.[39]

It was as symbols of such power that Iqbāl refers favourably to

38. *Asrār-o-Rumūz* (*Asrār-i Khudī*), pp. 55-6 (English translation by R.A. Nicholson).

39. Cf. Nietzsche: "What is good? All that increases the feeling of power, will for power, power itself in man. What is bad? All that proceeds from weakness. What is happiness? The feeling that power increases—that resistance is overcome. Not contentedness, but more power; not peace at any price, but warfare, not virtue, but capacity." See the writer's *A Study in Iqbal's Philosophy*, p. 86.

Rūmī has given expression to such power:

بہ زیر کنگرۂ کبریاش مردانند
فرشتہ صید و پیمبر شکار و یزداں گیر

Napoleon[40] and Mussolini.[41] His eulogies of Mussolini have led certain critics to accuse him of Fascist tendencies, as his references to Lenin and Marx have led others to charge him with Communistic leanings; as a matter of fact, he had neither. He was a Muslim, and wherever he saw an expression of certain Islamic teachings, he did not fail to appreciate it. A study of his books will reveal that his praise of Mussolini did not at all imply any apology for his misdeeds. He refers to him only as a symbol of power just as Satan stands for him as a representative of Power. In a letter to R.A. Nicholson, he refers to the criticism of Mr Dickenson about his views expressed in *Asrār-i Khudī*. He claims that by power he does not mean physical power or brute force but spiritual and moral power. As a matter of fact, Iqbāl believes in both, and in this he seems to be under the influence of Nietzsche. In the verses quoted above from *Asrār-i Khudī* he seems to have made power the sole criterion of moral values, and the trend of his argument and spirit of the language lead definitely to the view that Iqbāl had physical power in mind. Like Nietzsche, he believed that it was necessary to be physically strong and hard.

در صلابت آبروئے زندگی است
ناتوانی ناکسی ناپختگی است[42]

* * * *

تقدیر کے قاضی کا یہ فتویٰ ہے ازل سے
ہے جرمِ ضعیفی کی سزا مرگِ مفاجات[43]

40. Cf. *Bāl-i Jibrīl*, p. 201 :

راز ہے راز ہے تقدیرِ جہانِ تگ و تاز
جوشِ کردار سے کھل جاتے ہیں تقدیر کے راز
جوشِ کردار سے شمشیرِ سکندر کا طلوع
کوہِ الوند ہوا جس کی حرارت سے گداز
جوشِ کردار سے تیمور کا سیلِ ہمہ گیر
سیل کے سامنے کیا شے ہے نشیب اور فراز

41. Ibid., p. 202 :

ندرتِ فکر و عمل سے معجزاتِ زندگی
ندرتِ فکر و عمل سے سنگِ خارہ لعلِ ناب

42. *Asrār-o-Rumūz* (*Asrār-i Khudī*), p. 64. 43. *Bāl-i Jibrīl*, p. 210.

In another place Iqbāl says:

اگر لہو ہے بدن میں تو خوف ہے نہ ہراس
اگر لہو ہے بدن میں تو دل ہے بے وسواس[44]

Power represented by a Chingīz or a Mussolini may lead to the release of evil forces of destruction. But to Iqbāl this misuse of power serves to bring into relief the forces of good. The death of one thing means the birth of a new and perhaps a better one:

گفت رومی ہر بنائے کہنہ کآباداں کنند
می ندانی اول آں بنیاد را ویراں کنند؟[45]

Without this conflict between the forces of good and evil, it is impossible to conceive progress and development. Reality, says Iqbāl, is a sum of parts which are in perpetual conflict with one another, and yet are gradually progressing towards the Whole. This conflict results inevitably in their mutual integration. Without an ever-recurring strife and constant struggle, it is impossible for man to rise higher in the scale of life and attain the goal of immortality. Man is a candidate for immortal life which involves a ceaseless struggle in maintaining the tension of the ego:[46]

دوام حق جزائے کار او نیست
کہ اورا ایں دوام از جستجو نیست
دوام آں بہ کہ جانِ مستعارے
شود از عشق و مستی پایدارے[47]

The eternity of God is elemental and not the reward of His actions.
That eternity is superior, which a borrowed soul
Wins for herself by love's frenzy.

44. Ibid., p. 216.
45. *Bāng-i Darā*, p. 300.
46. *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 113.
47. *Zabūr-i 'Ajam* (*Gulshan-i Rāz-i Jadīd*), p. 237.

Thus power as such is an ideal for which one must be ready to fight. This is possible, according to Iqbāl, through the conquest of matter or control of the physical forces of nature. The material world is a field where the battle for the integration of self and its evolution is to be fought and won. Without attaining this power which is the result of mastery over nature, it is impossible to establish a durable civilisation. Says Iqbāl :

The cultures of Asia and, in fact, of the whole ancient world failed, because they approached Reality exclusively from within and moved from within outwards. This procedure gave them theory without power, and on mere theory no durable civilization can be based.[48]

Iqbāl's criticism of Plato and pantheistic mystics, in short, all the philosophies of life which taught contempt for material aspect of the universe, rose out of the conviction that without a proper adjustment to our physical environment, it was impossible to establish a lasting civilisation.

Thus, Satan, the personification of power, is identified with intellect because attainment of power is the result of our intellectual efforts. But power without some controlling principle is sure to assume such proportions as would make it destructive of all human values. We need Satan to a certain limit. He stands for passion, self-sufficiency, self-confidence, even denial of gods. But then this association must come to an end. If we go full length with him, he is sure to lead us into chaos and destruction. A stage comes when we must leave his company. It is then love which comes forward and helps us in scaling new heights. The demon of absolute and godless power is controlled by the angels of love. Satan helps us in giving power without which life of an individual would not be free in the real sense. God could have protected man from the guiles of Satan, had He wished it so ; but He preferred to leave him his independence and free-will to choose good or evil as he would. An unrestrained Devil is the symbol of man's true freedom. But then this power must be controlled by the moral force called love.

48. *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 14.

Milton's *Paradise Lost* revolves round the conflict between love, which delights in desiring some one and ultimately God, and pride or self-love, which clamours for personal independence. This conflict is indeed human and contemporary and has a great deal of interest for us.[49] Our age is full of stories of intellectual exploits by the modern man, but we seldom hear of the conquest of love. We have enough, and even to spare, of reason and conquest of matter, and the result of all this is disharmony and chaos in our lives. Everybody is yearning for an escape. The only way lies in surrender of oneself to love's frenzy.

In *Paradise Lost*, Milton stresses the role of reason to a degree which to our present generation seems excessive. One of his critics rightly points out that "mind and understanding is all ; heart and will little spoken of". In his faculty psychology, reason dominates and directs the will.[50] Thus *Paradise Lost* is considered to be a record of the conflict of passion versus reason. The greater your victory over Satan, the embodiment of passion, the nearer you reach the ideal of reason. To a certain degree we must give allowance to Milton for the demands of his age. It needed more of reason's coolness and clarity than faith ; hence, Milton's emphasis on reason. But if we plunge deeper into it, we discover that he acknowledged the will's conformity to Divine Love to be indispensable for attaining what he calls "aparadise within" (*Paradise Lost,* xii. 587). Love, rather than reason, resolves the seeming contradiction between free will and a created condition. "Freely we serve," the angels say, "because we freely love."[51]

To Satan, it is servitude of the worst sort to serve somebody other than one's self, an attitude of mind which has become the charact-ristic of the man of the modern age of intellectualism. But Abdiel, the loyal angel, replies that it is no servitude to serve whom God ordains. Servitude is when you serve your baser self:

49. Hamilton, *Hero or Fool ? A Study of Milton's Satan*, pp. 40-1.

50. M.M. Mahood, *Poetry and Humanism*, p. 221 (I am very much indebted to this work).

51. *Paradise Lost*, v. 538-9.

This is servitude
To serve th' unwise, or him who hath rebelled
Against his worthier, as thine now serve thee,
Thy self not free, but to thy self enthrall'd.[52]

The last line brings to the forefront the contradiction in Satan's character. The revolt of the angels was a movement of self-fulfilment and Satan at first appeared to completely realise it. Satan and his followers had all the virtues of courage, loyalty and pity, and at first their intellectual powers remained undiminished in Hell. But then Milton compares them to giant trees withered by lightning.[53] It signifies that all intellectual and moral qualities suffer sterility, when they are divorced from the source of life. Cut off from the Good, Satan suffers in his creative and dynamic potentialities. Satan once claimed :

The mind is its own place, and in it self
Can make a Heav'n of Hell, a Hell of Heaven.[54]

But as soon as he realises the futility of breaking away from the Good, he feels frustrated :

Which way I flie is Hell ; my self am Hell.[55]

At a later stage the realisation of barrenness and absence of self-fulfilment dawns on him in all its nakedness :

Bane, and in Heav'n much worse would be my state.[56]

No better words can describe the state of mental confusion into which man of the modern age has brought himself. Like Satan he revolted against the "tyrannical" authority of God's sacred Law and started on what he proudly claimed to be a career of self-fulfilment. But after every decade he began to feel that something was amiss and each day added to the anguish of his heart. It is this sterility of power divorced from Love, from "vision", which Iqbāl wanted to bring home to his contemporaries. Satan, as an embodiment of Power, must not be allowed to pursue a course totally cut off from Love, the source of all

52. Ibid., vi. 178-81 (italics mine).
53. Ibid., i. 612-5.
54. Ibid., i. 254-5.
55. Ibid., iv. 75.
56. Ibid., ix. 122-3.

life. Both must combine to give stability, security, peace and harmony to the life of the modern man who has made a hell for himself on every side. Iqbāl has described this condition of the modern man in the following words :

> The modern man with his philosophies of criticism and scientific specialism finds himself in a strange predicament. His naturalism has given him an unprecedented control over the forces of nature, but has robbed him of faith in his own future . . . . Thus, wholly over-shadowed by the results of his intellectual activity, the modern man has ceased to live soulfully, i.e., from within. In the domain of thought, he is living in open conflict with himself, and in the domain of economic and political life, he is living in open conflict with others. He finds himself unable to control his ruthless egoism and infinite gold-hunger which is gradually killing all higher striving in him and bringing him nothing but life-weariness.[51]

The only way to counteract this life-weariness, this tendency in the modern man to meet undeserved death, is to develop what Iqbāl calls the "perception of heart", to look to religion so as to restore the equilibrium in life which he is yearning after.

یورپ از شمشیرِ خود بسمل فتاد
زیرِ گردون رسمِ لا دینی نہاد

* * *

عقل و فکرش بے عیارِ خوب و زشت
چشمِ او بے نم ، دلِ او سنگ وخشت
علم ازو رسواست اندر شہر و دشت
جبرئیل از صحبتش ابلیس گشت
دانشِ افرنگیان تیغے بدوش
در ہلاکِ نوعِ انسان سخت کوش

* * *

عقل اندر حکمِ دل یزدانی است
چون ز دل آزاد شد شیطانی است[58]

57. *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, pp. 176-7.
58. *Pas Cheh Bāyad Kard*, pp. 56-8.

Milton's interpretation of the story of the Fall and the part played by Satan as dealt with in *Paradise Lost*, is similar in several respects to that of Iqbāl's. But in the Christian West, Adam's fall is looked upon as a sort of punishment for his disobedience, and, therefore, the cause of all our woes and miseries. The whole thing is inevitable. Yet Milton made the same story the theme of his poem which he claimed to be "an elaborate song to generations", and a poem "doctrinal to a nation". Wherein, then, lies this new doctrine which he offers "to a nation"?

"Milton", says Basil Willey, "was a Promethean, a Renaissance humanist, in the toils of a myth of quite contrary import, a myth which yearned, as no Milton could, for the blank innocence and effortlessness of a golden age."[59] This quotation sums up the significance of the attempt made by Milton in presenting the traditional story of the Fall of Adam in the *Paradise Lost*. He totally reversed the ideal so commonly cherished by pious Christians of all ages, of a return to a life of primitive innocence untouched by evil, sufferings and woes. To Milton there was no going back. To him the action of Adam and Eve was *not* a lapse, since its result was the coming of thought into the world. The act was in reality a brave vindication of Reason's freedom to choose. Satan seduced Eve and Adam, and thereby became a means, not of inflicting any punishment on mankind by driving them out of Paradise to this hell of earth, but of untold blessings in the form of giving them an opportunity to exercise freedom of choice by which man has the opportunity to create "aparadise within . . . happier farre".[60]

The Fall, therefore, according to Milton's new doctrine, is a cross-road of the mind at which its love of learning, like other impulses, takes the wrong direction. But this going astray is involved in the very nature of free will given to man. Only a being capable of sin could know the real meaning which Milton attached to the notion of spiritual freedom. Thus the Fall was logically a necessary stage in the evolution of man.[61]

59. *The Seventeenth Century Background* as quoted in M.M. Mahood, op. cit., p. 244.

60. *Paradise Lost*, xii. 587.

61. Cf. M.M. Mahood, op. cit.

In one of his prose works, Milton writes :

Good and evil we know in the field of this world grow up together almost inseparably; and the knowledge of good is so involved and interwoven with the knowledge of evil, and in so many cunning resemblances hardly to be discerned, that those confused seeds which were imposed upon Psyche as an incessant labor to cull out, and sort asunder, were not more intermixed. It was from out the rind of one apple tasted, that the knowledge of good and evil, as two twins cleaving together, leaped forth into the world. And perhaps this is the doom which Adam fell into of knowing good and evil ; that is to say, of knowing good by evil.

As therefore the state of man now is ; what wisdom can there be to choose, what continence to forbear, without the knowledge of evil? He that can apprehend and consider vice with all her baits and seeming pleasures, and yet abstain, and yet distinguish, and yet prefer that which is truly better, he is the true warfaring Christian. I cannot praise a fugitive and cloistered virtue unexercised and unbreathed, that never sallies out and sees her adversary, but slinks out of the race, where that immortal garland is to be run for, not without dust and heat. Assuredly we bring not innocence into the world, we bring impurity much rather ; that which purifies us is trial, and trial is by what is contrary.[62]

In the *Paradise Lost*, therefore, Milton does not intend to cry over spilt milk, nor does he wish to put the milk back in the bottle by a resort to "fugitive and cloistered virtue". He is ready to acknowledge Divine mercy which brought good out of evil. God created man free with the gift of reason and yet He has arranged everything so that His total plan may be realised. Satan himself, the great rebel, the free-will that opposes the Creator, is only an instrument in the carrying out of the ultimate plan. God speaks of his rebellion as :

My damage fondly deem'd.[63]

What Satan foolishly thinks he has done against God, has been done of Satan's own free will in fulfilment of God's decree. God has

62. F. A Patterson, *The Student's Milton*, p. 738 as quoted by M. M. Mahood, op. cit., p. 246. Cf. also *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 11-5.

63. *Paradise Lost*, vii. 152.

used evil, has used even Satan, to fulfil His purpose. That is why Adam, when the plans of God are revealed to him in the end, after having seen all the evil, crime and suffering that are to be, understands the Will of God and cries :

> O goodness infinite, goodness immense !
> That all this good of evil shall produce,
> And evil turn to good ; more wonderful
> Then that which by creatoin first brought forth
> Light out of darkness ! full of doubt I stand,
> Whether I should repent me now of sin
> By mee done and occasioned, or rejoyce
> Much more, that much more good thereof shall spring,
> To God more glory, more good will to Men
> From God, and over wrauth grace shall abound.[64]

Thus the Fall is a matter not of repentance or regret but of rejoiceing. It is not a punishment for an original act of sin.[65] To both Milton and Iqbāl it was a fortunate Fall in that it brought to mankind the gifts of freedom of choice and an opportunity for the exercise of reason. In this very Fall lies the seeds of regeneration of man.

In *Jāvīd Nāmah*, Iqbāl expresses the significance of the Fall for man. Iblīs addresses *Zindah Rūd* as follows :

در گذشتم از سجود اے بے خبر
ساز کردم ارغنونِ خیر و شر

* * *

تا نصیب از دردِ آدم داشتم
قهرِ یار از بهرِ او نگذاشتم
شعله ہا از کشت زارِ من دمید
او ز مجبوری بہ مختاری رسید

64. Ibid., xii. 469-78.
65. Milton did not believe in the theory of original sin. See Denis Sauret, op. cit., p. 199.

زشتئ خود را نمودم آشکار
با تو دادم ذوقِ ترک و اختیار[66]

It is through this freedom of the will and exercise of reason—the gifts of Satan to man—that man succeeds in mastering the forces of nature and thus brings under his control the forces of evil.

عقل بدام آورد فطرت چالاک را
اہرمنِ شعلہ زاد سجدہ کند خاک را[67]

The lesson we learn from the legend of the Fall, therefore, is that it was not Adam's birth but the disobedience of Satan that brought this universe of manifold charm and beauty into existence. The Fall has turned out to be fortunate on account of the "sacrifice" of Satan. Had Satan not disobeyed God and not succeeded in seducing Adam, man would have continued to live in a state of pure and unalloyed innocence, unaware of the pangs of love and separation, and of eternal conflict of good and evil, in a condition of total passivity and inactivity. It was really the "No" of Satan that brought dynamism and charm into the life of man. Into the unperturbed calm of the universe[68] at the time of birth of Adam, Iblīs threw the stone of denial and everything began to feel the throb of life. His was a creative dynamic force which gave meaning and significance to the existence of man.[69]

66. *Jāvīd Nāmah*, pp, 158-9. 67. *Payām-Mas͟hriq*, p. 101.
68. *Bāl-i Jibrīl*, p. 193.

کس قدر خاموش ہے یہ عالمِ بے کاخ و کو !

How noiseless this dull world is !
69. Ibid., pp. 192-3.

ابلیس : ہے مری جرأت سے مشتِ خاک میں ذوقِ نمو
میرے فتنے جامۂ عقل و خرد کا تار و پو

It was through my daring (to say no) that this handful of earth (i.e. man) came to possess the ambition of expression. My activities alone constitute the warp and woof of the garment of intellect and reason.

جبرئیل : ہمدمِ دیرینہ ! کیسا ہے جہانِ رنگ وبو ؟
ابلیس : سوز و ساز و درد و داغ و جستجوئے و آرزو !

Gabriel : Old comrade ! How do you find this world of charm ?
Iblīs : It is world of songs and cries, pains and torments, strife and ambition.

In the words of Mānī, the realm of Light was exclusively self-contained and utter passivity. All of a sudden the realm of Darkness invaded the realm of Light and lo ! everywhere there was activity, life, movement. The silence of death all at once changed into a roar of life.

من 'بلے' در پردۂ 'لا' گفتہ ام
گفتۂ من خوشتر از نا گفتہ ام[70]

My "No" was in reality an affirmation.
It is better that I said : "No".

It was in this "No" of Iblīs, this "invasion" of light by darkness, that both man and the universe came to their own. Addressing God, Iblīs justifies his "No" :

پیکرِ انجم ز تو، گردشِ انجم ز من
جاں بجہاں اندرم ، زندگیٔ مضمرم
تو بہ بدن جاں دہی، شور بجاں من دہم
تو بہ سکوں رہ زنی، من بہ تپش رہبرم

* * *

آدمِ خاکی نہاد دوں نظر و کم سواد
زاد در آغوشِ تو پیر شود در برم[71]

You created the stars : their movement is due to me.
The hidden life of the universe is through me [and not through you].
You blew your breath into the body [of man] ; but it became dynamic through me.
You walk on the path of passivity, while I lead all to activity.

* * *

This Adam of clay, lacking in vision and narrow in outlook,
Was born in your lap, but will mature under my care.

July 1952

70. *Jāvīd Nāmah*, p.158. 71. *Payām-i Ma<u>sh</u>riq*, p. 98.

Muhammad Munawwar

HARMONY IN IQBAL'S THOUGHT

It is generally believed that Pythagoreans were the first among the philosophers to call the world a "cosmos", i.e. an orderly whole, and maintain that man was a microcosm, i.e. a cosmos in miniature. According to them, the essential characteristics and the governing principles of the macrocosm were epitomised in the being of man. They added that by making a close study of these characteristics and principles of the universe and particularly its orderliness, man could bring a harmony and orderliness in his own self. We find many verses in the Qur'ān that have a bearing on this doctrine.

No want of proportion will you see in the creation of the Most Gracious [God]. So turn your vision again: Do you see any flaw?[1]

Verily, We have created everything in [due] measure.[2]

And the heaven He has raised high and set up the balance in order that you do not transgress [due] balance.[3]

Thus, according to the Qur'ān, God's creation is not haphazard and everything in it goes by law, proportion and measure. The Qur'ān also enjoins on man to study and ponder over the presence of balance, proportion and order in the universe so as to bring all this in his own

1. The Qur'ān, lxvii. 4.
2. Ibid., liv. 49.
3. Ibid., lv. 7, 8.

life. The whole idea, according to some modern scholars seems, to be embedded in man's religious consciousness. Lyman Bryson, for example, maintains: "The religious impulse, in all its forms, no matter how primitive in expression or how mature and profound, is always a faith that there is an ultimate harmony between the nature of the universe and man's dim ideas of justice, mercy and righteousness."[4] Harmony in the sense of balance in the dialectical forces of opposition seems to be the ontological base of the very existence of the material universe. The moment this balance is lost, the universe would cease to exist. This is also true of the existence of man and society both in the physical and in the moral sense.

Harmony with its implied dialectical bipolarity of the opposites seems to be the very quintessence of Iqbāl's thought. His philosophy of "self" is not without that of "selflessness". His *Shikwah* could not be left alone; it had to be weighed against *Jawāb-i Shikwah*. He finds good as well as bad points in different "isms". He could praise Mussolini for his fascinating and powerful personality, yet he did criticise his act of aggression against Ethiopia. He could never eulogise extremes. His poetical works present a fine blend of form and matter. He holds balance between words and meanings; the metres of his verses and lengths of his poems are commensurate with their diction as well as with their themes.

Iqbāl had keenly studied philosophy of both the East and the West. He was well versed in literature, history and law. A student of science he perhaps never was, yet he kept a keen eye on the latest scientific discoveries and theories. Being thus equipped intellectually he was in a position to pick up good points from different systems of polity, philosophy, economics and what not, and weave them into a new pattern.

Iqbāl easily discerned that almost every philosophy that dealt with human beings laid stress on this or that aspect of life and thus brought all others under subjugation of that particular aspect; various ideologies and isms dealt with life only in a fragmentary manner. He

4. *Patterns of Ethics in America Today*, p. 108.

keenly felt that human life at large was to be taken as one co-ordinated whole, nay the whole universe was to be considered an organic unity. Says he:

حقیقت ایک ہے ہر شے کی خاکی ہو کہ نوری ہو
لہو خورشید کا ٹپکے اگر ذرّہ کا دل چیریں [5]

The reality of all things is one, be they terrestrial or celestial.
The blood of the sun runs through the heart of an atom, should one cut it open.

In one of his *Qiṭ'ahs* in Persian he poignantly says:

دوصد دانا دریں محفل سخن گفت
سخن نازک تر از برگِ سمن گفت
ولے با من بگو آں دیدہ ور کیست
کہ خارے دید و احوالِ چمن گفت ! [6]

In this assembly [world] many a wise man has offered discourse more delicate than the jasmine flower.
Speak to me, however, of the seer who while observing a single thorn could narrate the affairs of the whole garden.

The existence of such a "seer" necessarily presupposes perfect coherence among all parts of the universe; how else could he explain the affairs of the garden merely by looking at a single thorn?

It is a widespread error of interpretation of Iqbāl's thought that he drew his inspiration mainly from this or that Western philosopher: Nietzsche, or Bergson, or Plato, for example. True there is some conformity of his thought if taken in piecemeal fashion with those of others such as is to be found in the notions of "Superman", "Will to Power", "Creative Evolution", "Struggle for Existence", "Socialism", etc. But Iqbāl's thought taken as a whole does not belong to anyone except to Iqbāl himself. His thought taken as a whole is indeed a big creative synthesis which blends all the great ideas and all the isms into a perfect harmony.

5. *Bāng-i Darā*, p. 310. 6. *Armughān-i Ḥijāz*, p. 192.

This idea of harmony is a running note to be found in most of his poems. He did not compose poetry for the sake of poetry, and hence he could not be attracted by themes or notions which did not harmonise with the main line of his thought. Some inconsistencies or contradictions to be found in his writings are no other than those which are the inevitable result of gradual unveiling of his spiritual vision. His thought taken in its entirety manifests a continuous progress towards the harmonisation of all apparent contradictions and incongruities. He was certainly different from those poets who, according to the Qur'ān, "wander bewildered in every valley".[7] Those who wander bewildered in every valley are the poets who do not find any purpose in the universe, otherwise they would have steadily followed some well-defined path or paths that could lead them to the cherished goal. But where there is no goal there can be only purposeless wandering. Purpose alone gives meaning to our life and brings harmony or consistency in our actions.

Iqbāl's notion of harmony is best exemplified in his concept of *mard-i mu'min*, i.e., the perfect man, who is an embodiment of the most harmonious combination of various qualities. Iqbāl says of him :

نرم دمِ گفتگو ، گرم دمِ جستجو
رزم ہو یا بزم ہو پاک دل و پاکباز[8]

He [*mu'min*] is mild in speech, and wild in action.
Be it battlefield or the assembly of friends, he is pure of heart and action.

Here are some verses from *Ḍarb-i Kalīm*, given under the caption "*Mard-i Musalmān*" :

قہاری و غفاری و قدوسی و جبروت
یہ چار عناصر ہوں تو بنتا ہے مسلمان

* * *

قدرت کے مقاصد کا عیار اس کے ارادے
دنیا میں بھی میزان ، قیامت میں بھی میزان

7. The Qur'ān, xxvi. 225. 8. *Bāl-i Jibrīl*, p. 132.

جس سے جگرِ لالہ میں ٹھنڈک ہو وہ شبنم
دریاؤں کے دل جس سے دہل جائیں وہ طوفان !
فطرت کا سرودِ ازلی اس کے شب و روز
آہنگ میں یکتا صفتِ سورۂ رحمٰن ![9]

Forgiveness, dominance, holiness and forcefulness—
These four make Muslim of a human being.

* * *

His intentions are the measure of destiny,
He is like a balance, both in this life and in the life hereafter.

On the one hand, he is like a drop of dew that pleases the heart of poppy flowers ;

And on the other, he is such a furious gale as makes the spirit of rivers quiver.

His life is like Nature's eternal melody,
He is harmonious like the Qur'ānic *sūrah* : *al-Raḥmān.*

At another place Iqbāl[8] says:

ہو حلقۂ یاراں تو بریشم کی طرح نرم
رزمِ حق و باطل ہو تو فولاد ہے مومن ![10]

While in the assembly of friends the *mu'min* is soft like silk,
In a battle between Truth and Untruth he is hard as steel.

The same idea is expressed differently in the following verse:

گزر جا بن کے سیلِ تندرو کوہ و بیاباں سے
گلستاں راہ میں آئے تو جوئے نغمہ خواں ہو جا[11]

Cross the deserts and mountains like high flood,
When you come across a garden then take the form of a singing brook.

The idea of balance or harmony is more clearly enunciated in the following *Qiṭ'ah* taken from *Armughān-i Ḥijāz* :

9. *Ḍarb-i Kalīm*, pp. 57-8.
10. Ibid., p. 41.
11. *Bāng-i Darā*, p. 312.

ز قرآن پیشِ خود آئینہ آویز
دگرگوں گشتہ ! از خویش بگریز
ترازوئے بنہ کردارِ خود را
قیامت ہائے پیشیں را برانگیز[12]

Keep the Qur'ān as a mirror before you.
You have completely changed, run away from yourself.
Fix a balance for your deeds [so that you may be able to],
Stir a commotion which your forebears stirred in the past.

Iqbāl longs to see this balance in every department of human life and deplores its absence. He saw that Western political and economic ascendancy was in the final analysis based on the philosophy of materialism which had no scope in it for the spiritual aspirations of man. Iqbāl believed that such a lopsided culture, which was not stronger than a "nest on a delicate bough", could not endure for long. But despite his hatred for crude materialism of the West he did not go to the extreme of preaching the monastic spiritualism of the East, i.e. that of hermits and ascetics. He was not the one to lose the sense of balance even in his aversions; everything was to have its due share in the real and full development of man. Whereas the Western soulless and Godless materialism was to be counteracted by making room for spiritual values, the East was to be saved from complete subjugation by the West through scienific and technological advancements. Iqbāl points out this lack of harmony prevailing in the Eastern and the Western societies thus :

بہت دیکھے ہیں میں نے مشرق و مغرب کے میخانے
یہاں ساقی نہیں پیدا وہاں بے ذوق ہے صہبا ![13]

I have visited numerous wine-houses in the East as well as in the West.
Here I find no *sāqī*, i.e. a cup-bearer, and there the wine has no taste.

دلِ بیدار ندادند بہ دانائے فرنگ
این قدر ہست کہ چشمِ نگرانے دارد[14]

12. *Armughān-i Ḥijāz*, p. 102.
13. *Bāl-i Jibrīl*, p. 38.
14. *Zabūr-i 'Ajam*, p. 130.

The European man of wisdom does not possess a wakeful heart,
Although he possesses a wakeful eye.

And here is a verse which if taken superficially contradicts the one just gone before :

اچھا ہے دل کے ساتھ رہے پاسبانِ عقل
لیکن کبھی کبھی اسے تنہا بھی چھوڑ دے [15]

It is better that the heart be guarded by the intellect,
But leave it sometimes alone to itself.

This leave to breathe freely is to be given to the heart only occasionally so that it does not die out under the pressure of the intellect. As a rule, Iqbāl wants to see the heart wedded to the intellect, for thus alone in the ordinary circumstances can the equilibrium of personality be kept intact. He says :

زیرکی از عشق گردد حق شناس
کارِ عشق از زیرکی محکم اساس

* * *

خیز و نقشِ عالمِ دیگر بنہ
عشق را با زیرکی آمیز دہ [16] .

Intellect enlightened by love becomes truth-loving,
While the affairs of love guided by intellect get a strong footing.

* * *

Rise and lay the foundations of another world,
Where love is mingled with intellect.

There has been a long controversy whether or not Iqbāl prefers heart or intuition to intellect. Even if Iqbāl often seems to prefer the former to the latter, never does he want us to do away with intellect altogether. How could he go to such an extreme ? Iqbāl's belief in "harmony" is so strong with him that he is not prepared to accept even religious inspiration (barring the revelations of prophets) unless it is scrutinised by reason.

15. *Bāng-i Darā*, p. 112. 16. *Jāvīd Nāmah*, p. 71.

صاحبِ ساز کو لازم ہے کہ غافل نہ رہے
گاہے گاہے غلط آہنگ بھی ہوتا ہے سروش [17]

The man of music, i.e. one who depends on intuition should always be watchful,
Sometimes the angel who brings music, i.e. the one who brings inspiration, is himself out of tune.

It means that intuition left to itself is not always reliable : it has to be constantly tested against the touchstone of reason. But reason by itself is abstract and lifeless, it has to be constantly enlivened and enlightened by intuition. Both are in need of mutual supplementation and rejuvenation.

Again, all our instincts and passions are to be regulated by the same principle of harmony or balance. No instinct is to be altogether thwarted, nor is it to be allowed to override others, All instincts have their functions within limits. In Iqbāl's opinion this demarcation of limits is the Shar'īah or the "Divine Law". Ego, be it of Hitler or that of Mussolini, when it yields to the "Divine Law" and begins to respect the "limits" becomes Muslim. This respect for "limits" is "justice", which, according to Ṭāhā Ḥusain, is the central principle of all Islamic injunctions. According to the Qur'ān, one who transgresses the "limits" is a *mu'tid* or *ẓālim*, and God Almighty does not like him. This is why in the Islamic jurisprudence *ḥadd*, i.e. the "limit" is synonymous with "punishment". The long and short of it is, that to remain within "limits" is to be harmonious, good and beautiful. Imām Ghazālī makes a very clear pronouncement in this regard. "Beauty", he says, "has almost universally been recognized as a thing of intrinsic value. It means the orderly and systematic arrangement of parts, and this is not the quality of material things only; it lies in the activities and the behaviour of man and in his ideas and concepts. Whatever is beautiful is loved by us for its own sake."[18] This immediately recalls to our

17. *Bāl-i Jibrīl*, p. 108.
18. M.M. Sharif (Ed.), *A History of Muslim Philosophy*, Wiesbaden, 1963, Vol. I., p. 636.

mind Iqbāl's already referred to beautiful lines in praise of *Mard-i-Musalmān* and more particularly the following :

آہنگ میں یکتا صفت سورۂ رحمٰن[19]

Sometimes it is held that Iqbāl's concept of Ego—the very pivotal notion of his philosophy—stands for the glorification of power. Nothing can be more misleading than this. Power, according to Iqbāl, must be qualified; it is with him not blind and aimless and thus sheer ruthlessness. Whatever power there is for man, it is on account of his respect for "limits" (*ḥudūd*). Bowing before "limits" is the very essence of power. In his opinion there is no power without some sort of compulsions or obligations.

Iqbāl's idea of balance or harmony is no other than that of compulsion accepted by the component parts of an organic whole. Take the example of music : it is only the discordant sounds compelled to harmonise; it is to this compulsion that music owes its strength and its magic-power. Again, what is the Tāj Maḥal, the exquisite poetry in marble, one of the greatest wonders of the world ? It is only the building material of different kinds compelled to obey some laws, without which raw material could never have created such an awe in the hearts of the onlookers. What is an army ? It is only a horde of individuals compelled to organise themselves and observe discipline, wherein lies its power to conquer and defend. Without a self-imposed discipline and compulsion the army is merely a lawless mob. The whole idea has been beautifully expressed by Iqbāl in a number of verses such as the following :

برگ گل شد چوں ز آئین بستہ شد
گل ز آئین بستہ شد گلدستہ شد
نغمہ از ضبطِ صدا پیداستے !
ضبط چوں رفت از صدا غوغاستے !

19. *Ḍarb-i Kalīm*, p. 58.

در گلوئے ما نفس موجِ ہواست
چون ہوا پابندِ نے گردد نواست[20]

The petal becomes a rose wh:n bound by law,
And the rose bound by law becomes a nosegay.
The music is a controlled sound ;
When the control is gone, the music is turned into noise.
Breath in our throat is a wave of air, which imprisoned in a reed becomes a melody.

July 1969

20. *Asrār-o-Rumūz* (*Rumūz-i Bekhudī*), p. 140.

Dr Miss Kazimi

IQBAL'S REVOLT

Introduction. On the eve of my departure for Pakistan to attend the APWA Conference over a year ago, a Pakistani friend presented to me a copy of one of Iqbāl's works. I thought it was one of so many poetical works meant for enjoyment. I casually opened the book and my eyes fell on the following verses :

آشنائے من ز من بیگانہ رفت
از خمستانم تہی پیمانہ رفت
من شکوہِ خسروی او را دہم
تختِ کسریٰ زیرِ پائے او نہم
او حدیثِ دلبری خواہد زمن
رنگ و آبِ شاعری خواہد زمن
کم نظر بیتابیٔ جانم ندید
آشکارم دید و پنہانم ندید

* * *

برگِ گل رنگیں ز مضمونِ من است
مصرعِ من قطرۂ خونِ من است[1]

It was not the power of diction, nor the music of the verses that

1. *Payām-i Mashriq*, p. 3.

attracted my attention. It was the burning sincerity of the poet that dominated all other qualities of poetic art. He did not aim at pleasing the ear by his sweet, soft melodies. His song was in fact a clarion call to warn the poets and vercifiers of the harm that their poetry with its traditional escapist bias and misleading interpretations of life could do to humanity.

زمن با شاعرِ رنگیں بیاں گوے
چہ سود از سوز اگر چوں لالہ سوزی
نہ خود را می گدازی ز آتشِ خویش
نہ شامِ دردمندے بر فروزی[2]

My short visit to Pakistan and my contact with Iqbāl's people, women and men, demonstrated to me what a real poet could achieve. His verses are quoted in private table talks, he is discussed over a cup of tea, and the political and social leaders of the nation derive strength from his melodies. He had rightly said :

اے بسا شاعر کہ بعد از مرگ زاد
چشمِ خود بربست و چشمِ ما کشاد[3]

So what is in Iqbāl that has made him the living symbol of a living people ? It is his "questioning". He is not prepared to accept life as he finds it. He verifies every human activity on the touch-stone of "Life". And as he finds the existing values, existing conceptions of art, poetry and life not in conformity with the glorious destiny of man, he declares war against his age.

گہے افتم گہے مستانہ خیزم
چہ خوں بے تیغ و شمشیرے بریزم
نگاہِ التفاتے بر سرِ بام
کہ من با عصرِ خویش اندر ستیزم[4]

Below is given a short account of Iqbāl's inspiring treatment of certain traditional conceptions which might excite the reader to

2. Ibid., p. 38.
3. *Asrār-o-Rumūz* (*Asrār-i Khudī*), p. 5.
4. *Armughān-i Ḥijāz*, p. 56.

attempt a more comprehensive study of this great genius who has done so much to awaken the East and re-inspire confidence in our hearts regarding our contibution to the ultimate good of humanity.

Iqbāl looked around him and saw his countrymen living not only under backward conditions, but under an ominous gloom that shadowed their very soul. Not only were they passing their days under the heels of foreign imperialism in abject slavery but seemed to have accepted their bondage with resignation. The "foreign master" dominated the heart and soul of the people, and Iqbāl to his horror saw this disease eating up the entire people. Something was to be done to save them. Political and economic bondage could be destroyed if the soul with the people was sound. But they would not permit any cure of their ills if their minds cease to react. Bondage, in Iqbāl's words, takes away from man his vision. It is only the free mind that can behold things correctly. A mind bedimmed with unhealthy moral and mental influences is not in a position to build up true picture of the phenomena around him. When the mind is diseased the entire moral and intellectual structure of human life is paralysed. Iqbāl keenly realised this important fundamental fact. He points out :

چوں شود اندیشۂ قومے خراب
نا سرہ گردد بدستش سیمِ ناب
میرد اندر سینہ اش قلبِ سلیم
در نگاہِ او کج آید مستقیم[5]

When the mind of a nation becomes corrupt,
Even genuine silver becomes base in its hands.
True heart dies within its bosom,
What is straight appears curved in its eyes.

This being an undebatable proposition, he proceeds to suggest a way out :

پس نخستیں بایدش تطہیرِ فکر
بعد ازاں آساں شود تعمیرِ فکر[6]

First step should be purification of its mind,
After that reconstruction of intellect will be easy.

5. *Pas Cheh Bāyad Kard*, p. 10. 6. Ibid., p. 11.

So Iqbāl raised the standard of revolt against the existing values whether literary, moral, religious, political, or economic and with all the means at his disposal he tried to shake the people from their slumber and inactivity.

Man's Destiny. Iqbāl tried to inspire in man unshakable confidence in his destiny. He created before him visions of the great heritage and his still greater future possibilities. He retold him the story of man's advent in a way that inspired respect and awe, not pity for a poor, hunted exile. He described man's achievements in the world of spirit as well as of matter, and his marvellous poetic power made these look as an everyday experience within reach of the common man. He tried to draw man's attention to his higher and nobler possibilities. He endeavoured first to purify and then to build up man's mind. His direct concern however, were the people of Indo-Pakistan Sub-continent in particular and the people of the East in general. The subhuman conditions under which they lived set aflame Iqbāl's heart.

ز جانِ خاور آن سوزِ کہن رفت
دمش وا ماند و جانِ او زتن رفت
چو تصویرے کہ بے تارِ نفس زیست
نمی داند کہ ذوقِ زندگی چیست[7]

The old fire has died out of the land of the East,
Its body remains, its soul has fled from it,
Like a picture that exists without breathing,
It knows not the real taste of life.

Iqbāl started a holy war. He revolted against the falsely created values and standards that obstructed free development of man in the worlds of mind and matter. He urged man to attack the physical universe and get hold over its material resources :

دشنہ زن در پیکرِ این کائنات
در شکم دارد گہر چون سومنات

* * *

7. *Zabūr-i 'Ajam* (*Gulshan-i Rāz-i Jadīd*), p. 203.

جانِ ما را لذتِ احساس نیست
خاکِ رہ جز ریزۂ الماس نیست[8]

Strike a dagger in the body of the Universe,
It is full of jewels like the idol of Somnath.

* * *

Our mind has failed to feel,
Otherwise the dust on our path is dust of diamonds.

Then he recalls the miracles of those great souls who conquered time and space and thus makes us feel proud of our great potentialities. Narrating the achievements of the great Haḍrat 'Alī, he writes inspiringly :

ہر کہ در آفاق گردد بوتراب
باز گرداند ز مغرب آفتاب[9]

He who becomes the "father of clay" in the world,
Can turn back even the sun from the West.

And, according to Iqbāl, the way that leads man to the attainment of these powers is a simple one. It is through realisation of his own inherent powers.

از خود آگاہی ید اللّٰہی کند
از ید اللّٰہی شہنشاہی کند[10]

Through his self-realisation he becomes the hand of God,
And as he becomes the hand of God, he rules over the Universe.

Thus Iqbāl took upon himself the onerous responsibility of re-creating values—retelling the tale of man's rise and fall. A few glimpses from his poetry will suffice to give the reader an idea of Iqbāl's "revolt" against passivity, necessitarianism (fate), against the blind materialists who could not see the beauty and power of human soul, and the clergy who interpreted the holy books so as to kill the

8. *Payām-i Mashriq*, p. 6.
9. *Asrār-o-Rumūz* (*Asrār-i Khudī*), p. 53.
10. Ibid.

spark of divine light as well as man's faith in his metaphysical powers.

It would be most interesting to start with the so-called "fall" of man. The pseudo-moralists and pseudo-religious clergy have treated man's journey from heaven to earth as an exile—as a fall—a punishment, and interpreted human life on earth as something base—something from which it was better to flee. But to Iqbāl it was the most glorious event in man's life. It was opening up of a new and great future.

In *Payām-i Mashriq* Iqbāl has epitomised the story in a most effective and dramatic manner. The coming of man is celebrated thus:

نعره زد عشق که خونیں جگرے پیدا شد
حسن لرزید که صاحب نظرے پیدا شد
فطرت آشفت که از خاکِ جہانِ مجبور
خودگرے، خودشکنے، خودنگرے پیدا شد

* * *

زندگی گفت که در خاک تپیدم ہمہ عمر
تا ازیں گنبدِ دیرینہ درے پیدا شد[11]

* * * *

خبرے رفت ز گردوں بہ شبستانِ ازل
حذر اے پردگیاں پردہ درے پیدا شد[12]

Love acclaimed the birth of a being with a bleeding heart,
Beauty trembled, for one who could see and observe was born.
Nature felt upset, for from the helpless clay was born a self-creating, self-breaking and self-observing being.

* * *

Life said, "I have writhed and wriggled all along and thus an opening could be made in this ancient dome."

* * * *

A warning was whispered round from Heavens to the abode of Eternity:

11. *Payām-i Mashriq*, p. 97. 12. Ibid.

Beware, though ye are veiled, the one who would rent asunder the veil is born.

The spirit of obstruction—Iblīs or Satan by whatever name we may call him—refuses to bow down before man and directs man's mind and energies to newer channels. He appeals to man's inherent qualities and man succumbs, *not to evil or to Satan*, but to his own desire to move forward into the unknown—to his curiosity. The following lines, in fact, ring of man's own creative self, though put in Satan's mouth :

زندگیٔ سوز و ساز بہ ز سکونِ دوام
فاختہ شاہیں شود از تپشِ زیرِ دام

* * *

زشت و نکو زادۂ وہمِ خداوندِ تست
لذتِ کردار گیر گام بنہ جوئے کام
خیز کہ بنمائمت مملکتِ تازۂ
چشمِ جہاں بیں کشا بہرِ تماشا خرام

* * *

تیغِ درخشندۂ جانِ جہانے گسل
جوہرِ خود را نما آئے بروں از نیام

* * *

تو نشناسی ہنوز شوق بمیرد ز وصل
چیست حیاتِ دوام ؟ سوختنِ نا تمام[13]

A life of warmth and fire is superior to a life of everlasting quiet,
A dove might become an eagle by fluttering in the snare.

* * *

Good or evil is created by the whim of your God,
Learn to enjoy action—step forth and fulfil your desires.
Rise that I may show you a new world,
Open your world-observing eye, move about and behold.

* * *

13. Ibid., pp. 98-9.

You are a glittering sword, strike the world,
Show your hidden qualities, come out of your sheath.

* * *

Don't you know that union kills enthusiasm and desire ?
What is eternal life ? Endless burning.

This is what is put into man's ears : continued peace, tranquillity or inactivity is too monotonous for man. He wants *to live*, not merely *to exist*. These words set man's mind aflame. He marches out in new quests. He looks around into the boundless space and time and involuntarily sets up a programme for the conquest of the visible and the invisible, of the physical and the metaphysical. The metre and the mode of expression used by Iqbāl are exhilarating and the ideas elevating and inspiring.

چہ خوش است زندگی را ہمہ سوز و ساز کردن
دلِ کوہ و دشت و صحرا بہ دمے گداز کردن
ز قفس درے کشادن بہ فضائے گلستانے
رہِ آسماں نوردن بہ ستارہ راز کردن

* * *

ہمہ سوزِ نا تمامم ہمہ دردِ آرزویم
بگماں دہم یقیں را کہ شہیدِ جستجویم[14]

How happy to make life full of warmth and enthusiasm !
To melt the hearts of hills and dales by mere breath,
To open a door from the cage into the garden,
To make journeys into high heavens and to unearth secrets of stars.

* * *

I am a fire—still aflame—I am all in pain due to my unfulfilled desire,
I would exchange my faith for "doubt", for I prefer to die in quest.

The man revolts. He prefers wavering "doubt" to stable "faith". He wants to die in quest rather than live in peace in a cage. And what

14. Ibid., pp. 99-100.

a tale of proud achievements man narrates before God on the Day of Judgment. He recalls his struggle against all the forces of nature. He explains to God why he followed the dictates of Iblīs and finally tells Him how he had conquered Iblīs and made him bow to him. Man addresses God:

اے کہ ز خورشیدِ تو کوکبِ جاں مستنیر
از دلم افروختی شمعِ جہانِ ضریر
ریخت ہنرہائے من بحر بیک نائے آب
تیشۂ من آورد از جگرِ خارہ شیر

* * *

من بہ زمیں در شدم من بفلک بر شدم
بستۂ جادوئے من ذرہ و مہرِ منیر
گرچہ فسونش مرا برد ز راہِ صواب
از غلطم در گذر عذرِ گناہم پذیر
رام نگردد جہاں تا نہ فسونش خوریم
جز بکمندِ نیاز ناز نہ گردد اسیر
تا شود از آہِ گرم ایں بتِ سنگیں گداز
بستنِ زنارِ او بود مرا ناگزیر
عقل بدام آورد فطرتِ چالاک را
اہرمنِ شعلہ زاد سجدہ کند خاک را[15]

My life's star owes its light to you,
Through my heart you lighted the candle of this dark world.
My art poured the oceans into a small channel,
My chip-axe brought forth milk from the heart of stone.

* * *

I penetrated deep into earth—I rose over the skies,
My magic tied together the atom and the bright Sun.
Although his [Satan's] guiles led me astray,
Excuse my failing and accept my apologies.
The world would not submit unless we accept its deceit,

15. Ibid., pp. 100-1.

Pride cannot be tackled without a show of humility.
In order to melt and soften this flint-hearted idol,
It was essential for me to act as its votary.
Intellect in the end ensnares this clever nature,
And Satan, born of Fire, bows down before Clay [Man].

Iqbāl's dynamic genius could not accept the view that man is an exile anxiously waiting for the expiry of his term of punishment. He rejoices at his achievement. In one of his *Rubā'īs* he says :

یکے اندازہ کن سود و زیاں را
چو جنت جاودانی کن جہاں را
نمی بینی کہ ما خاکی نہاداں
چہ خوش آراستیم این خاکداں را[16]

Just think of the advantages and loss,
Make this world eternal like paradise.
Don't you see how we, the earth-born people,
Have decorated this earth.

Iqbāl's view of paradise is quite opposed to its traditional descriptions. He finds it an uninteresting and uninspiring place.

کجا این روزگارے شیشہ بازے
بہشت این گنبدِ گرداں ندارد
ندیدہ دردِ زنداں یوسفِ او
زلیخایش دلِ نالاں ندارد
خلیلِ او حریفِ آتشے نیست
کلیمش یک شرر در جاں ندارد
بہ صرصر در نیفتد زورقِ او
خطر از لطمۂ طوفاں ندارد
یقیں را در کمیں بوکے و مگر نیست
وصال اندیشۂ ہجراں ندارد
کجا آں لذتِ عقلِ غلط سیر
اگر منزل رہِ پیچاں ندارد

16. *Armughān-i Ḥijāz*, p. 22.

مزی اندر جہانے کور ذوقے
کہ یزداں دارد و شیطاں ندارد [17]

You don't find this changing life there,
Paradise does not have a revolving dome.
Its Yūsuf has not seen sufferings in prison,
Its Zūlai<u>kh</u>ā does not possess a wailing heart.
Its <u>Kh</u>alīl is afraid of fire,
Its Kalīm (Moses) does not have even one spark in his soul.
Its Canoe is never confronted with violent gales,
And has no danger of raging storms.
Faith there is free from doubts,
Union with beloved has no fear of "separation".
How can we enjoy the going astray of our intellect,
If there are no winding ways to cover ?
Do not live in a world of bad taste,
Which has God but no Satan.

In another piece of poetry he tells us how a houri of paradise desires the poet to take rest and enjoy himself. The poet who feels little attraction in the unchanging houri or the static paradise says :

چہ کنم کہ فطرتِ من بہ مقام در نسازد
دلِ نا صبور دارم چو صبا بہ لالہ زارے
چو نظر قرار گیرد بہ نگارِ خوبروئے
تپد آں زماں دلِ من پۓ خوبتر نگارے
ز شرر ستارہ جویم ز ستارہ آفتابے
سرِ منزلے ندارم کہ بمیرم از قرارے

* * *

طلبم نہائتِ آں کہ نہائتے ندارد
بہ نگاہِ ناشکیبے بہ دلِ امیدوارے
دلِ عاشقاں بمیرد بہ بہشتِ جاودانے
نہ نوائے دردمندے نہ غمے نہ غمگسارے [18]

17. *Payām-i Mas<u>h</u>riq*, p. 154,

18. Ibid., pp. 148-9.

What should I do? My nature does not like to rest at a fixed place,
My heart is like the winds that blow over the poppy fields.
When I behold a beautiful face of a beloved,
My heart soon after begins to beat for a more beautiful one.
From the spark I march on in quest of the Star, from the Star on to the Sun.
I have no final goal, for I shall die if I am at rest.

* * *

I am in search of that end which does not exist,
But I go on with restless eyes and a hopeful heart.
The heart of a lover would die in an eternal Paradise,
For there is no cry of pain, no sorrow, nor a sympathiser.

Man's great and brilliant destiny as depicted in Iqbāl's poetry is as elevating in its past perspective as it is inspiring when viewed in the future. Even the angels hail his advent and forecast for him a life more varied and exhilarating:

In *Jāvīd Nāmah*, the angels declare:

فروغِ مشتِ خاک از نوریاں افزوں شود روزے
زمیں از کوکبِ تقدیرِ او گردوں شود روزے
خیالِ او کہ از سیلِ حوادث پرورش گیرد
ز گردابِ سپہرِ نیلگوں بیروں شود روزے [19]

The brilliance of this handful of dust [man] will excel that of the angels.
Through the guidance of his destiny's star, the earth will turn into heaven.
He, whose mind is reared by constant adventures,
Will rise above the whirlpool of the blue skies.

And the Divine voice from heavens tells the earth of the great treasures, spiritual and material, that are hidden in its depths. The voice gives us a vision of man's future as God's vicegerent on earth:

19. *Jāvīd Nāmah*, p. 10.

اے امینے از امانت بے خبر
غم مخور ، اندر ضمیرِ خود نگر
روزہا روشن ز غوغائے حیات
نے ازاں نورے کہ بینی در جہات

* * *

شستہ از لوحِ جاں نقشِ امید ؟
نورِ جاں از خاکِ تو آید پدید
عقلِ آدم بر جہاں شبخوں زند
عشقِ او بر لا مکاں شبخوں زند

* * *

چشمِ او روشن شود از کائنات
تا بہ بیند ذات را اندر صفات[20]

You are the trustee, unaware of your trust,
Look for a moment within yourself, be not dismayed.
Your days are enlivened with uproars of life
And not by the light you see in space.

* * *

Have you lost hope ?
Light of the Soul will emerge out of your dust.
Man's intellect will capture the world of space,
His love will conquer the Infinite, the world beyond space.

* * *

His eyes will get vision from the light of the Universe
So that he may see Essence through Its attributes.

He declares :

زندگانی نیست تکرارِ نفس
اصلِ او از حیّ و قیوم است و بس[21]

* * * *

20. Ibid., p. 9. 21. Ibid., p. 226.

زندگی خواہی خودی را پیش کن
چار سو را غرق اندر خویش کن[22]

* * * *

زندگانی قوت پیدا ستے
اصلِ او از ذوقِ استیلاستے[23]

Life is not mere breathing,
Its source is the Living God.

* * *

Do you want to live ? Project forth your self ;
Absorb the four spatial dimensions within you.

* * *

Life is power in action,
It is born out of the Love for domination and conquest.

Man, as has been stated above, was not thrown out of heaven as an outcast. He deliberately took upon himself the heavy and onerous responsibility of rehabilitating the world of God with new life. The heavens refused to stand up to the challenge of nature. Man with man-God attributes and confident of his powers offered himself to project God's creative qualities on earth. According to Ḥāfiẓ :

آسماں بار امانت نتوانست کشید
قرعۂ فال بنام من دیوانہ زدند[24]

The sky could not bear the burden of responsibility,
And the lot was thrown in my name—made as I am.

But Iqbāl's interpretation of the devolution of responsibility is different. Vicegerency of God on earth was not forcibly thrust on man or decided by the spin of coin or throw of the dice. Man's inherent urge to move forward, his ambition "to ride over the steed of Time and Space", would not let him rest in a state of perpetual immobility and inaction or non-creative action.

22. Ibid., p. 228.
23. *Asrār-o-Rumūz* (*Asrār-i Khudī*), p. 55,
24. *Dīvān-i Ḥāfiẓ*.

In the same context Iqbāl vehemently attacked the age-old concept of adjusting ourselves to our surrounding :

زمانہ با تو نسازد ، تو با زمانہ بساز [25]

If the world does not agree with you, you should bow down to it.

There is little scope for man's mental and physical powers if he were only to adjust himself to his surroundings. His creative urge could not be satisfied by merely sheltering himself from wind and rain, heat and cold. It is the surroundings that have to be moulded and adjusted to man's requirements and his desires—ever increasing desires. The real romance of life lies in re-creation, reshaping the visible and invisible forces of nature ; subservience to them is a mere existence, not life.

حدیث بیخبراں ہے 'تو با زمانہ بساز'
زمانہ با تو نسازد ، تو با زمانہ ستیز [26]

It is the ignorant who say : "adjust yourself to your surroundings".
If the surroundings (your times) do not conform to your wishes, you must fight against them.

He preaches revolution both within and without the self of man :

در شکن آنرا کہ ناید ساز گار
از ضمیرِ خود دگر عالم بیار
بندۂ آزاد را آید گراں
زیستن اندر جہانِ دیگراں [27]

Destory whatever does not suit you,
Create a new world out of your own self.
A free man feels unhappy,
To live in a world of others.

Iqbāl is no mere idealist. He studies the progress of man from the time of his birth onwards and suggests concrete proposals. He lays

25. Cf. *Bāl-i Jibrīl*, p. 26. 26. Ibid.
27. *Jāvīd Nāmah*, p. 225.

down irrefutable axioms, quotes instances from history, and fills his reader with confidence and courage necessary for the achievement of his destiny. In a simple, straightforward way he addresses man :

از طریقِ زادن اے مردِ نکوے
آمدی اندر جہانِ چار سوے

ہم بروں جستن بزادن می تواں
بندہا از خود کشادن می تواں

لیکن ایں زادن نہ از آب و گل است
داند آں مردے کہ او صاحب دل است

آں ز مجبوری است ایں از اختیار
آں نہاں در پردہ ہا ایں آشکار

* * *

آں سکون و سیر اندر کائنات
ایں سراپا سیر بیروں از جہات

آں یکے محتاجیِ روز و شب است
و آں دگر روز و شب اورا مرکب است

زادنِ طفل از شکستِ اشکم است
زادنِ مرد از شکستِ عالم است

* * *

جانِ بیدارے چو زاید در بدن
لرزہ ہا افتد دریں دیرِ کہن[28]

O good man ! You came into this world through birth.
You can also leap out of it through another birth and can snap the strings that bind you.
But this new birth is not a a purely physical phenomenon,
And a man of vision knows
That the first birth was obligatory, while this second one is through your own efforts.

28. Ibid., pp. 15-6

That one took place in concealment, this one is an all open affair.

* * *

That one was a movement only within the physical limits of the world,
This one is a sojourn out of Space.
That one meant our subjugation to day and night,
This one enables you to ride over the steed of day and night.
Mother's womb opens up to give birth to the *Child*,
But *Man's* birth bursts open the dome of the Universe.

* * *

When a living soul takes its birth within man's body,
This ancient world begins to shake and tremble.

Iqbāl opens up pages of history to provide an inspiring lesson to the Eastern nations, whose vision of their great and glorious past is dimmed by centuries of foreign domination.

چیست تاریخ اے ز خود بیگانۂ
داستانے قصۂ افسانۂ ؟
ایں ترا از خویشتن آگہ کند
آشنائے کار و مردِ رہ کند

* * *

ہمچو خنجر بر فسانت می زند
باز بر روے جہانت می زند

* * *

شعلۂ افسردہ در سوزش نگر
دوش در آغوشِ امروزش نگر
شمعِ او بختِ امم را کوکب است
روشن از وے امشب و ہم دیشب است
چشمِ پُر کارے کہ بیند رفتہ را
پیشِ تو باز آفریند رفتہ را

* * *

سر زند از ماضیٔ تو حالِ تو
خیزد از حالِ تو استقبالِ تو

مشکن ار خواہی حیاتِ لا زوال
رشتۂ ماضی ز استقبال و حال[29]

What is history, O stranger to thyself ?
Is it a mere tale, a story, a fable ?
History makes thee conscious of thyself,
It acquaints you with action and makes you a proper person for quest.

* * *

It grinds you on the whetstone like a dagger,
And then strikes you on the face of the world.

* * *

Behold the dormant flame in its fire,
Behold Tomorrow in the lap of its Today.
History is a candle that is the guiding star of nation's fortunes ;
It lights up both tonight and yesternight.
That experienced eye that beholds the past,
Re-creates the past for you.

* * *

Thy Present takes its birth from thy Past,
And thy Future emerges out of thy Present.
If you desire eternal life, do not cut off the link of the Past form your Present and Future.

And Iqbāl quotes from Islamic history inspiring examples to warm up the despairing hearts and urge them to fight despite handicaps, obstructions and material difficulties. He tells them :

عشق با نانِ جویں خیبر کشاد
عشق در اندامِ مہ چاکے نہاد

کلۂ نمرود بے ضربے شکست
لشکرِ فرعون بے حربے شکست

* * *

29. *Asrār-o-Rumūz* (*Rumūz-i Bekhudī*), pp. 172-3.

اے مثالِ مردہ در صندوقِ گور
می توان برخاستن بے بانگِ صور

*　*　*

بر مکان و بر زمان اسوار شو
فارغ از پیچاکِ ایں زنّار شو[30]

Love though fed on oats shattered the gates of Khaibar,
Love split open the body of the Moon.
Nimrūd's skull was broken without a blow,
And Pharoah's army was destroyed without a battle.

*　*　*

O you who are like the dead enclosed in the grave,
One could rise to life even without the clarion call of *Ṣūr* [on Doomsday].

*　*　*

You must ride over Time and Space :
You must free yourself from this snare.

Raising his voice over whispers of disappointment and dismay among the people of the East, he told them of man's destiny. He particularly recalled their own achievements and assured them of their future progress and prosperity. But he had to destroy many idols before the people could be brought face to face with reality. False values and false standards dominated the entire life of the people. Years of slavery had blinded the eyes. Inaction and dismay had destroyed faith in their hearts. The dominating materialism of the West had completely overshadowed them, so much so that even the religious leaders had started interpreting divine revelations in accordance with the wishes and dictates of the imperialist rulers who more than anything else wanted the people to "remain" in their blissful ignorance and serve them as sheep and goats.

Iqbāl severely attacked the foreign imperialists and laid bare the satanic tricks of their statecraft. In his *Mathnavī*-: *Pas Cheh Bāyad Kard*, he says :

30. *Jāvīd Nāmah*, pp. 18-9.

مکتب از تدبیرِ او گیرد نظام
تا بکامِ خواجہ اندیشد غلام
شیخِ ملت با حدیثِ دلنشیں
بر مرادِ او کند تجدیدِ دیں[31]

The schools are administered according to the plan of the (imperialist) master so that the slave should only think of what would benefit his master.

The religious leader of the people through appealing stories,
Readjusts religion according to his wishes.

He effectively attacks the Western conception of right and wrong

تا ندانی نکتۂ اکلِ حلال
بر جماعت زیستن گردد وبال
آہ یورپ زیں مقام آگاہ نیست
چشمِ او ینظر بنوراللہ نیست
او نداند از حلال و از حرام
حکمتش خام است و کارش ناتمام
امتے بر امتے دیگر چرد
دانہ ایں می کارد آں حاصل برد
از ضعیفاں ناں ربودن حکمت است
از تنِ شاں جاں ربودن حکمت است
* * *
تا تہ و بالا نہ گردد ایں نظام
دانش و تہذیب و دیں سودائے خام[32]

So long as you understand not what is lawful bread,
Life will be hard for the people.
It is sad that Europe is not aware of it !
Its eye sees not through God's light.
It does not know lawful from unlawful,
Its understanding is unripe and its work incomplete.

31. *Pas Cheh Bāyad Kard*, p. 16. 32. Ibid., pp. 37-8.

A nation devours another nation,
This sows the seed that reaps the fruit.
It is considered wise to rob the weak of bread,
And to deprive their bodies of soul.

* * *

So long as this social structure is not destroyed,
Wisdom, Civilisation and Faith are mere fancies.

Referring to the League of Nations set up by the Western powers after World War I, Iqbāl said it was only a peaceful way of exploitation of weaker nations by the West. His comment was :

من ازیں بیش ندانم کہ کفن دزدے چند
بہرِ تقسیمِ قبور انجمنے ساختہ اند [33]

I do not know more than this that a few thieves (who steal shrouds of the dead) have set up this League in order to distribute the graves (weaker nations).

But in *Pas Cheh Bāyad Kard* (What Should be Done ?), he has exposed the villainous diplomacy of the imperialists :

سلطنت را جامعِ اقوام گفت
کارِ خود را پختہ کرد و خام گفت
در فضایش بال و پر نتوان کشود
با کلیدش ہیچ در نتوان کشود
گفت با مرغِ قفس اے درد مند
آشیاں در خانۂ صیاد بند
ہر کہ سازد آشیاں در دشت و مرغ
او نباشد ایمن از شاہین و چرغ
از فسونش مرغِ زیرک دانہ مست
نالہ ہا اندر گلوئے خود شکست

* * *

33. *Payām-i Mashriq*, p. 233.

الحذر از گرمیٔ گفتارِ او
الحذر از حرفِ پہلو دارِ او
چشم ہا از سرمہ اش بے نور تر
بندۂ مجبور ازو مجبور تر

* * *

از خودی غافل نہ گردد مردِ حر
حفظِ خود کن حبِ افیونش مخور

* * *

دامنِ او را گرفتن ابلہی است
سینۂ او از دلِ روشن تہی است

* * *

آہ از قومے کہ چشم از خویش بست
دل بہ غیر اللہ داد از خود گسست[34]

Present day diplomacy named its imperialism as "League of Nations".
It tightened its grip but declared that it was loosening it.
One cannot open wings in its surroundings,
No door could be unlocked with its key.
It tells the bird in the cage : "Go and make your nest in the house of your hunter,
For whoever builds a nest in the desert or the meadows
Is not safe from the eagle and the hawk."
Its magic has intoxicated the wise birds with grain,
And the bird has broken its wailing within its throat.

* * *

Beware of his warm [deceiving] talk,
Eyes lose their light through its collyrium.
Helpless man becomes more helpless through its magic.

* * *

A free man is never forgetful of his self,
Preserve yourself, don't eat his opium.

* * *

34. *Pas Cheh Bāyad Kard*, pp. 46-8.

It is foolish to take his support,
His breast is without a shining heart.

* * *

Woe to the nation that closed its eyes,
And devoted its heart to other than God and fell into pieces.

Equally vehemently he attacks the Western meterialistic thought and thereby shatters the curtain obstructing the vision of the East. In his message to the "Wise Man of the West", he says:

از من اے بادِ صبا گوے بدانائے فرنگ
عقل تا بال کشود است گرفتار تر است

* * *

چشم جز رنگِ گل و لالہ بیند ورنہ
آں چہ در پردۂ رنگ است پدیدار تر است
عجب آں نیست کہ اعجازِ مسیحا داری
عجب ایں است کہ بیمارِ تو بیمار تر است
دانش اندوختہٴ دل ز کف انداختہٴ
آہ زاں نقدِ گرانمایہ کہ در باختہٴ [35]

O Breeze, tell the wise man of the West on my behalf that intellect has got more entangled, since it spread out its wings.

* * *

The eye sees naught except the colour of the rose and the poppy,
In fact what is concealed under cover of colours is more apparent.
It is not surprising that you possess the (life-giving) miracle of Jesus,
But it is strange that your patient's condition is worse than ever.
You have amassed knowledge, but cast away the heart,
How sad! you have lost your valuable wealth.

He tells the Eastern nations that science or knowledge is not the exclusive monopoly of the West. It is the result of quest, and in fact modern science and thought owe much to Muslim thinkers.

35. *Payām-i Mashriq*, p. 225.

حکمتِ اشیا فرنگی زاد نیست
اصلِ او جز لذّتِ ایجاد نیست
نیک اگر بینی مسلماں زادہ است
ایں گہر از دستِ ما افتادہ است
چوں عرب اندر اروپا پر کشاد
علم و حکمت را بنا دیگر نہاد
دانہ آں صحرا نشیناں کاشتند
حاصلش افرنگیاں بر داشتند
ایں پری از شیشۂ اسلافِ ماست
باز صیدش کن کہ او از قافِ ماست[36]

The knowledge of things is not a creation of the West,
Its root lies in man's desire for new inventions.
If you see truly, it was brought into being by Muslims,
This jewel has fallen from our hands.
When Arabs extended their sway over Europe,
They laid foundation of science and thought.
It were these people of the desert who sowed the seed,
But it were the Western people who got the fruit.
This "fairy" hails from the glass house of our ancestors,
Recapture it, for it comes from our Qāf.

But while he repeatedly urges the East to learn sciences from the West, he warns us of the danger of blind following. He specially bids us beware of the external forms of Western civilisation. He wants us to take only the useful and leave the rest. In *Jāvīd Nāmah*, he has beautifully analysed the two sides of the Western civilisation. He wants us to be "modern" but not to lose ourselves and our moral and cultural values :

شرق را از خود برد تقلیدِ غرب
باید ایں اقوام را تنقیدِ غرب
قوتِ مغرب نہ از چنگ و رباب
نے ز رقصِ دخترانِ بے حجاب

* * *

36. *Musāfir*, pp. 40-I.

محکمی او را نہ از لادینی است
نے فروغش از خطِ لاطینی است
قوتِ افرنگ از علم و فن است
از ہمیں آتش چراغش روشن است[37]

* * * *

علمِ اشیا علم الاسماستے
ہم عصا و ہم یدِ بیضاستے
علمِ اشیا داد مغرب را فروغ
حکمتِ او ماست می بندد ز دوغ[38]

* * * *

علم و فن را اے جوانِ شوخ و شنگ
مغز می باید نہ ملبوسِ فرنگ
اندریں رہ جز نگہ مطلوب نیست
ایں کلہ یا آں کلہ مطلوب نیست
فکرِ چالاکے اگر داری بس است
طبعِ درّاکے اگر داری بس است
گر کسے شبہا خورد دودِ چراغ
گیرد از علم و فن و حکمت سراغ
ملکِ معنی کس حدِ او را نہ بست
بے جہادِ پیہمے ناید بدست

* * *

بندۂ افرنگ از ذوقِ نمود
می برد از غربیاں رقص و سرود

* * *

از تن آسانی بگیرد سہل را
فطرتِ او در پذیرد سہل را
سہل را جستن دریں دیرِ کہن
ایں دلیلِ آں کہ جاں رفت از بدن[39]

37. *Jāvīd Nāmah*, pp, 208-9.
38. *Payām-i-Mashriq*, p. 6.
39. *Jāvīd Nāmah*, pp 209-10.

The East imitating the West is deprived of its true self,
It should attempt, instead, a critical appraisal :
The power of the West springs not from her music,
Nor from the dance of her unveiled daughters ;

* * *

Her strength comes not from irreligion,
Nor her progress from the adoption of the Latin script.
The power of the West lies in her Arts and Sciences,
It has kindled its lamps at their fire.

* * *

Science is the "knowledge of identity of things" :
It is both Rod of Moses as well as his White Hand.
Knowledge of things gave light to the West
Her art turns diluted milk into curd.

* * *

Arts and Sciences, O lively and eager youth,
Require a keen intellect, not Western clothes ;
What is needed in this quest is vision,
Not this or that particular head-dress !
If you have a subtle intellect and a discriminating mind,
They would suffice to guarantee success.
When one constantly pours over the midnight lamp,
One gains access to the domain of knowledge, art and wisdom.
The world of spirit which has no frontiers,
Cannot be conquered without a persistent crusade.

* * *

The slave of the West, anxious for display,
Borrows from her only her dance and music.

* * *

He barters his precious soul for frivolous sport ;
Self-indulgent, he grasps what is easy,
And his weak nature accepts it with readiness ;
But the choice of what is easy in life
Proves that the spirit has fled from the body !

He knew that the eyes of the Eastern people were dazed by the glittering appearances of the West and they were not able to judge right from wrong. He urged them to study closely the outer and inner life of the West and see for themselves the real causes of the material prosperity and intellectual and scientific progress of the West. He has rudely shaken the East from its daze and hypnotised state, and emphasised one fundamenlal truth that "knowledge of things" was the sole guide to material as well as spiritual progress. And urging us to pour over "the midnight lamp", he warns us of the pitfalls of the false values and the blinding glare of artfiicial and superficial light emanating from the West.

Poetry and Fine Arts. Another extermely important phase of Iqbāl's revolt is his criticism and condemnation of some modern theories of fine arts including poetry. He had through years of wide ranged experience found out that only such activities of man could be called "good" as contributed towards his general well-being. The object of art, according to Iqbāl, is not to create mere diversion or perversion, but to lend strength to man's creative powers by making the beautiful, more beautiful. He does not believe in art for the sake of art. For art or any other creative projection of man's personality, always aims at some thing beyond. He himself is proud that he wrote poetry not to enjoy its metre—its *radīf* and *qāfīyah*—or some strange airy fancies, but to lay bare the secrets of the human spirit:

کشودم از رخِ معنی نقابے
بدستِ ذره دادم آفتابے[40]

I lifted the veil from the face of "Reality",
I handed the sun to the atom.

Art to him is a means of raising ordinary life to a higher level, not breaking away from life. It is a direct as well as an indirect support of life, not an escape from it. The poetic art had drifted into unheal-

40. *Zabūr-i 'Ajam* (*Gulshan-i Rāz-i Jadīd*), p. 204.

thy channels leading away and downwards from the moral values of life, and Iqbāl directly faced the situation. He did not employ philosophical or metaphysical subtleties to argue his point of view. He has straightaway addressed the poet :

اے میانِ کیسہ ات نقدِ سخن
بر عیارِ زندگی او را بزن[41]

* * * *

ہرچہ باشد خوب و زیبا و جمیل
در بیابانِ طلب ما را دلیل
نقشِ او محکم نشیند در دلت
آرزو ہا آفرینند در دلت

* * *

سینۂ شاعر تجلی زارِ حسن
خیزد از سینائے او انوارِ حسن
از نگاہش خوب گردد خوب تر
فطرت از افسونِ او محبوب تر
از دمش بلبل نوا آموخت است
غازہ اش رخسارِ گل افروخت است
سوزِ او اندر دلِ پروانہ ہا
عشق را رنگیں ازو افسانہ ہا

* * *

فکرِ او با ماہ و انجم ہم نشیں
زشت را نا آشنا خوب آفریں
خضر و در ظلماتِ او آبِ حیات
زندہ تر از آبِ چشمش کائنات[42]

O ! if thou hast the coin of poetry in thy purse,
Test it on the touchstone of life.

* * * *

41. *Asrār-o-Rumūz* (*Asrār-i Khudī*), p.42.
42. Ibid., pp. 37-8.

Whatever is good and fair and beautiful,
Is our guide in the wilderness of seeking ;
Its image becomes impressed on the heart,
Beauty is the creator of desire's spring-tide.

* * *

'Tis in the poet's breast that Beauty unveils,
'Tis from his Sinai that Beauty's beams rise.
By his look the fair is made fairer,
Through his enchantments Nature is more beloved.
From his lips the nightingale hath learned its song,
And his rouge hath brightened the cheek of the rose.
'Tis his passion that burns in the heart of the moth,
'Tis he that lends glowing hues to love-tales.

* * *

His thoughts dwell with the moon and the stars,
He creates beauty and knows not what is ugly.
He is Khiḍr, and hides under his hiding place the Fountain of Life,
All things that exist are made more living by his tears.

The poet who believes in imaginary values and seems to find false, unreal solace in escape from life, in Iqbāl's view, is a diseased portion of human body and should either be cured or cut off. He pities the nation dominated by escapist poets :

وائے قومے کز اجل گیرد برات
شاعرش وا بوسد از ذوقِ حیات

خوش نماید زشت را آئینۂ اش
در جگر صد نشتر از نوشینہ اش

بوسۂ او تازگی از گل برد
ذوقِ پرواز از دلِ بلبل برد

سست اعصاب تو از افیونِ او
زندگانی قیمتِ مضمونِ او

می رباید ذوقِ رعنائی ز سرو
جرّه شاہیں از دمِ سردش تدرو

ماہی و از سینہ تا سر آدم است
چون بنات آشیان اندر یم است

از نوا بر ناخدا افسون زند
کشتی اش در قعرِ دریا افگند

نغمہ ہایش از دلت دزدد ثبات
مرگ را از سحر او دانی حیات

* * *

چون زیان پیرایہ بندد سود را
می کند مذموم ہر محمود را

در یمِ اندیشہ اندازد ترا
از عمل بیگانہ می سازد ترا

* * *

از خم و مینا و جامش الحذر
از مئے آئینہ فامش الحذر[43]

Woe to a people that resigns itself to death,
And whose poet turns away from the joy of living !
His mirror shows beauty as ugliness,
His honey leaves a hundred stings in the heart.
His kiss robs the rose of its freshness,
He takes away from the nightingale's heart the joy of flying.
Thy sinews are relaxed by his opium,
Thou payest for his song with thy life.
He bereaves the cypress of delight in its beauty,
His cold breath makes a pheasant of the male falcon.
He is a fish, and from breast upward a man
Like the Sirens in the ocean.
With his song he enchants the pilot,
And casts the ship to the bottom of the sea.

43. Ibid., pp. 39-40.

His melodies steal firmness from thine heart,
His magic persuades thee that death is life.

* * *

He dresses gain in the garb of loss,
He makes everything praiseworthy blameful.
He plunges thee in a sea of barren thought,
And makes thee a stranger to action.

* * *

Beware of his decanter and cup !
Beware of his sparkling wine !

Iqbāl did not perhaps fully visualise the modern escapist and symbolic tendencies now so pronounced in certain quarters, but his warning was timely and must have, to a great extent, influenced poetic art in his country. It is time, however, that his warning to poets and the nations of the East be repeated to guard them against the apparently easy achievement in composing poetry which serves little purpose except perhaps as an outlet for the surging perversities and complexes preying on the mind of our generation—caught between ignorance and knowledge, and trying to weave around it a curtain to keep itself in blissful oblivion. Let us repeat to them :

اے میانِ کیسہ ات نقدِ سخن
بر عیارِ زندگی او را بزن[44]

If thou hast the coin of poetry in thy purse,
Test it on the touchstone of life.

Revolt Against Necessitarianism. He cried halt to those who are being carried along the irresistible current of self-created and self-imposed power of a pre-ordained fate. He urged his reader to shut his ears and mind against the soothing and enervating drug :

کہ بر من و تو در اختیار نکشاد است[45]

The door of free-will is not open to us.

44. Ibid., p. 42. 45. *Dīvān-i Ḥāfiẓ*.

Fatalistic conception of life has done great harm by stifling and destroying the urge for struggle in the East especially among Muslims. Iqbāl attacked the deterministic views that are so common in our literature and thought, and emphasised man's will and action as the all-powerful elements determining the course of life. Iqbāl's treatment of the question of predestination is very revealing, convincing and as such, encouraging. He says :

معنیٔ تقدیر کم فہمیدۂ
نے خودی را نے خدا را دیدۂ
مردِ مومن با خدا دارد نیاز
'با تو ما سازیم تو با ما بساز'
عزم او خلّاقِ تقدیرِ حق است
روزِ ہیجا تیرِ او تیرِ حق است [46]

Little did you understand the meaning of "fate",
You have niether visualised your own self nor God.
The faithful is in communion with God
And says "we agree to Thy wishes,
Mayst Thou conform to ours !"
The determination of Man (the faithful) is God's command (fate),
On the day of battle his arrow is an arrow shot by God Himself.

Iqbāl was sorry that man lost confidence in his "self" through the belief that everything was predetermined by God's will :

ارضیان نقدِ خودی در باختند
نکتۂ تقدیر را نشناختند
رمز باریکش بحرفے مضمر است
تو اگر دیگر شوی او دیگر است [47]

The inhabitants of earth lost the wealth of "self",
They did not understand the secret of predetermined fate.
Its fine point is hidden in the remark :
If you change yourself, the fate will change accordingly.

46. *Jāvīd Nāmah*, p.142. 47. Ibid., p. 123.

And, according to Iqbāl, if the line of fate does not suit us, it is not manly to drag along or be dragged along. The course of life that is in conflict with man's own progress and ascension ought to be altered. Predestination has no independent existence apart from man's own will, determination and actions, and as such it is determined by our own volition. There are no limits imposed on the number or nature of man's creative actions, and his fate is linked up with the activity within him and his actions in the world outside his "self". Iqbāl has in everyday language expressed the apparently inexpressible subtleties of the conception of fate, and his concrete imagination has enabled him to give effective and axiomatic form to the agelong metaphysical deliberations :

گر زیک تقدیر خوں گردد جگر
خواہ از حق حکمِ تقدیرِ دگر
تو اگر تقدیرِ نو خواہی رواست
زانکہ تقدیراتِ حق لا انتہاست[48]

If a certain line of fate bleeds your heart,
Demand from God another destiny.
Your demand for a new fate is quite in order,
For God can decree destinies of unlimited numbers.

Iqbāl makes man feel his own responsibility so that instead of being a helpless creature drifting along in a rudderless boat on the current of Time he may raise himself to his true position of a "rider of the steed of time" and "the ruler over the elements" :

نائبِ حق در جہاں بودن خوش است
بر عناصر حکمراں بودن خوش است[49]

It is good to be God's vicegerent on earth,
And to be the ruler over the elements.

Iqbāl has tried to infuse in his readers love of danger ; and his way of persuasion is very effective :

48. Ibid. 49. *Asrār-o-Rumūz (Asrār-i Khudī)*, p. 49.

بہ کیشِ زندہ دلاں زندگی جفاطلبی است
سفر بکعبہ نکردم کہ راہ بے خطر است[50]

To those with a living heart, life means love of hardships;
I journeyed to Ka'bah not because it had no dangers.

In another *rubā'ī* in *Payām-i Mashriq* he says :

عجم بحریست نا پیدا کنارے
کہ در وے گوہرِ الماس رنگ است

و لیکن من نہ رانم کشتیٔ خویش
بدریائے کہ موجش بے نہنگ است[51]

'Ajam is a boundless ocean which abounds in pearls and jewels,
But I do not take my boat
To an ocean whose waves are free from crocodiles.

And another :

میارا بزم بر ساحل کہ آں جا
نوائے زندگانی نرم خیز است

بدریا غلط و با موجش در آویز
حیاتِ جاوداں اندر ستیز است[52]

Do not hold your *bazm* (pleasure party) on the shore ;
For there life's melody is rather soft and low.
Leap into the sea and struggle with its waves,
Eternal life lies in struggle.

Man and God. Man is not only conscious but proud of his creative powers. He has given a new shape to earth and water—he has built up order out of chaos, life and beauty out of the stray and scattered hillocks, barren wastes and frightening depths of forests. Man describes himself as a supplementing power to Almighty God, not a mere plaything of the surroundings :

50. *Payām-i Mashriq*, p. 172.
51. Ibid., p. 84.
52. Ibid., p. 41.

خدا

جہان را ز یک آب و گل آفریدم
تو ایران و تاتار و زنگ آفریدی
من از خاک پولادِ ناب آفریدم
تو شمشیر و تیر و تفنگ آفریدی
تبر آفریدی نہالِ چمن را
قفس ساختی طائرِ نغمہ زن را

انسان

تو شب آفریدی چراغ آفریدم
سفال آفریدی ایاغ آفریدم
بیابان و کہسار و راغ آفریدی
خیابان و گلزار و باغ آفریدم
من آنم کہ از سنگ آئینہ سازم
من آنم کہ از زہر نوشینہ سازم [53]

GOD

I created the world out of one and the same mixture of clay and water,
You created Iran, Tartary and Ethiopia.
I created iron-ore from the earth,
You created the sword, the arrow and the gun.
You created axe to cut down plants in the garden,
You constructed cage for the singing birds.

MAN

You created the night, I, the lamp.
You created the clay, I, the vase.
You created the desert, the mountains and jungles,
I created avenues, flower gardens and orchards.
It is I who make glass out of stone,
It is I who extract elixir out of poison.

53. Ibid., p. 132.

And how inspiring it is :

گفت یزداں کہ چنین است و دگر ہیچ مگو
گفت آدم کہ چنین است و چناں می بائست[54]

God said : things are as they are and don't say anything regarding this.
But Adam said : They are as they are, but such and such ought to be like that.

It would be proper to conclude this short appreciation of Iqbāl's genius with man's first and last question—the question regarding man's existence and his relationship with God. Apart from the philosophical significance, this is one of the finest examples of Iqbāl's power of effective expression, brevity, pointedness and his faith in man's ultimate destiny.

Iqbāl puts the following questions to God :

من کیم ؟ تو کیستی ؟ عالم کجاست ؟
درمیانِ ما و تو دوری چرا ست ؟
من چرا در بندِ تقدیرم بگوے
تو نمیری من چرا میرم بگوے[55]

Who am I ? What are You? What is the world ?
Why is there distance between You and us ?
Why am I in the bondage of Fate ?
You don't die, Why do I ?

The two verses that contain God's reply epitomise Iqbāl's entire conception of the human ego and its destiny :

بودۂ اندر جہانِ چار سو
ہر کہ گنجد اندرو میرد درو

54. *Zabūr-i 'Ajam*, p. 192. 55. *Jāvīd Nāmah*, p. 228.

زندگی خواہی خودی را پیش کن
چار سو را غرق اندر خویش کن
باز بینی من کیم تو کیستی
در جہاں چُوں مردی و چوں زیستی [56]

You have spent your life in the world of four dimensions,
One who is encompassed by this world dies within it.
If you want life, project thy self,
Absorb all the four dimensions within thy self.
Then you will see : Who I am and what you are,
And also realise how you died and lived in the world.

July 1954

56. Ibid.

Chaudhri Muhammad Ali

WHAT AILS THE SPIRIT OF THE EAST ?

Diagnosis and Remedy

In this article I shall attempt to discuss some aspects of one of Iqbāl's poems. It may appear unnecessary and even presumptuous to restate in crude and halting prose what has been said in such exalted poetry, but I am encouraged by Iqbāl's line :

بر آور ہر چہ اندر سینہ داری[1]

Among the later poems of Iqbāl is the *Mathnavī Pas Cheh Bāyad Kard ay Aqwām-i Sharq.*

1. The question "What, then, is to be done ?" is addressed to the nations of the East and more specifically to the Muslim nations. By its very phrasing the question evokes in the mind a background of long discussion and debate, of discontent with present conditions, of continuing search for a way out, culminating in an urgent, insistent, impatient demand for action. Something, it is clear, has to be done to free the spirit of the East, to break the shackles of the West, but what exactly is to be done remains to be determined. The poem gives the answer, as Iqbāl saw it ; but if we are to be faithful to his teachings we must attempt an answer ourselves. We must set the problem

1. *Payām-i Mashriq*, p. 23.

against our experience of the contemporary world, and out of the resources of our own mind find the solution to it. Only by such an effort would we gain the vision to see the task before us and the energy to carry it out. No doubt the mind of our generation has been largely fashioned by Iqbāl and, as we procced on our journey, we shall find our path illumined by his thought, but still the search and the endeavour has to be our own

2. The contemporary scene is dominated by two gigantic struggles. The first is the struggle of the nations of Asia and Africa against the political domination and economic exploitation by the West. The second, and relatively more recent struggle, is the contest between the capitalist countries headed by the U.S.A. and the Communist countries headed by the U.S.S.R. for the mastery of the world. The latter is generally referred to as the East-West struggle, although to the countries of Asia and Africa it is primarily a struggle between two groups of Western nations in terms of two varieties of Western ideology. These two struggles affect each other in a variety of ways, sometimes counteracting and sometimes reinforcing each other. As the two rival groups seek to win over the minds of the nations of the world, an ideological war of unprecedented intensity rages over the globe and particularly over Asia.

3. If one looks deep enough, both these struggles are the outcome of a single historic process which brought great power and opportunity for good and evil to the nations of the West. This was the great change in human affairs brought about by science and its practical application to industry—the process known by the name of the Industrial Revolution.

4. Science which is man's attempt to co-ordinate his observations of the physical world in a coherent system of concepts is as old as man. It is a ceaseless quest to correlate known facts and to explore future regions of experience in the light of this correlation. This ever-active curiosity, this urge for a deeper understanding of the world around us, is part of the very texture of the human mind. Without it man would never have risen beyond mere animal existence. Behind

all scientific investigation lies an active faith in the harmony and orderliness of existence. Such a faith is an integral part of Islam as the Qur'ān says :

مَا تَرَىٰ فِي خَلْقِ الرَّحْمَٰنِ مِن تَفَاوُتٍ ۖ فَارْجِعِ الْبَصَرَ لا
هَلْ تَرَىٰ مِن فُطُورٍ ○ ثُمَّ ارْجِعِ الْبَصَرَ كَرَّتَيْنِ يَنقَلِبْ
إِلَيْكَ الْبَصَرُ خَاسِئًا وَهُوَ حَسِيرٌ ○ [2]

You see no incongruity in the creation of the Beneficent God : Then look again, can you see any disorder? Turn back the eyes again and again : your look shall come back to you confused while it is fatigued.

It was natural therefore that Muslims should have played a notable part in developing the methods of scientific inquiry. Their knowledge and their impulse were transmitted to Western Europe, where they knidled a flame, the light of which is reflected back to us today. The advances made in scientific knowledge during the last few centuries have brought about a revolutionary change in man's understanding of the universe and his mastery of the physical environment.

To participate in this adventure of thought, this creative enterprise of the human mind, should be the privilege and duty of every human society, but particularly so of the Muslims who are enjoined by the Qur'ān to observe and study the universe.

هر چه می بینی ز انوارِ حق است
حکمتِ اشیا ز اسرارِ حق است
هر که آیاتِ خدا بیند حُر است
اصلِ این حکمت ز حکمِ اُنظُر است[3]

We have to make up for centuries of neglect and learn from those we once taught. We have not only to master the great volume of knowledge already gained, but we have to be in the vanguard of scientific advance. In spite of these advances in knowledge, mankind is still only at the beginning of a great adventure. The scheme of interconnected ideas with which we seek to grasp reality has itself undergone

2. The Qur'ān, lxvii. 3-4. 3. *Pas Cheh Bāyad Kard*, p. 57.

radical changes during the last fifty years, and will undoubtedly change still further in future. Our knowledge is fragmentary and uncertain, but among the choicest delights of the human spirit is this continual quest for truth, probing deeper and deeper into reality.

5. This quest for knowledge and understanding would be enough justification for scientific activity, but the manner in which its practical application to industry has transformed living conditions and given mastery over the physical environment provides an added reason of great force. This process of practical application started in the latter part of the eighteenth century and has since continued with accelerating momentum. The last two centuries have seen technological advances greater than those of all the preceding centuries taken together. The result is that industrialised countries are at a much higher level of power and production than is possible to any unindustrialised country. The difference is solely due to the appliction of mechanical and electrical power through machines. In an agricultural economy as opposed to an industrial economy, the energy for work is provided by animal muscle-power, whether for processes of production or transport. This power is necessarily limited by the number, strength and speed of animals such as the bullock or the horse. By use of mechanical and electrical power the total amount of work and its speed can be enormously increased. The difference is that between a bullock-cart and a railway engine or an aeroplane. Many processes which are impossible in an agricultural economy become feasible through the use of machines. Thus the total volume of production as well as the amount of goods and services available to each individual in the way of food, clothing, housing and transport is greatly increased. Since machines can best perform simple repetitive processes, the industrial revolution has brought about a division of labour unimaginable before, and the technique of mass production has enormously increased the volume and range of goods produced. With the rise in the productivity of labour goes an increase in purchasing power to absorb and sustain this flood of production. The operation of machines requires a higher degree of education and skill

than is needed for work in an agricultural community. The process of industrialisation is thus accompanied by a wide diffusion of education and a rise in the standard of living of the masses. For the first time man begins to dream of plenty for all. The tremendous forces placed at man's disposal can be used for diverting the course of rivers, changing deserts into green fields, conquering space and time through aeroplanes and radio communication, prolonging human life and overcoming disease. The increase in economic power brings about an even greater increase in military power. Knowledge of the working of metals, chemicals and living organisms can be used equally for constructive and destructive purposes. The methods of mass production make it necessary to organise large masses of men in big factories. The possibilities of large scale organisation, thus opened up, can be used equally in the concentration of huge armed forces. All these, it should be noted, have been rendered possible by science and its pracatical application to industry.

6. The tremendous increase in productivity and in military power, as well as the high standard of living and the wide diffusion of education among the masses, are thus seen to be consequences of industrialisation and industrialisation alone. Neither the political institutions nor the social doctrines of any industrial country have in themselves any power to bring about the improvement in the standard of living or in military power which so overawe the minds of the people of the East. Although it gives great political and cultural prestige to the countries adopting it, industrialisation itself being merely a technique of applying mechanical and electrical power through machines to processes of industrial production is neither the consequence, nor the necessary ally, of any particular creed. It can be associated with any social and political system and will produce its effects to the extent that it is applied. In the U.S.A. it has been developed and used by a democracy. In Japan industrialisation was combined with Shintoism. In Russia it has been applied by a dictatorship. It is of the utmost importance to grasp this point. The economic and military power gained through industrialisation is continually used by both the contending

world groups to lend prestige and authority to their social and political doctrines. Both the U.S.A. and Russia are militarily powerful; both have succeeded in raising the standard of living and of education of their masses. Since they profess opposing ideologies, it is obvious that this material progress and military power cannot be the fruit of either of these ideologies but must be the result of a factor common to both. That factor is industrialisation.

7. It might help us in understanding the part played by the Industrial Revolution in the modern world, if we attempt a not too fanciful an analogy with the agricultural revolution that must have taken place many thousands of years ago. The conditions of life of the primitive man living in small colonies and dependent solely upon the relatively feeble power of human muscles must have been hard and precarious in the extreme. Then, within a relatively short period of time, possibly a span of only two or three hundred years, a remarkable change took place in the Euphrates and the Nile valleys. The domestication of animals and their employment in agriculture, the use of metals, the manufacture of textiles, the construction of houses, and numerous other advances in the arts and sciences ushered in what one might call the Agricultural Revolution. The great increase in military strength which resulted from the use of horses and chariots, and metals for weapons must have made the power of these agricultural communities irresistible. Gradually the arts and sciences which produced the Agricultural Revolution spread over the whole world and became the common heritage of mankind. But, in the earlier stage, when only a few communities had mastered them, their power and prestige must have been very high among their primitive neighbours. Imagine a primitive man visiting one of these cities with its imposing temples, fine houses, crowded streets and well-clad men and women. It would be difficult for him to discern the true cause and he might well imagine that all this wealth and culture was the result of worship of the city's particular goddess; and when he would compare the harsh conditions of his own life with the soft and refined ways of the city, its glamour might blind him still further. But, however wrong our imaginary visitor

might have been in his assessment of the causes, he would instinctively have sensed that no primitive community could withstand the power of an agricultural community. The reason is that an agricultural economy operates on a higher level of energy than a primitive economy. The higher level of energy is provided by animal power and the technology appropriate to the utilisation of that power. In more concrete terms it means the use of bullocks, horses, ploughs, carts and similar other implements for purposes of production. Leaving aside the last two centuries, the entire historical epoch known to us operated on this level of energy. A variety of civilisations have flourished in it but the mode of production of all of them was agricultural. The complete contrast, for example, between Byzantium and the early Caliphate provides a refutation of the materialistic interpretation of history which regards the mode of production as the determining element in society.

8. During the last two centuries industrialisation has raised a number of countries to a higher level of energy provided by mechanical and electrical power. Just as the agricultural mode of production gradually spread all over the world, the industrial mode of production will also spread throughout the world, and all countries will ultimately operate at the higher level of energy provided by it. At this higher level also there will still be vital and significant differences between various cultures. But while this change from the agricultural to the industrial economy is in the process of taking place, man's attention is naturally drawn to it. This accounts for the present-day emphasis on economic issues and partly explains the rise of materialism as a philosophy of life.

9. The disparity of power which industrialisation has brought about can be judged from the fact that according to a recent U.N. report, countries comprising two-thirds of the world's population disposed of only 15 per cent of the world's income. It is not merely a matter of riches and property; it goes much deeper than that. It is a matter of survival value. Any society which operates on a lower level of energy cannot withstand the impact of another working on a higher

energy level. Any society which wishes to survive and maintain its own cultural pattern must, therefore, attempt to gain the highest level of energy available in the contemporary world. Otherwise it will survive at the mercy of others and with a continued feeling of cultural inferiority, which will spell its ultimate disintegration. The instinctive sense of mankind has always placed a high value on the factors which make for survival. Those of us who feel distressed at this emphasis on industrialisation may well ponder over the extent to which the products of industrial countries are necessities of modern life. Self-respect demands that we should not be mere beneficiaries of the knowledge and skill of others. We must equip ourselves fully with the science and technology of the West and should be equal partners in contributing to human knowledge. Only in this way can we regain our cultural integrity.

10. We can now turn to the manner in which industrialisation has affected the relations between the West and the East and has intensified rivalries and conflicts between Western nations. It is a commonplace how the economic and military strength of the West through industrialisation stimulated the search for markets and the desire to control territories producing raw material, and gave a powerful impetus to Western imperialism. From the middle of the eighteenth century onwards, the countries of Asia and Africa were subjected to European domination. The nineteenth century, which most Western writers regard as a century of progress, was for the bulk of mankind a century of oppression and exploitation. The struggle of the peoples of Asia and Africa for liberation from the Western yoke is one of the most powerful forces shaping history, but it can never completely achieve its objective until the nations of Asia and Africa acquire power through industrialisation. The political freedom which has been won by some countries of Asia and Africa would never be complete without economic independence which only industrialisation can bring.

11. Of the Western countries England was the first to achieve industrialisation, and it was the first in the race for the subjugation and exploitation of the East. Indeed in England's case it is difficult to

say which is the cause and which the effect, so intimate was the mutual action and reaction of industrialisation and exploitation of Eastern countries in the earlier stages. England's success excited the rivalry of other European nations. The first great struggle was between the British and the French under Napoleon. It is obvious enough now that it was a struggle for power and the mastery of the East, but to the contemporary world it was represented as an ideological conflict between the ideals of the French Revolution, on the one hand, and the institutions of British democracy and liberty, on the other. The British emerged as victors. The next challenge to their position in the East during the 19th century came from Czarist Russia which spread eastwards and absorbed the Muslim countries of Central Asia. Again this struggle for power was represented as a struggle between Czarist despotism and Western liberalism, but a little later when confronted with the rising power of imperialist Germany, these two conflicting ideologies agreed to co-exist peacefully by dividing weaker countries into their respective spheres of interest. The First World War was a result of the challenge which the new power of Germany threw to England's supremacy. Having been defeated once, Germany made a second bid in the last world war to capture world power. The Second World War has been succeeded by a cold war of great intensity between America and its allies on the one hand and Russia and its associates on the other. This struggle, like all previous struggles of a similar nature, has taken on the colour of an ideological conflict, but is at bottom a struggle between two groups of powers for the domination of the world. Throughout these struggles the guiding force has been nationalism which, in its more unbridled forms, appears as racialism and, when combined with exploitation and subjugation of other people, becomes imperialism. We might pause at this point and listen to Iqbāl :

آدمیت زار نالید از فرنگ
زندگی ہنگامہ بر چید از فرنگ
پس چہ باید کرد اے اقوامِ شرق ؟
باز روشن می شود ایامِ شرق

در ضمیرش انقلاب آمد پدید
شب گذشت و آفتاب آمد پدید
یورپ از شمشیرِ خود بسمل فتاد
زیر گردوں رسمِ لادینی نہاد
گرگے اندر پوستینِ برۂ
ہر زماں اندر کمینِ برۂ
مشکلاتِ حضرتِ انساں ازو است
آدمیت را غمِ پنہاں از و است
در نگاہش آدمی آب و گل است
کاروانِ زندگی بے منزل است[4]

* * * *

با خساں اندر جہانِ خیر و شر
در نسازد مستیٔ علم و ہنر
آہ از افرنگ و از آئینِ او
آہ از اندیشۂ لادینِ او[5]

12. The religious wars that followed the Reformation in Europe produced, in course of time, a general revulsion against religion. The assaults of rationalism on the dogmas of the Christian Church further weakened the hold of religion upon the masses. In this climate men's loyalties were drawn to the nation-State, and nationalism became the living faith of the nations of Europe.

ان تازہ خداؤں میں بڑا سب سے وطن ہے[6]

The good of the nation became the ultimate good and, since national good could most easily be conceived in material terms, any action that contributed to the power and greatness of the country was regarded as intrinsically good, irrespective of its moral quality or its effect upon other nations. This new idolatry has divided mankind into groups whose interests are in conflict and for whom no universal moral values hold good. Every nation in the world is now

4. Ibid., p. 56.
5. Ibid., p. 58.
6. *Bāng-i Darā*, p. 173.

smitten with it, and so deeply has it entered into men's minds that there is very little consciousness even in Western countries of the havoc it has played. Even the devastation caused by two world wars has not awakened them to its dangers. It has perverted history and literature. Even though Western domination is barely two centuries old, most European writers treat history as the march of the superior Western races to their place of pre-eminence in the world. Every original thought, every invention, every high aspiration is appropriated to the West. Within this general framework every Western nation aspires for the highest place of honour. Late comers to power like Germany and Russia have to make a more deliberate effort ; that is why their re-writing of history is so blatant as compared with the more subtle methods of the older powers. Even the most liberal thinkers of Europe can seldom envisage a future in which the West does not play the dominating role in world affairs. Communism, which at one time stressed its international character in the hope of arousing all the workers of the world against their rulers, is now no more than an instrument of Russian foreign policy, dedicated to the interests of Russia as a great power. The hold of Russia over the Muslim countries of Central Asia is basically of the same character as the domination by other European powers over many countries of Asia and Africa.

13. The conflict between the two world groups is then primarily due to the desire of each group to play the dominant role in world affairs. Neither group is inspired by universal moral values or by the interests of mankind as a whole. Whatever their claims, the conduct of each is guided by power politics and nothing else. The methods of the one may be more crude than those of the other ; the grip of the one may be more unrelenting than that of the other, but to the peoples of the East both appear as oppressors ; and it is only their mutual rivalry that keeps them in check to some extent.

14. Notwithstanding the general similarity of their world outlook which is based on nationalism and materialism, there are real differences between the two world groups. Even their stress on national-

ism and materialism varies. But their most outstanding difference lies in the field of distribution of property and income. Both are agreed on treating the production and exchange of goods as determining other human activities, the only difference being that Communism is much more explicit and emphatic on this point. The distinguishing characteristic of Western liberalism is the view that economic good can best be achieved by a system of free competition in a society which gives the same political rights to every member through the institution of representative government. In a society, however, in which economic power is unevenly distributed, it is obvious nonsense to equate the result of free competition with the general good. The problem of the uneven distribution of property and income became very acute with the progress of the industrial revolution during the nineteenth century. Practically all economic power was concentrated in the hands of the small commercial and industrialist class. Marx did not have much difficulty in demonstrating that the classical economic doctrines of *laissez faire* and free competition served the interests of this class, and used his demonstration to promote class war between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The solution advanced by Communism for the elimination of economic inequalities and of class conflicts is the concentration of all economic power in the hands of the State. With the surrender of all political and economic power and liberty to the dictatorship of the proletariat, all classes would be on equal footing as against the State which then would somehow wither away. It is an indication of the strength of the human desire for social justice that so self-contradictory a doctrine should have found widespread acceptance. The concentration of all political and economic power in the hands of the State would undoubtedly reduce all classes to an equal level. But it would be a level of equal helplessness. A dictatorship of this description once formed would be self-perpetuating. Instead of withering away it would strengthen its grip over every phase of human activity, and since the population would be completely within its power, no means would be left to the latter to change the regime. The Communist answer to the problem raised by the tendency of an industrial system to concentrate power in a few hands is not a real

solution at all ; the remedy is worse than the disease.

Western liberalism has, in course of time, attempted another solution. In the first place it tries to confront the economic power of capital with the economic power of organised labour in the hope that the resultant of two more or less equal opposing forces would produce a more equitable equation. Profit-sharing, giving labour a voice in the management or a share in the capital and various other measures are being tried to overcome the antagonism which the struggle for the rights of labour has necessarily produced.

Secondly, legislation is undertaken to prevent the formation of excessively large units. Thirdly, an attempt is made to reduce inequalities through progressive taxation and social security schemes. The concept of the welfare State is an indication of the new approach.

15. Muslim nations are today confronted with the various problems produced by Western domination: nationalism, materialism and the clashing ideologies of Communism and Western liberalism. We have to decide our attitude to these problems and our course of action. Among the Muslim world today a great searching of heart is going on. What is the right solution to these problems? What must we do to meet the challenge of the West? Would our response be adequate and would it preserve for us the integrity of our faith and culture? On the answer to these questions would depend our well-being and may be even our survival.

16. All these questions have been raised by the effect of Western domination on our society and that domination is primarily due to industrialisation. Industrialisation, as a technique of production is ideologically neutral and is an essential means for raising our economic and military power to a level where we can meet the challenge of the West. It will also provide us with the means for mass education, for health services on the widest scale and for raising our living standards. We must, therefore, exert ourselves to the utmost to learn the sciences and technology in which the West is pre-eminent, so that we might partake in the progress of human knowledge as equal contributors.

17. For the rest, of what the West has to offer, our approach should be critical. We should examine the social and political doctrines of the West in an independent spirit in the light of the criteria furnished by Islam.

گماں مبر کہ خرد را حساب و میزاں نیست
نگاہِ بندۂ مومن قیامتِ خرد است [7]

To take nationalism first, the countries of the East are seeking to gain national independence and this struggle against imperialism has aroused and strengthened nationalist feelings. To the extent that it acts as a liberating force, nationalism in the East is wholly to be desired but there is a danger in it for the unity of the Muslim world, if it takes on the Western form. For non-Muslim peoples it may be natural to adopt the nationalism of the Western type as their active faith, even though they too should be warned by the experience of Europe and by what Japan did in Asia. But for the Muslim countries to give it unlimited sway would be a great betrayal of faith in the unity of Islam. It is necessary to draw a clear distinction between a limited concept of nationalism subordinated to the higher goal of the unity of mankind as preached by Islam and the unbridled nationalism of the West. Iqbāl was deeply conscious of the dangers of this new idolatry for the Muslim world and he has repeatedly referred to this theme :

جو کرے گا امتیازِ رنگ و خوں مٹ جائے گا
ترک خر گاہی ہو یا اعرابی والا گہر [8]

His denunciation of Machiavelli is directed not so much against his ethics of statecraft as against his exaltation of the nation-State as an absolute value.

مملکت را دینِ او معبود ساخت
فکرِ او مذموم را محمود ساخت

7. *Pas Cheh Bāyad Kard*, p. 4. 8. *Bāng-i Darā*, p. 301.

بوسہ تا بر پائے ایں معبود زد
نقدِ حق را بر عیارِ سود زد[9]

In the present phase it is the duty of each Muslim country to strengthen itself to the utmost, but it is necessary at the same time to develop harmonious relations and ties of friendship within the Muslim world so that in course of time a League of Muslim Nations, united in its ideals and policy, is able to shape and influence world events.

ربط و ضبطِ ملتِ بیضا ہے مشرق کی نجات
ایشیا والے ہیں اس نکتے سے اب تک بے خبر[10]

Whatever the stage of our journey today we must never lose sight of our mission in the world. In undertaking our various tasks we should always bear in mind Iqbāl's words :

Vision without power does bring moral elevation but cannot give a lasting culture. Power without vision tends to become destructive and inhuman. Both must combine for the spriritual expansion of humanity.

18. There are other aspects of Western civilisation, for example the commercial exploitation of the sex instinct through the cinema and advertisements which are abhorrent to Islam. I have little doubt that later generations in the West itself will look with repugnance at such practices. On the other hand, there are elements in the experience of the West which we can and should assimilate. To give an instance, the representative institutions evolved in the West are a practical method by which Islamic democracy can find concrete form in the large populations of today. Similarly, while we must reject the dialectical materialism and the materialistic interpretation of history preached by Communism, we can learn a great deal from the Russian efforts to diffuse education and culture among the masses within a short time. To the extent that such endeavours are inspired by the urge for social justice and for providing equality of opportunity, they are akin to the

9. *Asrār-o-Rumūz (Rumūz-i Bekhudī)*, p. 134.
10. *Bāng-i Darā*, p. 301.

ideals of Islam :

إِنَّا عَرَضْنَا الْأَمَانَةَ عَلَى السَّمٰوٰتِ وَالْأَرْضِ وَالْجِبَالِ
فَأَبَيْنَ أَنْ يَحْمِلْنَهَا وَأَشْفَقْنَ مِنْهَا وَحَمَلَهَا الْإِنْسَانُ إِنَّهُ
كَانَ ظَلُومًا جَهُولًا [11]

19. To the problem of the relationship between capital and labour and the manner in which the inequalities which an industrial system generates are to be mitigated, neither the West nor anybody else has yet found a clear-cut and final solution. The Communist solution is no solution at all. To put every citizen at the mercy of the State possessed of all political and economic power, is totally opposed to the spirit of Islam. Islam regards each individual as responsible to God and although each individual is influenced by, and influences, his environment and can reach his full maturity only as a member of society, yet the core of his being is his moral responsibility. That is the trust which the heavens and the earth refused to bear and which man was willing to take on his feeble shoulders. Any effort, therefore, to reduce man to the level of an automaton or to belittle the central feature of his Ego is opposed to Islam.

20. The type of society that Islam favours is a society of free individuals earning their living by their own hard and honest work and co-operating with each other in all the affairs of life.

در جہاں اسرارِ دیں را فاش کن
نکتۂ شرعِ مبیں را فاش کن
کس نہ گردد در جہاں محتاجِ کس
نکتۂ شرعِ مبیں این است و بس [12]

Such a society demands the widest possible distribution of property and income ; and Islamic institutions, such as the law of inheritance, are intended to bring about such a distribution. In an industrial society, however, some large units of production are inevitable. Although electric power makes it possible to disperse production in a number of

11. The Qur'ān, xxxiii. 72.

12. *Pas Cheh Bāyad Kard*, p. 41.

small units, the tendency of industrial production is towards large units. But the physical size of the units need not stand in the way of a wide distribution of property rights. The institution of joint-stock companies with the division of stock into a number of shares provides a method for doing this. The basis for any Islamic society should be equality of opportunity, particularly in education. Apart from mass education, all boys and girls, whatever the status of their parents, should be enabled to reach the highest level of education for which they are fit. This effort was made by all Islamic societies in the past and we must again put it into practice. it is not only a fulfilment of an Islamic duty ; it is sound common sense. The number of men with exceptional gifts in any society is limited, but is distributed fairly evenly over all classes, rich and poor. To limit higher educational opportunities only to the rich is to allow a great reservoir of ability to run waste. The institution of *Zakāt* in Islam is intended to provide that no one in a Muslim society shall be in want. It is the first example in human history of a social security scheme operating throughout the State and applicable to every individual. These are some of the ways in which Islam attempts to put the relation between individual and groups in a society on a harmonious basis. There are others such as the injunctions against hoarding and usury and the circulation of wealth only among the well-to-do ; or against gambling and speculation and other undesirable trade practices. My purpose is not to enumerate all these measures but to indicate the direction in which they point.

I shall, however, make a few general observations which might help to clear the method of approach to such problems.

There are many situations to which there is no single clear-cut solution but a combination of factors reinforcing each other which tend towards as complete a solution as is humanly possible. To give a homely example, there is no mathematically perfect solution to the fundamental human problem of married happiness. All that any system can do is to provide a rational institution of marriage and reinforce it with appropriate standards of conduct to achieve in the majority of cases as close an approximation to the ideal as is feasible. Islam

demands of its followers certain standards of conduct. If our society in general follows those standards we would develop enough harmony in our social relations and be able to resolve conflicting claims of individuals and groups more successfully than is otherwise possible.

The problem of relation between capital and labour has been rendered unnecessarily intricate and difficult in Europe by the bitter and prolonged class conflict extending over a hundred and fifty years. We are fortunate that we have no such legacy and should, therefore, be better able to tackle this problem.

Every society has its ways of thought and conduct determined largely by tradition and custom. Muslim societies have, through centuries of decadence and un-Islamic ways of thought and conduct, accumulated a thick crust of customs which are inimical to the spirit of Islam. Our society is shot through and through with privilege, in spite of all our boasts about freedom from distinctions of caste. The equality of opportunity that our society provides is not even a hundredth part of that provided by many non-Muslim countries. A tremendous effort will be required to reconstruct the foundations of our life on an Islamic basis. Even though the purification of our thought is a first condition of progress towards our objective, we shall fail in it if we undertake it merely as an intellectual exercise. When our intelligentsia demand a system of thought that without any effort on their part to change their lives, should provide a theoretically perfect solution to the problems raised by modern industrial society, they are failing to understand the temper of Islam and its ways of transforming society. It is only through action that the spirit of Islam would unfold itself before us and guide us on our way. Our judgment of Islam itself will undergo a change as we proceed on this journey. No religion can be judged even by its own followers apart from the practices of its followers.

انساں کی ہوس نے جنھیں رکھا تھا چھپا کر
کھلتے نظر آتے ہیں بتدریج وہ اسرار
قرآن میں ہو غوطہ زن اے مردِ مسلماں
اللہ کرے تجھ کو عطا جدّتِ کردار

جو حرفِ 'قل العفو' میں پوشیدہ ہے اب تک
اس دور میں شاید وہ حقیقت ہو نمودار [13]

The working out of any fruitful idea takes a long time and requires the devoted work of generations. Take for example the methods of scientific investigation. They could be written down on a few pages, and yet no man merely by reading these pages could have formed any idea of their rich potentialities. It is only through the faith and action of scientific workers over the centuries that the possibilities have unfolded themselves to our view.

So it is with Islam. But the tragedy is that the self-confidence and the faith of the Muslims in the capacity of Islam to solve the problems of the modern world have been seriously undermined. The superiority of the West in political and economic power has produced in the people of the East a deep sense of cultural inferiority. Their eyes are blinded by the imposing exterior of the West to the weakness and inadequacy of its moral foundations. The shallow and arrogant rationalism of the West which questions every faith except its own irrational belief in nationalism, the militant Communism which poses as the only progressive force in the world, the self-indulgent liberalism which looks askance at every earnest endeavour, the corrosive cynicism which sees through everything except its own evasion of responsibility—all these have in various ways contributed to the state of confusion and lack of faith, so prevalent today. There is nothing against which Iqbāl battled so vigorously and persistently as against the lack of faith which saps the will to action.

آدم بمیرد از بے یقینی [14]

* * * *

جب اس انگارۂ خاکی میں ہوتا ہے یقیں پیدا
تو کر لیتا ہے یہ بال و پرِ روح الامیں پیدا [15]

Not until we recapture faith in Islam as a living force capable of leading humanity to its highest development; not until we place

13 *Ḍarb-i Kalīm*, p. 138.
14. *Zabūr-i 'Ajam*, p. 164.
15. *Bāng-i Darā*, p. 309.

all the resources of our mind in the service of this great cause ; not until then would we have the vision to see what Islam can do for humanity. Faith is the prerequisite of all endeavour ; and it is by our endeavour that we shall be judged. At every moment of our life, for everything that we do or fail to do, we stand on trial, and if we are found wanting we shall be cast on the scrap-heap. Such is the law of Him who created life and death that He might test us which of us is the best in deeds.

تَبٰرَكَ الَّذِىْ بِيَدِهِ الْمُلْكُ وَهُوَ عَلٰى كُلِّ شَىْءٍ قَدِيْرُ ۨ لا
الَّذِىْ خَلَقَ الْمَوْتَ وَالْحَيٰوةَ لِيَبْلُوَكُمْ اَيُّكُمْ اَحْسَنُ
عَمَلًا ط وَهُوَ الْعَزِيْزُ الْغَفُوْرُ ۨ لا [16]

July 1952

16. The Qur'ān, lxvii. 1-2.

Hafiz Abbadullah Farooqi

IQBAL'S CONCEPT OF STATE

Iqbāl outright rejects a theory of State which maintains a dualism of Church and State for this is not allowed by Islam. "In Islam", he holds, "it is the same reality which appears as the Church looked at from one point of view and the State from another. It is not true to say that the Church and the State are two sides or facets of the same thing. Islam is a single unanalysable reality which is one or the other as your point of view varies."[1] He further maintains that "The Islamic idea of the State must not be confounded with the European idea of the separation of Church and State. The former is only a division of functions as is clear from the gradual creation in the Muslim State of the office of Shaikh-ul-Islam and Ministers; the latter is based on the metaphysical dualism of spirit and matter."[2]

The ideological State of Iqbāl being an Islamic State affords equal opportunities to the people to make as much progress as their potentialities permit. In such a State every member of the State is to be encouraged to display the best in him in the service of God and humanity. An Islamic State, according to Iqbāl, exists for the perfec-

1. Iqbāl, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, Oxford University Press, London, 1934, p. 146.

2. Syed Abdul Vahid, *Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbal*, Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf, Lahore, 1964, p. 284.

tion of the world-order and for the raising of humanity to a higher, nobler, and spiritual life, and is thus to be distinguished from a national State, which is narrow and secular in its outlook. Iqbāl says that "the state, from the Islamic standpoint, is an endeavour to trans-from . . . ideal principles into space-time forces, an aspiration to realize them in a definite human organization. It is in this sense alone that the state in Islam is a theocracy, not in the sense that it is headed by a representative of God on earth who can always screen his despotic will behind his supposed infallibility. The critics of Islam have lost sight of this important consideration."[3]

Iqbāl thus rejects nationalism in the secular sense; yet he is an advocate of Islamic nationalism which he bases primarily on the principle of the unity of God, and hence cherishes the vision of a World State in which all the Muslim nations would form an indivisible community. Nationalism in this sense has its place in an Islamic ideological State. Iqbāl further elucidates this point: "The political ideal of Islam consists in the creation of a people born of a free fusion of all races and nationalities. Nationality, with Islam, is not the highest limit of political development; for the general principles of the law of Islam rest on human nature, not on the peculiarities of a particular people. The inner cohesion of such a nation would consist not in ethnic or geographic unity, not in the unity of language or social tradition, but in the unity of the religious and political ideal; or, in the psychological fact of 'like-mindedness', as St. Paul would say. The membership of this nation, consequently, would not be determined by birth, marriage, domicile or naturalisation. It would be determined by a public declaration of 'like-mindedness', and would terminate when the individual has ceased to be like-minded with others. The ideal territory for such a nation would be the whole earth."[4]

The struggle for territorial nationalism is usually allied with the demand for the establishment of democratic government. Islam is not

3. Iqbal, op. cit., p. 147.   4. S.A. Vahid, op. cit., p. 60.

a democracy in the Western sense of the term; it is the rule of God for the perfection of humanity. Iqbāl repudiates secular Western democracy, the philosophical foundation of which is the sovereignty of the people and is thus totally different from Islamic polity reared on the sovereignty of God and vicegerency of man. He positively maintains that so long as the so-called democracy, the wretched nationalism, and the degraded imperialism have not crumbled into dust, so long as men have not demonstrated by their action the belief that the entire mankind is one family and so long as the distinctions of race, colour and nationality have not been completely swept away, we will not be able to lead a happy life, and the fine ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity will never be realised. He, therefore, takes a firm stand against racial discriminations. So he says:

یہی مقصودِ فطرت ہے یہی رمزِ مسلمانی
اخوت کی جہانگیری محبت کی فراوانی
بتانِ رنگ و خوں کو توڑ کر ملت میں گم ہو جا
نہ تورانی رہے باقی نہ ایرانی نہ افغانی[5]

The ultimate aim of Nature as well as the inner secret of Islam is to establish the universality of brotherhood and the abundance of love.
Shatter the idols of race and colour and lose thyself in the *millah*;
So that there remains no distinction between the Turānians, the Persians and the Afghāns.

Iqbāl condemns the Western democracy and advocates in its place the spiritual democracy. In fact, spiritual democracy is the only form of government that suits the ideological State of Iqbāl. He, therefore says: "let the Muslim of to-day appreciate his position, reconstruct his social life in the light of the ultimate principles, and evolve, out of the hitherto partially revealed purpose of Islam, that spiritual democracy which is the ultimate aim of Islam."[6] He reiterates that "The best form of Government for such a community would be democracy, the

5. *Bāng-i Darā*, pp. 307-8. 6. Iqbal, op. cit., p. 170.

ideal of which is to let man develop all the possibilities of his nature by allowing him as much freedom as practicable."[7] Thus democracy in Islam, according to Iqbāl, does not grow out of the idea of economic opportunity but basically from the spiritual principle that every human being is a centre of latent powers and possibilities which can be realised by cultivating a certain type of character.

According to Iqbāl, the Muslim Commonwealth is based on the absolute equality of all Muslims in the eye of the law. There is no caste system. Freedom in the Islamic State means that the individual is free to grow, develop his talents and exercise them freely in the community within the limits prescribed by the State. It implies the full development of one's personality by realising the social and moral ideals. Liberty in Islam is thus the natural right of every member of the State, who, believing in one God and the Prophet, works for the realisation of the Islamic social ideal. Liberty of unrestricted nature hampering the liberty of others is not allowed in an Islamic State. Thus, paradoxically enough, liberty in the ideological State of Iqbāl signifies the presence of "limits" prescribed by the State on man's actions. For liberty to exist in political, religious and social matters, the real question is not the presence and absence of limits; but whether or not the limits imposed on one's actions are conducive to self-realisation and to the achievement of divinely ordained social ideal.

In an ideological State of Islam the supreme power of sovereignty enjoyed by the head of the State is limited by the sovereignty of God. Political liberty means people's having an effective voice in the government. What distinguishes the Islamic democracy from the Western form of democracy is that while the Western political theories imply a democratic sovereignty, Islam recommends democratic Caliphate or the presidential form of government which safeguards the social liberty of the individual for the full development and growth of his personality. So far as the principle of equality is concerned, Iqbāl makes full allowance for equality in respect of the opportunities for securing livelihood. Economic freedom, therefore, means freedom

7. S. A. Vahid, op. cit., p. 51.

from legal or customary handicaps in an individual's struggle for economic prosperity according to his capacity. Thus in a State as envisaged by Iqbāl the individual is called upon in the interest of society to accept certain restrictions and obligations, but he is also left free to regulate his own affairs to the best of his abilities.

Equality in its civic sense implies that all the citizens of the Islamic State should be treated alike in the enjoyment of rights. The existenec of a downtrodden class of people in an Islamic organisation is an infringement and violation of the noble principle of justice. The aim of State, according to Iqbāl, is nothing but to establish the rule of God with a view to maintaining social justice. The doctrine of divine unity carries within it uniform principles of action such as promote the advancement of humanity. The belief in one God, indeed, is the acceptance of divine code as a basis for action. According to Iqbāl, no religious belief is authentic unless it is carried into practice by performing the duties implied in it or expressly enjoined by it. The Muslims are directed to strive hard to achieve the ethical and religious ideals for which Islam stands. The *Sharī'ah*, a code of ethical and religious laws, manifests the will of God and so forms the basis of all the laws of the Muslim State. The *millah*, that is the Muslim community as a whole, is required to achieve the real collective ego in order to live, move and have its being as a single individual. The end of the State is the perfection of humanity, i.e. the highest well-being to which humanity may attain, and this well-being is both material and spiritual. Spiritual well-being means to act according to the will of God, which is manifested in the *Sharī'ah*. In the ideological State of Iqbāl, both the individual and the society have the same end, i.e. to obey the will of God and thus become His co-worker. The Islamic State thus is connected with the ideal of raising humanity to the highest well-being both material and moral by means of a Commonwealth built on the belief in one God Whose sovereignty is supreme.

Geographical nationalism is foreign to Muslim polity. To a Muslim the entire world is his abode, for it lies within the sovereignty of

Allāh. Iqbāl, however, justifies territorial notionalism in the sense of patriotism. He points out that nationalism in the sense of love of one's country and even readiness to die for its honour is a part of the faith of a Muslim. It comes into conflict with Islam only when it begins to be the sole principle of national solidarity, demanding that Islam should recede in the background as a mere private opinion and cease to be a living factor in the national life.

Thus a Muslim national State, according to Iqbāl, is essentially an ideological State and not one based merely on racial or geographical factors. A secular State, on the other hand, means a group of people, occupying a territory and possessing a political organisation of its own on the basis of certain common characteristics such as race, language, custom, etc. Iqbāl recognises the importance of these factors in the shaping of national sentiment but insists that these factors by themselves do not engender a feeling of unity and solidarity in the people, which is best brought about by the two principles of *tauḥīd* and the finality of prophethood. Thus nationality is a spiritual sentiment of unity, induced by neither the sameness of race, nor that of language, territory, or custom, but based essentially on the principle of Unity of God which also implies the unity of mankind. It is noteworthy that even those nations which preach territorial nationalism and which still suffer from such social maladies as colour or race consciousness, are in search of a principle of unity as a bigger and more powerful centre of their loyalties. In the present-day world certain institutions with their grandiose slogans such as the "United Nations", "the Common Market", "Greater Europe", "European Community", and the regrouping of Afro-Asian countries, are a few visible signs of this search for the principle of unity.

Muslim nationalism as distinguished from secular nationalism is based on a creative urge for the advancement of humanity. Consequently the ultimate goal of Muslim national State is not self-glorification but love and sympathy for all nations. In other words, this goal is not nationalism in a narrow sense but internationalism. Iqbāl emphasises that the Muslims in a national State while maintaining

their distinctive individuality should materially contribute towards the cause of a World State. A Muslim nation in so far as it is grouping together of all those who owe allegiance to Allāh and His Prophet, strictly speaking, has no fatherland in the ordinary sense of the term. It defines its boundaries only for the practical convenience of administration. No matter from what Muslim State a Muslim comes and no matter what his race, colour or language, he is a citizen equally of of every Muslim State. Belief in the doctrine of *tauḥīd* is an allegiance to Allāh and a vow to abide by the divine laws as revealed through His Prophet The principles of equality, solidarity and freedom are among the multifarious expressions of this doctrine. The Muslim State in its essence is an endeavour to transfer these principles into spatio-temporal order, that is, to realise them in a definite form of human organisation.

Although Islam aims at creating a World State based on the principle of Unity of God, it is not opposed to national preservation, provided the ultimate goal of Islamic ideology is kept in view. Although Iqbāl was fully conscious of the evils of territorial nationalism which infuses in the people the sinister desire of conquest and subjugation of other nations, he deeply felt the need of homeland for the Muslims of India to safeguard their basic rights and to preserve and develop their individual entity as a nation.

In the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the beginning of twentieth, while the European Colonial Powers were engaged in the process of subduing Muslim countries of the Middle East one after the other, the Hindus in India, being a majority community having all the loaves and fishes of the British Government to themselves, were trying to reduce the Muslim minority community to the position of hewers of wood and drawers of water. There was every possibility of their being altogether effaced as a distinct political entity. Iqbāl, therefore, suggested that they should adopt the principle of Muslim nationalism. This eventually led to the establishment of Pakistan in 1947. The following excerpts from letters of Iqbāl to Qā'id-i A'ẓam Muḥammad 'Alī Jinnāḥ are worthy of note in this respect :

After a long and careful study of Islamic Law I have come to the conclusion that if this system of Law is properly understood and applied, at least the right to subsistence is secured to everybody. But the enforcement and development of the Shariat of Islam is impossible in this country without a free Muslim state or states. This has been my honest conviction for many years and I still believe this to be the only way to solve the problem of bread for Muslims as well as to secure a peaceful India. . . . For Muslim India to solve these problems, it is necessary to redistribute the country and to provide one or more Muslim states with absolute majorities. Don't you think that the time for such a demand has already arrived? Perhaps this is the best reply you can give to the atheistic socialism of Jawaharlal Nehru. Anyhow I have given you my own thoughts in the hope that you will give them serious consideration. . . . Muslim India hopes at this serious juncture your genius will discover some way out of our present difficulties.[8]

Iqbāl wrote to the Qā'id-i A'ẓam in June 1937: ". . . you are the only Muslim in India today to whom the community has a right to look up for safe guidance through the storm which is coming to North West India, and perhaps to the whole of India. . . . A separate federation of Muslim provinces . . . on the lines I have suggested above, is the only course by which we can secure a peaceful India and save Muslims from the domination of non-Muslims. Why should not the Muslims of North-West India and Bengal be considered as nations entitled to self-determination just as other nations in India and outside India are?"[9]

In the Foreword to *Letters of Iqbal*, the Qā'id-i A'ẓam wrote in 1943:

It was a great achievement for Muslim League that its lead came to be acknowledged by both the majority and minority Provinces. Sir Muhammad Iqbal played a very conspicuous part, though at the time not revealed to public, in bringing about this consummation. . . . His views were substantially in consonance with my own and had finally

8. *Letters of Iqbal to Jinnah*, Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf, Lahore, 1963., pp. 18 ff.

9. Ibid., pp. 20 ff.

led me to the same conclusions as a result of careful examination and study of the constitutional problems facing India, and found expression in due course in the united will of Muslim India as adumbrated in the Lahore Resolution of the All-India Muslim League, popularly known as the "Pakistan Resolution," passed on 23rd March, 1940.

In the end we may say that though Pakistan is geographically defined by its territorial limits, the basis of its nationalism is neither territorial, nor linguistic, but ideological. Iqbāl very aptly remarks that region or territory as a geographical concept does not come into conflict with Islamic ideology, because boundaries of Muslim States are fixed for administrative purposes and as such are changeable while Islam is eternal. He further maintains that nationalism comes into conflict with Islam only when, like Christianity, a gulf is created between the Church and the State.

January 1967

James B. Prior

IQBAL'S VIEW OF ISLAMIC NATIONALISM IN JAVID NAMAH

شاعر اندر سینهٔ ملت چو دل
ملتے بے شاعرے انبارِ گل (۴۵)

The poet is like the heart in the breast of a nation,
a nation without a poet is like a heap of clay. (723-4)[1]

Only rarely can history trace the emergence of an important political event to a poet's dream. But the idea of Pakistan as a separate Muslim State was first generated in the mind of Muḥammad Iqbāl. Though the poet died before Pakistan was born, already in 1930 he had called for "Self-government . . . of a consolidated North-West Indian

1. Annemarie Schimmel, *Gabriel's Wing*, E.J. Brill, Leiden, 1963, p. 71. The numbers in parentheses follow the numeration of Arthur J. Arberry's translation: *Iqbal : Javid-namah*, George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. London, 1966. The numbers against the original verses in Persion refer to the pagination of the November 1959 printing of *Jāvīd Nāmah* (Lahore). It seems appropriate to say a word about the use of quotations in these pages. Quotations are numerous—and justly so. Iqbāl is a master of economical expression. Usually any "summary" of a few lines, other than a direct translation, would add useless words and reduce clarity. Arberry's translation is generally accurate and well-written. Where disagreement with his rendering of the original Persian arises, due note is taken or a substitute translation is given. Otherwise, Arberry's translation should serve the reader well who has no knowledge of Persian. For those who can read Persian, the original is provided.

[Muslim] State."[2] "The construction," he said, "of a polity on Indian national lines, if it means a displacement of the Islamic principle of solidarity, is simply unthinkable to a Muslim."[3]

Having planted the seed in an unambiguous prose, Iqbāl set out to nurture it and give it a poetical garb in his *Jāvīd Nāmah* published in 1932. The philosophical and the theological, the personal and the communal in this masterpiece have been closely laced together into a beautiful poetic fabric. The main purpose of the present essay is to unstitch the fabric of the *Jāvīd Nāmah* and to re-order the threads into a form of an intellectual analysis of Iqbāl's philosophy of "Islamic nationalism" that can be understood in prose. Such an attempt, it seems to me, is possible only by first understanding Iqbāl's major views with regard to the function of poetry, theory of knowledge, theology, philosophical anthropology, etc. So a brief account of these is in order before we discuss his view of "Islamic nationalism" in detail.

1. The Poetical Mode. *Jāvīd Nāmah* is a poetic drama written in the form of a mystical journey through the celestial spheres. The poet as a pilgrim encounters and converses with a series of mythical and historical figures who offer him insight. Although the poem borrows from history, it points explicity to the future. *Jāvīd Nāmah*, meaning "The Book of Jāvīd," was dedicated to the poet's son Jāvīd Iqbāl.[4] Thus the poem was not merely the vision of a fifty-five year old man looking towards his own death—the future it points to is the historical future of coming generations. Understandably then, the *Jāvīd Nāmah* is frankly didactic rather than primarily aesthetic. Iqbāl spoke explicitly of this, saying :

I have no interest in the art of poetry, but I have some special intentions for the declaration of which I have chosen the way of

2. A. Schimmel, op. cit., pp. 33-4. She also quotes a 1909 letter expressing similar sentiments.

3. Aziz Ahmad, *Studies in Islamic Culture in the Indian Environment*, Oxford University Press, 1964, p. 273.

4. A. Schimmel, op. cit., p. 52.

poetry because of the state and traditions of this country.[5] A philosophical pearl from a prose treatise is seldom quoted in the Islamic world, but the same thought, expressed in poetry, can be easily memorised and is often transmitted far beyond the literate public by oral tradition.[6]

As any teacher knows, a didactic purpose can easily become manipulative : it can "fashion man" even in the positive sense that Iqbāl expresses. The voice of Rūmī says :

شعر را مقصود اگر آدم گری است
شاعری ہم وارثِ پیغمبری است (۳٦)

If the purpose of poetry is the fashioning of man,
poetry is likewise the heir of prophecy. (722-8)[7]

Or, as A. Schimmel has put it,

Poetry as active history and history-making prophecy, that is the supreme goal of Iqbāl's aesthetics.[8]

For his prophetic role, Iqbāl chose the medium of poetry because it was the most effective way of communicating his message to others. The poet also has political power :

کارگاہِ زندگی را محرم است
او جم است و شعرِ او جامِ جم است (۱۹۸)

He is intimate with the workshop of life,
he is Jamshid, his poetry Jamshid's Cup. (3097-8)

Jām-i jam, or Jamshīd's Cup, is a "symbol of wordly power".[9] With its magical potency, it is the vessel of political legitimacy or royal charisma which the ancient Persian monarch was said to possess.

5. Ibid., p. 70. Iqbāl's allusion to writing for "this country" should not pass unnoticed.

6. Ibid., pp. 65-6.

7. All translations are from the Arberry volume, op. cit., unless otherwise indicated.

8. A. Schimmel, op. cit., p. 72.

9. Idem, *Persian Poetical. Symbolism* (unpublished lecture notes), Harvard University, 1968-69, p. 77.

But apart from its usefulness in disseminating Iqbāl's ideas, the world of poetic fantasy which he created also expanded his own freedom of expression.

II. The Search for Wisdom. (*a*) *Ascension.* The genesis of nation-building is conceptual. The idea of a nation or a community is a product of the mind, and much of the quality of life in that nation depends on the quality of thinking that serves as its foundation. The *Jāvīd Nāmah* is a search for wisdom or insight into founding a nation. The problem of epistemology is reflected even in the form of the poem. The poet's heavenly journey is an ascension, imitating the *mi'rāj* of the Prophet :

چیست معراج آرزوئے شاہدے
امتحانے روبروئے شاہدے (۱۴)

What is Ascension ? The desire for a witness.
an examination face to face of witness— (253-4)

Thus the programme for the journey is set out : the pilgrim's task is to examine himself in the presence of various witnesses, and, in the process, the pilgrim experiences a second birth :

زادنِ طفل از شکستِ اشکم است
زادنِ مرد از شکستِ عالم است (۱۶)

A child is born through the rending of the womb,
a man is born through the rending of the world ; (293-4)

The second is a spiritual birth, an escape from the four-sided or four-dimensioned world—جہانِ چار سوئے (۱۵)

(*b*) *Seeing.* Iqbāl poses the problem of understanding by using visual imagery : seeing, beholding, vision, image, etc. There are two objects which are principally worth seeing—the self and God. For Iqbāl, the starting point, the first absolute presupposition of epistemology, is the self :

شاہدِ اوّل شعورِ خویشتن
خویش را دیدن بنورِ خویشتن (۱۴)

The first witness is self- consciousness,
to behold oneself in one's own light ; (241-2)

Another rendering of shu'ūr-i khīshtan might be "one's own intelligence" or even "one's own common sense". It has to be understood in any case, that this starting point is rather crude, for it is in early childhood that we become aware of ourselves. According to one interpretation, Adam and Eve attained that awareness when they ate of the forbidden tree and experienced a new emotion : shame. "Shame," according to E. H. Erikson, "is the estrangement of being exposed and conscious of being looked at disapprovingly. . . ."[10] Thereby, a person becomes aware of another, and according to Iqbāl :

شاہدِ ثانی شعورِ دیگرے
خویش را دیدن بنورِ دیگرے (۱۴)

the second witness is the consciousness of another,
to behold oneslf in other's light ; (243-4)

Although for Iqbāl the feeling of shame does not appear, becoming conscious of another human being works as means for seeing the third witness, namely God. In the "Sphere of Jupiter" the mystic martyr Ḥallāj says to the pilgrim :

نقشِ جان تا در جہان گردد تمام
می شود دیدارِ حق دیدارِ عام ! (۱۵۲)

when the soul's image is perfected in the world,
to behold the commons is to behold God. (2377-8)

Arberry has translated *'ām* as "the commons", but the singular form of the original seems stronger : "the common man", "every man," "the layman", or, if one must, "the public". The meaning seems quite close to the traditional Quaker notion that we can see "that of God"[11] in the other man. Understanding any other ordinary human

10. "Life Cycle," in *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, The Macmillan Company and The Free Press, New York, 1968, p. 288.

11. Harold Loukes, *The Quaker Contribution*, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1965, p. 33.

being thus becomes a means for understanding God. But "seeing" another person is decidedly secondary to self-perception and seeing God. This is made clear by the couplet immediately preceding the one quoted last :

نقش حق اول بجاں انداختن
باز او را در جہاں انداختن ! (۱۵۲)

First, to implant on one's soul the image of God,
then next to implant it on the world ; (2375-6)

Taken together, the two couplets are an answer to the pilgrim's question :

چیست دیدار خدائے نہ سپہر (۱۵۱)

What is the beholding of the God of nine spheres. . . .? (2373)

If we listen carefully to Ḥallāj's answer, we will hear that one can "behold" (a visual symbol) God by doing such and such with the "image" (again another visual symbol) of God. Obviously we are caught up here in circular logic—a "pearl" that can be "pierced" only through mystical experience. But in order to complete the circle, Iqbāl makes clear that self-knowledge is entirely dependent upon seeing God :

مرد حق بیں جز بحق خود را ندید (۵۳)

The God-seeing man sees himself only through God ; (831)

The problem of Iqbāl's basic epistemology clearly involves an interrelation of theological, personal and social perception ; so a full answer must await a careful analysis of the theology, philosophical anthropology, and even political philosophy of the poet. Meanwhile, Iqbāl's understanding of certain abstract categories of epistemology which emerge more clearly than "seeing" should be explored.

(*c*) *Reason, Science and Love.* Iqbāl was an accomplished student of the philosophy and history of both East and West. I speak of philosophy and history in the same breath, since for an Easterner who lived his whole life under Western political control, the two had to be

understood in the same context. It is also understandable why certain categories became almost stereotypes associated with the East and the West in Iqbāl's writings.

"Reason" (*k͟hirad*), for instance, is mostly a negative category for Iqbāl. He complains bitterly in the opening prayer of the *Jāvīd Nāmah* that:

عصرِ حاضر را خرد زنجیرِ پاست
جانِ بے تابے کہ من دارم کجاست ؟ (۳)

Reason is a chain fettering this present age:
where is a restless soul such as I possess? (43–4)

Similarly, Gautama warns the pilgrim in the "Sphere of the Moon" against two other pitfalls:

دانشِ مغربیان فلسفۂ مشرقیان
ہمہ بتخانہ و در طوفِ بتاں چیزے نیست ! (۴۸)

The science of the Westerners, the philosophy of the Easterners
are all idol-houses, and the visiting of idols yields—nothing. (767-8)

So *dānis͟h*, which might better be called simply "knowledge" or "learning" and *falsafah*, "philosophy", are both understood to give us closed narrow systems, and are therefore limited. *Ḥikmah* is another term closely resembling *falsafah* and is compared with *'irfān'* thus:

کارِ حکمت دیدن و فرسودن است
کارِ عرفاں دیدن و افزودن است ! (۱۳۳)

The task of science is to see and consume,
the work of gnosis is too see and augment; (2103-4)

The meaning of the negative notion of *falsfah* can perhaps be understood better with reference to the following verses where it has been compared to poetry:

بو علی اندر غبارِ ناقہ گم
دستِ رومی پردۂ محمل گرفت

این فروتر رفت و تا گوہر رسید
آن بگردابے چو خس منزل گرفت
حق اگر سوزے ندارد حکمت است
شعر می گردد چو سوز از دل گرفت [12]

Avicenna was lost in the camel dust ;
Rūmī grasped the veil of the camel litter.
The latter went deeper and found the pearl ;
The former, like a tumbleweed, chose a dwelling in the whirlpool.
Truth, if it has no passion, is philosophy—
It becomes poetry when it takes passion from the heart.

In plain language philosophy, whether *falsafah* or *ḥikmah* if it is just philosophy—abstract and lacking any personal commitment—prevents one from gaining any real knowledge of or having a direct encounter with Ultimate Reality. Avicenna, at least poetically here in comparison to Rūmī, had no chance of communing with the mystical beloved(symbolised by the camel litter) through the philosophy and medicine he practised.

So *kh̲irad* and *dāinsh̲*, *falsafah* and *ḥikmah* happen to be thoroughly negative categories of thought in to Iqbāl's *Jāvīd Nāmah*. However, other terms, to which we now turn, emerge both positively and negatively, according to their context.

The first term in this category is *'aql*, variously translated "reason" "science", "intellect", or "wisdom". The word occurs most often in tandem with *'ish̲q*, meaning "love" or "passion".[13] In the midst of an original *ghazal* by Rūmī, Iqbāl has inserted these lines :

اے عقل تو ز شوق پراگندہ گوئے شو
اے عشق نکتہ ہائے پریشانم آرزوست (۱۲)

O reason, become out of yearning a babbler of words confused :
O love, distracted subtleties are my desire. (205-6)

12. Iqbāl, *Payām-i Mash̲rīq*, p. 122.

13. The word *'ish̲q* plays an important and complex role in the vocabulary of Islamic mysticism, the details of which are beyond the scope of this article.

Here, *'aql* is understood as the stumbling block to the journey which the pilgrim is about to undertake. It stands in the way because *'aql* is strictly limited to this world:

عقلِ آدم بر جہاں شبخوں زند
عشقِ او بر لامکاں شبخوں زند (۹)

Man's reason is making assault on the world,
but his love makes assault on the Infinite; (159-60)

In these lines, *'aql* seems to be judged as neutral in value, for "making assault on the world" is neither a positive nor a negative act; it merely stands as an activity wholly distinct, even though subordinate to that of "assaulting the Infinite". However, when *'aql* is closely associated with *'ishq*, its force is wholly positive; hence the welcoming stars chant:

عقلِ تو حاصلِ حیات عشقِ تو سرِّ کائنات (۲۳)

Your reason is the fruit of life, your love is creation's mystery; (443)

A related, but far more prominent, term appearing in the *Jāvīd Nāmah* is *'ilm,* most commonly translated "science" but also as "knowledge". It is used in a variety of ways, ranging from a demonic to a strongly positive intellectual force. But however it occurs, it always seems to be associated with the West, and East is called upon to deal with it in some new way. The utterly evil side of *'ilm* is illustrated by a transparent historical reference:

علم رابے سوزِ دل خوانی شراست
نورِ او تاریکیٔ بحر و بر است

* * *

بحر و دشت و کوہسار و باغ و راغ
از بمِ طیارۂ او داغ داغ!
سینۂ افرنگ را نارے ازوست
لذتِ شبخون و یلغارے ازوست (۸۲-۸۳)

Science without the heart's glow is pure evil,
for then its light is darkness over sea and land, (1323-4)

* * *

sea, plain and mountain, quiet garden and villa
are ravaged by the bombs of its aeroplanes.
It is its fire that burns the heart of Europe,
from it springs the joy of raiding and robbing ; (1327-30)

The passage undoubtedly refers to the air raids that were carried out "for police purposes" throughout the summer of 1930 against tribal villages in the North-West Frontier Province,[14] a small precursor of the Vietnam War. The implication is to be noted : instead of condemning the perpetrators of that kind of overt oppression, Iqbāl holds their system of thought at fault. Their belief in the *'ilm* which they think leads them to truth—*that* is what brings on evil acts like bombarding the earth and its people. Iqbāl, however, does not condemn science as such, but rather "science without the heart's glow". Two couplets that follow, carry the notion a step further. With *'ishq* (love), *'ilm* takes on a completely new character, but without it *'ilm* and *ḥikmah* as well as *'aql* are derided :

علم بے عشق است از طاغوتیان
علم باعشق است از لاہوتیان !
بے محبت علم و حکمت مردۂ
عقل تیرے بر ہدف ناخوردۂ (۸۳)

Science without love is a demonic thing,
science together with love is a thing divine ;
science and wisdom without love are a corpse,
reason is an arrow that never pierced the target. (1341-4)

Even though Iqbāl has elevated *'ilm* and *'ishq* in their unified state to a very high status, they continue to be distinct entities :

علم از تحقیق لذت می برد
عشق از تخلیق لذت می برد (۷۷)

14. D.G. Tendulkar, *Abdul Ghaffar Khan : Faith is a Battle*, Bombay, 1967, pp. 3, 72-3.

Science derives pleasure from verification,
love derives pleasure from creativeness. (1217-8)[15]

The designation of "verification" (*taḥqīq*) as opposed to "creativeness" (*takhlīq*) seems to strike at a basic characteristic of the scientific attitude: objective science prides itself in being "*dis*interested" and *dis*passionate". Without *'ishq*, something is badly amiss about the whole process. A researcher in chemico-biological warfare or a missile technician can go about his horrid work of devastation in a completely dispassionate way. And if such a person makes a new discovery to destroy wheat stockpiles or invents a technique for faster deployment of a missile, his new "idea" is not "creativeness", at least not in the way Iqbāl uses the term.[16] Creativeness in man involves him in an intimate relationship with the creation around him:

علم ترساں از جلالِ کائنات
عشق غرق اندر جمالِ کائنات (۱۳۹)

science is fearful of the grandeur of creation,
Love is immersed in the beauty of creation ; (2201-2)

The term *'ilm* in *Jāvīd Nāmah* is also associated with other words, some of which put it in a more obviously political context. The concept of *'ilm-o-fan*, "science and technology", is purely Western and is isolated by the voice of Abdālī, the Afghān King, as the only object

15. In any critical analysis of the lines of a couplet such as this which run so perfectly parallel, we must be aware of the formal use of a remarkable close *tajnīs* or play on words. Not only are *'ilm* and *'ishq* brought into a time-honoured parallel, but the only other words which vary between the two halves of the couplet are made to look almost alike: *taḥqīq* or "verification" appeas as تحقیق in Persian, while *takhlīq* or "creativeness", appears as تخلیق Sometimes coherent meaning is bent to conform to the written pun, although seldom so in the poetry of Iqbāl. A brief discussion of the point is to be found in A. Schimmel, *Persian Poetical Symbolism*, p. 10.

16. A. Schimmel suggests that the two can be combined in the midst of purely scientific work : " . . . scientific research may bring man to a point where he feels the mystery of Creation, where eventually his ardent quest for knowledge approaches . . . adoration That is the point on which Iqbal's interest is concentrated : the point where *'ishq*, the ardour of love, and *'ilm*, the ardour of science, may be united, and thus help mankind to reach a higher spiritual level." *Gabriel's Wing*, p. 191.

of the West worthy of appropriation by the East.

قوتِ افرنگ از علم و فن است
از ہمیں آتش چراغش روشن است ! (۲۰۹)

The power of the West comes from science and technology,
and with that selfsame flame its lamp is bright. (3271-2)

Another companion of *'ilm* : *hunar,* i.e. "art" or "craft", is dismissed by the pilgrim in a pithy dialogue with the Indian sage, Jahān-Dost :

گفت این علم و ہنر ؟ گفتم کہ پوست (۳۷)

He asked, 'This science and art ?' I said, 'Mere husk.' (619)

This combination, too, is associated with the West in Rūmī's description of the "Sphere of Mars" :

ساکنانش چوں فرنگاں ذوفنوں
در علومِ جان و تن از ما فزوں ! (۱۱٦)

Its dwellers are skilled in many arts, like the Franks,
excelling us in physical and psychical sciences. (1833-4)

Science and art, thus identified as coming from the West, are clearly meant by Iqbāl to be appropriated by the East, but in a different way. Science and art are part of life in Iqbāl's visionary Utopia, the city of Marghadīn in the "Sphere of Mars" :

خدمت آمد مقصدِ علم و ہنر
کارہا را کس نمی سنجد بزر ! (۱۲۱)

The aim of science and art there is service.
no one weighs work done against gold ; (1933-4)

One more intellectual term deserves our attention. *Zīrkī*, "intelligence" or "ingenuity", is also linked with *'ishq* in the *Jāvīd Nāmah* and in a wholly positive way. The voice of the Turkish reformer Sa'īd Ḥal'īm Pāshā makes it out to be the best of the West, which should be accepted while retaining the best of the East ;

غربیاں را زیرکی سازِ حیات
شرقیاں را عشق رازِ کائنات (۱۷)

For Westerners intelligence is the stuff of life,
for Easterners love is the mystery of all being. (1101-2)

He continues by urging the pilgrim to combine *zīrkī* with *'ishq* and design a new world.

(*d*) *Summary*. What have we learned, in brief, from Iqbāl's search for wisdom that will inform our understanding of his philosophy of "Islamic nationalism"? We see on an epistemological plane that Iqbāl perceives a great polarisation in the conception of wisdom between East and West. His own literary medium is characteristically Eastern : dramatic poetry serving a didactic purpose in the form of a mystical ascension. Perception, the beginning of his epistemology, is also clearly mystical, not logical in any Western sense. Yet, faced with the negative aspects of Western "knowledge", "art", and "science" that seem to be indefatigably invading the East, he chooses to accept them, but only in combination with a subjective concept of "love", which he associates with the East. He is writing primarily for fellow-Muslims, urging them to build the intellectual foundation of a new order in the East.

Fundamental to this new order is a rejuvenated sense of theological reality, to which we will now turn.

III. One Sovereign God. (*a*) *Tauḥīd*. The most basic Muslim theological affirmation is *tauḥīd*—declaring that there is but one God. The concept is often mentioned, but not fully worked out in the *Jāvīd Nāmah* : its details are simply presupposed. It first occurs in the pilgrim's answer to a question by Jahān-Dost in the dialogue referred to above :

گفت جاں ؟ گفتم کہ رمزِ لا الہ (۳۷)

He asked, 'The Soul' ? I said, 'The symbol of the One God.' (616)

Since the soul is called a *symbol* of the One God, the One God does not share any substance with the soul. God's essence is wholly

distinct from the soul, even though His atributes may be said to be symbolically reflected by the soul. This passage also tells us that there must be an essentially unitary aspect of the soul.

Another clue comes from the voice of Zoroaster as he speaks of the God-seeing man :

لا اله می گفت و در خون می تپید ! (۵۳)

crying 'One God', he quivers in his own blood. (832)

Clearly, there is something about One God which manifests His overpowering majesty and makes the man who "sees" God so fearful. Why this is so is not indicated until in the untranslated "Address to Jāvīd : A Word to the New Generation" at the conclusion of the *Jāvīd Nāmah*, the poet uses more graphic language :

این دو حرفِ لا اله گفتار نیست
لا اله جز تیغِ بے زنهار نیست

زیستن با سوزِ او قهاری است
لا اله ضرب است و ضربِ کاری است (۲۳۴)

These two words *lā ilāh* are not mere words ;
Lā ilāh is nothing but a sword from which there is no escape.
To live with its burning is to attain power ;
Lā ilāh is a stroke very telling and effective.[17]

Profession of the doctrine of Oneness of God may, however, become meaningless in the hands of a falsely pious man :

لا اله اندر نمازش بود و نیست
ناز ہا اندر نیازش بود و نیست (۲۳۴)

His prayers were once inspired by *lā ilāh* though not now ;
His submission [to God] had once a grace of its own.[18]

The awesome reality of the "One God" may thus in the latter case become a powerless religious formula that is repeated with no real understanding of its import.

17. Bashir Ahmed Dar (Tr.), *Iqbal : Address to Javid*, Karachi, n. d., pp. 5-6.
18. Ibid., p. 6.

(*b*) *Knowledge of God.* As we noted above in the section on "Seeing", knowledge of God, according to the *Jāvīd Nāmah*, is difficult to come by. Nevertheless in a speech by Jamāl al-Dīn Afghānī, Iqbāl clearly implies that knowledge of God is not only possible, but quite necessary. In this passage, Afghānī is chiding both communism and capitalism for lacking such knowledge :

ہر دو را جاں ناصبور و ناشکیب
ہر دو یزداں ناشناس آدم فریب (۷۰)

The soul of both is impatient and intolerant,
both of them know not God, and deceive mankind (1091-2)

However, no formula or methodology is suggested that can help us to know God other than the language of mysticism :

زیرکی از عشق گردد حق شناس
کارِ عشق از زیرکی محکم اساس (۷۱)

Only through love [*'ishq*] intelligence [*zīrkī*] gets to know God,
love's labours find firm grounding in intelligence; (1103-4)

The frustrated soul unsuccessful in his search can only reach one of two honest conclusions. Ba'al in the "Sphere of Venus" recognises man's dilemma :

آدم ایں نیلی تتق را بر درید
آنسوئے گردوں خدائے را ندید (۱۰۲)

Man has rent yonder azure veil
and, beyond the sky, has seen no God. (1641-2)

The irreconcilable situation leads the ancient god to conclude :

از خداوندے کہ غیب او را سزد
خوشتر آں دیوے کہ آید در شہود (۱۰۳)

Better the demon that makes itself visible
than a God to whom the Unseen is meet. (1674-5)

A second conclusion is reached by the voice of Nietzsche beyond the spheres, not by appealing to demonology, but resigning himself to

ecstatic negation :

بر لبش بیتے کہ صد بارش سرود !
"نہ جبریلے نہ فردوسے نہ حورے نے خداوندے
کفِ خاکے کہ می سوزد زجانِ آرزو مندے !" (۱۷۶)

On his lips was a verse he chanted a hundred times :
'No Gabriel, no Paradise, no houri, no God,
only a handful of dust consumed by a yearning soul.' (2700-2)

Since it is impossible for man, apparently, to know God in a direct way, it is necessary for him to keep alert for signs of God which he *can* know. We meet with several of these signs in the *Jāvīd Nāmah.* The first is simply a believer :

بندۂ مومن ز آیاتِ خدا ست (۷۳)

A believing servant himself is a sign of God, (1137)

Or, on a more general plane, as Rūmī says in the "Sphere of the Moon" :

گفت اقوام و ملل آیاتِ اوست
عصرہائے ما ز مخلوقاتِ اوست (۴۶)

He said, 'peoples and nations are his signs,
Our centuries are things of his creation . . .' (730-1)

And finally, a frankly political situation can also manifest something of the power of God :

مرگِ جبّاران ز آیاتِ خدا ست (۱۰۵)

the death of tyrants is one of God's signs. (1708)

God, then, is knowable, only through mystical encounter, or through signs that are visible in the historical process of which men are a part.

(*c*) *God's Rule.* The doctrine of *tauḥīd* has enormous political consequences for Muslims. God alone is the real sovereign. One of the most concrete consequences of God's rule is the notion that He is the only legitimate landowner. The voice of Afghānī brings up this idea in the *Jāvīd Nāmah* :

باطن الارض لله ظاہر است
ہر کہ ایں ظاہر نہ بیند کافر است (۸۱)

'The Earth is the Lord's' : the inward meaning is plain,
and he who sees not this plain is an infidel. (1291-2)

Such an idea that ownership is a prime characteristic of kingship has long been current in India. And precisely because of that tradition, Iqbāl's emphasis not only on God's sovereignty but also on His status as the ultimate landowner, may be viewed as revolutionary, if not also subversive in the Indian context. It was subversive in the 1930's not only for the British Empire, but also for the Brahmanic elite, because it threatened economic as well as political hegemony of earthly rulers. It is noteworthy that this concept of God as landowner is also referred to in Afghāni's message to the Russian people :

رزق خود را از زمیں بردن رواست
ایں 'متاع' بندہ و ملک خداست
بندۂ مومن امیں ، حق مالک است (۹۰)

It is lawful to draw one's sustenance from the soil—
this is man's 'enjoyment', the property of God.
The believer is the trustee, God is the possessor ; (1471-3)

The effect of this kind of formulation is the same as of declaring the land to be sacred. Even though a man can depend on the soil to give him a livelihood, the trustee is bound not to abuse that soil in the process.[19] The use of the word *rizq*, meaning "sustenance" or "daily bread", implies that using the soil for the purpose of luxurious gain cannot be considered to be lawful.

What can be said about land can also be said about life—God owns it :

19. The most blatant example of grossly mishandled stewardship of land is the United States of America. The enormous rape of the natural environment caused by the birth of one American (when compared to an Indian, for example) has been graphically illustrated recently by Wayne H. Davis in his article, "Overpopulated America", *The New Republic*, Jan. 10, 1970, pp. 13-5.

زندگانی چیست ؟ کانِ گوہر است
تو امینی صاحبِ او دیگر است ! (۱۲۳)

What is life ? A mine of gems ;
you are the trustee, its owner is another. (1989-90)

The word *zindigānī* traslated here as "life" means, in fact, the "course of life" in the sense of life history and not life as a miraculous substance. God's interest in life of men is concrete—He is concerned about how men *govern* their lives. The functions of owner and trustee are distinct, and even though God is the owner, man is free to misgovern if he so chooses, but the social consequence of that mismanagement, which really amounts to disobedience, can be severe :

غیرِ حق چون ناہی و آمر شود
زور ور بر ناتوان قاہر شود (۷۸)

when other than God determines the aye and nay
then the strong man tyrannises over the weak ; (1243-4)

Although it is God who should determine the "aye and nay", it is man who executes it. As Rūmī says to Jahān-Dost ;

آدمی شمشیر و حق شمشیر زن
عالم این شمشیر را سنگِ فسن ! (۳۵)

Man is a sword, and God is the swordsman ;
the world is the whetstone for this sword. (577-8)

We have moved, almost as if inevitably, from theology to anthropology. The rule of God leads directly to the servanthood of man. So it is man to whom we must now turn our attention in order to understand Iqbāl's political philosophy.

IV. What is Man ? The first answer to that question was given by the pilgrim to a question by Jahān-Dost.

گفت آدم ؟ گفتم از اسرارِ اوست (۳۷)

He asked, 'And Man ?' I said, 'One of God's secrets.' (617)

We are back in the world of mystical language. All we can garner from such an answer is that somehow man is under God's control. But in what way? No answer. Man is a mystery:

در دو عالم ہر کجا آثارِ عشق
ابنِ آدم سرے از اسرارِ عشق (۷۴)

In the two worlds, wherever love leaves signs,
The son of Adam is a mystery in the mysteries of love.[20]

Man is mysterious because of his immeasurable power. In the midst of the world, he is an anomaly disproportionate to his physical strength:

آنچہ در آدم بگنجد عالم است
آنچہ در عالم نگنجد آدم است (۷۵)

That which is contained within man is the world,
that which is not contained within the world is man. (1175-6)

But these words describe the ideal man, i.e. the one who is the true servant of God. Most men are too much caught up in other things to attain that status. Rūmī helps us glance at the men of world as they generally are; he compares for the pilgrim the inhabitants of the earth to the Martians:

خاکیاں را دل بہ بندِ آب و گل
اندریں عالم بدن در بندِ دل ! (۱۱٦)

Earth's dwellers—their hearts are bound to water and clay;
in this world, body is in bondage to heart. (1839-40)

"Water and clay" (*āb-o-gil*) is a symbol for the world of matter, devoid of spirit. The Martian contrast is where the material (body) and the spiritual (heart) are united. The man without spirit, empty of any spunk of life is the one who is so easy a prey for Satan that he earns only contempt. In the famous "Satan's Lament" in the *Jāvīd Nāmah*, Satan lavishes upside down praise on man :

20. Translated by this author.

ابن ِ آدم چیست ؟ یک مشت ِ خس است
مشت ِ خس را یک شرار از من بس است (۱۶۱)

What is man? A handful of straw ;
one spark from me is enough for a handful of straw. (2525-6)

In search of an answer to the question, "What is man?" we have found that he is either a very lofty or very despicable creature, depending on his relationship to the "two worlds". If the answer seems not very enlightening it might mean that the question, "What is man?" itself is not well formulated.[21] In order to penetrate Iqbāl's understanding of man, we must examine something of man's relation to God, to himself and even to history.

(*a*) *God's Unter-tan*. A direct corollary to the sovereignty of God is the fealty of man. In the ideal relation between the two, the situation is clear. Afghānī says of the servant of God:

ملک و آئینش خدا داد است و بس
رسم و راه و دین و آئینش ز حق
زشت و خوب و تلخ و نوشینش ز حق (۷۸)

his kingdom and laws are given by God alone,
his customs, his way, faith, his laws are of God,
of God his foul and fair, his bitter and sweet. (1234-6)

But the actual man on the earth, of course, seldom measures up to this stature. His tarnished character is again described by Satan:

ہیچ گہ از حکم ِ من سر بر نتافت (۱۶۰)

* * *

بندۂ صاحب نظر باید مرا
یک حریف ِ پختہ تر باید مرا

* * *

اے خدا یک زنده مرد ِ حق پرست
لذتے شاید کہ یابم در شکست (۱۶۱)

21. Abraham J. Heschel, *Who is Man?* Stanford University Press, Stanford (California), p. 28,

Not once has he rebelled against my rule; (2509)

* * *

I need a servant of God possessed of vision,
I need a riper adversary! (2521-2)

* * *

Grant me, O God, one living man of faith;
haply I shall know delight at last in defeat. (2539-40)

The sovereignty of God is apparently limited to the degree that man obediently serves as His *Unter-tan*. Indeed, disobedience to God's rule (or obedience to Satan's command) is much more common than obedience to divine command. In the void caused by man's disobedience, man feels lonely and lost. That state of man is clearly depicted in the *Jāvīd Nāmah.*

(*b*) *The Loneliness of Man.* The *Jāvīd Nāmah* opens with a fervent "invocation" of desperate loneliness. It is worthy of being quoted at some length.

آدمی اندر جہانِ ہفت رنگ
ہر زماں گرمِ فغاں مانندِ چنگ!

آرزوئے ہم نفس می سوزدش
نالہ ہائے دل نوا ز آموزدش

لیکن ایں عالم کہ از آب و گل است
کے تواں گفتن کہ دارائے دل است!

بحر و دشت و کوہ و کہ خاموش و کر
آسماں و مہر و مہ خاموش و کر!

گرچہ بر گردوں ہجومِ اختر است
ہر یکے از دیگرے تنہا تر است!

ہر یکے مانندِ ما بیچارہ ایست
در فضائے نیلگوں آوارہ ایست!

کارواں برگِ سفر نا کردہ ساز!
بیکراں افلاک و شب ہا دیر یاز!

این جهان صید است و صیّادیم ما ؟
یا اسیرِ رفته از یادیم ما ؟
زار نالیدم صدائے بر نخواست
ہم نفس فرزندِ آدم را کجاست ؟ (۱-۲)

Man, in this world of seven hues,
lute-like is ever afire with lamentation;
yearning for a kindred spirit burns him inwardly
teaching him threnodies to soothe the heart,
and yet this world, that is wrought of water and clay—
how can it be said to possess a heart?
Sea, plain, mountain, grass—all are deaf and dumb,
deaf and dumb heaven and sun and moon;
though the stars swarm in the selfsame sky
each star is more solitary than the other,
each one is desperate just as we are,
a vagrant lost in an azure wilderness—
the caravan unprovisioned against the journey,
the heavens boundless, the nights interminable.
Is this world then some prey, and we the huntsmen,
or are we prisoners utterly forgotten?
Bitterly I wept, but echo answered never:
where may Adam's son find a kindred spirit? (1-18)

The lack of a *ham-nafas*, a "fellow breather" or "kindred spirit", creates extreme depression. Loneliness can be terrifiying. However, Iqbāl does a remarkable, but subtle, thing in these opening lines. He observes that the natural world around him cannot hear or speak,[22]

22. In another poem تنہائی (*Tanhā'ī*) Iqbāl elaborates the theme of a dumb heartless world. After successively asking a restless wave, a mountain and the moon to speak with him—to no avail—he approaches God:

شدم بحضرتِ یزداں گذشتم از مہ و مہر کہ در جہانِ تو یک ذرہ آشنایم نیست
جہاں تہی زدل و مشتِ خاکِ من ہمہ دل چمن خوش است ولے درخورِ نوایم نیست
تبسمے بہ لبِ او رسید و ہیچ نگفت

I came to Almighty God, I passed by sun and moon,
"I'm not acquainted with one particle of your world,

[Contd. p. 404

and that the heavenly bodies are also lonely. At first glance, the loneliness of the stars might seem to augment the pilgrim's loneliness, but paradoxically there is comfort, even perhaps a community of spirits, between the pilgrim and the stars. In the midst of his lament he has pointed to a *ham-nafas*. Loneliness has turned to solitude. Solitude is very different; it is the starting point for a search. The central question that starts that search is:

> Is this world then some prey, and we the huntsmen,
> or are we prisoners utterly forgotten?

Is man on top of things or is he involved in a vast riddle? The complete answer never comes. In fact, near the end of the *Jāvīd Nāmah*, the pilgrim complains:

زندگی ہر جا کہ باشد جستجو است !
حل نشد این نکتہ من صیدم کہ اوست (۲۲۳)

> Life, wherever it may be, is a restless search;
> unresolved is this riddle—am I the quarry, or is He? (3525-6)

Though unsolved, what began as a great question remains as only a *nuktah*, a "subtlety" or a "riddle". In the midst of the great search that stands between the problem and the riddle, the pilgrim has learned a great deal, especially about himself. Self-knowledge begins with solitude:

گرچہ داری جانِ روشن چوں کلیم
ہست افکارِ تو بے خلوت عقیم !
از کم آمیزی تخیل زندہ تر
زندہ تر جویندہ تر یابندہ تر ! (۷۷)

Your world is empty of heart, and a handful of my dust is all heart.
Garden is beautiful, but it isn't worthy of my song."
A smile came to His lips and He said nothing.

God's smile seems best explained as acknowledgment of a particle of self-knowledge on the part of the poet (Iqbāl, op. cit., p. 137). Translated by this author.

Though you possess a soul illumined as Moses,
yet without solitude your thoughts remain barren ;
by isolation the imagination becomes more vivid,
more vivid, more questing, more finding. (1211–4)

Although solitude makes thought more pregnant, it is accompanied by struggle, as Zoroaster characteristically reminds us :

چیست خلوت؟ درد و سوز و آرزوست
انجمن دیداست و خلوت جستجواست (۵۳)

What is solitude ? Pain, burning and yearning ;
company is vision, solitude is a search. (839-40)

The search is not easy. It is painful and wearying. But for Iqbāl suffering is not in vain :

از بلاها پخته تر گردد خودی
تا خدا را پرده در گردد خودی (۵۳)

The Self becomes more mature through suffering
until the Self rends the veils that cover God. (829-30)

The notion of the developmental value of suffering as expressed here shows that Iqbāl had a very optimistic view of man. If out of lonely suffering man matures and comes closer to a knowledge of God, surely that man must be bound by few limits. All men do not bridge the gap between depressing loneliness and searching solitude, but those who do are free men. Let us see just what that means.

(*c*) *The Free Man.* A. Schimmel has defined Iqbāl's Perfect or Free Man in one sentence. He is :

The faithful who has realized in himself the Divine call to vicegerency, and who has consolidated his ego so much that he is able to have a person-to-person encounter with his creator . . . .[23]

23. *Gabriel's Wing*, p. 118.

The person-to.person encounter with God by the Free Man in the *Jāvīd Nāmāh* is first of all as *bandah-i ḥaqq*, the servant or slave of God :

بندۂ حق بے نیاز از ہر مقام
نے غلام اورا نہ اوکس را غلام
بندۂ حق مردِ آزاد است و بس (۷۸)

The servant of God has no need of any station,
no man is his slave, and he is the slave of none ;
the servant of God is a free man, that is all. (1231-3)

It is noteworthy here that by becoming a slave of God, man automatically frees himself from all other forms of slavery. The free man is not simply in a static state of not being a slave, however. The essence of his freedom consists in assuming the difficult task of bringing light to darkness :

جاں نگنجد در جہات اے ہوشمند
مردِ حُر بیگانہ از ہر قید و بند
حُر زخاکِ تیرہ آید در خروش
زانکہ از بازاں نیاید کارِ مُوش ! (۶۸)

Man of reason, the soul is not contained in dimensions :
the free man is a stranger to every fetter and chain,
the free man rails against the dark earth
for it beseems not the falcon to act like a mouse. (1051-4)

Such an enterprise is all-encompassing in th e life of a man. It focuses the bulk of his attention toward life on this earth. Even thoughts of an after-life reflect the style of life on earth—all which makes death far less significant than life for Iqbāl :

می فتد بر مرگ آن مردِ تمام
مثل شاہینے کہ افتد بر حمام !

هر زمان میرد غلام از بیمِ مرگ
زندگی او را حرام از بیمِ مرگ!
بندهٔ آزاد را شانے دگر
مرگ او را می دہد جانے دگر! (۲۱۷)

The perfect man swoops upon death
even as a falcon swooping upon a dove,
The slave dies every moment in fear of death :
the fear of death makes life for him a thing forbidden ;
the free servant has another dignity,
death bestows upon him a new life, (3423-8)

Iqbāl's frequent use of hunting and battle imagery (we have seen several examples above) is not accidental. The essence of life is activity.[24] Activism is understandably, then, the centre of gravity of Iqbāl's philosophical anthropology.

(*d*) *Activism.* In the first place, activism means simply keeping in motion and avoiding static nothingness. The pilgrim expresses this simple thought with the imagery of travel :

کیشِ ما مانندِ موجِ تیز گام
اختیارِ جاده و ترکِ مقام! (۲۲۰)

24. In a charming quatrain, Iqbāl makes the point in a characteristically pithy way :

ساحل افتاده گفت گرچه بسے زیستم
ہیچ نه معلوم شد آه که من چیستم
موج زخود رفتهٔ تیز خرامید و گفت
ہستم اگر می روم گر نروم نیستم

The shore said humbly : "Although I've lived a lot.
Nothing has appeared—Ah, what am I, anyway ?"
The uncontrolled wave swelled quickly and said,
"I am, if I'm moving—if I'm still, I'm not."

Iqbāl, op. cit., p. 150. Translation by this author. The concept may well be a universal conception of *homo religiosus*. It is, at least, as W. Brede Kristensen asserts, "typically religious" that "life is not a static condition, but a process of becoming and striving." (*The Meaning of Religion*, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1960, p. 195).

Our creed, like the swift-paced wave :
abandon the halting-place, choose the highway. (3465-6)

This notion can take form of spiritual activity, as well as physical. It may even find expression in exaggerated mystical ecstasy, as enunciated by the voice of Ḥallāj in Sufi language :

شریکِ حلقۂ رندانِ بادہ پیما باش
حذر زبیعتِ پیرے کہ مردِ غوغانیست ! (۱۳۶)

Be partner with the ring of wine-bibbing dissolutes ;
beware of allegiance to a Master who is not a man of tumult. (2155-6)

The purpose of such mystical ecstasy is to break into the circle of knowledge of the self and God, as has been discussed above.

Other kinds of activity suggested by Iqbāl are also purposive. One is to infuse life where there is barrenness. After having demonstrated the lifelessness of both communism and capitalism, Afghānī says :

زندگانی سوختن با ساختن
در گلے تخمِ دلے انداختن ! (۷۰)

Life means a passionate burning, an urge to make,
to cast in the dead clay the seed of a heart ! (1099-1100)

Having put life into the lifeless soil, man can actually begin to share in the continuing creation of new surroundings :

زندگی را سوز و ساز از نارِ تست
عالمِ نو آفریدن کارِ تست ! (۷۲)

It is from your fire that the glow of life comes,
and it is your task to create the new world. (1115-6)

In its most virile form, activism is used to pull the weeds, to get rid of the evil that is entangling the world :

خویش را بر اہرمن باید زدن
تو ہمہ تیغ آں ہمہ سنگِ فسن ! (۱۸۶)

One must strike oneself against Ahriman ;
you are a sword, he is the whetstone ; (2897-8)

All of this activity is extremely this-worldly. It is focused here, right now, in the midst of the surrounding world. Hermitage—very different from solitude, which embarks upon search from the context of life—is the same thing as death :

تن بخویش اندر کشیدن مردن است
از جهان در خود رمیدن مردن است ! (۱۱۷)

Death is to draw in the body,
death is to flee from the world into one's self. (1855-6)

By this exacting standard of activism, life is judged by its quality, not its quantity. It opens up a completely new concept of eschatology :

زانکه در عرضِ حیات آمد ثبات
از خدا کم خواستم طولِ حیات !
زندگی را چیست رسم و دین و کیش ؟
یک دمِ شیری به از صد سالِ میش ! (۲۱۷)

immortality is in the breadth of life—
I do not ask of God for length of days,
What is the law, the religion, the rite of life ?
Better one instant a lion, than a century of sheep. (3415-8)

That is the kind of philosophy held by such modern martyrs as Patrice Lumumba, Malcolm X, and Martin Luther King Jr. It is no wonder, then, that Iqbāl chooses an Indian Muslim martyr, Sulṭān Tīpū of Mysore, to express the same feeling :

هیچ می دانی که این پیغام کیست ؟

* * *

آنکه گفتارش همه کردار بود
مشرق اندر خواب و او بیدار بود (۲۱۵)

do you know from whom this message comes ? (3378)

* * *

[From] the man whose words were all action,
the one man awake, whilst the East slept. (3385-6)

The use of such a poignant historical example underlines the reality that activism is not simply one of many possible anthropological conceptions—it demands total commitment to "life", even at the cost of life.

(*e*) *Man and Fate.* The question is an old one : How free is any "free man", including Iqbāl's Free Man ? How much is man limited by fate ? Iqbāl faces the question in general terms,[25] and comes down unequivocally on the side of man's free will over fate. In the first place, however, that kind of freedom requires partnership with God. Zarvān, symbolising fate, warns the pilgrim of his power and his own limitations :

گفت ''زروانم جهان را قاہرم
ہم نہانم از نگہ ہم ظاہرم
بستہ ہر تدبیر با تقدیرِ من
ناطق و صامت ہمہ نخچیرِ من

* * *

لی مع اللہ ہر کرا در دل نشست
آن جوانمردے طلسمِ من شکست
گر تو خواہی من نباشم درمیاں
لی مع اللہ باز خوان از عینِ جان'' (۲۱-۲۲)

He said, 'I am Zarvan, I am the world-subduer.
alike hidden from sight and manifest am I.
Every plan is bound up with my determining ;
voiced and voiceless—all alike are my prey. (407-10)

* * *

But he who has in his heart *I have a time with God,*
that doughty hero has broken my talisman ;
if you wish that I should not be in the midst,
recite from the depths of your soul *I have a time with God.*'
(425-8)

25. Detailed questions, such as how much a given man is limited by objective circumstances, such as place and time of birth, sex, nutrition, nurturing and cultural milieu, are not posed by Iqbāl in the *Jāvīd Nāmah.*

We see that fate is recognised as a potent force that man must deal with, but also that it can be overcome, according to the Tradition referred to, by taking on a new kind of divine time. A similar reference uses visual imagery, which we are familiar with from our epistemological discussion :

نقشِ حق داری ؟ جہان نخچیرِ تست
ہم عنان تقدیر با تدبیرِ تست (۱۵۲)

Do you possess God's image ? The world is your prey ;
destiny shares the same reins as your design. (2387-8)

Now one more step has been taken. Not only can man shake off the strictures of fate, but with knowledge of God, he can also point fate in the direction of his own will. This later development takes a radical form in a passage by Bartarī-Harī :

این جہانے کہ تو بینی اثرِ یزدان نیست
چرخہ از تست وہم آن رشتہ کہ بردوکِ تو رشت !
پیشِ آئینِ مکافاتِ عمل سجدہ گذار
زانکہ خیزد ز عمل دوزخ و اعراف و بہشت ! (۲۰۰)

This world you behold is not the handiwork of God,
the wheel is yours, and the thread spun on your spindle.
Prostrate yourself before the law of action's reward,
for from action are born Hell, Purgatory and Paradise. (3123-6)

Fate, thus, is in man's hands, but only that man's who is in union with God.

مردِ حق ! بـّرندہ چون شمشیر باش
خود جہانِ خویش را تقدیر باش ! (۲۲۵)

Man of God, be trenchant as a sword,
be yourself your own world's destiny ! (3565-6)

(*f*) *Ijtihād* : *An Anthropological Summary*. *Ijtihād*, or the right of individual legal interpretation, is not in itself discussed in the *Jāvīd Nāmah*. However, the concept is implicit in Iqbāl's basic notions about man. First of all, a servant of God, if he really is such, can

appeal to his personal relationship with God as authority for an interpretation that goes againt some established norm. The idea that a search for truth begins in solitude also points directly to the approval of the idea of *Ijtihād*. Of course, the free man who engages in the sort of activism Iqbāl advocates, even taking destiny into his own hands, is automatically involved in a kind of interpretation-through-action.

The spirit of individual interpretation can be a potentially dangerous subversive force for an insecure religious authority—especially one linked with political authority. A classic example is the Quaker Mary Dyer, who was hanged in Boston in 1660 for returning to the Massachusetts Bay Colony after expulsion. Her defence had a ring perfectly appropriate to the Islamic concept of *Ijtihād* : " . . . in obedience to the will of the Lord I came, and in His will I abide faithful to death."[26] As Iqbāl was working for Muslim nationhood in India, he had to deal with two illegitimate authorities : the British rulers and the rigid old-guard Islamic religious judges. The first weapon he could use in both cases was *Ijtihād*.

V. **The Politics of Community.** So far, we have discussed three main fields of concern in Iqbāl's *Jāvīd Nāmah* : his epistemology, his theology and his anthropolgy. As we noted in the beginning, Iqbāl had a vision about how wisdom could be attained, about how the One God ruled, and how the Free Man should actively obey Him. We have seen how closely meshed these three fields are. Similarly, Iqbāl harboured a vision about an Islamic community. That conception, too, was bound up in the midst of his other concerns. We have separated his concept of community for convenience of analysis.

(*a*) *The Individual in Community.* Reconciling the interests and needs of the individual over against his community has been a basic problem for all reformers. American Federalists faced it. So have American New Leftists. So did Iqbāl. He marks the contrast by

26. *Faith and Practice of New England Yearly Meeting of Friends*, Cambridge (Massachusetts), 1966, p. 20.

speaking of solitude, *khalvat*, and manifestation, *jalvat*.[27] Both in this context are quite positive :

عشق در خلوت کلیم اللّٰهی است
چون بجلوت می خرامد شاهی است ! (۵۴)

Love in solitude is colloquy with God ;
when love marches forth in display, that is to be a king !
(841-2)

The display means to be exposed in the open, to take in the world, to immerse oneself in a community. Or, viewed the other way round, the surrounding world can be immersed in the individual.

زندگی خواهی خودی را پیش کن
چار سو را غرق اندر خویش کن (۲۲۸)

If you seek life, advance your selfhood,
drown the world's dimensions in your self. (3615-6)

By losing oneself in the world, the life of the individual is heightened. That is essentially why the question of community or nation, is so crucial for Iqbāl. We are now ready to look at the political content of Iqbāl's thought about nationhood. First, we will look at the inevitable influence of the West, and then we will be prepared to see what kind of community Iqbāl has in mind for the Islamic East,

(*a*) *The Challenge from the West*. All is not completely awry with West. We have seen that Iqbāl approved of certain aspects of Western epistemology, which he felt the the East should adopt. Almost in an aside, even Western scholarship is handed a tribute by Ba'al in the assembly of the gods ;

زنده باد افرنگیِ مشرق شناس
آنکه ما را از لحد بیرون کشید ! (۱۰۲)

Long live the European orientalist
who has drawn us forth from the tomb ! (1647-8)

27. This is the same *tajnīs* which was discussed above, n. 15.

It is, of course, true that sometimes Western scholars have helped the East to appreciate more of itself; but these benefits have been few in number and of minor importance. The basic challenge the West has offered the East is a threat, both physcial and ideological. The physical threat is the most obvious, and we will examine that first.

(*1*) *The Yoke of Empire.* Iqbāl's condemnation of Western imperialism is blatant and uncompromising. Speaking to Afghānī, the pilgrim says:

ترک و ایران و عرب مستِ فرنگ
ہر کسے را در گلو شستِ فرنگ
مشرق از سلطانیِ مغرب خراب (٦٧)

Turk, Persian, Arab intoxicated with Europe
and in the throat of each the fish-hook of Europe;
and East wasted by the West's imperialism. (1029-31)

By including the Turks and Persians—who were politically independent —along with Arabs—who were mostly colonised in 1930—Iqbāl is clearly referring to a subtler kind of control, a control of the spirit. It was they who were intoxicated with Europe, not that Europe had successfully conquered territory. How was the East laid waste? Not after the manner of Chingīz Khān, but emotionally, even morally. With magnificent sarcasm Pharaoh exposes the misdeeds of empire:

پیکرے کو در عجائب خانہ ایست
بر لبِ خاموشِ او افسانہ ایست!
از ملوکیت خبرہا می دہد
کور چشماں را نظرہا می دہد
چیست تقدیرِ ملوکیت؟ شقاق
محکمی جستن ز تدبیرِ نفاق! (١٠٧)

A human shape dwells in a museum
with a legend upon its silent lips
telling the history of imperialism
and giving visions to the blind.

What is the grand design of imperialism? [28]
To seek security by contriving division. (1733-8)

His statement has proved even more germane in the post-colonial era. Division fed by an imperial power has more often festered and exploded after its absence form the scene. Even the system of government practised by the imperial powers is questioned by Iqbāl :

حاصلِ آئین و دستورِ ملوک ؟
ده خدایاں فربہ و دہقاں چو دوک !
وائے بر دستورِ جمہورِ فرنگ (۹۷)

What results from the laws and constitutions of kings?
Fat lords of the manor, peasants lean as spindles!
Woe to the constitution of the democracy of Europe! (1253-5)

The mixture of Western imperialism with the East simply doesn't work. It breeds malignancy in both camps. The last words of the pilgrim in the *Jāvīd Nāmah* epitomise this thought :

دیده ام تدبیر ہائے غرب و شرق
وانما تقدیر ہائے غرب و شرق ! (۲۲۹)

I have seen the contrivings of West and East—
prevent the destinies of West and East. (3623-4)

It is, of course, hardly surprising that a prophet of "Islamic nationalism" would oppose imperialism. What makes Iqbāl's conception of the West significant is that he rejects both major economic ideologies of the West : capitalism and communism. Let us look at both.

(2) *The Capitalist Devil and the Communist Hoax.* Capitalism, of course, is associated with imperialism in Iqbāl's experience. It is no wonder that he expresses his misgivings in the language of "we" and "they" :

28. Apparently for aesthetic reasons Arberry fails to translate the one-word answer to the question in line 1737 : *shiqāq*, meaning "science" or discord". The essential meaning is preserved in the following line, however.

فاش باید گفت سرِّ دلبراں
ما متاع و ایں ہمہ سوداگراں !
دیدہ ہا بے نم ز حبِّ سیم و زر
مادراں را بارِ دوش آمد پسر (۷۹)

The secrets of these charmers must be revealed :
We are the merchandise and they are the traders.
Their eyes are dried up with love of silver and gold ;
These sons are burdens on their mothers' backs.[29]

So Iqbāl feels that capitalists deceive themselves as much as they do their prey. The communists have also deceived themselves by aiming their sights too low :

رنگ و بو از تن نگیرد جانِ پاک
جز بہ تن کارے ندارد اشتراک (۶۹)

The pure soul takes not colour and scent from the body,
and Communism has nothing to do save with the body. ((1075-6)

But Iqbāl at times seems gentler in his criticism of communism than of capitalism. In the message of Afghānī to the Russian people, he compliments them for having broken away from imperial rule ; but he warns them :

اے کہ می خواہی نظامِ عالمے
جُستۂ او را اساسِ محکمے ؟ (۸۸)

You who desire a new world-order,
have you sought for it a firm foundation ? (1441-2)

He proceeds to suggest the Qur'ān as the best foundation.

With particular insight, however, Iqbāl points to the common characteristics of both capitalism and communism. He says these Western ideologies look for the wrong goals :

غربیاں گم کردہ اند افلاک را
در شکم جویند جانِ پاک را (۶۹)

29. Translated by this author.

The Westerners have lost the vision of heaven,
they go hunting for the pure spirit in the belly. (1073-4)

Finally in rapid-fire summation, Iqbāl attacks both ideologies mercilessly :

هر دو را جاں ناصبور و ناشکیب
هر دو یزداں ناشناس آدم فریب !
زندگی ایں را خروج آں را خراج
درمیانِ ایں دو سنگ آدم زجاج !
ایں بہ علم و دین و فن آرد شکست
آں برد جاں را زتن ناں را زدست (۷۰)

The soul of both is impatient and intolerant,
both of them know not God, and deceive mankind.
One lives by production, the other by taxation
and man is a glass caught between these two stones
The one puts to rout science, religion, art,
the other robs body of soul, the hand of bread. (1091-6)

In short, the challenge of the West must be met by accepting some of its knowledge and epistemology, with modifications. But its history of imperial possession of the East must be opposed, along with the dynamic ideologies which propel it—capitalism and communism. The slate must first of all be wiped clean, or nearly so. Then the East can begin building itself into a new community. We will now examine how, according to Iqbāl, that should be done.

(*c*) *A Community in the East*. Aside from declaring independence from Western overlords, the Muslims of the East have to recognise their own past errors, augment the best of that past, effect needed changes and thereby build a new community. These are steps on the path to nationhood, which we are now ready to detail.

The Decadent Past. The way Islam has been practised is derided in the *Jāvīd Nāmah* by the voice of the nineteenth-century Ottoman statesman, Sa'īd Ḥalīm Pāshā :

دین۔ حق از کافری رسواتر است
زانکہ ملا" مومن۔ کافرگر است ! (۸۴)

The religion of God is more shameful than unbelief,
because the mullah is a believer trading in unfaith ; (1355-6)

But the problem is more acute than the presence of a few religion-mongers. Decadence permeates the most widespread and well-endowed religious institutions. The pilgrim bitterly laments :

معنیٔ تازہ کہ جوئیم و نیابیم کجاست
مسجد و مکتب و میخانہ عقیم اند ہمہ (۹۳)

Where is the new truth which we seek and do not find ?
Mosque, school and tavern, all alike are barren. (1531-2)

Iqbāl is referring here to the mosque (*masjid*), school (*maktab*) and the "tavern", which is meeting-place of a Sufi order (*maikhānah*). An even more spectacular sign of past decay was seen when Muslims worked to aid Western imperialism. Two historical examples from British India are singled out :

جعفر از بنگال و صادق از دکن
ننگِ آدم ننگِ دیں ننگِ وطن !
نا قبول و نا امید و نا مراد
ملّتے از کارِ شاں اندر فساد ! (۱٦٦)

Jaafar of Bengal and Sadiq of Deccan,
shame to mankind, religion and fatherland,
unaccepted, despairing, undesired,
a nation ruined by their handiwork. (2561-4)

With visions of nationhood, Iqbāl scrutinises the Islamic countries not under colonial rule. His first target is Turkey, which Muṣṭafā Kemāl has been turning upside down. Iqbāl concludes, ironically, through the mouth of the Turk Pāshā again :

ترک را آہنگِ نو در چنگ نیست
تازہ اش جز کہنۂ افرنگ نیست (۷۲)

No, the Turks have no new melody in their lute,
what they call new is only the old tune of Europe ; (1121-2)

The most spectacular reform that Turkey had instituted by the time of the *Jāvīd Nāmah* was adoption of Latin alphabet.[30] Such a change can subject an old literary culture to selective stagnation or revision within a single generation. The change of Persian-speaking Tajikistan to the Cyrillic alphabet has produced the same effect : the new generation is able to read only those works from the past that the regime decides to have transliterated. The change to Latin in Turkey's case was an unmistakable sign of a door opening to the West, rather than to the East.

The next Muslim country of Iqbāl's concern is Iran under the strong hand of Rezā Shāh. The hearkening back by the new Pahlavī dynasty to Iran's ancient glory passes over the Islamic contribution to Iran. The pilgrim tells Nādir of the then state of Iran :

با وطن پیوست و از خود در گذشت
دل به رستم داد و از حیدر گذشت !
نقشِ باطل می پذیرد از فرنگ
سر گذشتِ خود بگیرد از فرنگ ! (۳۰۲)

Wedded to the 'fatherland', having abandoned her self
she has given her heart to Rustam, and turned from Haider.
She is accepting a false image from Europe.
she takes the version of her history from Europe. (3191-4)

The term "*vaṭan*" (fatherland) is distinguished from "*millat*" (nation), which is the kernel of Iqbāl's "Islamic nationalism". Rustam is the brawny mythic hero of Iran's Zoroastrian past, depicted in Firdausī's epic, the *Shāh Nāmah*. He is contrasted with Ḥaider, i.e. 'Alī, the son-in-law of the Prophet and the Imām and patron-saint of the Shi'ītes who predominate in Iran.

The tendency of Westerners to see the ancient, but not the modern

30. In 1928, according to Wilfred Cantwell Smith, *Islam in Modern History*, The New American Library, New York, 1957, p. 178.

history of the East is as well known in Iran as in Egypt where the outsiders fail to understand the Arab contention that the pyramids are overshadowed by the Aswan Dam. Iqbāl reminds Persians that Islam rejuvenated Iran :

مردِ صحرائی بایران جان دمید
باز سوئے ریگ زارِ خود رمید !
کہنہ را از لوحِ ما بسترد و رفت
برگ و سازِ عصرِ نو آورد و رفت !
آہ احسانِ عرب نشناختند
از تشِ افرنگیان بگداختند ! (۲۰۴-۲۰۵)

The desert-dwellers breathed life into Iran
and then sped back to their sandy wastes ;
they erased from our tablet all that is old, and departed,
they brought the apparatus of new age, and departed.
Alas, Iran has not recognized the benefaction of the Arabs ;
she has melted away in Europe's fire. (3207-12)

The third Islamic country, Afghanistan, is criticised for its own tradition—not for melting before Europe. The pilgrim reports to Abdālī. the founder of modern Afghanistan :

امتّاں اندر اخوّت گرم خیز
او برادر با برادر در ستیز ! (۲۰۶)

Whilst other nations are eager in brotherhood,
with him brother is at war against brother. (3227-8)

The problem would not have been new to Abdālī (Aḥmad S̲h̲āh Durrānī, died 1773), who also had to contend with the ancient Afghan code calling for vendetta, *badal*, against a transgressor's family by a victim's family.[31] Needless to say, that kind of endless feuding would be counter-productive to building an Islamic community.

Having severely chastised three major Islamic countries, Iqbāl

31. Muhammad Yunus, *Frontier Speaks*, Hind Kitabs Ltd , Bombay, 1957, p. 5.

makes a general statement, about their common element: the concept of *vaṭan* or "country":

لُردِ مغرب آن سراپا مکر و فن
اہلِ دیں را داد تعلیمِ وطن
او بفکرِ مرکز و تو در نفاق
بگذر از شام و فلسطین و عراق (٦٧)

The Lord of the West, cunning from head to toe,
taught the people of religion the concept of Country.
He thinks of the centre, while you are at discord—
give up this talk of Syria, Palestine, Iraq ! (1033-6)

This passage makes it clear that even after his demand for a separate Muslim State in India, Iqbāl still held out hope for pan-Islamic union.

The most important danger of *vaṭan* is that it can rise up as a false god. The Spirit of India warns the pilgrim:

تا جہانِ رنگ و بو گردد دگر
رسمِ او آئینِ او گردد دگر
پیش ازیں چیزے دگر مسجودِ او
در زمانِ ما وطن معبودِ او (١٧٠)

As the world changes in scent and colour,
even so its customs and usages change;
In former times it bowed before other gods,
in our days its idol is the fatherland. (2627-30)

Significantly, the word in current Persian usage for "patriotism" is *vaṭan-parastī*, meaning literally "fatherland-worshipping". The implication is clear, especially in the United States where the cult of patriotism practises human sacrifice as its most sacred rite. Iqbāl saw that kind of danger in a narrowly-conceived nationalism which was defined only by geography and politics. He sought a firmer basis for his nation.

(2) *A Good Foundation*. We have already noted (see above, "God's Rule") that theocracy is the starting point of Iqbāl's political philoso-

phy. A community or nation is bound together as a corollary to its basic obedience to God. For Muslims, therefore, the first functional legal authority of the community is the Qur'ān, as Afghānī says in his speech about divine government :

اے بہ تقلیدش اسیر آزاد شو
دامنِ قرآں بگیر آزاد شو! (۸۰)

You enchained to the imitation of Europe, be free,
clutch the skirt of the Koran, and be free ! (1271-2)

Afghānī describes the world as envisaged by the Qur'ān with great optimism :

عالمے در سینۂ ما گم ہنوز
عالمے در انتظارِ قُم ہنوز
عالمے بے امتیازِ خون و رنگ
شامِ او روشن تر از صبحِ فرہنگ (۷۳)

It is a world lost now in our breast,
a world awaiting yet the command 'Arise !'
A world without distinction of race and colour,
its evening is brighter than Europe's dawn ; (1143-6)

Thus, even though Iqbāl recognises the past faults of the East, under the new kind of rule which he envisions, he holds out the highest hopes. He even urges the Russian people to join with the East :

ملتے می خواہد ایں دنیائے پیر
آنکہ باشد ہم بشیر و ہم نذیر
باز می آئی سوئے اقوامِ شرق
بستہ ایامِ تو با ایامِ شرق (۸۸)

This aged world requires a nation
that shall be both bearer of good tidings and warner.
Return again to the peoples of the East ;
your 'days' are bound up with the 'days' of the East. (1429-32)

Besides "God's Rule" other foundations of the Qur'ānic world enumerated by Afghānī, namely, man as God's vicegerent, God as the legitimate landowner, and divinely-guided wisdom have already been discussed. When Afghānī says of tbe Qur'ānic world :

باطنِ او از تغیّر بے غمے
ظاہرِ او انقلابِ ہر دمے (۸۴)

inwardly it is anxious not of change,
outwardly, every moment is revolution. (1153-4)

he means that it is these Qur'ānic foundations which are of inward character. But why the outward revolution ?

(3) *Revolution.* There is no question that the *Jāvīd Nāmah* looks toward the need for revolutionary change. The language of revolution pervades the work. Afghānī says to Russian people :

چیست قرآن ؟ خواجہ را پیغامِ مرگ
دستگیرِ بندۂ بے ساز و برگ ! (۸۹)

What is the Koran ? Sentence of death for the master-man,
succour for the slave without food and destitute. (1463-4)

The call for revolutionary action is more specificed in a reference to the situation in Kashmir :

ہیچ می دانی کہ روزے در وُلر
موجہ می گفت با موجِ دگر
چند در قلزم بیک دیگر زنیم
خیز تا یک دم بساحل سرزنیم (۱۹۳-۱۹۴)

Do you not know what one day a wave
said to another wave in Lake Wular ?
'How long shall we strike at each other in this sea ?
Rise up, let us break together against the shore. . . .' (3019-22)

Even more forthright and open-ended a call for revolutionary action is given by the voice of beauty :

در شکن آنرا کہ ناید سازگار
از ضمیرِ خود دِگر عالم بیار
بندۂ آزاد را آید گراں
زیستن اندر جہانِ دیگراں (۲۲۵)

break whatsoever is uncongenial,
out of your heart produce a new world—
it is irksome to the free servitor
to live in a world belonging to others. (3557-60)

The call for revolution is qualified, however, not only by retaining certain traditions and institutions of old that are positive, but also by other factors. First of all, the pilgrim, using Sufi language, says explicitly that radical political action requires spiritual power :

با نشۂ درویشی در ساز و دما دم زن
چوں پختہ شوی خود را بر سلطنتِ جم زن (۱۹٦)

Habituate yourself to the dervish wine and quaff it continuously ;
when you become riper, hurl yourself at the dominion of Jamshid.[32] (3065-6)

It is eminently reasonable to believe that while *Jāvīd Nāmah* was being composed by Iqbāl, his views were largely influenced by the political conditions obtaining in India. As an apostle of freedom and dignity of man he certainly was, as ever before, highly critical of the British imperialistic designs on the Subcontinent. Hence, he says :

ہندیاں منکر ز قانونِ فرنگ
در نگیرد سحر و افسونِ فرنگ
روح را بارِ گراں آئینِ غیر
گر چہ آید ز آسماں آئینِ غیر! (۲۱۲)

32. Here again, the ancient Persian monarch is associated with political power. (See above, n. 9.)

The Indians reject the statutes of Europe,
they are immune to Europe's magic charms ;
alien laws are a heavy burden on the soul
even though they descend from heaven itself. (3329-32)

These lines are especially convincing since they constitute a report by the pilgrim to the Martyr-King about present conditions in India. There is also indication that Iqbāl would prefer that the revolutionary action to come should, so far as possible, be in non-violent form. How else can "the sword of the Koran" be interpreted in these lines :

کُشتنِ ابلیس کارے مشکل است
زانکه او گم اندر اعماقِ دل است !
خوشتر آن باشد مسلمانش کنی
کشتۂ شمشیرِ قرآنش کنی (۸۳)

To slay Satan is indeed a difficult task,
since he is hidden within the depths of the heart ;
better is it to make him a true Mussulman,
better to smite him dead with the sword of the Koran. (1335-8)

It is proper that Iqbāl's revolution be non-violent, for in the community he wishes to create, love rather than violence is to be practised and egalitarianism is a high ideal.

(4) *Peace and Equality.* In a lofty dialogue between the pilgrim and the mystic Ḥallāj, love is preferred to violence as a means of creation. The pilgrim says :

نقشِ حق را در جهان انداختند
من نمی دانم چسان انداختند ؟ (۱۵۳)

God's image has been implanted on the world ;
I do not know how it has been implanted. (2391-2)

And Ḥāllāj replies :

یا بزورِ دلبری انداختند
یا بزورِ قاهری انداختند !

زانکہ حق در دلبری پیدا تر است
دلبری از قاہری اولیٰ تر است ! (۱۵۳)

It has been implanted by force of love
or it has been implanted by force of violence;
because God is more manifest in love,
love is a better way than violence. (2393-6)

The logic is mystical, for a jump has been made from the realm of divine precedent to human action, from God's love to human love. On a much more concrete plane, Rūmī deplores institutions of violence as part of the accoutrements of government :

فوج و زندان و سلاسل رہزنی است
اوست حاکم کز چنیں ساماں غنی است (۱۰۸)

Armies, prisons, chains are banditry ;
he is the true ruler who needs not such apparatus. (1749-50)

The community without violence is a community at peace with itself, with gulfs of inequality erased from its midst. Iqbāl sees Islamic revelation as essentially fostering that ideal. Afghānī says :

وحیِ حق بینندۂ سودِ ہمہ
در نگاہش سود و بہبودِ ہمہ (۷۸)

God's revelation sees the benefit of all,
its regard is for the welfare and profit of all. (1239-40)

The model for such an ideal, although not a particularly spectacular one when viewed from our post-abolitionist perspective, is offered by the behaviour of the Prophet himself. The Prophet's arch-enemy, abū Jahl, chastises his social manners by saying :

'در نگاہِ او یکے بالا و پست
با غلامِ خویش بر یک خواں نشست' (۵۹)

in his eyes lofty and lowly are the same thing—
he has sat down at the same table with his slave. (927-8)

Having duly prepared the way carefully in accordance with

traditional Islamic thinking, Iqbāl shows us a picture of his ideal society—a society of concord and absence of exploitation of man by man. That picture is painted for us in the mythical city of Marghadīn in the "Sphere of Mars". What follows is the high point of the social thought of the *Jāvīd Nāmah*:

سخت کش دہقاں، چراغش روشن است
از نہابِ ده خدایاں ایمن است!
کشت و کارش بے نزاعِ آبجوست
حاصلش بے شرکتِ غیرے ازوست!
اندراں عالم نہ لشکر نے قشون
نے کسے روزی خورد از کشت و خوں!
نے قلم در مرغدیں گیرد فروغ
از فن تحریر و تشہیرِ دروغ!
نے ببازاراں ز بے کاراں خروش
نے صدا ہائے گدایاں دردِ گوش! (۱۲۱-۱۲۲)

the lamp of the hard-toiling farmer is always bright,
he is secure from the plundering of the landlords,
his tillage is not a struggle for water,
his harvest is his own, no other shares in it.
In that world there are no armies, no squadrons,
none gains his livelihood by killing and murder;
In Marghadin no pen wins lustre
from inscribing and disseminating lies;
in the market-places there is no clamour of the workless,
no whining of beggars afflicts the ear. (1939-48)

Finally to climax the social egalitarianism, a political doctrine of creative anarchy (the very opposite of political chaos) is espoused by the wise man of Mars:

کس دریں جا سائل و محروم نیست
عبد و مولا حاکم و محکوم نیست (۱۲۲)

No one here is a mendicant or destitute,
slave and master, ruler and ruled, here are none. (1949-50)

A society with peace and equality is a society where its members have a great deal in common. They have, in short, unified themselves; they have built a real community, a nation,

(5) *A New Nation.* The cornerstone of nationhood is unity of a group of people. This unity must first of all be a common affirmation of faith, of common purpose :

مرده از کین زنده از دین است دل !
قوتِ دیں از مقامِ وحدت است
وحدت ار مشهود گردد ملت است ! (۲۰۸)

the heart dies of hatred, lives of faith.
The power of faith derives from unity;
when unity becomes visible, it is a nation. (3260-2)

There is also a second kind of unity : the vision of *tauḥīd*, the Unity of God. When Muslims stand together, their unity as a community manifests the Unity of God :

یک نگاہی را بچشمِ کم مبیں
از تجلی ہائے توحید است ایں !
ملّتے چوں می شود توحید مست
قوت و جبروت می آید بدست ! (۲۲۷)

Do not look slightingly on oneness of vision ;
this is a true epiphany of the Unity.
When a nation becomes drunk with the Unity
power, yea, omnipotence lies in its grasp. (3597-3600)

In other words, political unity is essential for unity of religious faith. Spiritual purity is dependent, apparently, on political purity. That, in short, is why Iqbāl advocated a separate Muslim State in India. An Islamic nation is an essential part of faith for a Muslim. The implica-

tion is clear : not only is the West a threat to Islam, but the myriad of divisive forces inside the Indian Subcontinent are an inherent threat to Islam. The Muslims of India must, therefore, band together—or perish. They are caught in depressing crisis, but Iqbāl is heralding their resurrection :

باش تا بینی کہ بے آوازِ صور

ملّتے برخیزد از خاکِ قبور ! (۱۹۵)

wait till you see, without the sound of the Trumpet,
a nation rising out of the dust of the tomb. (3049-50)

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July 1971

M. M. Sharif

IQBAL'S THEORY OF BEAUTY

This article does not aim at an estimate of Iqbāl's poetry. That is a literary question, and only a scholar of literature can adequately deal with it. I shall, therefore, raise no question as to the form and content of his poetry, and shall pronounce no judgment on his works as works of art, except in so far as it is necessary for the development of my subject.

One who writes on a thinker's theory of aesthetics, has to confine himself to only two questions. First : What is his theory of beauty ? And second : What is his theory of art in general ? Therefore, in considering the genesis of Iqbāl's aesthetics, I shall devote all my attention to these two questions. In the present essay, I shall confine myself to the first of these two questions.

Iqbāl was undoubtedly a genius, and one of the greatest poets of the world. This, however, does not mean that he received nothing from the environment in which his genius developed. A gifted soul, like a healthy seed, has to depend for its development on "the soil and moisture" from which it draws its elements of growth. The tallest oak, no less than the tiny seedling, is rooted in the soil from which it springs. Like every other thinker, Iqbāl was a child of his age, and his thought grew out of the thoughts of previous thinkers. He gathered the entire harvest of Eastern and Western philosophy and art. But this

does not mean that he left the thought of his predecessors where he found it. What he gathered from others became the foundation upon which he built the stately edifice of his own system. Just as in the case of other great thinkers, so in his, "all previous thought became transfigured under the light of his genius".

The artist's personality, like that of others, develops in a society embodying the accumulated heritage of the past, and it bears the stamp of that society ; consequently, its expression in his works of art also bears that stamp. If society in a certain age of peace and prosperity is satisfied with its intellectual, moral and social achievements, and has fixed beliefs, set ideals, clear codes of behaviour and decorum, the artists of that society will, as a rule, develop the formal side of their personalities at some sacrifice and to the comparative exclusion of their "content side". And since the formal side of their lives will dominate their personalities, their art will be classical. They will "look to the past", to the balanced, the stable, the standard, the typical and the commonly accepted and felt, with confidence and respect ; and this outlook will find expression in their works.

But after a time society becomes rigid. Its convictions become conventions and dogmas prejudices, and its rules become chains. The delicate, dynamic social equilibrium gets jammed. Spirit changes into form and form into abstraction. Life becomes stagnant and art becomes empty, commonplace, repetitive, mechanical.

Yet this state does not last very long. Life also has its autumn and spring. From within the stagnated society rises the spirit of revolt. and history takes a new turn. The frozen gods are shattered ; customs and conventions are shed, and fresh thoughts and basic emotions sprout forth in all their freshness. The shell of dead form breaks, and a new spirit issues forth. The old rules, techniques and standards are discarded, and a sense of freedom prevails. There is a bustle and struggle in life, and a shaking of the social balance. New ventures are undertaken, some destined to succeed and others doomed to fail. The artist being more sensitive than an average man, becomes the first embodiment of the new spirit. The formal side of his nature leaves

the conventional and the customary, and retains only the instinctive and the natural. The content side of his personality—the assemblage of his sentiments and impulses—bursts forth into violent emotionality, natural sensibility, romantic thrill, subtler though vaguer thoughts, wild dreams, new ideals, new forms and new visions ; and he produces romantic works.

During the glorious period of the Mughul empire our literature was classical. From the latter part of the thirteenth century onward, Muslim thought gradually became more and more mystical. Basic principles of this mysticism were Platonic as modified by Plotinus and the Muslim thinkers like Ibn Sīnā, Ibn'Arabī, al-Jīlī, and others. Plato identifies God with Good and Beauty and in the *Symposium* and the *Phaedrus* he gives priority to Beauty. It is the desire to perceive the loveliness of God's Eternal Beauty, which sets in motion the dynamics of *Eros* or love. *Eros* fills the human heart with longing and enthusiasm, inspires youth with invincible courage, and gets expressed in the poet's songs. There are stages of beauty, but the ultimate Beauty is the source of them all. All particular beauties are changeable and perishable, but Divine Beauty is eternal. Every beautiful object is so because it participates in Divine Beauty—because Divine Beauty reveals itself in it. Nature is beautiful because it participates in the One Eternal Beauty. The sight of every beautiful object reminds us of the Eternal Beauty and this accounts for the mystic rapture—the emotion, the joy, with which we greet the sight of the beautiful. Eternal Beauty reveals itself suddenly as a "wondrous vision" to those who love Him and perceive with courage and understanding and hold fast to the last.

Plotinus accepts this theory of Divine Beauty and lover's pursuit of it as given in the *Symposium* and the *Phaedrus*. He recalls in fresh phrases the ladder of love of the *Symposium* upon which the lover has to climb, to have a glimpse of Beauty above the beauties of the earth. It is the beauty of incorporate things which creates in us a love for them. The beauty of the soul consists in becoming the image of God Who is the Supreme Beauty. It is the aspiring and burning love which gives one the intuitive power of apprehending Supreme Beauty. Spirit

in thinking of Him only knows Him; spirit in love becomes one with Him. The experience of the soul, when it becomes one with God is too immediate to be described. It is then an indescribable vision—the beatific vision. The Supreme Beauty makes those who love Him with a mighty longing also beautiful.

For Ibn Sīnā, everything in the world being imperfect strives for its completion. The willing of or striving for perfection is the secret of growth and is named love. The perfection it aims at is beauty. The entire universe is moving by the power of love to the one Supreme Beauty, the most perfect and best. Just as iron-filings are attracted by a magnet, so also are all things attracted by God. Eternal Beauty, the source, the essence, and the ideal of everything, brings into existence movements in all things—force in physical objects, growth in plants, instincts in beasts and will in man.

These Neoplatonic ideas were further developed by the mystics of Islam—some of them, like Ibn 'Arabī, gave them a pantheistic turn. By and large, this theory of Beauty and Love became traditional in the classical poetry of the East.

Towards the end of the Mughul empire, society became degenerated and fossilised and its literature became extremely formal, sex-ridden, repetitive, opiating, sombre and depressing. Though poignantly expressing the wails and travails of the times in a symbolic garb, it, on the whole, became artificial and conventional and consisted chiefly of ornate prose and lyrical verse called the *ghazal*.

By the time Iqbāl was passing through his school and college days the romantic movement had already set in under the pioneering spirit of Ghālib. Sir Sayyid Aḥmad Khān, Shiblī, Ḥālī, Chirāgh 'Alī and others. They started a revolt against the conventional modes of life and literature, and thus attempted to infuse warmth in the chilled and frozen body of Muslim society in India. When a society begins to emerge from the period of its stagnation, old forms are used to express new content, and thus there is a fusion of classicism and romanticism, and romanticism grows into full vigour. While Sir Sayyid and those belonging to his group were transforming Urdu literature, they were

doing so within the framework of the classical theory of beauty and love. They were so to say, pouring new wine into old bottles.

Almost a century before the dawn of romanticism in Muslim India, the romantic movement in art and general aesthetic theory had started in the West. From the last years of the eighteenth to the middle of the nineteenth century, its influence was widespread. It was represented in France by Rousseau, Chateaubriand, Hugo, Lamartine; in Germany by Goethe, Schiller, Novalis, Herder and the Schlegels; and in England by Blake, Scott, Wordsworth, Browning, Shelley, Keats, Ruskin and Byron. Western Romanticism was a revolt against the primacy of reason, the tyranny of oppressive institutions, and the fetters of artificial forms, rules, manners, social and religious conventions, and set ideas, attitudes and traditions. It gave intuition and imagination, surcharged with emotion, the place of reason; it held in high esteem new ideas, new forms, sincerity and emotionality in expression, love of nature and a keen sense of beauty. Therefore, no wonder that Neoplatonism, as also the ideas and forms of foreign literature, had a strong appeal for these romanticist. Translations were made from Sanskrit and Persian literature, and poets like Ḥāfiẓ and 'Umar Khayyām, who represented classical literature for us, became the favourites of Romanticism in the West. How *ghazal* attracted the Schlegels and Goethe is well known. The influence of Neoplatonism was, however, more marked on the British romanticist. Like all Neoplatonists, they rose from the admiration of Nature to belief in the Absolute; like them, they made imagination the vessel of wisdom, and intuition the source of true knowledge. The poetic genius was, for them, the "spirit of prophecy", and the poet was a diviner of events. Thus, we see that the Neoplatonic elements of our classical literature were also the elements of British Romanticism.

Owing to our political connections with England and the fact that, since Macaulay's time, English had become the medium of instruction in our country, it was naturally British Romanticism which could influence our literature in the first instance. During Iqbāl's school and college days, English Romanticism decorated the syllabuses of the University of the Punjab, as well as those of other Universities.

As a result, a wave of Romanticism ran over the whole country. Its poetry of nature and its Neoplatonic theory of aesthetics which, to a large extent, was identical with what had become, in practice, traditional in Persian and Urdu poetry, had a deep influence on him. In this respect, the denouncer of Plato's metaphysics was his disciple in his theory of beauty.

If, like all romanticist of the *Makhzan* group, Nāẓir, Yaldram, Nadhīr Aḥmad, Muḥammad Ismā'īl I'jāz, Ḥaidar 'Alī Ṭabāṭabā'ī, Ḥādī, Surūr, Chakbast and a host of others, Iqbāl sings in praise of nature, it is because of his admiration for nature; but more so, because in everything in nature he finds revealed the one Eternal Beauty.

حسنِ ازل ہے پیدا تاروں کی دلبری میں
جس طرح عکسِ گل ہو شبنم کی آرسی میں [1]

* * * *

حسنِ ازل کی پیدا ہر چیز میں جھلک ہے
انساں میں وہ سخن ہے، غنچے میں وہ چٹک ہے

یہ چاند آسماں کا شاعر کا دل ہے گویا
واں چاندنی ہے جو کچھ یاں درد کی کسک ہے

اندازِ گفتگو نے دھوکے دیئے ہیں ورنہ
نغمہ ہے بوئے بلبل، بو پھول کی چہک ہے

کثرت میں ہو گیا ہے وحدت کا راز مخفی
جگنو میں جو چمک ہے، وہ پھول میں مہک ہے [2]

Again :

چھپایا حسن کو اپنے کلیم اللہ سے جس نے
وہی ناز آفریں ہے جلوہ پیرا نازنینوں میں [3]

But nowhere does Iqbāl express his Neoplatonism as beautifully as in his poem "*Sulaimā*" :

1. *Bāng-i Darā*, p. 191.
2. Ibid., p. 84. 3. Ibid., p. 107.

جس کی نمود دیکھی چشمِ ستارہ بیں نے
خورشید میں، قمر میں، تاروں کی انجمن میں
صوفی نے جس کو دل کے ظلمت کدہ میں پایا
شاعر نے جس کو دیکھا قدرت کے بانکپن میں
جس کی چمک ہے پیدا جس کی مہک ہویدا
شبنم کے موتیوں میں، پھولوں کے پیرہن میں
صحرا کو ہے بسایا جس نے سکوت بن کر
ہنگامہ جس کے دم سے کاشانۂ چمن میں
ہر شے میں ہے نمایاں یوں تو جمال اس کا
آنکھوں میں ہے سلیمیٰ تیری کمال اس کا[4]

There is a flood of natural beauty all around us, and yet our souls have an unquenchable thirst for something higher. So, says Iqbāl :

محفلِ قدرت ہے اک دریائے بے پایانِ حسن
آنکھ اگر دیکھے تو ہر قطرے میں ہے طوفانِ حسن
حسن کوہستاں کی ہیبتناک خاموشی میں ہے
مہر کی ضو گستری، شب کی سیہ پوشی میں ہے
آسمانِ صبح کی آئینہ پوشی میں ہے یہ
شام کی ظلمت، شفق کی گل فروشی میں ہے یہ
عظمتِ دیرینہ کے مٹتے ہوئے آثار میں
طفلکِ نا آشنا کی کوششِ گفتار میں
ساکنانِ صحنِ گلشن کی ہم آوازی میں ہے
ننھے ننھے طائروں کی آشیاں سازی میں ہے
چشمۂ کہسار میں، دریا کی آزادی میں حسن
شہر میں صحرا میں ویرانے میں آبادی میں حسن[5]

In the next two lines, Iqbāl gives expression, to even the metaphysical theory of Plato that the soul before birth enjoyed the presence of Eternal Beauty, and its yearning for beauty in this life is a yearning for regaining that loss. He says :

4. Ibid., pp. 127-8. 5. Ibid., p. 95.

روح کو لیکن کسی گم گشتہ شے کی ہے ہوس
ورنہ اس صحرا میں کیوں نالاں ہے یہ مثلِ جرس

حسن کے اس عام جلوے میں بھی یہ بیتاب ہے
زندگی اس کی مثالِ ماہیٔ بے آب ہے [6]

Later on, in the Introduction to *Asrār i-Khudī* and in the *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* Iqbāl condemned the pantheistic mystics for their wrong metaphysics, but, during the period we are considering, he was not only a Neoplatonist, but also a full-fledged pantheist. The verses so far quoted may or may not be interpreted pantheistically, but there are others which can be understood in that sense alone, for example :

تارے میں وہ، قمر میں وہ، جلوہ گہِ سحر میں وہ
چشمِ نظارہ میں نہ تو سرمۂ امتیاز دے [7]

* * * *

وہی اک حسن ہے لیکن نظر آتا ہے ہر شے میں
یہ شیریں بھی ہے گویا، بیستوں بھی، کوہکن بھی ہے [8]

And Iqbāl is fully conscious that he is treading on dangerous ground, for he ends one of his pantheistic poems in these words :

شریعت کیوں گریباں گیر ہو ذوقِ تکلم کی
چھپا جاتا ہوں اپنے دل کا مطلب استعارے میں

جو ہے بیدار انساں میں وہ گہری نیند سوتا ہے
شجر میں پھول میں حیواں میں پتھر میں ستارے میں [9]

The Neoplatonic thesis, that it is Beauty that stimulates all love and desire, is expounded in this line :

حسن سے عشق کی فطرت کو ہے تحریکِ کمال [10]

and Ibn Sīnā's version of this theory is reflected in a dialogue between the moon and the stars :

6. Ibid.
7. Ibid., p. 117.
8. Ibid., p. 73.
9. Ibid., p. 147.
10. Ibid., p. 122.

کہنے لگا چاند : ہمنشینو !
اے مزرعِ شب کے خوشہ چینو !
جنبش سے ہے زندگی جہاں کی
یہ رسم قدیم ہے یہاں کی
ہے دوڑتا اشہبِ زمانہ
کھا کھا کے طلب کا تازیانہ

* * *

انجام ہے اس خرام کا حسن
آغاز ہے عشق ، انتہا حسن [11]

Beauty is all-pervasive and is immanent even in the love that it excites.

کبھی اپنا بھی نظارہ کیا ہے تو نے اے مجنوں !
کہ لیلیٰ کی طرح تو خود بھی ہے محمل نشینوں میں [12]

Now, everyone knows that the subject of these verses is by no means original. All their freshness lies in the romantic mode of presentation. A hoary doctrine has been so dressed up as to appear in the prime of life. There is nothing new in the doctrine, for it came to Iqbāl as a legacy from the past. But this is not the journey's end. For we have yet to go a long way.

Iqbāl's theory of beauty so far relates only to the first period of his poetic career which ended in about 1908. There is a time in one's life when one accepts the wisdom of the ages uncritically, but it is often succeeded by a period of scepticism or doubt. Iqbāl's period of complacency was also followed by a short period of doubt about the existence of the One Eternal Beauty. He gave expression to this doubt in some exquisite verses. Take, for example, the question he raises in his poem "*Jalvah-i Ḥusn*" :

جلوۂ حسن کہ ہے جس سے تمنا بیتاب
پالتا ہے جسے آغوشِ تخیّل میں شباب

11. Ibid., p. 125. 12. Ibid., p. 107.

ابدی بنتا ہے یہ عالمِ فانی جس سے
ایک افسانۂ رنگیں ہے جوانی جس سے
جو سکھاتا ہے ہمیں سر بہ گریباں ہونا
منظرِ عالمِ حاضر سے گریزاں ہونا
دور ہو جاتی ہے ادراک کی خامی جس سے
عقل کرتی ہے تاثّر کی غلامی جس سے
آہ! موجود بھی وہ حسن کہیں ہے کہ نہیں؟
خاتمِ دہر میں یا رب وہ نگیں ہے کہ نہیں؟ [13]

"Beauty" puts the same question to the Creator Himself, but, alas, gets a negative reply :

خدا سے حسن نے اک روز یہ سوال کیا
جہاں میں کیوں نہ مجھے تو نے لازوال کیا
ملا جواب کہ تصویر خانہ ہے دنیا
شبِ درازِ عدم کا فسانہ ہے دنیا
ہوئی ہے رنگِ تغیّر سے جب نمود اس کی
وہی حسیں ہے حقیقت زوال ہے جس کی
کہیں قریب تھا، یہ گفتگو قمر نے سنی
فلک پہ عام ہوئی، اخترِ سحر نے سنی
سحر نے تارے سے سن کر سنائی شبنم کو
فلک کی بات بتا دی زمیں کے محرم کو
بھر آئے پھول کے آنسو پیامِ شبنم سے
کلی کا ننھا سا دل خون ہو گیا غم سے
چمن سے روتا ہوا موسمِ بہار گیا
شباب سیر کو آیا تھا، سوگوار گیا [14]

Before I go further I should like to remove one possible misunderstanding. It may be said that in the present discussion I have ignored the influence of religion on Iqbāl. But that is not so. Iqbāl was a staunch Muslim and yet a philosopher Muslim. Like every Muslim

13. Ibid., p. 135.
14. Ibid., pp. 116-7.

he believed that *Jamāl* is one of the ninety-nine names of God which denote the different shades of Divine attributes. The Muslim philosophers, however, speculated about the nature or the essence of God. Those who were under Aristotle's influence thought He was in essence Reason ; another class held that He was the Highest Good, the *summum bonum* ; and yet another group regarded Him as the One Supreme Beauty. The Neoplatonic mystics belonged to the last group, and Iqbāl in this first period of his spiritual development was entirely under their influence, though the concept of *Jamāl* as a Divine attribute must have played its role in moulding his thought as much as theirs. All that I have held is that his theory as well as theirs was basically Neoplatonic.

We have noticed that to begin with, Iqbāl, following the Neoplatonic tradition, regarded beauty as eternal and as the efficient and final cause of all love, all desire, all movement. But later on there was a change in his position. First a doubt and then a kind of pessimisim crept into his mind about the significance of beauty in this world, and with this began the second period of his mental development which extended from 1908 to 1920.

Iqbāl's stay in Europe and his visits to Spain and Sicily recalled to his mind the past glory of Islam and made him deeply conscious of the present dark and dismal state in which the Muslim world had fallen. It also aroused in him a burning desire to reinvigorate the Muslims. Immediately after his return from Europe he gave expression to this burning desire in the well-known poem which he addressed to Sir 'Abdul Qādir :

اُٹھ کہ ظلمت ہوئی پیدا اُفقِ خاور پر
بزم میں شعلہ نوائی سے اُجالا کر دیں
ایک فریاد ہے مانندِ سپند اپنی بساط
اسی ہنگامے سے محفل تہ و بالا کر دیں
اہلِ محفل کو دکھا دیں اثرِ صیقلِ عشق
سنگِ امروز کو آئینۂ فردا کر دیں

جلوهٔ یوسفِ گم گشتہ دکھا کر ان کو
تپش آمادہ تر از خونِ زلیخا کر دیں

* * *

رختِ جاں بتکدۂ چیں سے اُٹھا لیں اپنا
سب کو محوِ رخِ سعدیٰ و سلیمیٰ کر دیں
دیکھ یثرب میں ہؤا ناقۂ لیلیٰ بیکار
قیس کو آرزوئے نو سے شناسا کر دیں
بادہ دیرینہ ہو اور گرم ہو ایسا کہ گداز
جگرِ شیشہ و پیمانہ و مینا کر دیں
گرم رکھتا تھا ہمیں سردیٔ مغرب میں جو داغ
چیر کر سینہ اسے وقفِ تماشا کر دیں [15]

One who wanted to put life into the dead body of the Muslim world could do so only by replacing the other-worldliness of mysticism by the philosophy of power, force, movement, and superhuman effort. There are always some historical forces which prepare the ground for a change in the thought and life of men and nations. The same forces conspired to drive pantheism out of Iqbāl's mind and put his thought into a new mould.

After the middle of the nineteenth century, the Romantic movement in the West took a new turn. In England Browning had written verses surcharged with force, and Carlyle had published several works in admiration of the heroes of the world in which he included our Holy Prophet. The latter's *Heroes and Hero-Worship*, *Sartor Resartus*, *The French Revolution* and *Frederick* were all written in the spirit of hero-worship and admiration of the heroic will. This vitalistic position was reinforced by *The Emergent Evolution* of the vitalistic biologist Lloyd Morgan. It was further spurred by McDougall's *Social Psychology* and *Outline of Psychology* (published respectively in 1908 and 1910), in which works heroic energy was taken the essence of life, and the sentiment of egohood or self-regard as the core of human personality. H.G. Wells through his novels inspired men to conquer time and space, and the scientists were busy, as they still are, in making that con-

15. Ibid., p. 140.

quest a reality. Among other literary men Bernard Shaw was a great believer in life-force. His high admiration for Caesar, Napoleon, Hitler, Mussolini and Stalin is enough to prove his deep interest in vitalism and heroism.

In Germany, the celebrated philosopher, Kant, had already drawn attention to the freedom of the will as a factor in determining our appreciation of beauty ; and Schopenhauer had called attention to the will as a constituent of the world. But Goethe went further. It has been said about him that his search for the nature of beauty culminated and ended in praise of the divine power of love, "love" which eternalises the image of the beloved by creating it afresh every moment. Like Goethe's, Iqbāl's search for the nature of beauty was also destined to end in praise of the power of love. And as for Goethe, so for Iqbāl, love eternalises the image of the beloved every moment afresh :

عشق می گفت تب و تابِ دوامے دارم[16]

Later on Marx developed a doctrine of dialectical activism—a philosophy of history, according to which the dialectical driving force of history is man's relation to the means of production, man for whom objects have no meaning without reference to action and whose chief task is not to know the world but to alter it. Engels extended this dialectical activism to the whole of reality.

When Iqbāl was in Germany, Nietzsche's philosophy of the will-to-power was having a hold on the minds of the German people. Stefan George, Richard Wagner and Oswald Spengler continued Nietzsche's work of the cult of the superman. Driesch in his work ascribed the activities of living organism to entelechy, i.e. a vital force.

At the same time France came under the influence of Bergson's philosophy of *elan vital*, i.e. of movement and change.

In Austria Freud made sex-love the source of all fine arts, while Adler identified the ego-energy with the will-to-superiority.

16. *Payām-i Mashriq*, p. 195.

This vitalistic philosophy rising simultaneously in so many countries of the West made a great appeal to Iqbāl. It had affinity with the idea of the perfect man which had a long history in our own literature. The Platonic conception of the Philosopher-King had been fully developed by Muslim philosophers like al-Ghazālī, Ibn Sīnā, Ibn 'Arabī, Rūmī, al-Jīlī and others. The subject of the Perfect Man takes more space in Rūmī's *Mathnavī* than any other topic except the sayings of the Holy Prophet. Rūmī, like Nietzsche and other heroic vitalists, believed in evolution, in the freedom, possibilities and eternity of the self, in the will-to-power and the value of the super-ego, and in the destruction of old forms for the construction of new ones. Like Bergson, he believed in movement as the essence of reality and in intuition as the source of knowledge.

In his metaphysics, Iqbāl was a heroic vitalist inspired by the desire for reviving Islam, and making Muslims a nation of heroes. He adopted Rūmī as his guide and master, ignoring all those passages of his *Mathnavī* which could be interpreted pantheistically. But he was not yet a full-fledged heroic-vitalist. Even in this period beauty still retained for him its high position as the creator of love. Indeed it is now that Iqbāl gave the clearest expression to that idea:

ہر چہ باشد خوب و زیبا و جمیل
در بیابانِ طلب مارا دلیل
نقشِ او محکم نشیند در دلت
آرزوہا آفریند در دلت
حسن خلّاقِ بہارِ آرزوست
جلوہ اش پروردگارِ آرزوست [17]

In his metaphysics Iqbāl never was a Platonic Idealist. He was more a heroic-vitalist than a Neoplatonist. God is Beauty, but He is also the Supreme Ego, the Supreme Centre of Energy. Man too is an ago and a life-centre. His goal is conquest, even the conquest or capture of God—the capture of divine attributes—for his own enrich-

17. *Asrār-o-Rumūz* (*Asrār-i Khudī*), p. 37.

ment, and that is possible by a burning love for God. He emphasises the role of desire in life and goes even so far as to call poor Plato an old sheep whose false philosophy of inaction turned lions into goats, who had no taste for action and loved only the non-existent.

بسکہ از ذوقِ عمل محروم بود
جانِ او وارفتۂ معدوم بود [18]

Desire is now regarded as the fire of life, the wine of life, the spur of life, or the music of the organ of life. Iqbāl owes allegiance to both beauty and desire. Beauty was his first love, but desire or the will-to-power which is the essence of the ego is his second love, and therefore the more favoured of the two. Iqbāl is now a heroic-vitalist in philosophy, a reformer in religion and is at half-way house from Neoplatonism to heroic vitalism in his theory of aesthetics. These three elements have not yet entered into organic relationship within his personality, and consequently in his poetic imagination. Religious and social reforms are still externl to his poetry, though not outside his philosophy. That is why during this period his reformative poems, *Jawāb-i Shikwah*, *Asrār-i Khudī*, and *Rūmūz-i Bekhudī* are the least poetic of all his works. All these are didactic. Poetry is subordinated to an external goal—the reform of the Muslims and the awakening of their latent energies.

But this was only a transitory phase. This was still a period of Iqbāl's development and in a genius like him it was bound to lead to a period of full maturity. The concept of the One Eternal Beauty was gradually becoming weak. It was essentially Neoplatonic and was inevitably destined to lose its privileged place in the mind of one who was now an avowed enemy of Plato.

Psychologically aesthetic vitalism had already taken root in Iqbāl's mind. If two equally strong ideas govern a man's mind and one of them is weakened, the other rules supreme. When beauty lost its place in Iqbāl's speculation, it was natural that love should have taken its place.

18. Ibid., p. 35.

In the first and the second periods of Iqbāl's thought, as I have explained at some length, beauty created love. Now in the ensuing period, extending from 1920 to the last days of his life, the process of creation is reversed. Now will-to-power or ego-energy becomes the creator of beauty. The essence of Reality is no longer beauty, but love or the will of th ego. God, the Supreme Ego or Eternal Will, is the Ultimate Reality. He is the Creator of the universe. Man is also a free ego and like Him the creator of things. God has made nature, but it is God's vicegerent, man, who has made it beautiful. *In this capacity* man can face his Creator with pride and say :

تو شب آفریدی چراغ آفریدم
سفال آفریدی ایاغ آفریدم
بیابان و کہسار و راغ آفریدی
خیابان و گلزار و باغ آفریدم
من آنم کہ از سنگ آئینہ سازم
من آنم کہ از زہر نوشینہ سازم [19]

All the beauties of nature are the creation of the will : "Desire creates them, not they, desire."

بباغاں بادِ فروردیں دہد عشق
براغاں غنچہ چوں پرویں دہد عشق [20]

* * * *

بہ برگِ لالہ رنگ آمیزیٔ عشق [21]

Beauty is perishable, but love is eternal :

حسن می گفت کہ شامے نہ پذیرد سحرم
عشق می گفت تب و تاب دوامے دارم [22]

* * * *

اے عالمِ رنگ و بو ایں صحبتِ ما تا چند
مرگ است دوامِ تو ، عشق است دوامِ من [23]

19. *Payām-i Mas͟hriq*, p. 132.
20. Ibid., p. 12.
21. Ibid., p. 13.
22. Ibid., p. 195.
23. *Zabūr-i 'Ajam*, p. 197.

The secrets of life which beauty cannot disclose, love can :

غمیں مشو کہ جہاں را ز خود بروں ندہد
کہ آنچہ گل نتوانست مرغِ نالاں گفت [24]

Beauty is only a quality of the ego in action, of the will-to-power, when it climbs to its heights. Ugliness appears when the will-to-power, the fountain of all life and all growth, runs dry :

نمود جسکی فرازِ خودی سے ہو وہ جمیل
جو ہو نشیب میں پیدا قبیح و نا محبوب [25]

* * * *

مری نظر میں یہی ہے جمال و زیبائی
کہ سر بسجدہ ہیں قوت کے سامنے افلاک [26]

Bodies, no less than their beauty, are the expression of the ego's will-to-achievement :

چیست اصلِ دیدۂ بیدارِ ما ؟
بست صورت لذتِ دیدارِ ما
کبک پا از شوخیٔ رفتارِ یافت
بلبل از سعیٔ نوا منقار یافت [27]

For the Neoplatonist Iqbāl, beauty was the creator and the goal of love ; for the budding vitalist Iqbāl, it was the creator of love, but not its goal ; now for the full-fledged heroic-vitalist Iqbāl, love is everything : the sea, the sailing vessel and the sea-shore :

یمِ عشق کشتیٔ من ، یمِ عشق ساحلِ من
نہ غمِ سفینہ دارم ، نہ سرِ کرانہ دارم [28]

Iqbāl's position now comes very near to Heine's who treated *reason* scornfully, regarded *life* as the source of all beauty ; and did not shrink from admiring even the great despots, provided they expressed the fierce vigour of untrammelled life-force.

24. Ibid., p. 95.
25. *Ḍarb-i Kalīm*, p. 79.
26. Ibid., p. 122.
27. *Asrār-o-Rumūz (Asrār-i Khudī)*, p. 17.
28. *Zabūr-i 'Ajam*, p. 28.

It was during this period that heroic vitalism, the spirit of reform and the sense of beauty, got fully integrated in Iqbāl's personality and, consequently, in his poetry. He intuited beautiful images and cast them superbly in immortal songs. Now he did not, starting with a story, exhort the poor, for example, to rise against the rich ; but his personality roused his imagination to the production of an image in which God ordered His angels to awaken the poor and to destroy the palaces of the rich and burn their farms:

اُٹھو مری دنیا کے غریبوں کو جگا دو [29]

Such poems do involve a purpose, but the purpose is not external to them. They do not lead on to it. They involve that purpose as their integral, irreducible and irremovable part. It is such poetry that made Iqbāl one of the greatest poets of the world.

Iqbāl's theory of beauty is esssentially a theory of expression, for it is the life-force of the ego which expresses itself in the realisation of beauty.

Now there are several aesthetical theories of expression. Four of them are subjectivistic and two objectivistic. The first one of the subjectivistic theories is that of Freud : according to him beauty is the contemplator's sex-desire. The second is that of Robert Vischer, Lipps, and Volkelt who hold that beauty consists in empathy or the contemplator's subconscious sympathetic feelings projected into objects. The third is the theory of Schiller, Herbert Spencer, Karl Groos, Konrad Lange and others for whom beauty is the expression of the contemplator's activity of play. The fifth and the best known of all these is the doctrine of Croce, who holds that beauty is the full expression of the contemplator's emotions.

Iqbāl has nothing in common with any of these writers in his theory of beauty though a great deal in his theory of art. Their theories are mostly psychological, while Iqbāl's theory is essentially metaphysical. He explains beauty not in terms of the contemplator's mind, but in terms of a universal principle, a vital impulse working

29. *Bāl-i Jibrīl*, p. 149.

in life in all its aspects, including the aesthetic aspect.

Of the objectivistic theories one is Iqbāl's own, which I have just explained, and by which beauty is a quality of things created by the expression of their own "egos". For their loveliness they own nothing to the contemplator's mind, but everything to their own inner life-force.

The second objectivistic theory, also metaphysical, is that of Plotinus. According to him, the visible world is beautiful, because it expresses the life of the Universal Spirit; and the bodies of all living beings are beautiful, because they express their lives. The difference between Iqbāl's position and his lies only in the conception of life itself. For Plotinus as for Plato, life is essentially rational; for Iqbāl it is essentially volitional. That is why the former's theory, in spite of its kinship even with Iqbāl's vitalism, is idealistic, while Iqbāl's is activistic. This shows that even when Iqbāl considers himself farthest from that "despicable man", Plato, he is still closely related to him through Plotinus. One would not be far wrong, if one should call Iqbāl a vitalist Plato, and Plato an idealist Iqbāl. Of course, there is a great difference between their positions, but there is also great deal of resemblance. However, if one were to choose between the objectivistic theories, one would prefer Iqbāl's, because it is more in keeping with the basis of life as generally accepted today.

But the most significant question before us is whether or not Iqbāl's theory fares well against all the subjectivistic theories. It is a bold thing to criticise the views of the greatest genius that Islam has produced during the last seven centuries. But to accept the absolute validity of Iqbāl's doctrine is to accept a dead stop in thought. According to his own teachings, life is an eternal flow and its possibilities are infinite. It is the duty of everyone to make an endeavour to know the truth. It is that endeavour which has led me to the view that neither Iqbāl nor any of the subjectivists gives us the whole truth about the nature of beauty. I have two arguments to advance. First, unless there are some characteristics in the objects which act as stimuli on the contemplator's mind, there is no reason why certain objects should look beautiful to us and certain others ugly or

indifferent. Neither sex-desire, nor play-activity, nor the projection of sympathetic feeling into objects, nor a group of emotions as a whole expresses itself in relation to all objects without distinction. There are always some particular objects with certain specific characteristics which stimulate the sex-desire, play-activity, or emotions in us. In other words there must be some peculiar characteristics in the so-called objective world by virtue of which objects arouse subjective expression. These peculiarities of the objective world cannot be entirely set aside in an adequate theory of beauty.

Secondly, each one of these aestheticians emphasises only one aspect of personal life, the expression of which he regards as the real source of beauty. Actually human personality cannot be dissected into parts. Mental structure is an organic whole and it always functions as a whole. Beauty does involve expression, but not the expression of only one part or only one aspect of our personality. It involves the expression of personality as a whole.

Iqbāl has given us immortal poetry, but I wish I could say the same about his theory of beauty. If beauty is only the expression of the life of the ego, and according to Iqbāl there is life in everything, then why is it that all things do not seem beautiful to us? Why is it that generally the females are attracted by the males and the males by the females? Why is it that the moon, which is almost dead earth, looks so beautiful? Why is it that the energy of the light-rays from the moon called moonlight, and of those reflected through water vapours called the rainbow look so beautiful, and the energy passing through us in an electric shock does not? Why again do the feathers of a peacock look so beautiful and its legs so ugly? Why is not a murderer in action more beautiful than a sleeping child? Why is it that even a dead butterfly looks beautiful, but not a charging buffalo, pig, or ass? And again why is it that if Iqbāl's life-inspiring poem "*Farmān-i Khudā*"[30] is superb, no less superb are Ghālib's pessimistic lines :

30. Ibid., pp. 149-50.

کوئی امید بر نہیں آتی
کوئی صورت نظر نہیں آتی
موت کا ایک دن معین ہے
نیند کیوں رات بھر نہیں آتی
آگے آتی تھی حالِ دل پہ ہنسی
اب کسی بات پر نہیں آتی

and such couplets of Mīr as :

شام ہی سے بجھا سا رہتا ہے
دل ہے گویا چراغ مفلس کا

It seems to me that Iqbāl's vitalistic theory fails to answer these questions satisfactorily, while a complete theory of beauty could not leave them unanswered.

I think subjectivism is incomplete without objectivism, and objectivism without subjectivism. Some characteristics of the objective world seem to be essential for an object to become beautiful for us, and it cannot become so, unless our personality as a whole plays upon them, and our impulses, desires, ideas, images and feelings dye them with their own hues. As Jigar has said :

جس کے ہر اک جمال میں پنہاں
میری رعنائی خیال بھی ہے

Objects having certain specific characteristics arouse emotions, desires, ideals and images in our minds, and when these mingle with our sensuous experience of the objects, we call them beautiful. It is not one desire like the sex-desire, nor one instinctive impulse like that of play or sympathy, nor the whole group of emotions, which become one with the specific qualities of our experience of objects to make them beautiful for us. Actually, in contemplation our whole personality comes into play. On the other hand, it is not only one objective quality—call it its inner life-force, vital impulse, love, or whatever you will—that makes an object beautiful. The object must possess some other qualities as well ; and again these must pass through the sieve of the contemplating mind before it can be called beautiful or

ugly. Even if inner vital force is the only quality that is essential for an object to be beautiful, I shall say with Aṣghar :

حسن کا رنگ بھی ہے ذوقِ نظر کا محتاج

Here I would like to quote a passage or two from one of my own writings :

It [beauty of the phenomenal objects] is neither purely objective nor purely subjective. It arises out of a synthesis or construction made possible by the interrelation of objects of a certain sort and [a subject in] a certain condition. The object must in its own right possess one or more of the characteristics of unity, harmony, rhythm, sex-indication, . . . etc., and the subject must have, apart from other things, a dynamic equilibrium of impulses. In the elementary forms of beauty, impression plays a prominent part ; in the more complex forms of it, expression. If, after Kant, bare objects be called phenomena, then these aesthetic facts are born of a union between the objective and subjective phenomena, and beauty is a unique quality of these aesthetic facts. Union between the object, possessing one or more of the characteristics, of unity, harmony, rhythm and other forms that touch the attraction-group of instincts, and the subject, with impulses in a state of dynamic equilibrium, is necessary to bring to life this fair child. On this view, if an object, instead of presenting a harmonious system of relations, lacks unity, contains irregularities or is too large or too small to be smoothly apprehended, and arouses and is fused with discordant impulses and purely unpleasant feelings, we have the experience of ugliness.[31]

I regard human knowledge, good, and beauty, as incident to human nature. Man is finite and these are finite. We are not in possession of completely self-consistent knowledge, perfect good or beauty, but only relatively consistent knowledge, relative good and relatively abiding beauty.

But, in spite of our finitude, we have a vague conception of an infinite self-subsistent, self-consistent and perfect whole of reality which is at once an Individual embracing all individuals, a Universal enveloping all universals and a Value embodying all values in their completion—an Absolute, in itself Perfect Knowledge, Perfect Goodness and perfect Beauty. Beyond this conception neither our thought nor our imagination can go. It is the highest ideal of our will and in its contemplation our feelings are fully appeased.

31. M. M. Sharif, *Studies in Aesthetics*, Lahore, 1964, pp. 201-2 (Editor).

No doubt we also have the opposite conception of a being which is all ignorance, all inconsistency, all evil and all ugliness: but the idea of the actual existence of such a being is painful and repulsive to our minds.

The testimony of the whole of our soul—the criteria of the intellect, clarity and consistency; the criterion of our emotions, satisfaction . . .; the criteria of our will, our highest hopes—all lead not to the knowledge (for the finite cannot know the infinite), but to the faith that such an infinite Absolute which is Perfect Knowledge, Perfect Beauty and Perfect Good, does exist. This faith involves the corollary that the human subject is a part of that Infinite Reality; it is subsumed in it and does not stand over against it; and thus, within this higher sphere the distinction between the subject and its object, the finite ego and the non-ego, remains no longer valid. There is nothing outside the great all-enveloping Unity that may be supposed to be the subject apprehending it. Therefore, while the beauty for man, the phenomenal beauty, is both objective and subjective, the Absolute Beauty which is not known to us finite beings, but in which the finite beings must have faith, can be neither objective nor subjective. It is an all-embracing Unity in which all objects and subjects and all values are subsumed.

Love, hope, sense, imagination and intellect, working in unison, create in us the vision and the faith that Reality in which the knower, knowledge and the known are one, is a dynamic Universe, creating in us, its parts, an ever-changing, ever-growing series of phenomena, the physical world, and at times exciting in us emotions that blend with a certain type of environment and thus envelop the seer, the sight and the seen . . . yielding, at moments of contemplation and art creation, the microcosmic union of these. It is at such sublime moments that we, the parts, feel that we are one with the whole.[32]

During his period of maturity Iqbāl gave us a correct view of reality and of the basis of all our experience. The Ultimate Reality is a free dynamic creative Ego, and the finite egos, inorganic or living, are also free dynamic creative forces in different stages of development. Both object contemplated and the subject contemplating are ultimately free dynamic ego-forces; and whatever is produced by the subject contemplating or by the object as expression of its own inner urge, or by the interaction of both, or again by the One Supreme

32. Ibid., pp. 209-11.

Reality above the subject-object distinction, is ultimately the expression of a free dynamic force or such forces in interaction. So far all should agree with Iqbāl whether they are subjectivists, objectivists, or like me, subjective-objectivists. But that is an explanation of all reality and all experience—not of beauty in particular. For the appearance of beauty in this world some further analysis is needed and that Iqbāl has left to his successors.

In the end, I must clear one possible misunderstanding. It might be said that Iqbāl was writing poetry and not theorising about beauty. That is perfectly true, and the theories of aesthetics that we have attributed to Iqbāl in the different stages of his development are nowhere given by him as philosophical doctrines. They are implicit in his poetry and we have extracted them from it. He was essentially creating beauty and not writing a thesis on aesthetics, and in doing the task he assigned to himself, he achieved unparalleled success. Nevertheless, it would be most misleading, indeed, most disparaging to Iqbāl, to think that he had no theory of beauty as a foundation for the sublime edifice that his great genius built. It must always be borne in mind that he was not a mere poet, but a philosopher-poet.

July 1952

M. M. Sharif

IQBAL'S THEORY OF ART

The theories of beauty which I have attributed to Iqbāl in the different stages of his development are nowhere enunciated by him in a philosophical form. They are only implicit in his poetry, and one has to extract them from it. Such is not the case with his theory of art. On this part of aesthetics he is very explicit. He has something definite to say in criticism of some other hypotheses and has made positive observations even about individual arts.

The question what determined his views on art, is closely related to the question what determined his personality, for it is the personality of an individual and his experiences within a certain environment that find expression in his art. Towards the end of the last century, Taine held that art is the product of its environment and nothing else. As the plant is determined by climate and the quality of the soil, so, according to him, is a poem determined by the social "temperature". The Marxist critics further restrict this social temperature by urging that the determining factors in history are ultimately the economic forces of production and re-production, and the artists reflect their class and time. One may not accept this extreme and narrow relativism for the simple reason that it ignores the geographical, biological and psychological factors which also go towards the making of a

personality; it is, nevertheless, true that all minds, and more so the highly sensitive minds of the artists, are greatly affected, negatively or positively, by the society in which they live. Their art is the expression of their response to their impression of the social environment—an expression which shapes the impressions and carries them along as parts of its texture. Iqbāl's poetry and his views on art were greatly determined by the social conditions prevalent in his country during his time. His literary art is the most significant art of a society emerging out of a period of decadence. A society's period of decadence is a period of ebb in social life, and unless the stream is wholly dried up, it is followed by a period of flow. The artists who appear at the rise of the tide have the force of rushing waters—a force which is at the same time destroying and conserving—destroying of لا and conserving of الا :

شانِ خلیل ہوتی ہے اُس کے کلام سے عیاں
کرتی ہے اُس کی قوم جب اپنا شعار آذری [1]

This is true of Iqbāl and also of his art and his doctrine of art which both reflect his personality. His reactions to his society are of the nature of a revolt against decadence and slave-mentality crept into it as the inevitable consequence of a foreign rule; and are, therefore, saturated with an emotionally surcharged apprehension of values—values that belonged to that society's past and those which directed its future. If at times he appears to be a reactionary, it is so because he sees in the past some eternal values and wants them to be seen and actively pursued by those whom decadence has made blind to them. There is much in the past which is sheer rubbish and it is well that the present be rid of it, but there is also some real good which a new society can ignore only at its own peril. If he seems to be a revolutionary, it is so because he sees the future pregnant with new values. It is this view of the past and the future which is distinctive of Iqbāl's poetry and which has greatly moulded his theory of art.

Most writers on art regard art as functional to some purpose. But in the beginning of the nineteenth century a movement was

1. *Bāng-i Darā*, p. 235.

vigorously started against functionalism in France by Flaubert, Gautier and Baudelaire, in Russia by Pushkin and in England by Walter Pater, Oscar Wilde and the American writer Edgar Allan Poe. Actually this group received this movement as a legacy from Romanticism. Its germs are found in such Romantics as Friedrich Schlegel and Heinrich Heine, both of whom believed in the freedom of art. The slogan of this movement was "Art for art's sake". By this it was meant that beauty is a specific quality of art. It is the whole or the supreme and absolute intrinsic value; other values like truth and goodness are either subordinate to it or irrelevant to it. With this supreme value, art exists for its own sake. Within life it has a domain of its own, independent, autonomous and complete-in-itself. It has no goal and serves no end beyond itself, "no mission to fulfil other than that of exciting in the soul" of the contemplator "the sensations of supreme beauty". It is its own purpose and fulfils this purpose or rather itself by just being beautiful. It is worth having on its own account. An ulterior end for a work of art—morality, instruction, money, or fame—far from determining its artistic worth, is, on the other hand, hostile to that worth. Ulterior ends lower artistic value rather than raise it. "We believe", says Gautier, "in the autonomy of art; for us art is not a means but a goal; an artist who pursues an object other than the beautiful is not an artist." Again, "A thing that becomes useful ceases to be beautiful." For Oscar Wilde, the "first condition of creation is that the critics should be able to recognise that the sphere of Art and the sphere of Ethics are absolutely distinct and separate."[2]

If beauty is the supreme quality of art alone, what about nature? Is it not beautiful in its mountains, woods and streams? The artists of this school generally regard nature as "hostile or even mean and despicable". Flaubert detests reality, and the beauty of Alps has no appeal for him. Baudelaire finds nature "in its native hues montonous and boring". As art has to deal with the highest and absolute values, it is made to replace philosophy and religion. Sociologically, the move-

2. "The Critic as Artist", *The Writings of Oscar Wilde*, New York, 1931, Vol. V, p. 210.

ment of art for art's sake was a movement of extreme individualism that appeared as a result of decadence—a period of art which was destructive of all aesthetic values of the previous age.

There is one thing in favour of the protagonists of art for art's sake that they do not confine beauty to any region within the domain of art, but there was an analogous movement initiated about half a century earlier by the psychologist Johann Friedrich Herbart and his followers, and it was taken up a few decades later by Hanslick, Fiedler, and, in our own time, by Clive Bell and Roger Fry. This group makes a distinction within art between simple elements and their relations, i.e. between the content of art and the form of art, between the story, the characters, the scenes, sentiments, sensations, images and meanings, on the one hand, and language, metre, rhyme, cadence and style, on the other. The content, according to them, has no aesthetic value. It is a mere accident or a mere vehicle for the artistic effect. *What* you convey through art does not matter ; what counts is *how* you convey it. What you convey may be good or bad, true or false, right or wrong; it does not affect the value of art, for that depends entirely on the form you give it. All aesthetic value is exclusively concerned with form or relations. Thus the formula "art for art's sake" is changed into the formula "form for form's sake". For these formalists, in music for example, beauty resides in none of the individual notes. None of the single notes whose relation makes, say, the fifth interval "has by itself in the least that character which attaches to it when they sound together". Consequently, artistic taste is "the result of perfect apprehension of relations formed by a complexity of elements". These experimental psychologists undoubtedly succeeded in discovering a few aesthetically pleasing relations. Adolf Zeising discovered the "Golden Section", a division of a geometrical figure in which the proportions of the parts divided are about 3 : 5. Zimmermann attempted to determine the pleasing relations and ratios in the ideas and images in a poem. Wilhelm Unger found them in some harmonious colours. Nevertheless, the endeavour of this group to explain the whole field of aesthetic experience on formalistic lines completely failed. Their failure to solve the aesthetic riddle was due to their complete neglect

of content—colours, sounds, images, emotions and sentiments. They did not realise that a work of art is an organic whole, an indivisible unity, the aesthetic value of which cannot be ascribed to any one factor. As A. C. Bradley observes, when we are reading and enjoying a poem, we do not see substance and form apart. This distinction between substance and form is valid, but not relevant in connection with aesthetic value. The aesthetic value of a poem lies in the whole poem and not in any part of it. "The end, substance and form of poetry"—and so of all art—"are all so blended in real art that it is difficult to extricate one of them without injury to the others."

While the movement of "art for art's sake" suffered from excess by making art supreme in the realm of life, and thus extending its domain too far, the formalist movement suffered from defect in ignoring the content of art and attributing all aesthetic value to mere form.

These two movements were strong, when Iqbāl began writing poetry. But the first one remained entirely unnoticed by him. Perhaps the chief reason was that it was mainly a Continental movement and Iqbāl had not extensively studied any of the Continental languages. Besides, the writings of its English representatives could not get entrance into India. A movement for the freedom of art from the alleged foreign influences, was after all a freedom movement. How could its entry into a slave country be allowed by the influential Professors at our colleges who were all Englishmen in Iqbāl's student days ? When he started seriously thinking about aesthetic problems, this movement had already spent its force and, therefore, did not deserve much notice. But had he taken notice of it, he would have been definitely hostile to it, for he is a confirmed functionalist, and functionalism is its logical contradictory. To the formalist movement he is explicitly opposed. He lays great stress on content which the formalists completely ignore. For him, music, for example, without the content of volition, emotions and ideas is no better than dead fire.

نغمہ می باید جنوں پروردۂ
آتشے در خونِ دل حل کردۂ

* * *

نغمہ گر معنی ندارد مردہ ایست
سوزِ او از آتشِ افسردہ ایست [3]

When Iqbāl writes :

سوزِ سخن ز نالۂ مستانۂ دل است
این شمع را فروغ ز پروانۂ دل است [4]

* * * *

آیا کہاں سے نالۂ نے میں سرورِ مے
اصل اس کی نے نواز کا دل ہے کہ چوبِ نے؟ [5]

* * * *

نقش ہیں سب ناتمام خونِ جگر کے بغیر
نغمہ ہے سودائے خام خونِ جگر کے بغیر [6]

he is as emphatic on the significance of emotions and sentiments for art as Ghālib, when he said :

حسن فروغ شمع سخن دور ہے اسد
پہلے دلِ گداختہ پیدا کرے کوئی

In consonance with his general theory of life, he makes will the ultimate source of the artistic effect, for, in the last analysis, the whole content of art—sensations, feelings, sentiments, ideas and ideals—arise from this source. He says :

جانِ ما را لذت اندر جستجو ست
شعر را سوز از مقامِ آرزوست [7]

Of the many theories of art the oldest, perhaps, is the theory that art is imitation. It was held by both Plato and Aristotle. Plato disapproves of art, because it emulates natural objects which are themselves faulty appearances or shadows of Reality. He speaks disparagingly of poets whose false statements about gods and men have baneful effect on the minds of the young, and he condemns drama,

3. *Zabūr-i 'Ajam* (*Bandagī Nāmah*), p. 253.
4. *Payām-i Mashriq*, p. 205.
5. *Ḍarb-i Kalīm*, p. 113.
6. *Bāl-i Jibrīl*, p. 136.
7. *Jāvīd Nāmah*, p. 199.

because by imitating strong emotions, it stimulates and strengthens emotional tendencies in us and makes them difficult to control. Aristotle approves of art, because it is human making in the image of divine making, for it emulates the Universal in knowledge, and God is the highest Universal, and it emulates nature, and God is the Prime Mover of nature. He approves of art also, because it arouses emotions by imitating the tragedies and comedies of life, and thus purges us of emotions and makes them easy for us to control.

Iqbāl agrees with Plato in condemning poets of a certain type on similar grounds. Quite like Plato, he disapproves of drama in his poem "*Tīātar*", because it kills our personality or egohood. Personality is the centre of life. If you remove that, nothing will be left in art.

حریم تیرا خودی غیر کی ! معاذ اللہ
دوبارہ زندہ نہ کر کاروبارِ لات و منات
یہی کمال ہے تمثیل کا کہ تو نہ رہے
رہا نہ تو، تو نہ سوزِ خودی نہ سازِ حیات [8]

He also agrees with Aristotle in approving poetry in so far as it is human creativeness, and creativeness is a divine quality. But unlike both, he does not conceive of art as imitation. Although as a romanticist he is a great admirer of nature, yet, according to him, art is not the imitation even of nature, for the artist creates and imitation is not the same thing as creation. In fact he regards nature as an obstacle in the way of our creativeness. He declares that "Resistance of what *is* with a view to creating what *ought to be*, is health and life; all else is decay and death."[9] He is anxious to have art freed from the shackles of nature, for he says :

فطرت کی غلامی سے کر آزاد ہنر کو
صیاد ہیں مردانِ ہنر مند کہ نخچیر ؟ [10]

According to him, the artist who imitates nature is a beggar at nature's door, and the one who builds upon nature or re-creates nature unfolds

8. *Ḍarb-i Kalīm*, p. 104.
9. Foreword to *Muraqqa'-i-Chughtā'ī*.
10. *Ḍarb-i Kalīm*, p. 115.

to us the secrets of his own being. His creations possess eternal beauty. Denying the gods his genius makes, is denying God Himself.

آں ہنر مندے کہ بر فطرت فزود
رازِ خود را بر نگاہِ ما کشود
* * *
حورِ او از حورِ جنت خوشتر است
منکرِ لات و مناتش کافر ست [11]

In a beautiful dialogue between God and man, Iqbāl shows how man and his aesthetic activity in the sphere of useful arts, has not imitated nature but has improved upon it. This is how man addresses the Creator :

تو شب آفریدی چراغ آفریدم
سفال آفریدی ایاغ آفریدم
بیابان و کہسار و راغ آفریدی
خیابان و گلزار و باغ آفریدم
من آنم کہ از سنگ آئینہ سازم
من آنم کہ از زہر نوشینہ سازم [12]

In rejecting imitation as the genus of art Iqbāl is at one with most modern writers on art. But this outright rejection of the imitation theory of art is not quite consistent with his own doctrine, for there is a type of imitation of which he is himself an advocate. It is the imitation of Divine attributes in our own personalities. He uses the word assimilation, but as this assimilation makes no reduction in the attributes of God, it is hardly different from imitation.

Opposed to those who hold the doctrine of "art for art's sake" or "form for form's sake" are the functionalists, that is, those for whom art has a goal or a purpose. These functionalists are divided into two main groups, each of which has its own view of the function of art. According to one group, the purpose of art is to give pleasure. Aristotle himself is a functionalist of this kind. According to him,

11. *Zabūr-i 'Ajam*, p. 256. 12. *Payām Mashriq*, p. 132.

art is imitation, but it is an imitation which has a certain psychological and sociological goal. This goal is the pleasure that results from the purgation of pent-up emotions. During the medieval period, St Augustine held that the function of art is to create beauty and beauty is that which, having been seen, pleases. Castelvetro, a writer of the Renaissance, was of the view "that poetry is to be distinguished by its aim of giving pleasure from science which aims at truth."[13] Likewise, Fracastoro and other radical critics of the Renaissance said that the only thing to be considered in a work of art is the pleasure it gives. "Its truth, its power to teach, its balancing of its own wit . . . were to be thrust back to let stand in accented isolation the one end of pleasure."[14] In the eighteenth century, Lord Kames and David Hume, two British scholars, took more or less the same position. Coming down to our own times, among literary men, George Santayana holds that the function of art is to please, but to do so, not as Aristotle held by purgation of emotion, but by objectification. Among psychologists, Freud is a full-fledged Aristotelian, as the function of art for him is not only pleasure but pleasure by the purgation of emotions, or, to use his own words, by wish-fulfilment. Art relieves the minds of the artists and the contemplators of all tensions by indirectly satisfying their pent-up desires. Iqbāl himself is a functionalist. But, very rightly, he does not subscribe to this view of the goal of art. Had he done so, he would not have denounced classical Persian poetry, the pleasure-giving qualities of which he concedes :

ہے شعرِ عجم گرچہ طربناک و دل آویز
اس شعر سے ہوتی نہیں شمشیرِ خودی تیز[15]

Iqbāl is fully conscious of the pleasure-giving quality of his own poetry, which besides being یک چمن گل ، یک نیستاں نالہ is also یک خمخانہ مے[16]. All art is pleasing indeed, but pleasure is only one of its effects rather than its goal. Nor does he accept the Freudian theory of indirect

13. Castelverto, *Poetica d' Aristotele*, see K.E. Gilbert and H. Kuhn, *A History of Esthetics*, New York, 1939, p. 173, n. 48.
14. K.E. Gilbert and H. Kuhn, op. cit., p. 192.
15. *Ḍarb-i Kalīm*, p. 127.
16. *Zabūr-i 'Ajam*, p. 69.

wish-fulfilment unconditionally. It is psychologically true that art gives vent to pent-up emotions حرفِ تمنا جسے کہہ نہ سکیں روبرو[17] and it does relieve the mind of tensions :

کھل تو جاتا ہے مغنی کے بم و زیر سے دل[18]

But this relief by release of emotions is not the purpose of art. Sometimes, it may even kill desire and when it does so, it is of no significance for Iqbāl :

نہ رہا زندہ و پائندہ تو کیا دل کی کشود[19]

And, on the other hand, when the soul is welling up with new desires, its yearning for new ideals does not decrease even by the release of emotions through art :

تپِ شعلہ کم نگردد ز گسستنِ شرارہ[30]

Let us now come to the second group of functionalists. The most noted of those who belong to this group, are Plato, Ruskin, Guyau, Tolstoy, Ibsen, Shaw and Iqbāl. For Ruskin, the artist is a prophet and a teacher. For Guyau, "the principle of art is life itself". Art is a "methodical whole of means chosen to create . . . the feeling of beauty", and this feeling of beauty "is the consciousness of society in our individual life." "The highest aim of art is to make the human heart throb, and, as the heart is the very centre of life, art must find itself interlaced with the whole moral and material existence of mankind." According to Tolstoy, art has for its purpose "the transmission to others of the highest and best feelings." For Ibsen, the purpose of art is criticism of life. Shaw says about his *Pygmalion*: "It is so intensely and deliberately didactic that I take delight in throwing it at the head of the wiseacres who repeat the parrot cry that art should never be didactic. Its success in Europe and America goes to prove my contention that art should never be anything else."[21] Broadly speaking, for all these writers the function of art is social

17. *Bāl-i Jibrīl*, p. 125.
18. *Ḍarb-i Kalīm*, p. 124.
19. Ibid.
20. *Zabūr-i 'Ajam*, p. 18.
21. Shaw, Preface to *Pygmalion*.

reform. But the father of functionalism in art is really Plato. According to him, in respect of both its content and its form, art must serve ethical and instructional ends. The magic of art must be used only for the production of good citizens. In music, for example, only those melodies should be allowed which make the listeners warlike and brave, and inspire them to valorous deeds, or those which would make them sober, temperate, orderly, just and reverent to the gods. The pleasure-giving quality of art is a useful accompaniment of reason for placing men on the right path. Plato strongly condemns those whose art is a source of moral corruption. He even recommends their expulsion from the State. Iqbāl, though an avowed antagonist of Plato in his metaphysics, is his disciple in his theory of art. The purpose of art is the same for both.

No great writer within my knowledge has pleaded the cause of didactic art more eloquently and censured the poetry of decadence more strongly than Iqbāl. According to him, art has no meaning without reference to life, man and society. The first aim of art is life itself. Art must create in us a yearning for eternal life.

مقصود ہنر سوزِ حیاتِ ابدی ہے
یہ ایک نفس یا دو نفس مثلِ شرر کیا [22]

The verse which brings a message of eternal life furthers the divine purpose like words of the archangel, and his voice announces the Day of Judgment. Poetry keeps the field of life green, and bestows upon humanity the recipe for life everlasting.

وہ شعر کہ پیغامِ حیاتِ ابدی ہے
یا نغمۂ جبریل ہے یا بانگِ سرافیل [23]

* * * *

شاعرِ دل نواز بھی بات اگر کہے کھری
ہوتی ہے اس کے فیض سے مزرعِ زندگی ہری

* * *

22. *Ḍarb-i Kalīm*, p. 117. 23. Ibid., p. 133.

اہلِ زمیں کو نسخۂ زندگیٔ دوام ہے
خونِ جگر سے تربیت پاتی ہے جو سخنوری [24]

Art is a valuable means for the achievement of life :

اے میانِ کیسہ ات نقدِ سخن
بر عیارِ زندگی او را بزن [25]

The second aim of art is the making of men. If art does not build up personality it is of little avail :

گر ہنر میں نہیں تعمیرِ خودی کا جوہر
وائے صورت گری و شاعری و نائے و سرود [26]

and if it does, it is next to prophethood :

شعر را مقصود اگر آدم گری است
شاعری ہم وارثِ پیغمبری است [27]

The artist must infuse spirit, manliness and courage into the chicken-hearted :

نوا پیرا ہو اے بلبل کہ ہو تیرے ترنم سے
کبوتر کے تنِ نازک میں شاہیں کا جگر پیدا [28]

and create yearning in the hearts of men for ever new ends and ideals :

بادِ صبا کی موج سے نشو و نمائے خار و خس
میرے نفس کی موج سے نشو و نمائے آرزو [29]

The third aim of art, for Iqbāl, is social advancement. He exemplifies his view of art and its relation to society in poetry. The poet, according to him, is the eye of the nation :

شاعرِ رنگیں نوا ہے دیدۂ بینائے قوم
مبتلائے درد کوئی عضو ہو ، روتی ہے آنکھ
کس قدر ہمدرد سارے جسم کی ہوتی ہے آنکھ [30]

24. *Bāng-i Darā*, pp. 235-6.
25. *Asrār-o-Rumūz* (*Asrār-i Khudī*), p. 42.
26. *Ḍarb-i Kalīm*, p. 112.
27. *Jāvid Nāmah*, p. 46.
28. *Bāng-i Darā*, p. 306.
29. *Bāl-i Jibrīl*, p. 153.
30. *Bāng-i Darā*, p. 53.

Nay, he is the nation's very heart :

شاعر اندر سینۂ ملت چو دل
ملتے بے شاعرے انبارِ گل [31]

With prophetic powers the artist should rouse nations and lead them to great, greater and yet greater heights :

شاعر کی نوا ہو کہ مغنی کا نفس ہو
جس سے چمن افسردہ ہو وہ بادِ سحر کیا !

بے معجزہ دنیا میں ابھرتی نہیں قومیں
جو ضربِ کلیمی نہیں رکھتا وہ ہنر کیا ! [32]

Of what value is the verse which cannot raise an emotional storm in society ?

جس سے دلِ دریا متلاطم نہیں ہوتا
اے قطرۂ نیساں وہ صدف کیا وہ گہر کیا ! [33]

Plato severely criticised Homer and Hesiod for basing their poetry on legends which were fictitious and false, setting thereby wrong ideals before the young and thus corrupting their morals. Tolstoy condemned the art of French Decadence for expressing the views of the degenerate ruling class, catering to the preverted appetites of the well-to-do and for being artificial, obscure, involved and affected. Iqbāl denounces the decadent art of this Subcontinent in no uncertain terms. In his Foreword to *Muraqqa'-i Chughtā'ī*, he writes: "The inspiration of a single decadent, if his art can lure his fellows to his song or picture, may prove more ruinous to a people than whole battalions of an Attila or a Changez." The true function of art is vitalisation of life, man and society. An artist should be a harbinger of dawn and should better be silent than sing in dark, dismal, depressing strains :

31. *Jāvīd Nāmah*, p. 45.
32. *Ḍarb-i Kalīm*, p. 117.
33. Ibid.

افسردہ اگر اس کی نوا سے ہو گلستاں
بہتر ہے کہ خاموش رہے مرغِ سحر خیز[34]

* * * *

اگر نوا میں ہے پوشیدہ موت کا پیغام
حرام میری نگاہوں میں نائے و چنگ و رباب[35]

* * * *

شاعر کی نوا ہو کہ مغنی کا نفس ہو
جس سے چمن افسردہ ہو وہ بادِ سحر کیا![36]

In describing the decadent artist of this Subcontinent, he says :

عشق و مستی کا جنازہ ہے تخیل ان کا
ان کے اندیشۂ تاریک میں قوموں کے مزار

* * *

چشمِ آدم سے چھپاتے ہیں مقاماتِ بلند
کرتے ہیں روح کو خوابیدہ بدن کو بیدار

ہند کے شاعر و صورت گر و افسانہ نویس
آہ بیچاروں کے اعصاب پہ عورت ہے سوار[37]

In *Zabūr-i 'Ajam* long poems are written on the music and painting of the slaves. In *Asrār-i Khudī*, there is a poem on poetry, thirty lines of which are devoted to decadent poetry. In the same poem there are a few lines in which he gives expression to his idea of a true poet :

سینۂ شاعر تجلی زارِ حسن
خیزد از سینائے او انوارِ حسن
از نگاہش خوب گردد خوب تر
فطرت از افسونِ او محبوب تر
از دمش بلبل نوا آموخت است
غازہ اش رخسارِ گل افروخت است

34. Ibid., p. 127.
35. Ibid., p. 125.
36. Ibid., p. 117.
37. Ibid., p. 128.

سوزِ او اندر دلِ پروانہ ہا
عشق را رنگیں ازو افسانہ ہا
بحر و بر پوشیدہ در آب و گِلش
صد جہانِ تازہ مضمر در دلش
در دماغش نا دمیدہ لالہ ہا
نا شنیدہ نغمہ ہا ہم نالہ ہا
فکر او با ماہ و انجم ہم نشیں
زشت را نا آشنا خوب آفریں
خضر و در ظلماتِ او آبِ حیات
زندہ تر از آبِ چشمش کائنات[38]

In the Foreword to *Muraqqa'-i Chughtā'ī* Iqbāl writes : "The artist whois a blessing to mankind . . . is an associate of God. . . . He sees all nature full, large and abundant as opposed to him who sees all things thinner, smaller, emptier than they actually are." Iqbāl actually subordinates poetry to morality and makes it "subservient to life and personality". According to him, "Resistance of what *is* with a view to creating what *ought to be* is health and life ; all else is decay and death." The artist must discover the *ought* within the depths of his own being. True artist is the one who aims at the human assimilation of divine attributes and gives men infinite aspirations.

So far I have spoken of Iqbāl's functionalism. But this makes only one side of Iqbāl's theory of art. There is another equally important side of it and that is his expressionism.

In the history of aesthetics the first great expressionist was Plotinus. According to him, beauty of a piece of art comes not from the material—sounds, colours, tones or stones—but from the form which operates in the mind of the artist. This form the artist confers upon the material from his own inner resources. This doctrine suffers from the defect that it splits up a work of art into separate entities, matter and form, making matter external and form internal to the artist.

38. *Asrār-o-Rumūz (Asrār-i Khudī)*, pp. 37-8.

The most thorough-going expressionist is, however, one of Iqbāl's own contemporaries, Croce—the most famous Italian philosopher of recent times whose theory of art has had great influence in the West since the beginning of the second decade of this century. Briefly stated, his theory is this. Art is a creative activity which has no purpose and serves no end. No criteria of utility, ethics and logic apply to it. It is just the outpouring of the artist's emotions in the form of an image, vision, or intuition. In the intuition, form and content are indivisibly united. It yields direct knowledge of concrete individualities, whereas the intellect, which is a post-intuitional analytical activity, yields reflective knowledge. In other words, logical activity merely analyses what is already given as intuitional knowledge. Intuition is the self-expression of the experiencing individual. There is only one quality common to all the intuitions and that is the creative activity of self-expression. If a work of art is appreciated by a contemplator, it is so because it arouses in him the same intuition as belongs to the artist, and that is so because both are kindred spirits. This theory was followed in artistic execution by El Greco, Cézanne, Picasso, Matisse, Gauguin and others.

Now, evidently, there are four main parts of this theory : (1) that art is an activity, completely autonomous and free from all considerations of ethics ; (2) that this activity is distinct from the activity of the intellect ; (3) that it consists in the unfolding of the artist's personality ; and (4) that appreciation is the contemplator's re-living of the artist's experiences.

Out of these four parts of the doctrine, Iqbāl is strongly opposed to the first, for he makes art strictly subordinate to morality ; but he endorses the second part in so far as it entails the view that the work of the intellect is dissectional ; it grasps reality only piecemeal, while intuition grasps it in its wholeness.[39] But he agrees with Bergson rather than Croce in taking intuition as a higher form of the intellect[40]—as something succeeding rather than preceding thought. It seems to me

39 *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, London., 1934, p. 2.

40. Ibid.

that actually both parties are right. There is a kind of intuition which precedes thought, and there is another kind which succeeds it.

Regarding the remaining two parts, he is in entire agreement with Croce. He agrees that art is the self-expression of the artist. He expounds this view, when, with special reference to the Tāj, he sings in praise of the architects belonging to a free people :

خویش را از خود بروں آوردہ اند
ایں چنیں خود را تماشا کردہ اند

* * *

نقش سوئے نقش گر می آورد
از ضمیرِ او خبر می آورد

* * *

عشقِ مرداں سرّ خود را گفتہ است
سنگ را با نوکِ مژگاں سفتہ است[41]

And he addresses his own poetry in these words :

ہے گلہ مجھ کو تری لذتِ پیدائی کا
تو ہوا فاش تو ہیں اب مرے اسرار بھی فاش[42]

By *asrār* he does not mean mere intellectual ideas or the forms of Plotinus, but fiery thoughts surcharged with emotion and capable of shaking men and nations.

نغمہ می باید جنوں پروردۂ
آتشے در خونِ دل حل کردۂ[43]

* * * *

آیا کہاں سے نالۂ نے میں سرورِ مے ؟
اصل اس کی نے نواز کا دل ہے کہ چوبِ نے ؟[44]

* * * *

حق اگر سوزے ندارد حکمت است
شعر می گردد چو سوز از دل گرفت[45]

41. *Zabūr-i 'Ajam*, pp. 262-3.
42. *Ḍarb-i Kalīm*, p. 100.
43. *Zabūr-i 'Ajam*, p. 253.
44. *Ḍarb-i Kalīm*, p. 113.
45. *Payām-i Mashriq*, p. 122.

Again, he agrees with Croce that appreciation is possible because, broadly speaking, all of us have the same emotions as the artist.

نوائے او بہ ہر دل ساز گار است
کہ در ہر سینہ قاشے از دلِ اوست[46]

This in brief is Iqbāl's expressionistic position.

Now we have noticed that, on one side, Iqbāl makes art subservient to morality. On the other side, he regards it as self-expression of the artist. As subservient to morality, nothing is to be cosidered true art, however expressive of the artist's personality, if it does not effect discernment of values and does not create new hopes and new yearnings and aspirations for the advancement of life, man and society. On the other hand, every work which expresses the personality of the artist, whatever the contents of that personality—morally good, bad or indifferent—is a true work of art. Take these few lines of Ghālib :

رگِ سنگ سے ٹپکتا وہ لہو کہ پھر نہ تھمتا
جسے غم سمجھ رہے ہو یہ اگر شرار ہوتا

* * * *

زندگی اپنی جب اس شکل سے گزری غالب
ہم بھی کیا یاد کریں گے کہ خدا رکھتے تھے

* * * *

کیوں گردشِ مدام سے گھبرا نہ جائے دل
انسان ہوں پیالہ و ساغر نہیں ہوں میں

* * * *

ہستی کے مت فریب میں آجائیو اسد
عالم تمام حلقۂ دامِ خیال ہے

These lines are not poetic from the point of view of Iqbāl's vitalistic functionalism, but are superb poetry from the point of view of his expressionism as a theory of art.

There are some admirers of Iqbāl who hold that he has said the last word on all philosophical probelms. These enthusiasts misunderstand Iqbāl and do a great disservice to him by discouraging a frank examination of his doctrines. His philosophly would be utterly false if

46. *Armughān-i Ḥijāz*, p. 34.

his system created a dead stop in thought. He rightly emphasises that life is dynamic and so is human thought, and there are infinite possibilities in the womb of the future in either sphere. In both these spheres, Iqbāl's services are immeasurable, and yet he has left a great deal for his successors to achieve. The conflict in his thought to which I have just referred has to be resolved, and as his humble disciple, I regard it my duty to offer a solution. I think nobody would doubt the highly poetic nature of Ghālib's lines, quoted a moment ago, although functionally judged they can hardly be said to be so. Iqbāl's expressionism, as a theory of art, however incomplete, must be accepted as a basis, and his functionalism, which now stands apart, must be subsumed under it to give his system a unity. Purpose, which now lies outside, must be brought within the sphere of expression. Expressionism cannot find a place in functionalism; let his functionalism be brought under his expressionism. There is one form of purpose which can in no case fall within the activity of art and that is conscious purpose like money-making or making a living by book-making or racing or a game of cards or even by a poetic competition. This is a purpose completely outside art.

But there are two forms of purpose which fall within the activity of art. These are, firstly, cosmic purpose of which the agent is unconscious, e.g., preparation for reproduction in a doll's marriage in the play of girls, and secondly, cosmic purpose as a part of the content of intuition of which the agent is conscious. The unconscious cosmic purpose which art serves is training for life by a spontaneous pursuit of it on the plane of imagination, and increase of life by affording relief by the release of pent-up emotions or by the overflow of energies within the artist's personality. Purpose in this sense is biological. The artist himself is not conscious of it.

There is, however, another form of purpose of which the artist is fully aware. It is the cosmic purpose as an objective ingredient in his intuition of the universe as a whole. His all-embracing intuition contains within itself the idea of this cosmic purpose as a content and, therefore, it falls within its expression. Being an essential part of this

expression, it does not collide with it. The idea of the highest good which pervades through the Dialogues of Plato or the whole poetry of Iqbāl is not external, but internal to their art. Art can be allowed to be didactic only in this sense. It is only when the artist's personality is wholly dominated and coloured by an ethical conception of such vast magnitude that purpose becomes internal to his spontaneous intuitions. If the art is conceived as *expression* of the artists *impressions* of reality, then purpose may or may not form a part of the artist's intuitions, and whether it does so or not, his work can yet be beautiful. And that is why some verses of Mīr, Ghālib and Fānī possess supreme beauty, even though they are pessimistic and non-didactic. After the suggested modification, works embodying a purpose and those without any purpose, both can find a place in true art, and all kinds of experiences and ideals can fall within its ambit. Some such modification in Iqbāl's theory of art is essential to make it self-consistent and comprehensive enough to cover all types of art.

Iqbāl put us on the right path to the highest reaches of life and thought. He took us a long way on that path under his own leadership. Then he left us saying : Do not halt ; go on. You will reach many stages. Do not stop at any of them, taking it to be the last. Work your way up and up to greater and yet greater heights. There will be no limit to your achievements, provided you persevere. This is what he said in fact and his voice still rings in our ears. Let all of us heed his advice and go on persevering in search of life and truth unflinchingly, and improve our thoughts as well as our deeds unceasingly. May God help us !

January 1954

Dr Andalib Shadani

IQBAL'S CONCEPTION OF ART

All art in one form or other is an ideal representation of reality. When reality is seen through imagination and gets imbued with emotion, art springs. The artist, however, always needs some sort of material to serve as a medium for the expression of his artistic impulse. Whether this material be marble slabs, paints, or words, the bond between the actual and the ideal remains unbroken.

Architecture is regarded as the most inferior of all the fine arts, because the artist in it is almost tied down to the material on which he works. Sculpture comes next and is a step higher, for the artist here chisels out of a slab of stone a new joy, a new life. Yet a step higher is painting; the whole world may here be compressed on a small canvas. Superior to all these is music where the material used is merely voice or senseless sounds made to convey a world of meaning and harmonious sweetness. Poetry comes last and is the finest of all the fine arts ; the link between the ideal and the real in it can be superbly maintained through the medium of words.

Sculpture, painting and music undoubtedly exercise immense influence on human psyche, but they are not capable of representing all the aspects and moods of life and as such they do not come up to the level of poetry. Speaking of the comparative merits of poetry, music and dance, a Chinese thinker observes that poetry is the soul while

dance the body of music. Iqbāl has endorsed this view thus :

شعر سے روشن ہے جانِ جبرئیل و اہرمن
رقص و موسیقی سے ہے سوز و سرورِ انجمن
فاش یوں کرتا ہے اک چینی حکیم اسرارِ فن
شعر گویا روحِ موسیقی ہے رقص اس کا بدن [1]

Poetry illumines the soul of both Gabriel and Devil ;
Dance and music give joy and fervour to the assembly.
A Chinese thinker has thus revealed the secrets of art :
Poetry is the soul and dance the body of music.

Iqbāl has divided art into two distinct kinds : the "art of slaves" and the "art of free people".

In the last section of the *Zabūr-i 'Ajam*, entitled "*Bandagī Nāmah*", Iqbāl has fully dealt with the evils that follow in the wake of slavery. It creates disunion among a people ; they start fighting against one another. A true believer is turned into an infidel under the influence of slavery ; he loses all the lofty traits of a noble character. Fear of death enters his very soul and makes him a coward. He feels the infirmities of old age even in the prime of his youth. He ceases to care for lofty ideals of life and feels quite satisfied if his physical needs are met with. In short, the man in him dies ; the animal alone continues to live.

The art of slaves, thus, takes away the very life form us. It inculcates in us the escapist tendencies, suggesting to us to seek salvation in death instead of exhorting us to overcome the obstacles in our way to progress. Commenting upon the music of a slave Iqbāl says :

نغمۂ او خالی از نارِ حیات
ہمچو سیل افتد بدیوارِ حیات

* * *

از نۓ او آشکارا رازِ او
مرگِ یک شہر است اندر سازِ او

1. *Ḍarb-i Kalīm*, p.134.

ناتوان و زار می سازد ترا
از جهان بیزار می سازد ترا[2]

* * *

الحذر این نغمہ موت است و بس
نیستی در کسوتِ صوت است و بس[3]

His melody is devoid of the fire of life ; like a flood it demolishes the very foundation of life.

* * *

His flute reveals his secret ; his harp is deadly enough to cause death to the whole townspeople.

It renders you feeble, saps your energy and makes you feel disgusted with the world.

* * *

Beware, this is a melody of death : annihilation has put on the garb of sound.

Such a music, according to Iqbāl, robs man of the fire of life and gives him sorrow instead. And sorrow, Iqbāl further explains, is of two kinds. One is that which devours man, the other which devours all other sorrows. If you have this latter kind of sorrow, you are relieved thereby of all other cares and anxieties. When this sorrow takes its abode in man's heart, the heart becomes a shoreless ocean. Slavery means ignorance of the deeper passions of soul ; and, therefore, the melody of a slave cannot give one that other kind of sorrow :

من نمی گویم کہ آہنگش خطاست
بیوہ زن را این چنیں شیون رواست[4]

I do not say that his chanting is erroneous,
But that such lamentation behoves a helpless widow only.

In the same strain Iqbāl has spoken of the painting of the slaves. He poignantly lists some of the favourite themes which find expression in such paintings :

2. *Zabūr-i 'Ajam*, p. 251.
3. Ibid., p. 252.
4. Ibid.

"راہبے در حلقۂ دامِ ہوس
دلبرے با طائرے اندر قفس
خسروے پیشِ فقیرے خرقہ پوش
مردِ کوہستانیٔ ہیزم بدوش
نازنینے در رہِ بت خانۂ
جوگیٔ در خلوتِ ویرانۂ
* * *
نوجوانے از نگاہے خوردہ تیر
کودکے بر گردنِ بابائے پیر"[5]

A hermit caught in the meshes of passion ;
Beautiful maiden carrying a cage with a bird in it.
A monarch paying homage to a beggar in tatters ;
A highlander carrying wood on his shoulders.
A pretty damsel on her way to temple ;
A yogi in a lonely wilderness.
A youth wounded by the darts of glances ;
A child on the shoulders of his old father.

After giving these and a few similar specimens of these paintings, Iqbāl concludes in a masterly way :

می چکد از خامہ با مضمونِ موت
ہر کجا افسانہ و افسونِ موت[6]

His brush paints nothing but death in various forms,
And all the stories that he relates reach their climax in nothingness.

Dwelling on the baneful influences of slavery, Iqbāl rightly observes that in a state of slavery body cannot retain its soul ; and obviously one cannot expect any good from a soulless body. Desire for invention and self-expression dies in a slave and he becomes quite oblivious of his own self. If Gabriel were to be made a slave he would

5. Ibid., p. 254. 6. Ibid.

fall from heaven. The creed of a slave is to follow on the footsteps of others, and his vocation in life is to make idols. To create something new and novel is the greatest sin in his religion ; to do so multiplies his doubts and fears. He is pleased with whatever is old and worn out. He always looks back to the past, shuts his eyes to the future, and earns his living from the grave like its keeper.

All this is followed by a note of warning from Iqbāl :

گر ہنر این است مرگِ آرزو ست
اندرونش زشت و بیرونش نکوست

طائرِ دانا نمی گردد اسیر
گرچہ باشد دامے از تارِ حریر[7]

If this is art, it is the death of all noble desires ;
Its outside is pretty, its inside is ugly.
A wise bird never gets caught,
Even though the net be made of silken thread.

As an ardent lover of freedom Iqbāl more pointedly directs his criticism against the Indian artists, whose art under foreign domination has further augmented their state of slavery.

موت کی نقش گری ان کے صنم خانوں میں
زندگی سے ہنر ان برہمنوں کا بیزار

چشمِ آدم سے چھپاتے ہیں مقاماتِ بلند
کرتے ہیں روح کو خوابیدہ بدن کو بیدار

ہند کے شاعر و صورت گر و افسانہ نویس
آہ ! بیچاروں کے اعصاب پہ عورت ہے سوار[8]

The art of these Brahmans makes one disgusted with life,
They only paint death and conceal from man his exalted position ;
They awaken the body and lull the soul to sleep.

7. Ibid., p. 257.

8. *Ḍarb-i Kalīm*, p. 128.

Alas, these Indian poets, painters and story-writers ; they are all obsessed with sex—they cannot conceive of anything without a woman.

In contrast to the art of a decadent and subject nation there is the kind of art which brings about the spiritual regeneration of a people. This kind of art flourishes under the fostering care of a people who are free to carve out their own destiny. Hence, Iqbāl urges us to choose the art that must inspire us and infuse a new life in us, i.e. continually create new aspirations and ideals in us and spur us to realise them.

"In so far as the cultural history of Islam is concerned", says Iqbāl, "with the single exception of architecture, the art of Islam (music, painting and even poetry) is yet to be born . . . the art, that is to say, which aims at the human assimilation of divine attributes, gives man infinite inspiration and finally wins for him the status of being God's representative on earth."

On his way back to India from Europe, Iqbāl visited the tombs of the Pharaohs of Egypt and made a very significant observation about the statues of the kings who lie buried there. "These statues", said Iqbāl, "inspire awe and display power and, as such, made a deep impression on me. The mosque of 'Umar in Jerusalem and the mosque of Quwwat-ul-Islam at Delhi also make a similar impression. The element of power has gradually declined in the Muslim architecture of the later period and even the Taj Mahal of Agra is not an exception. It does not impress one as the Quwwat-ul-Islam does. In fact it is the element of power which maintains the balance of beauty." Hence, comparing the art of free people with that of the slaves, Iqbāl has particulary referred to the glorious architecture of the Muslims.

یک زماں با رفتگاں صحبت گزیں
صنعتِ آزاد مرداں ہم بہ بیں
خیز و کارِ ایبک و سوری نگر
وا نما چشمے اگر داری جگر

خویش را از خود بروں آوردہ اند
ایں چنیں خود را تماشا کردہ اند
سنگہا با سنگہا پیوستہ اند
روزگارے را بآنے بستہ اند
دیدنِ او پختہ تر سازد ترا
در جہانِ دیگر اندازد ترا
نقشِ سوئے نقش گر می آورد
از ضمیرِ او خبر می آورد
ہمتِ مردانہ و طبعِ بلند
در دلِ سنگ ایں دو لعلِ ارجمند[9]

Sit for a moment with the ancients and see the art of free men.
Get up and look at the work [architecture] of Aibak and Sūrī; open your eyes if you have the courage.
They have brought out their own selves and in this manner have witnessed themselves.
They have united stone with stone, and thus compressed a whole age in a moment.
It makes you more stable if you look at it, and transports you to another realm.
The picture takes you back to the painter and reveals his mind to you.
In the heart of these stones you will find two precious gems: manly resolution and lofty spirit.

In order to fully appreciate Iqbāl's conception of art, it is necessary to know his criterion for distinguishing good from evil. Happily we have Iqbāl's very clear and definitive views on this rather vexing problem. In a letter to Nicholson he wrote: "Personality, or the state of tension, is the most valuable achievement of man, . . . Thus the idea of personality gives us a standard of value; it settles the problem of good and evil. That which fortifies personality is good, that which weakens it is bad. Art, religion and ethics must be judged from the standpoint of personality." The same idea has been vividly

9. *Zabūr-i 'Ajam*, p. 262.

expressed by him in the following verses :

سرود و شعر و سیاست ، کتاب و دین و ہنر
گہر ہیں ان کی گرہ میں تمام یک دانہ

* * *

اگر خودی کی حفاظت کریں تو عینِ حیات
نہ کرسکیں تو سراپا فسون و افسانہ[10]

Music, poetry, politics, the Scripture, religion and art, all possess most precious gems.

* * *

If they protect the Ego they verily embody life ; but if they fail to do so, they are mere deception.

In another poem Iqbāl says :

گر ہنر میں نہیں تعمیرِ خودی کا جوہر
وائے صورت گری و شاعری و نائے و سرود[11]

If art is devoid of that substance which fosters self; woe be to such painting, poetry and music.

Iqbāl expressed this view as far back as 1914. Two years later in an article published in the *New Era* (Lucknow) it was repeated in the following words :

The ultimate end of all human activity is life . . . glorious, powerful, exuberant. All human art must be subordinated to this final purpose, and the value of everything must be determined in reference to its life-yielding capacity. The highest art is that which awakens our dormant will-force and nerves us to face the trials of life manfully. All that brings drowsiness and makes us shut our eyes to reality around, on the mastery of which alone life depends, is a message of decay and death. There should be no opium-eating in Art. The dogma of Art for the sake of Art is a clever invention of decadence to cheat us out of life and power.

Iqbāl considers it vitally important to bring home to his readers

10. *Ḍarb-i Kalīm*, p. 98. 11. Ibid., p. 112.

the view that the object of all art and science is to preserve and protect life and make it more powerful and glorious. He takes up this theme over and over again and dilates on it.

آ گہی از علم و فن مقصود نیست
غنچہ و گل از چمن مقصود نیست
علم از سامانِ حفظِ زندگی است
علم از اسبابِ تقویمِ خودی است
علم و فن از پیش خیزانِ حیات
علم و فن از خانہ زادانِ حیات [12]

Knowledge is not the goal of science and art;
Buds and flowers are not the objective of a garden.
Science is the equipment wherewith it protects life ;
It is the means to the end of self-preservation.
Both science and art are the handmaids of life—
Nay, slaves born and brought up in its house.

After knowing Iqbāl's conception of art in general, one would like to have an idea of the qualities that an ideal artist must possess. As Iqbāl looks upon art to be subservient to life and personality, in an ideal artist love reveals itself as a unity of beauty and power. Says he :

دلبری بے قاہری جادو گری است
دلبری با قاہری پیغمبری است [13]

The art which is only a representation of beauty and not the manifestation of power is nothing but a necromancer's trick ; but the art which reveals power along with beauty falls in line with the work of a prophet.

"The modern age", Iqbāl tells us, "seeks inspiration from Nature. But Nature simply *is* and her function is mainly to obstruct our search for *ought* which the artist must discover within the depths of his own being."

12. *Asrār-o-Rumūz*, (*Asrār-i Khudī*), pp. 17-8.
13. *Zabūr-i 'Ajam*, p. 264.

حسن را از خود برون جستن خطاست
آنچہ می بائست پیشِ ما کجاست ؟[14]

To seek beauty outside one's self is a mistake because that which *ought to be* does not exist.

The artist thus has to create beauty on his own, and, therefore, "resistance to what *is* with a view to creating what *ought to be* is health and life ; all else is decay and death."

The above verse has led some to think that Iqbāl was an idealist. But they are wholly mistaken. All he means is that Nature has provided the artist with all the necessary material in a crude form, and it is for him to refashion it, i.e. give it the shape it ought to possess. Iqbāl has repeatedly expressed this idea in both his Urdu and his Persian verses :

تو قدرِ خویش ندانی بہا ز تو گیرد
وگرنہ لعلِ درخشندہ پارۂ سنگ است[15]

You do not know your worth,
It is you who give value to a glittering ruby; otherwise it is nothing but a piece of stone.

جمیل تر ہیں گل و لالہ فیض سے اس کے
نگاہِ شاعرِ رنگیں نوا میں ہے جادو ![16]

The glance of an elegantly eloquent poet is fraught with magic, wherewith he can render roses and tulips much more beautiful.

از نگاہش خوب گردد خوب تر
فطرت از افسونِ او محبوب تر[17]

Beautiful becomes more beautiful when he looks at it ;
His charm renders Nature more lovely.

14. Ibid., p. 255.
15. *Payām-i Mashriq*, p. 179.
16. *Bāl-i Jibrīl*, p. 20.
17. *Asrār-o-Rumūz* (*Asrār-i Khudī*), p. 37.

According to Iqbāl, the artist who is a blessing to mankind, is the one who deifies life. He, indeed, is an associate of God in the act of creation. God has not created the universe once for all; He is perpetually re-creating and refashioning it. Man is God's co-worker in this refashioning of the universe, in so far as he, through the exercise of his creative faculties, brings order in it and gives it a new design and form. We quote below Iqbāl's famous verses wherein he clearly explains how man is an associate of God in the act of creation; how the artist in him with his creative genius has produced things which have embellished Nature, and how his creations bear a mark of superiority over the work of Nature. Man says to God:

تو شب آفریدی چراغ آفریدم
سفال آفریدی ایاغ آفریدم
بیابان و کہسار و راغ آفریدی
خیابان و گلزار و باغ آفریدم
من آنم کہ از سنگ آئینہ سازم
من آنم کہ از زہر نوشینہ سازم [18]

You created night: I made the lamp. You created clay; I made the goblet.
You created deserts, mountains and forests; I made parterres, flower-beds and gardens.
I am the one who makes mirror out of stone and produces nectar from poison.

As an example of the life-giving art, Iqbāl calls our attention to the Pyramids of Egypt which at once manifest power, grandeur and glory. Here again the comparison between Nature's work and man's creation clearly brings out man's superiority over Nature. He says:

اس دشتِ جگرتاب کی خاموش فضا میں
فطرت نے فقط ریت کے ٹیلے کئے تعمیر!
اہرام کی عظمت سے نگونسار ہیں افلاک
کس ہاتھ نے کھینچی ابدیت کی یہ تصویر؟

18. *Payām-i Mashriq*, p. 132.

فطرت کی غلامی سے کر آزاد ہنر کو
صیاد ہیں مردانِ ہنرمند کہ نخچیر ؟[19]

In the hushed expanse of this burning desert, Nature has built mounds of sand only.

But who has painted this picture of eternity, these Pyramids whose grandeur humbles the heavens?

Set thy art free from Nature's subservience; for artists are hunters, not the game.

Iqbāl's conception of a real artist and his art found poignant expression in the following verses.

نغمہ می باید جنوں پروردۂ
آتشے در خونِ دل حل کردۂ

* * *

نغمہ گر معنی ندارد مردہ ایست
سوزِ او از آتشِ افسردہ ایست[20]

* * * *

آں ہنرمندے کہ بر فطرت فزود
رازِ خود را بر نگاہِ ما کشود

* * *

حورِ او از حورِ جنت خوشتراست
منکرِ لات و مناتش کافر است
آفریند کائناتِ دیگرے
قلب را بخشد حیاتِ دیگرے

* * *

زاں فراوانی کہ اندر جانِ اوست
ہر تہی را پر نمودن شانِ اوست[21]

A melody must be steeped in madness of love; it should be like fire dissolved in the very blood of life.

* * *

19. *Ḍarb-i Kalīm*, p. 115.
20. *Zabūr-i 'Ajam*, p. 253.
21. Ibid. p. 256.

A melody that has no meaning is lifeless; it draws its fervour only from a dying fire.

* * *

The artist who improves upon Nature lays bare his own secret to our gaze.

* * *

The houri which he creates is more beautiful than that in heaven. One who repudiates the idols carved by an artist is an infidel.

He [the artist] creates a new world and gives the heart a new life.

* * *

His skill lies in filling up every gap in life with the fullness of his own soul.

Sincerity, according to Iqbāl, is the pre-eminent quality of a great artist; it alone enables him to produce excellent pieces of art. It is absolutely essential if an artist wants to work miracles. No great work of art is possible without it. It is sincerity which turns a lifeless block of stone into a heart throbbing with life, and makes the sounds quiver with melody, fervour and ecstasy. Without sincerity all paintings are imperfect and all songs, cries in the wilderness. Says Iqbāl :

رنگ ہو یا خشت و سنگ چنگ ہو یا حرف و صوت
معجزۂ فن کی ہے خونِ جگر سے نمود
قطرۂ خونِ جگر سل کو بناتا ہے دل
خونِ جگر سے صدا سوز و سرور و سرود [22]

* * *

نقش ہیں سب ناتمام خونِ جگر کے بغیر!
نغمہ ہے سودائے خام خونِ جگر کے بغیر [23]

Iqbāl's viewpoint with regard to art is very well summed up in a small but fascinating poem *Funūn-i Laṭīfah* (Fine Arts) in his work : *Ḍarb-i Kalīm*. It runs as follows :

22. *Bāl-i Jibrīl*, p. 129.   23. Ibid., p. 136.

اے اہلِ نظر ذوقِ نظر خوب ہے لیکن
جو شے کی حقیقت کو نہ دیکھے وہ نظر کیا !

مقصودِ ہنر سوزِ حیاتِ ابدی ہے
یہ ایک نفس یا دو نفس مثلِ شرر کیا !

جس سے دلِ دریا متلاطم نہیں ہوتا
اے قطرۂ نیساں وہ صدف کیا وہ گہر کیا !

شاعر کی نوا ہو کہ مغنی کا نفس ہو
جس سے چمن افسردہ ہو وہ بادِ سحر کیا !

بے معجزہ دنیا میں ابھرتی نہیں قومیں
جو ضربِ کلیمی نہیں رکھتا وہ ہنر کیا ! [24]

O wise ones, the taste for seeing pretty things is good; but the eye which fails to see the reality of a thing is worthless.

The object of all art is to inflame the fire of life, not for a moment or two as in a spark, but eternally.

O drop of spring rain, both the shell and the pearl are of no consequence, if they cannot cause an upheaval in the heart of the sea.

The song of a poet or the melody of a singer [is useless if it fails to inspire the listener, and causes dejection to him]; the morning breeze which withers a garden is, indeed, worthless.

No nation rises in the world without working miracles; hence, the art which is incapable of dealing miraculous blows like the staff of Moses is no art at all.

Iqbāl refers to the same criterion in order to judge the merit of good poetry.

اے میانِ کیسہ ات نقدِ سخن
بر عیارِ زندگی او را بزن [25]

O you who have the coin of poetry in your purse, test it on the touchstone of life.

Before proceeding further, it is necessary to make clear the charge of inconsistency with regard to Iqbāl's views on poetry. On the one

24. *Ḍarb-i Kalīm*, p. 117.
25. *Asrār-o-Rumūz* (*Asrār-i Khudī*), p. 42.

hand, it is said, he vehemently condemns those who call him a poet, while, on the other, he lauds poetry and poets to the skies. He exclaims :

نہ بینی خیر ازاں مردِ فرو دست
کہ برمن تہمتِ شعر و سخن بست [26]

You can never expect any good from that mean fellow who falsely accuses me of being a poet.

Iqbāl further complains of his friends who could never appreciate his point of view correctly.

او حدیثِ دلبری خواہد زمن
رنگ و آبِ شاعری خواہد زمن
کم نظر بیتابیٔ جانم ندید
آشکارم دید و پنہانم ندید [27]

They demand of me love-songs full of elegance and glamour of poetry.

These men of narrow vision could not see my restless soul ; they only saw the manifest and not what is hidden in me.

To a casual reader the following verse presents a sharp contrast to what has been said above :

شاعر اندر سینۂ ملت چو دل
ملتے بے شاعرے انبارِ گل ! [28]

The poet is like the heart within the bosom of a nation; without a poet a nation is but a heap of clay.

But this inconsistency, in fact, is only apparent, not real. The poet whom Iqbāl condemns is the conventional poet who revels in sensual pleasures and invites others to the same ; he is obsessed with sex and sees a woman on whatever he casts his glance. Such poets,

26. *Zabūr-i 'Ajam (Gulshan-i Rāz-i Jadīd)*, p. 204.
27. *Payām-i Mashriq*, p. 3.
28. *Jāvīd Nāmah*, p. 45.

indeed, take the very life out of us ; for they utterly fail to exhort us to overcome the obstacles in the onward march of life. It was with this view that Iqbāl once condemned even Khwājah Ḥāfiẓ, whose poetry in his opinion was full of those baneful elements which dampen the spirit of enterprise and make men content with their present lot, however abject it might be. With such poets Iqbāl hates to be classed. But he is all praise for a real poet whose poetry has the qualities of raising fallen individuals or nations to the loftiest position which they are capable of attaining. Of such poetry, Iqbāl says :

شعر را مقصود اگر آدم گری است
شاعری ہم وارثِ پیغمبری است[29]

If poetry aims at producing ideal men ; the poet may rightly be said to have inherited the qualities of a prophet.

So far as his own poetry is concerned, Iqbāl looks upon it only as a means to achieve noble ends and lofty ideals such as have been referred to above. He makes the confession :

نغمہ کجا و من کجا سازِ سخن بہانہ ایست
سوئے قطار می کشم ناقۂ بے زمام را[30]

I have nothing to do with songs and melodies ; they are only an excuse. The object of my singing is only to bring back to the line the camels that, having broken their reins, have wandered away.

Yet Iqbāl undoubtedly is a supercraftsman and his poetry is possessed of all the graces of form and profundities of thought ; only he does not attach much importance to the mere form. Says he :

مری نوا میں نہیں ہے ادائے محبوبی
کہ بانگِ صورِ سرافیل دل نواز نہیں[31]

My singing is not very alluring ; the thundering sound of Isrāfīl's trumpet after all cannot be pleasing to the heart.

29. Ibid., p. 46.
30. *Zabūr-i 'Ajam*, p. 79.
31. *Bāl-i Jibrīl*, p. 59.

مری نوائے پریشاں کو شاعری نہ سمجھ
کہ میں ہوں محرمِ رازِ درونِ میخانہ[32]

Do not take my incoherent chanting to be poetry, because I am not a poet but one who knows the hidden mysteries of things.

July 1971

32. Ibid., p. 76.

Sir Abdul Qadir

THE INFLUENCE OF IQBAL ON URDU LITERATURE

Shortly before the dawn of the twentieth century there arose, on the firmament of Indian literature, a star that has just passed out of our sight, after having shone for about forty years with a lustre peculiarly his own. That star was the poet Iqbāl, or to give him his full name and titles : Dr Sir Muḥammad Iqbāl, who left the scene of his earthly labours in April 1938.

He was about four and twenty when he first rose to fame as a writer of Urdu poetry, and he continued his devotion to literature and learning for the rest of his life. His Urdu poems, which have been collected and published under the name of *Bāng-i Darā* made him widely known throughout India. When he discovered that he could express his thought in Persian, the *Asrār-i Khudī* (*The Secrets of the Self*) served to extend his fame beyond the borders of India ; and its English translation, with notes by Professor Nicholson of Cambridge, made Iqbāl's work known to the scholars of the West. This book was followed by the *Rumūz-i Bekhudī* (*The Mysteries of Selflessness*). Then came the *Payām-i Mashriq* (The Message of the East), which is a response to Goethe's *Divān*. His other books in Persian are the *Zabūr-i 'Ajam* and *Jāvīd Nāmah.*

While the poet was busy with his Persian poems, there was a growing demand on the part of the admirers of his Urdu verse that he should make some further contributions to Urdu poetry. He responded to this call by giving us two more collections of Urdu poems, called the *Bāl-i Jirbīl* and the *Ḍarb-i Kalīm*, which reproduce the theme of the "Secrets of the Self", thal is the development of the powers of the Ego, which runs through all the Persian writings of Iqbāl. A posthumous collection of his poems, entitled *Armughān-i Ḥijāz*[1], has just been published in India. It consists mostly of Persian poems but has in it some Urdu poems as well, mainly religious in character as its name implies.

The effect of the poetry of Iqbāl on the mind of the Urdu-reading public in India, and on those who can understand his Persian poems, may be gauged from the fact that a few months before his passing away, there was a spontaneous movement throughout the country to organise huge gatherings of people, at different centres of intellectual activity, to pay tributes of admiration to the poet and to discuss the value of his writings. Hundreds of such meetings were held, at each of which papers dealing with Iqbāl's works were read, and poems written about him were recited.

Some of these papers and poems, collected and published in book-form, make very interesting reading. There is no record in India of such a widespread homage paid to any literary man in his lifetime and, so far as I am aware, perhaps it is difficult to find an exact parallel elsewhere.

The influence of Iqbāl on his contemporaries has been vast and varied and he has left an impress on the form as well as the substance of present-day Urdu literature. In the early stages of his career the tendency was to adopt his favourite expressions and his Persianised phrases in the style of G͟hālib. Towards the end of his life there was a strong inclination to follow the thought and purpose of his poetry.

Among the writers in the United Provinces, the earliest to adopt

1. First published in November 1938.

his style were Durgā Sahā'i Surūr[2] of Jahānābād and Nādir Kākorvī. They had a fair amount of success, but the same cannot be said of all who tried to adopt this feature of the earlier poems of Iqbāl. There was in Iqbāl's poems skilful blending of Persian phrases with Urdu in the manner of Ghālib, and he could do this with his exceptionally good knowledge of Persian ; but an imitation of that style by people not so well versed in Persian and not so artistic had results which were far from happy. The tendency to use too many Persian expressions has to some extent crept into modern Urdu prose and even in journalistic prose, but this should be discouraged as it is necessary to keep the language of Urdu prose as simple as possible.

It must be remembered, however, that Iqbāl's Urdu poetry was not all in the ornate Persianised style. Many of his best poems are models of simplicity. Take, for instance, the pieces written by him for the young, which are fondly recited by our children in their schools as well as homes. The opening lines of *Parinday kī Faryād* ("The Bird's Wail") may be quoted as a specimen. They are so simple and touching. It is the song of a caged bird remembering his lost liberty :

> The memory comes to me of the times gone bye,
> The delights of the Garden, where all chirped together.
> Where is now that freedom of my own nest,
> The coming in and going out at pleasure ?

Among the poems for grown-ups, the *Nayā Shivālah*, which was a call for Hindu-Muslim unity, is a fine example of simple Urdu. In the closing lines, the poet has shown his command of simple Hindi as well. He says :

> We may chant every morning those *mantars* sweet,
> And inebriate all worshippers with the wine of love.
> In the song of the devout, dwells Power as well as Peace ;
> The salvation of the denizens of the Earth lies in affection for one another.

Many of Iqbāl's later poems also combine simplicity of expres-

2. Born 1873, died 3 December 1910 ; see "*Muqaddimah*" : *Khum Khānah-i Surūr*.

sion with sublimity of thought. The *Sāqī Nāmah* in the *Bāl-i Jibrīl* furnishes a fine illustration. Take the following lines[3] :

Thou thinkest that life is a secret ;
It is only another name for the desire to soar high.
Many ups and downs it has seen,
But it loves the journey better than the destination.

With his wide range of study of Western poetry and philosophy, Iqbāl found numerous subjects to form the bases of his poems, and has thus served as a source of inspiration to many younger writers. As a notable instance of this form of influence may be mentioned the work of one of our most popular young poets, Ḥafīẓ Jalandharī. His style differs very much from that of Iqbāl, but many of the themes chosen by him have their parallels in the earlier works of Iqbāl and must have been suggested to him by his studies of Iqbāl's poetry, for which he has great admiration. Take the poems of both on the Himalayas, each excellent in its own way, or on the river Rāvī, each having a distinctive approach to the same subject and a distinctive treatment of it. The seed of the famous song of Ḥafīẓ, known as *Parīt kā Gīt*, could be traced to the closing lines of Iqbāl in his *Nayā Shivālah*.

A subject to which we find frequent references in the writings of Iqbāl and which has become a popular theme in Urdu poetry and prose, is sympathy for the toiling millions of the world. The antagonistic attitude of mind towards the rich, which is induced by a contemplation of the troubles of the poor, is a sequence of this sympathy. The following lines in the *Bāl-i Jibrīl*,[4] which are supposed to embody a command of God to His angels, show the attitude of Iqbāl to this important question :

Rise ! and awaken the poor of my world,
And shake the gates and walls of the mansions of the rich.

* * *

The period of the supremacy of the people is approaching,
Do away with all the old lineaments.

3. *Bāl-i Jibrīl*, p. 17. Here and elsewhere in this article only English translation of the Urdu verses has been given (Editor).
4. Ibid., pp. 143-50.

The field that fails to give livelihood to the peasant,
Burn every sheaf of corn in that field.

* * *

This new civilisation is a factory of glass-makers ;
Teach a new method [of dealing with it] to the poet of the East.

Iqbāl found many adherents of this creed among the literary men of his day. In fact I was surprised to find, when I went to India for a short visit last year, that the place of the "rose" and the "nightingale" in Urdu poetry was being taken by the comparatively dry theme of capital and labour in popular literary contests. Professor Tā<u>th</u>īr[5], who is an ardent admirer of Iqbāl and himself a rising literary man, is continuing this part of Iqbāl's work in the Urdu poems which he has cotributed to different periodicals. Another well-known poet, Jo<u>sh</u> Malīḥabādī, is a keen supporter of labour against capitalism. His writings, however, are fully Communistic, as they discard religion along with capital, Iqbāl's Socialism is not dissociated from religion.

The emphasis laid by Iqbāl on the world's need for religion is one of the special features of his work, and many other writers are following him in this direction. According to him, many of the troubles of the Western countries are due to their indifference to religion. He asks the nations of the East to bear in mind the importance of spiritual advancement along with material progress. As a Muslim, he derives his inspiration from his own religion ; and the religious terms used by him in his poems are mainly Islamic. He has exercised great influence on the youth of his country and represents a strong reaction against the materialistic tendencies of Western education.

The reference to his spiritual call brings us to a consideration of the subject of *<u>kh</u>udī*, which Iqbāl made particularly his own. The literal meaning of the word "*<u>kh</u>udī*" is "selfhood", but it has been clothed by Iqbāl with a wider connotation. He believes that man is a part of the

5. Born 1921, died 30 November 1950 ; *Āti<u>sh</u> Kadah*, a collection of his Urdu poems, was published after his death.

Great Light which illuminates the whole universe and has immense potentialities within him, just as a small seed has in it the making of a great tree. He holds that it is a duty which man owes to himself and to his Creator and to the creation around him, to develop his God-given power in such a way as to utilise nature for the good of humanity. The ideal is beautifully expressed in the following lines[6] :

> The stars are trembling at the progress of man, made of clay ;
> Lest this fallen star may attain the brilliance of the full moon.

A detailed discussion of what Iqbāl means by "*khudī*" and its development is not within the scope of this paper. Those desiring to study it must read the *Asrār-i Khudī* in Persian, or Professor Nicholson's translation of it. To give you an idea of the poet's view, I am quoting the English translation of a few lines in Urdu from the *Ḍarb-i Kalīm*[7] :

> The Truth-seeking man, whose self has awakened,
> Is like a sword which is cutting and brilliant.
> To his keen eye is visible,
> The power to show what is latent in every atom.
> You are nowhere in comparison with that man of God ;
> You are the slave of the heavens,
> While he is their master.

In another place[8] in the same book, the poet thus addresses the reader :

> If the Self is alive, even poverty is kingship ;
> The prestige of the penniless is not inferior to that of Sanjar and Ṭughril.
> If the Self is alive, the endless ocean is fordable.
> To a live self the stones of a mountain are soft like silken cloth.
> A live crocodile is free when encircled by water,

6. *Bāl-i Jibrīl*, p. 14.
7. *Ḍarb-i Kalīm*, p. 73.
8. Ibid., p. 75.

While lifeless crocodile is enchained, even when there is only a mirage in place of water.

Iqbāl preaches the cult of manly self-dependencea nd the cultivation of power for the individual as well as the nation. When he first emphasised this view, it was remarked by some of his critics that he had taken this idea from his studies of the German philosopher Nietzsche. He was, no doubt, familiar with Nietzsche and must have been, to some extent, influenced by him ; but he points out in one of his verses that the distinction between himself and the German philosopher was that the life of self which he aims at developing is through faith in God, while the scheme of the German philosopher was without God.

This phase of Iqbāl's poetry has had a far-reaching effect on the minds of young men in general and on Muslim young men in particular. Essays have been written on this subject in schools and colleges and articles have appeared on it in newspapers and periodicals.

The sorrow caused by his departure from this world has lent fresh impetus to the study of his works and of his most favourite themes. An institution called the Iqbāl College has just been formed by some of his admirers at Sialkot, the place of his birth and early life, to give regular instruction to those who wish to study the works of Iqbāl. I hope the college will receive due encouragement and would serve as a fitting tribute to the memory of Iqbāl.

I wish to refer to one more prominent feature of Iqbāl's poetry before I conclude, and this is his criticism of the civilisation of the West. In spite of his Western education and an extensive study of Western literature and philosophy, he remained a true Oriental at heart, proud of the best traditions of the East. He has called himself the "Poet of the East", in more places than one. He was not impressed by the glare and glitter of modern civilisation and warned his people against yielding to its external attractions. He also warned the people of the West against the lure of a civilisation divorced from religion, and its poisonous effects on their body politic. This trend of thought has also earned many followers among the writers of Urdu poetry and prose.

Looking at the many ways in which Iqbāl has exercised his influence over Urdu literature, I think it must be acknowledged that we owe him a lasting debt of gratitude for the great service rendered by him to Urdu. By his work in this field, he has left Urdu richer in thought as well as expression.

July 1971

S. A. Vahid

IQBAL'S ELEGIES

Mourning for dear ones when expressed in poetical language, cannot fail to strike a responsive chord in the human heart, because death spares no one. In modern literature, Eastern as well as Western, an elegy either represents a lyric of mourning or is a direct expression of a personal bereavement or grief. But this has not always been the case. In Greek literature an elegy was a poem written in "elegiac" measure, which Longfellow describes and illustrates as follows :

> Peradventure of old some bard in Ionian Island,
> Walking along by the sea, hearing the wail of the waves.
> Learn'd the secret from them of the beautiful verse elegiac,
> Breathing into his song motions and sounds of the sea.

To the Romans an elegy simply meant a poem written in elegiac couplets, a pair of lines of which the first was a dactylic hexameter and the second a dactylic pentameter. Most of love poetry in Latin is to be found in elegies. Thus it will be seen that in Western literatures elegiac poetry in antiquity was not necessarily concerned with death or mourning. But this has never been the case in Oriental literatures where an elegy is always a poem of mourning or lamentation in suitable metres. As can be imagined, the causes of lamentation could be various – war and the misery wrought by it, political feuds, the manners and morals of time and, above all, death. Sometimes

elegies are the media for communal expressson of grief, for example the *Marthīahs* of Anīs and Dabīr in Urdu. Often an elegy is a memorial or encomiastic poem containing the poet's tribute to some friend or a great man, for example, Ḥālī's elegy for Maḥmūd Khān of Delhi in Urdu. Very often the philosophical and speculative elements enter into poem as in Shelley's "Adonais". Sometimes all these elements are combined as in *In Memoriam*. Sometimes the term elegy has been applied to reflective or narrative poems which are of distinctly melancholy nature, for example, Gray's *Elegy Written in a Country Churchyard*. But this is not generally the case in Urdu and Persian poetry.

It can be said that Arabic poetry started with elegy in the modern sense of the term. Pre-Islamic poetry no doubt possesses some memorable elegies, but in the Islamic period flourished two poets, Khansā' and Mu'tammim, who have left us elegies unsurpassable in the intensity of passion and beauty of diction. Khansā' was very devoted to her brother Ṣakhr, who was unfortunately killed in a battle. The shock was so great for Khansā' that she went off her head and started roaming about like a mad woman composing and reciting elegies in his memory. Mu'tammim also had a brother who was killed in a battle—nothing unusual in an age when intertribal feuds were the order of the day—and this tragic occurrence so affected Mu'tammim that he started roaming in the country and visiting the various tribes and reciting elegies that he composed in memory of his brother. These elegies used to attract big audience. Once Mu'tammim went to see Caliph 'Umar, and recited one of the elegies. 'Umar was a man of steel nerves and great self-control, but he was so moved by Mu'tammim's elegy that tears poured from his eyes. Later on, 'Umar asked Mu'tammim to compose an elegy in memory of his brother Zaid. Mu'tammim did this and went to see the Caliph next day with the elegy ready. After listening to it the Caliph remarked that the elegy lacked the fire and feeling of the elegies Mu'tammim had composed in memory of his own brother. Mu'tammim replied: "Sir, Zaid is your brother, not mine." This expressive remark indicates the true nature of elegiac poetry. Arabic poetry is probably the only poetry in the world which possesses elegies composed by poets referring to them-

selves. It is said that the first poet who composed such an elegy was Yazīd ibn Ḥamaq. Yazīd was bitten by a snake. Realising that his end was near, he lay down and employed his last moments in composing an elegy—a wonderful phenomenon, because in such moments it is not easy to secure necessary concentration.

Persian as well as Urdu poetry possesses beautiful and memorable elegies, although their number is small as compared to elegies in Arabic. Farrukhīs elegy in memory of Maḥmūd of Ghaznah and Sa'dī's elegy on the sack of Baghdād by the Mongol hordes are poetry of a high order. In Urdu, Ghālib's elegy written on the death of his nephew and Ḥālī's elegy on the death of his friend, Ḥakīm Maḥmūd Khān, will be classed among the finest elegiac poetry of the world. Then came the Lucknow school—mainly Anīs and Dabīr, whose elegies, describing the sufferings of the martyrs of Karbalā, breathe immortality.

Like other mortals, Iqbāl suffered bereavements which moved him to compose great and beautiful elegies. The chief elegies written by him are listed below :

(1) *Dāgh*. (2) *Swāmī Rām Tīrath*. (3) *Fātimah*. (4) *Shiblī-o-Ḥālī*. (5) *Wālidah Marḥūmah kī Yād men* (In Memory of My Mother). (6) *Humāyūn*. (7) *Rās Mas'ūd*, (8) *Akbar*.

All the above elegies, except the last, are written in Urdu. The elegy in memory of Akbar is written in Persian. These elegies were written at different periods of Iqbāl's life. There are two poems of a reflective and narrative nature which treat of death and life hereafter. These are :

(1) *Khuftīgān-i Khāk se Istifsār*, and (2) *Goristān-i Shāhī*.

Generally such poems are classified as descriptive, albeit melancholy, but not elegiac. But as both these poems bear a remarkable resemblance to the well-known elegy in the English language, a brief reference will be made to them also.

All these elegies were written by Iqbāl in memory of persons for whom he had feelings of attachment and devotion in varying degrees. Naturally the intensity of his lament also varies. For example, although Iqbāl admired Dāgh for his poetry, he had never met him and known him only through correspondence. His passing away only meant the

setting of a literary star, a sad event, but not one to effect a stunning grief. In his elegy on Swāmī Rām Tīrath, whom Iqbāl never knew intimately, but whose great and charming personality he admired for its noble and sterling qualities, Iqbāl pays his tribute to a great man. There is no feeling of a great personal loss, although the poet feels that the world is poorer after the death of a person so great and noble. In his elegy on Shiblī and Ḥālī, Iqbāl mourns the setting of great literary stars whose brilliance had added glory to the firmament of Urdu literature for a considerable period, and whose work for their people in fields other than literary was also of no mean order.

Humāyūn is the *nom de plume* of the late Mr Shāh Dīn, Chief Justice of the Punjab High Court, a great friend of Iqbāl. In the short elegy on Humāyūn, Iqbāl mourns the loss of a kindred spirit in whose character Iqbāl found much to admire. While the poet praises the departed friend for all that he could achieve in spite of the handicap of chronic ill-health, the poem is suffused with feelings of affection that existed between the two. This is one of the first remarkable elegies composed by Iqbāl, which in spite of its brevity must be ranked high among his elegiac poems. It is a quiet poem, but solid and sincere.

In the elegy on Akbar written in Persian, Iqbāl gave expression to the grief he felt over the loss of a great friend, a versatile poet and a remarkable man. The surprising fact about this elegy is that although it was included in the first edition of *Payām-i Mashriq*, it was left out in the subsequent editions. An elegy will certainly be out of place in *Payām-i Mashriq*, but the poem possesses such remarkable merits that it should be preserved.* In this elegy Iqbāl has paid the highest tribute to his friend and fellow bard. In the last lines he writes :

دماغش ادب خوردهٔ عشق و مستی
دلش پرورش دادهٔ جبرئیلے

His head drew food from love and ecstasy ;
His heart drew nourishment from Gabriel.

* See *Bāqīyāt-i Iqbāl* edited by Sayyid 'Abdul Vāḥid Mu'īnī, [the author of the present article] Lahore, 1966, p. 239 (Ed.).

While all these elegies represent poetry of a high order, it is admitted by all students of Iqbāl that his great masterpieces in elegiac poetry are those he composed on the death of his mother and his friend Ross Masud. Iqbāl's mother died in 1914, and as a result he was overwhelmed with a grief that found expression in this poem, which is regarded today as one of the most remarkable elegies in Urdu poetry. The elegy has no conscious scheme, but represents the reaction of a sorrowing spirit with high sensibility when brought face to face with a grief of great intensity. For a moment the poet forgets the sense of personal loss and begins to explore the mysteries of life and death and the laws which govern these. The inevitability and immutability of these laws, when surveyed through cold philosophy, buoys up the spirit of the poet and gives him fortitude and courage to treat all bereavements as a matter of course. But this attitude does not last long and is of no avail when the overwhelming sense of his great loss overpowers him. There are no great thoughts in the poem, but a great poet has no need to search for thoughts that are out of the ordinary.

The design of the poem is original, so far as elegies in Urdu and Persian literature are concerned. Instead of referring to the stunning loss he has sustained, and describing the great qualities of his mother, the poet starts by referring to the laws regulating the universe. He faces the death of a loving mother with the fortitude of a philosopher who realises that the whole universe and every object in it is subject to certain laws and these laws are inexorable. All bereavements being subject to these laws, it is hardly worthwhile weeping one's heart over what must take place whether one likes it or not. But this philosophical attitude which prepares him to stand the stunning blow is of help only momentarily. The poet starts with the following lines :

آسماں مجبور ہے، شمس و قمر مجبور ہیں
انجمِ سیماب پا رفتار پر مجبور ہیں

ہے شکست انجام غنچے کا سبو گلزار میں
سبزہ و گل بھی ہیں مجبورِ نمو گلزار میں

نغمۂ بلبل ہو یا آوازِ خاموشِ ضمیر
ہے اسی زنجیرِ عالمگیر میں ہر شے اسیر
آنکھ پر ہوتا ہے جب یہ سرِّ مجبوری عیاں
خشک ہو جاتا ہے دل میں اشک کا سیلِ رواں [1]

The firmament is subject to laws; so are the Sun and the Moon.
The mercury-footed stars are compelled to travel.
The bud must end by bursting in the garden,
The verdant grass and the flowers all have to grow in the garden.
It may be the nightingale's song or the silent voice of conscience,
All are enchained by the chain of laws.
When this secret of helplessness is revealed to the eye,
The gushing flood of tears dries up.

But just as the poet thinks that his philosophy would help him to face the grief stoically, he chances to look at his mother's picture and this leads to complete loss of self-control.

پر تری تصویر قاصد گریۂ پیہم کی ہے
آہ یہ تردید میری حکمتِ محکم کی ہے [2]

But the sight of thy picture brings forth endless sobbing,
Ah ! this is a refutation of all my solid philosophy.

Thus a small incident means complete loss of self-control and sweeping away of all philosophical ideas. Now the elegy takes a new turn. The picture shows what the mother used to do when she was alive :

حیرتی ہوں میں تری تصویر کے اعجاز کا
رخ بدل ڈالا ہے جس نے وقت کی پرواز کا
رفتہ و حاضر کو گویا پا بپا اس نے کیا
عہدِ طفلی سے مجھے پھر آشنا اس نے کیا [3]

1. *Bāng-i Darā*, pp. 252-3.
2. Ibid., p. 254.
3. Ibid., pp. 254-5.

I wonder at the miracle preformed by your picture,
It has changed the direction of the passage of time.
It has brought the past and the present together,
And has recalled to me once again the days of my childhood.

This brings back to Iqbāl the fact that even when grown up, in his mother's company he always used to feel as a child.

عام کی سنجیدہ گفتاری ، بڑھاپے کا شعور
دنیوی اعزاز کی شوکت ، جوانی کا غرور
زندگی کی اوج گاہوں سے اُتر آتے ہیں ہم
صحبتِ مادر میں طفلِ سادہ رہ جاتے ہیں ہم [4]

The serious talks based on learning and consciousness of old age,
The splendour of worldly honours, the pride of youth, all go.
We come down from the pinnacles of life's glory,
In mother's company, we become but children.

After meditating upon the miseries and troubles to which man is heir, Iqbāl seeks solace in the thought that this life will after all lead to a better one. What nobler lines than the following can be imagined which prepare a man for facing death with equanimity and even indifference :

مرنے والے مرتے ہیں لیکن فنا ہوتے نہیں
یہ حقیقت میں کبھی ہم سے جدا ہوتے نہیں [5]

* * * *

موت تجدیدِ مذاقِ زندگی کا نام ہے
خواب کے پردے میں بیداری کا اک پیغام ہے [6]

* * * *

جوہرِ انساں عدم سے آشنا ہوتا نہیں
آنکھ سے غائب تو ہوتا ہے ، فنا ہوتا نہیں

* * *

4. Ibid., p. 255. 5. Ibid., p. 170.
6. Ibid., 262.

یہ اگر آئینِ ہستی ہے کہ ہو ہر شام صبح
مرقدِ انساں کی شب کا کیوں نہ ہو انجام صبح ؟[7]

Those facing death die, but are not exterminated,
In reality they never leave us.

* * * *

Death only means renewal of the will to live,
Under the cloak of sleep it is a call for awakening.

* * * *

The essence of humanity never faces extinction,
It disappears from the eye but is not annihilated.

* * *

If the law is that every evening be followed by morn,
Why should not the night of human grave usher in a morn ?

These lines remind us of the following lines from Shelley :

He lives, he wakes, 'ts Death is dead, not he.
Mourn not for Adonais—Thou Young Dawn
Turn all thy dew to splendour, for from thee
The spirit thou lamentest is not gone.

It will be seen that through a veil of tears there emerges gradually the problem of immortality and faith in reunion. It is through bitter reaction and long pauses of uncertainty that the poet works out his conviction of immortality. The development of thought is natural and graceful, and its expression highly artistic. The poem represents a mind gifted with the keen sensibility and profound thinking suddenly made aware of moving sensations. Out of these sensations emerges the central idea that it is not only good to believe in immortality of the soul; it is necessary and even inevitable to do so. No other conception is possible or tolerable. It is impossible to think of man heading towards complete annihilation.

The elegy is sustained throughout by a diction raised high above the level of common discourse, yet never so lofty as to lose the

7. Ibid., pp. 264-5.

common touch. The rich variety of the verses contains homely utterances along with philosophical musings, but the diction is throughout noble and grand. For example :

دام سیمین تخیل ہے مرا آفاق گیر
کر لیا ہے جس سے تیری یاد کو میں نے اسیر

یاد سے تیری دل درد آشنا معمور ہے
جیسے کعبے میں دعاؤں سے فضا معمور ہے

وہ فرائض کا تسلسل نام ہے جس کا حیات
جلوہ گاہیں اس کی ہیں لاکھوں جہان بے ثبات

مختلف ہر منزل ہستی کی رسم و راہ ہے
آخرت بھی زندگی کی ایک جولانگاہ ہے[8]

The silvery net of my imagination can enclose the worlds,
With it I have captured thy remembrance.
The heart given to pain is full of thy remembrance,
As in Ka'bah the air is suffused with prayers.
That succession of duties that we name life,
Displays itself in myriads of mortal worlds,
Every station of life has different rules,
The afterlife is also but a jumping-off place.

The beauty of diction makes the poem as one of the noblest elegies in the Urdu language. The choice of words is so natural and yet so dignified that they echo the wails of a heart stricken with a grief of great intensity. The essence of the poem is not stateliness, but homeliness, tenderness and sublimity harmonised by a youthful candour that one can display only in a mother's presence. When we come to the magnificent peroration we feel that Iqbāl has given us the very best :

کس کو اب ہوگا وطن میں آہ! میرا انتظار ؟
کون میرا خط نہ آنے سے رہے گا بیقرار ؟

8. Ibid., pp. 265-6.

خاکِ مرقد پر تری لے کر یہ فریاد آؤں گا
اب دعائے نیم شب میں کس کو میں یاد آؤں گا؟

* * *

عمر بھر تیری محبت میری خدمت گر رہی
میں تری خدمت کے قابل جب ہوا تو چل بسی[9]

* * * *

مثلِ ایوانِ سحر مرقد فروزاں ہو ترا
نور سے معمور یہ خاکی شبستاں ہو ترا
آسماں تیری لحد پر شبنم افشانی کرے
سبزۂ نو رستہ اس گھر کی نگہبانی کرے[10]

Who would wait for me anxiously in my native place ?
Who would display restlessness if my letter fails to arrive ?
I will visit thy grave with this complaint :
Who will now think of me in midnight prayers ?

* * *

All thy life thy love served me with devotion,
When I became fit to serve thee, thou departed.
May thy grave be radiant like the mansion of morn !
Radiance may fill this earthly abode of thine !

* * *

May heavens shower dew on thy grave,
May newly grown grass serve as sentinel for this house !

Here is a child crying for his mother ! In this epilogue there is not a phrase, there is hardly a word, which is not made deeper in meaning and richer in fragrance, by the echoes it awakens in all of us of memories of our own childhood. The most durable impression of these lines is that of a poem which renders with an infinitely subtle melody the muffled emotions of a human soul overwhelmed by sorrow.

The dignity and harmony of the verse can be appreciated only by those who can read the poem in the original. Words chosen, no less

9. Ibid., p. 256. 10. Ibid., p. 266.

than ideas expressed, impart a singular dignity and charm to the poem. Iqbāl uses every device the language can hold to increase the force of his rhythm and the richness of his phrasing ; end-rhymes, internal rhymes, assonances and alliterations make the verses sparkle like rich irregular crystals in the gleaming flow of his limpid thought.

The second great elegy was written by Iqbāl on the death of his dear friend Sir Ross Masud. This poem is the story of an overwhelming loss when a soul is confronted by the fact that a kindred spirit is suddenly swept into the Unseen. But with the help of faith, the grieving spirit gradually runs out of the shadow into a firm belief in immortality. Belief in immortality is the undertone of all his poetry, and in this elegy it bursts further into a mighty symphony which voices all the warrants of our immortality in everlasting music. Before referring to immortality, Iqbāl gives vent to doubts under the impact of the shock, and begins wondering whether this world is a reality or a mere illusion :

یہ مہر و مہ یہ ستارے یہ آسمانِ کبود
کسے خبر کہ یہ عالم عدم ہے یا کہ وجود
خیالِ جادہ و منزل فسانہ و افسوں
کہ زندگی ہے سراپا رحیلِ بے مقصود

* * *

زوالِ علم و ہنر مرگِ ناگہاں اس کی
وہ کارواں کا متاعِ گراں بہا مسعود
مجھے رلاتی ہے اہلِ جہاں کی بیدردی
فغانِ مرغِ سحر خواں کو جانتے ہیں سرود [11]

This Sun and Moon, these stars and the azure sky,
Who knows if this world is real or illusory.
Thought of journey and goal are mere illusions.
Because life is a journey without a goal.

* * *

11. *Armughān-i Ḥijāz*, pp. 242-3.

Knowledge and learning have suffered due to his sudden death,
That esteemed member of the caravan – Mas'ūd !
The callousness of fellow-men breaks my heart,
Wails of the morning bird they regard as a song.

While still groping in the shadow, he asks himself searching questions : Why should death part us ? Is the parting temporary or permanent ?

نہ مجھ سے پوچھ کہ عمرِ گریز پا کیا ہے
کسے خبر کہ یہ نیرنگ و سیمیا کیا ہے
ہوا جو خاک سے پیدا وہ خاک میں مستور
مگر یہ غیبتِ صغریٰ ہے یا فنا ؟ کیا ہے ؟
غبارِ راہ کو بخشا گیا ہے ذوقِ جمال
خرد بتا نہیں سکتی کہ مدعا کیا ہے

* * *

غمیں مشو کہ بہ بندِ جہاں گرفتاریم
طلسمہا شکند آں دلے کہ ما داریم [12]

Do not ask me what this fleeting life is,
Nobody knows what is in this change and charm.
He who is born of dust disappears into dust,
But is this parting temporary or complete annihilation ?
Dust from the roadside has an urge for immortality,
Wisdom cannot tell us the object of all this.

* * *

Grieve not that we are prisoners in this universe,
The heart we possess will break through all its magic.

Then suddenly through the darkness of the shadow dawns upon the poet the light of faith in immortality. In spite of all the doubts and terrors, it was intolerable to conceive of a Godless world, whirling through space toward a purposeless annihilation. If the human personality is developed and is strong, death is for man but a trifling ripple

12. Ibid., pp. 244-5.

on the great sea of Being.

خودی ہے زندہ تو ہے موت اک مقامِ حیات
کہ عشق موت سے کرتا ہے امتحانِ ثبات
خودی ہے زندہ تو دریا ہے بیکرانہ ترا
ترے فراق میں مضطر ہے موجِ نیل و فرات
خودی ہے مردہ تو مانندِ کاہ پیشِ نسیم
خودی ہے زندہ تو سلطانِ جملہ موجودات

* * *

مقام بندۂ مومن کا ہے ورائے سپہر
زمیں سے تا بہ ثریا تمام لات و منات
حریمِ ذات ہے اس کا نشیمنِ ابدی
نہ تیرہ خاک لحد ہے نہ جلوہ گاہِ صفات
خود آگہاں کہ ازیں خاک داں بروں جستند
طلسمِ مہر و سپہر و ستارہ بشکستند[13]

If Self is alive then death is but a stage in life,
For love tests its immortality by death.
If Self is living then thy ocean is limitless,
The Nile and the Euphrates are longing to merge in thee !
If Self is dead then it is like grass before the breeze,
If Self is alive then you rule over the universe.

* * *

The position of a *mu'min* is beyond the Heaven,
From Earth to Pleiades all is false and unreal.
His immortal abode is the Throne Divine,
Neither the dark grave, nor this world.
The self-discerning who outsoared this earth,
Have outdone the magic of the sun, the sky and the stars.

The last line brings to our mind the following lines of Goethe written as an epitaph on Schiller's tomb, a few months after his death ;

13. Ibid., pp. 245-6.

Meanwhile his mighty spirit onward pressed,
Where goodness, beauty, truth for ever grow,
And in his shadowing outline, lay
The vulgar which we all, alas, obey.

The loss of his friend was sustained by Iqbāl at a mature age when his views on life, death and immortality had been crystallised ; still the blow came so suddenly and unexpectedly that the poet was baffled, and he started questioning the very purpose of life. This bewilderment and confusion are only an index to the intensity of his grief. The elegy is characterised by deep thoughts expressed in dignified language. Every section, stanza and line of the elegy was wrought to the highest degree of effectiveness which his art could encompass. The central theme is human self, and through bitter reactions and long pauses of uncertainty he works out his conception of immortality and love. Belief in immortality is mentioned in all his elegies, but a reference to the view that immortality is to be attained by us bears a close resemblance to Matthew Arnold's ideas on the subject. In the sonnet entitled "Immortality" he distinctly implied the possibility of survival for souls sufficiently heroic to rise by their inherent spiritual power to eternal life.[14]

In both these threnodies, apart from art and craftsmanship, there are two characteristics of design which deserve mention. As a critic has remarked of Matthew Arnold, Iqbāl does not concentrate his sorrow on the individual but widens his view to human life in general. It is this feature which imparts to both these elegies a universal appeal apart from the charm of art and imagery. Secondly, each poem begins with a statement of the poet's doubts, but as the design develops his verses make a statement of what the poet believes most fervently. The conclusion of both the elegies breathes faith, and yet the interest of both centres not in their conclusion, but in the moods of despair and doubts, through which the ultimate convictions are attained. But there is something still nobler and greater in these

14. Cf. C.B. Tinker and H. F. Lowry, *The Poetry of Matthew Arnold*, London, 1940, pp. 145-6.

elegies than any of the qualities we have noted. There is a spirit and courage, a strength of faith which conquers doubt and darkness, a light of inward hope which burns dauntlessly under the shadow of death. There is a faith which does not ignore doubt and mystery, but triumphs over them. Beneath all the distractions and shadows of a perplexing world, the poet hears a divine undertone, and hearing it he can wait and be at peace.

The elegy on Fāṭimah has charm of its own, mainly because in it the stirrings of the heart of Islam, still bleeding from the onslaughts of Western Imperialism, have found expression. An 'Arab girl was shot dead by Italian soldiers when she was distributing water among the 'Arab troops on the battlefields of Libya. While lamenting her death, Iqbāl describes the feelings of a world-community in the process of resurgence against triumphant Western Imperialism. In lines of rare beauty and great poignancy addressing Fāṭimah, the poet says :

فاطمہ ! تو آبروئے امتِ مرحوم ہے
ذرہ ذرہ تیری مشتِ خاک کا معصوم ہے
یہ سعادت حورِ صحرائی تری قسمت میں تھی
غازیانِ دیں کی سقّائی تری قسمت میں تھی
یہ جہاد اللہ کے رستے میں بے تیغ و سپر
ہے جسارت آفریں شوقِ شہادت کس قدر

* * *

فاطمہ ! گو شبنم افشاں آنکھ تیرے غم میں ہے
نغمۂ عشرت بھی اپنے نالۂ ماتم میں ہے

* * *

ہے کوئی ہنگامہ تیری تربتِ خاموش میں
پل رہی ہے ایک قومِ تازہ اس آغوش میں [15]

Fāṭimah ! you are the honour of this blessed community,
Every particle of thy dust is innocent.
O houri of the desert ! this was an honour destined for thee,
To distribute water amongst God's own warriors.

15. *Bāng-i Darā*, pp. 239-40.

This fighting for God without sword and shield,
How the zest for martyrdom gives one courage!

* * *

Fāṭimah, though the eye is shedding tears in thy grief,
My wails have a note of glee also.

* * *

In thy silent grave tumultuous revolution is rising,
And a new nation is breeding in its wake.

While the elegy is a tirade against modern wars waged against undeveloped countries by European powers with all the modern arms of destruction at their disposal, it also describes the indomitable human spirit, which does not shirk any sacrifice to preserve its freedom. The whole background of the poem, a young unarmed girl engaged in distributing water among her thirsty countrymen, on the burning sands of Cyrenaica, engaged in an unequal fight for the presevation of their freedom against the armed hordes of an invading army, cannot fail to excite feelings of sympathy and admiration in human heart.

The clever use of vowels and consonants along with alliteration, heightens the emotional effect. It will be difficult to find a weak line in the poem. But it is not mere craftsmanship that makes the poem memorable. It is the vision of the poet who sees a comity of nations, sharing spiritual and moral values, finding strength and rising out of the grave of this helpless innocent, unarmed girl shot mercilessly by troops bent on killing the spirit of a resurgent nation that gives significance to the poem. Through image, symbol, and rhythm the silent striving of the communal soul are given expression, such as music alone can give.

Now it is necessary to refer to two narrative poems which, according to the normal classification in Urdu and Persian, cannot be classified as elegies, but which deal with the dead and the mystery of death. They both are remarkable poems and a brief reference to them here will not be out of place.

In *Khuftigān-i Khāk se Istifsār* written quite early in his career, Iqbāl tries to unravel the mystery of life, death and life hereafter

The ideas which later crystallised into regular philosophy are found here in a nebulous from. They represent the yearning of an enquiring spirit to explore the depths of life. The questions with which Iqbāl deals in the poem are those which have baffled humanity from the dawn of creation, and will continue to do so till the end of the world. The poem does not fail to animate us ; it adds zest to our melancholy. The whole poem is exalted by a grand pervading idea, the idea, namely, that we only part to meet.

In 1910, Iqbāl visited Hyderabad (Deccan) and stayed with Sir Akbar and Lady Ḥaidarī. One evening after dinner the party visited the royal graveyard near Golconda. It was a moonlit night, but clouds were about, and the scene was very impressive. Visits to graveyards always evoke thoughts of great poignancy and deep pathos, and this visit in moonlight moved Iqbāl to write the poem. As a work of art it is marvellous, and, strange though it may seem, it can be compared to Gray's great poem *An Elegy Written in a Country Churchyard.* While one deals with a royal graveyard the other deals with a country churchyard, but in death kings and plebeians both meet.

Gray's elegy was written in 1750 and Iqbāl's poem in 1910, but sentiments protrayed in both the poems display a remarkable similarity.

In a stanza dealing with the transitoriness of human life Iqbāl says :

کیا یہی ہے ان شہنشاہوں کی عظمت کا مآل
جن کی تدبیرِ جہانبانی سے ڈرتا تھا زوال
رعبِ فغفوری ہو دنیا میں کہ شانِ قیصری
ٹل نہیں سکتی غنیمِ موت کی یورش کبھی[16]

It is not necessary to translate the above lines. The following stanza from Gray expresses the ideas contained in the above lines beautifully :

16. Ibid., p. 162.

The boast of heraldry, the pomp of power,
And all that beauty, all that wealth e'er gave,
Awaits alike th' inevitable hour :
The paths of glory lead but to the grave.

Sarojini Naidu, the Indian poetess, has described the royal grave-yare at Golconda in the following lines :

In vain, O Kings, doth time aspire,
To make your names oblivion's sport.
While yonder hill wears like a tiara,
The ruined grandeur of your fort.
Though centuries falter and decline,
Your proven strongholds shall remain,
Embodied memories of your line,
Incarnate legends of your reign.

After describing a scene of exquisite beauty and charm on a moonlit night with clouds overhanging against the background of Golconda Fort perched on a high hill, the poet describes the graves and then goes on to refer to the fall of the Kingdom of Golconda and its significance in the history of the human race. The reference to the history of nations, their rise and fall, serves to awaken our attention and grips our interest.

اس زیاں خانے میں کوئی ملتِ گردوں وقار
رہ نہیں سکتی ابد تک بارِ دوشِ روزگار
اس قدر قوموں کی بربادی سے ہے خوگر جہاں
دیکھتا بے اعتنائی سے ہے یہ منظر جہاں

* * *

مصر و بابل مٹ گئے باقی نشاں تک بھی نہیں
دفترِ ہستی میں ان کی داستاں تک بھی نہیں
آ دبایا مہرِ ایراں کو اجل کی شام نے
عظمتِ یونان و روما لوٹ لی ایام نے[17]

17. Ibid., pp. 163-4.

In this house, where one only loses, no nation how mighty,
Can continue to dominate for ever.
The world is so used to the annihilation of nations,
That it looks on at the process with indifference.

* * * *

Ancient Egypt and Babylon have disappeared leaving no signs,
The book of existence does not contain their story.
The evening of annihilation has overtaken the sun of Iran,
Times have robbed Greece and Rome of their greatness.

Thus it will be seen that Iqbāl's elegies will be classed by all students with the best elegiac poetry of the world for their artistic beauty and charm. But apart from craftsmanship there is something nobler and greater in these elegies—the spiritual courage and faith which conquer doubts and darkness. It is this quality which imparts to them the universal appeal which is characteristic of all great poetry. They serve to buoy up a man's courage to face great personal disasters with fortitude and faith.

January 1958